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Abstract 
The macroscopic picture of China today is highly contradictory: on the one hand there is an explicit 
scenario of modernisation initiated by the government and developing in unexpected depth and rapidity, 
and on the other hand an implicit but unrecognised scenario of democratisation nurtured by modernisation 
and actively involving different social forces. Due to the intensifying social problems – and perhaps even 
social crisis – that accompany the many transformations, such as the restructuring relationship between 
Party-state, society and individuals and the changing culture and value system, remarkable contentious 
activities have been launched by a wide range of social actors striving for their rights and interests. 
Underneath the dynamic character of contentions in China, this research will try to test the normative and 
ethical presumption that contentious politics promotes both robust civil society and representative 
government – the substance of democracy. I examine the contentious actions of the three significant social 
groups - the labourers, intellectuals and religious groups - and the Party-state responses to their politics, 
which are largely co-optation, toleration and control-repression. I also examine the important dynamic 
between centre and province with regard to their responses. My methods of documentation, interviewing 
and internet content analysis have been adopted in order to study these contentions and Party-state 
responses. The thesis concludes that the relationships between Party-state, society and individuals are 
restructured in contentions and interactions driven by modernisation. There are mounting democratic 
pressures and open demands from people with an increasing political consciousness, which challenge 
authority to different extents all over the country and will lead to China‘s democratisation in both bottom-
up and top-down directions.  
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Chapter 1– Introduction 
1.1 An intellectual curiosity 
In October 2007, at the 17
th
 National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) new 
national objectives were announced which were to build a strong, prosperous, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious and modernised socialist country (Xinhua News, 2007). The 
official statement integrated the most recently announced doctrines of the ‗Three Represents‘ 
and the ‗Harmonious Society‘ and was evidence of the CPC‘s confidence that the emerging 
discourses at home and abroad regarded China as a rising global power.  
This statement of objectives not only conceptualises an overarching blueprint designated and 
delivered by ‗the great leadership‘– the Communist Party – but it also accentuates a confident 
transition from the prospects, promises and ideology to the realities of China. Besides being 
up-to-date and emphasising modernisation and harmony, this statement underlines the basic 
nature of the regime as socialist and democratic to signify its ideological continuity. But are 
these claims only valid in the CPC‘s own terms or are they universally accepted? 
As for modernisation, no one will disagree that there is an abundance of evidence that China 
has made historic achievements in its economic development as well as in social and cultural 
progress and thus in its prosperity and civilisation. The concept of modernity, however, is 
inevitably bound up with ideology and power relations and China needs to explore its own 
developmental path (Fewsmith, 2001: 117). The brief three decades of reform and opening up 
since 1978 are also divided into different eras. In particular, it can be argued that after 1992, 
during Jiang Zemin‘s era, China took a path that charged at full speed towards modernism or 
even capitalism rather than socialism. It did so by prioritising marketisation and privatisation 
while de-emphasising communist ideals. In Hu Jintao‘s era, such opinions were more 
balanced and there was a re-emphasis on socialism with a top-down ideology as well as 
policies regarding ‗sustainable development‘ and a ‗harmonious society‘. Some have 
suggested that China has even developed along the lines of – and modelled itself as – a 
‗Beijing Consensus‘ as an alternative to the ‗Washington Consensus‘ for developing countries 
(Ramo, 2004). Though there are claims as to the success of ‗socialism with Chinese 
characteristics‘, this still falls short of the expectations of both the populace and academics 
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because of unsolved or emerging problems and the cost of reform, which can never be 
underestimated, concealed or ignored.  
With regard to political and institutional aspects, the Party-state rhetoric of building up the 
Chinese characteristics of a socialist democracy has faced fiercer criticism over time. Until 
the early 21
st
 century China was still categorised as an ‗unfree‘ state in world politics, where 
citizens‘ human rights and liberties were systematically curtailed or denied (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 2001: 64). Such arguments, supported by evidence of ongoing human rights 
violations, corruption and abuses of power, contribute to the unsettling puzzle of how China 
can sustain its rapid economic progress without substantial political reform, such as 
democratisation. In fact, the Party-state led practice of evolving political relations, such as 
village committee elections, intra-party democracy, legal reform, addressing social justice 
and welfare, internet consultations and public hearings, has been emerging and apparently 
contextualised by special Chinese conditions. The increasing amount of political 
transformation taking place in China has led to questions as to whether it is still possible to 
simply label China undemocratic. This has resulted in continual energetic intellectual efforts 
both inside and outside China trying to characterise the Chinese regime as neo-
authoritarianism (Petracca and Xiong, 1990), post-Communism (Cook and Murray, 2001), 
incremental democracy (Yu, 2002), constitutional democracy (Y. Zheng, 2008) or 
deliberative dictatorship (Leonard, 2008). This has also stimulated a more fundamental 
controversy over how to define democracy in China in a way that distinguishes it from the 
dominant Western definition (Nathan, 2008; Zhao, 2000). 
The drives behind such pro-democratic practice and observable involvement in political 
system in China are also different from its Western counterparts. According to the classic 
theory development promotes democracy (Huntington, 1968, 1991; Lipset, 1959, 1960) and, 
in the practice of the established democracies, economic growth produces an educated and 
entrepreneurial middle class who, sooner or later, begin to demand political rights and 
participation in the form of civil society organisations, which will undermine repressive 
governments (Mesquita and Downs, 2005). On the other hand is the development of a market 
economy and capitalism, and the effective use of resources that require free multiple decision 
making, independent property ownership and citizenship, and a whole network of 
independent processes of scrutiny, justification, transparency and accountability of which 
 9 
democracy, in the sense of representative government, is crucial (Hutton, 2008). However, 
the Chinese practice seems a mix of these deductions.  
China also has an emerging civil society, but according to Western standards, it appears to be 
neither forming organisations that enjoy full autonomy and independence nor working as a 
check and balance to the state. China has a growing middle class and wealthy class, yet it can 
be suggested that greater wealth alone does not automatically lead to greater political 
freedom and democracy. In certain circumstances, the regime can reap the benefits of 
economic development and legitimise its political control. A new conceptual framework with 
both practical feasibility and theoretical adaptability is then needed to connect modernisation 
and democratisation in China. This thesis begins with such an academic curiosity and inquiry.  
 
1.2 Background 
The CPC came into power through revolution – the anti-federalist, anti-imperialist, anti-
colonialist revolution – to free its people from a century of humiliated and chaotic history. 
After 1949, under Party-state hegemony and revolutionary-style rule, much emphasis was put 
on unity, uniformity, centralisation, egalitarianism and collectivism. The all-embracing 
impact of the CPC was felt as it became embedded in almost all aspects of people‘s lives, 
from ideological, political, economic, social and cultural to organisational practice. However, 
within the homogenised, totalitarian and introverted society, there was still a great, conscious 
or unconscious, both top-down and bottom-up demand for change, for pluralism, 
individuality, autonomy and liberation. Deng Xiaoping‘s great decision to reform, open up 
and liberate the thoughts could be successfully and efficiently put into action only because it 
acknowledged and met the public demand at the time. As a result, this reform has become 
China‘s second revolution, resulting in a market economy, global competition and the 
development of high technology and telecommunication. The market has replaced central 
planning as the dominant mechanism of resource allocation. There is a separation of 
government functions from enterprise management. More autonomy, incentives and revenue-
raising powers have been offered to local governments during the process of decentralisation. 
As the interconnection between China and the world deepens, different actors and agents 
from outside China, whether corporative, collective, national or international in nature, have 
strengthened their mutual communication and participation in the trend towards globalisation.  
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Such economic liberation and exchange has multifaceted political, social and cultural 
implications: the old totalitarian mode of control, in which the state absolutely controls 
society, has gradually eroded. Both decentralisation and institutionalisation have stimulated 
and shaped the significant dimensions of reform programs such as village elections, 
educational and legal reforms in reaction to people‘s growing demands for more political and 
social rights, legal guarantees and geographic mobility. There is a further separation between 
the party and the government, an empowerment of the National People‘s Congress and an 
opening up of public spaces for civic associations (Lin, 2006: 3). Economic development and 
improved quality of life are also important for the growth of civil society in diversifying 
social roles and sustaining associational relationships. Information and ideas can be shared 
and exchanged in an external globalising network through high-tech communication tools, 
most notably the internet. The once floating, marginalised, unofficial, informal, alien, ignored, 
underground and minor voices are now making their demands heard by insisting that they are 
allowed to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and freedom and to be guaranteed their 
individuality. These institutional changes, openness and pluralism have enabled different 
social groups to gain a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the Party-state, and have been 
regarded as opportunities for broader social participation and expression. 
On the other hand, the problems of modernisation deeply shape the transitional process itself. 
China is becoming a heterogeneous society, not as harmonious as officially propagated, but 
contradictory in many aspects. The main contradiction is the conflicting co-existence of both 
an old and a new China during the modernising process, which inevitably generates and 
intensifies a diversity of political, economic and social-cultural problems, such as polarisation, 
corruption and a mutual penetration of political and economic power (Fewsmith, 2001: 113). 
Inequality and injustice can turn into threats to people‘s lives and rights and easily trigger 
people‘s grievances. Contentions will then take place in reaction to problems, which will 
palpably lead to social unrest and demand a decent official response.  
There is an increasing amount of remarkable contentious activity all over the country 
including appeals, petitions, publications, sit-ins, demonstrations, rallies, parades, campaigns, 
strikes, riots, violent attacks and confrontations and so on. The actors range from farmers, 
urban workers, residents, migrants, students, scholars, entrepreneurs, religious groups and 
dissidents to officials, taking individual, organisational or collective form. Although not all 
protests are political, or have democracy as their goal, they have truly challenged the Party-
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state to different extents. The protests do have the potential to accelerate China‘s transition to 
a more democratic and liberal regime by striving for people‘s rights and interests as well as 
expanding their impact in spite of the government‘s restriction, persecution and repression. 
When ongoing unrest becomes an urge for the people and an alert to the Party-state, the 
authorities start to realise that China could face greater political, social and economic 
instability if they do not change their repressive strategies, acknowledge people‘s desire for 
democracy or push for democratisation themselves (Moore, 2008).  
The background to this research is that the achievements and transformations during 
modernisation, and the problems of the uneven transitional status within this authority-led 
process, provide opportunities and triggers for an expanding arena of expression, 
participation, mobilisation and contention. This activism, which is both shaped by and 
dynamically shaping the Party-state responses, is directing China towards a robust civil 
society, a more representative government and a democratic transformation of the political 
system. 
 
1.3 Identifying Topic and Statement of Significance 
The macroscopic picture of China is that of an explicit scenario of modernisation at high 
speed, with an uneven distribution of wealth and social goods on one hand and an implicit 
scenario of democratisation contributed by different social forces on the other. This research, 
embedded in the background settings and processes of Chinese modernisation, will 
investigate the complex circumstances and prospects of Chinese democratisation in-depth. It 
will do so by examining the contentious activities of different social forces and the respective 
governmental reactions, and seek to establish lessons for democratic transitions from the 
restructuring of state-society-individual interactions.  
The contentious nature of politics in contemporary China is the thematic focus of this 
research, which addresses the question of how the contentions are driven by modernisation 
and how they may lead to democratisation. Empirically and analytically I have chosen three 
contentious groups – labourers, intellectuals and religious groups –examined their interplay 
with the Party-state and presented my finding as case studies, which provide a comprehensive 
discussion at the macro, meso and micro level in order to capture the dynamics of a 
transforming individual-society-state relationship from contention to democratisation. 
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This research seeks to contribute to both the literature and the actual practice during China‘s 
contemporary transitional period for the following reasons. Firstly, studying contentious 
politics is important not only because it is emerging, growing and expanding quickly all over 
China, but also because it signifies new, unconventional, different and oppositional 
expressions and actions. These types of contention have enormous implications for China‘s 
political democratisation, which begins with a tolerance of and then a co-existence with 
different voices. How the contentious groups and activities challenge the limits of tolerance 
and demand a response from the authorities is not only phenomenal but also conducive to 
greater political transitions, and, potentially, democratisation. This indicates the intellectual 
curiosity set out at the beginning, i.e., that contentious politics can be the connecting point 
between modernisation and democratisation under China‘s conditions. This is the insight that 
is derived from this empirical study. 
Secondly, my research on contentious politics has adopted a people-oriented approach. Its 
emphasis on the strength of the people is demonstrated by the interviews conducted with the 
people in order to gather their concepts, evaluations and attitudes towards modernisation and 
its problems, towards social organisations and networks, and towards varied contentions and 
Party-state responses. The range of people engaging in the research also covers a diversity of 
contentious social groups, from labourers and intellectuals to religious groups. It is of great 
practical significance to record and analyse the power of people to push forward political 
transitions. This reflects the renaissance of people‘s self-consciousness to act against the 
abuse of power and social injustice, and act as subjects and agents in their own life and in 
pushing forth historical change. This study will also contribute to the literature on civil 
society and social movements in China from the perspective of contentious politics and the 
people.  
The involvement of individuals according to political science in classic state-society relations 
underlines an input of individuality and citizenship into the political power structures, a 
positioning of the active role of discursive and cultural framing at the micro level and a 
combination of two directions of contentions: a breaking down of defending public rights 
resulting in individual rights, and a congregating of individual demands into organisational 
networks and public voices. This displays both conceptual and methodological innovation. 
Theoretically, the integration of individual and microscopic mobilisation into the bigger 
picture of contentious politics and the provision of a two-way dimension into the analysis 
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framework can better capture the dynamics of interactions between different actors, or parties, 
at different levels. Empirically, the in-depth interviews, internet content analysis and case 
studies data collected in the field enriches the research findings and discussion and leads to a 
more comprehensive and confident conclusion.  
 
1.4 Hypotheses and Questions 
According to the research theme and topics, three hypotheses are proposed for the particular 
case of contemporary China as we examine the role of contentious politics in promoting 
robust civil society and representative government – the substance of democracy. These are 
the practical inquiries into the visible causes and the predictable futures of the contentions. 
They are developed in accordance with the theoretical framework and its formulation of 
macro opportunity structure, meso mobilising structure and micro strategic structure.  
H1: Contentious politics is modernisation-driven 
H1 is proposed on the basis that all of the micro grievances and struggles that trigger 
particular contentions are attached to the macro structural problems. As stated in Section 1.2, 
a vast range of opportunities for the growing contentions has been opened up by China‘s 
modernisation and economic liberation, its engagement with the world, the pluralisation of 
social roles, groups and cultures, the enlargement of the public sphere and the increase in 
public consciousness and public demands. On the other hand, the problems and distortions 
generated by the reforms, including corruption, polarisation, unemployment, insecurity and 
so on, indicate the institutional contradictions and deficiencies of the reforms, and have 
ultimately become the chief causes of collective grievances leading to numerous contentious 
activities.  
H1 is required in order to investigate two research questions, Q1 and Q2: 
Q1: What are the social changes, along with social problems, that are emerging and 
intensifying in China‘s modernisation process? 
This question is not only the crucial starting point for an inquiry into Chinese modernisation 
but it is also an opportunity for reflecting on other variables that are important for 
democratisation. Since China shares some of the characteristics of pre-modern, modern and 
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post-modern societies, this makes the transition from a traditional phase to modernity more 
complicated. The challenges facing the government and the people, caused by an internal 
vacuum of value systems and an external network of information sharing, are increasingly 
severe. The current research uses in-depth interviews as the main method to discover how 
individuals and different social groups view and describe the modernisation process and its 
attendant problems in terms of their political, economic and social-cultural aspects.  
Q2: How are the changes and problems of China‘s modernisation process transformed into 
the drivers behind contentious actions? 
There is also a greater need to find out how individuals and groups themselves perceive 
measure and evaluate the opportunities and threats of the modernisation process as realistic 
motivations for contentious activities. People engage in contentious activities of expression 
when given more opportunities, more freedom and larger space, or of resistance when faced 
with threats, deprived of certain rights, repressed, or in a combination of both types of 
contentious activities. The cultural implications of social change, media interpretation and 
personal experiences are the keys to evaluating and attributing the opportunities and threats 
faced by people. It is therefore necessary to explore popular trends in how people perceive 
opportunities and threats in response to changing social realities and problems. These trends 
are the drivers that transform objective social change into subjective grievances and real 
contentions.  
 
H2: Civil society is both the origin and destination of contentious politics 
Civil society is a significant concept and practice in relation to modernisation, contention and 
democratisation. It is also the mediated sphere between Party-state and individuality. To build 
up connections between civil society and contentious politics is by no means an easy task. 
Theoretically civil society is the organisational basis and setting for contentions, and in the 
long term contentions will increase individuals‘ awareness of their rights, be bounded by civil 
virtues and directed by the rule of law, and change into a robust system of checks and 
balances on the state. Based on this assumption, H2 proposes that civil society is both the 
origin and the destination of contentious politics. However, this hypothesis is arguable under 
China‘s special condition. This hypothesis seeks to help answer two questions, Q3 and Q4: 
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Q3: How does civil society develop with Chinese characteristics? 
To answer this question I again used interviews to collect information about people‘s 
membership of and participation in civil society organisations (CSOs) in China. I also 
focussed on their opinions and attitudes toward different cleavages that are influential in 
organisational operation and mobilisation and on their own informal networking resources as 
well as on state interference. Another type of civil society involvement is found in online 
activism in cyberspace, which reflects an expansion of the public sphere
1
 to some degree. To 
encompass all these activities, I define civil society in China as comprising SCOs, informal 
networks and the online public sphere. The Chinese characteristics of civil society will be 
demonstrated by the degree of freedom of affiliation enjoyed, the propensity of people to 
participate, the type of organisation people participate in, the density of social network spaces, 
the effect of state involvement and the structural potentials, as well as any deficit of civil 
society. 
Q4: How is civil society related to contentious politics? 
Firstly, a subsidiary question should be asked: is civil society in fact the origin of contentious 
politics? Since mobilising structures for contentions refer to both formal and informal 
networks, I will look at how the organisational and networking resources available to a 
Chinese characterised civil society can generate necessary social appropriation of mobilising 
structures for people to take contentious activities. Since civil society organisations, networks 
and cyberspace are all in development and overlapping with each other, I will also reflect on 
the potential coherence and fragmentation of civil society based on the nature, processes and 
consequences of contentions.  
Secondly, is civil society the destination of contentious politics? The answer to this question 
will prove or disprove part of the theme – whether contentious politics will promote a robust 
civil society. It is important to study the dynamics between the two through the lens of 
interaction among the individual-society-state relationship, and whether the strong private 
sphere of informal networking or the spontaneous cyber activism can be contained, subjected 
and destined to mature civil society.  
                                                        
1 Habermas (1989) originally described the public sphere as strictly a ‗bourgeois‘ public sphere, the sphere of private people 
who join together to form a ‗public‘, to indicate a new opening in the social and political fabric of Europe during the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Here I adopted a more generalised definition in the contemporary context that the public sphere has been 
significantly altered by the internet, which I will further elaborate in chapters 2 and 7. 
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H3: Contentious politics will lead to representative governance and 
democracy. 
This is the main assumption of the thesis and requires a large collection of empirical evidence 
with theoretical support. The final aim or potential outcome of this project is to identity the 
prospects of contentious politics to a pro-democracy course in China after reviewing and 
sifting the vast scope of contentious activities and evaluating their interplay with the Party-
state. I work out a two-way flow of discussion: 1) from the macro opportunity structure and 
meso-level mobilisation to record the micro framing of contentions; and 2) from the 
contentious interaction between different groups of people and the authorities, which is 
taking place at a grassroots level in order to generalise their implications for the macro 
transformation of government and political system. H3 will help explore two questions, Q5 
and Q6: 
Q5: What are the features and trends of contentions of different social groups? 
Contentious activities can be researched at the meso and micro level by mobilising structure 
and the cultural framework to identify organisational resources as well as emotional, moral 
and cognitive triggers for the dynamics of contention (McAdam et al, 1996, 2001; Jasper, 
1999). The subjects targeted in this research fall into three social groups – labourers, 
intellectuals, and religious groups – and they are selected depending on their unique attributes 
and positions in the changing society, their tendency to express their grievances, their 
associational bases, their frequency of taking action and their influences. 
Firstly, labourers consist of peasants, workers and migrant workers who have been 
marginalised and disadvantaged due to a lack of opportunity and distribution inequalities 
during the reform era and the restructuring of social stratification. Besides the miserable life 
experience of numerous deprived farmers and laid-off workers, tens of millions of migrant 
workers from rural to urban cities live precarious lives with irregular employment, poor 
wages and working conditions, and an absence of social welfare. However, these 
unprivileged labourers are beginning to constitute an active social force in the civil society by 
forming associational networks offering mutual aid, friendship and solidarity. The demands 
of labourers have become increasingly concrete, for instance, with regard to compensation on 
land requisition, social security for re-employment and pensions. They also disapprove of the 
large income gap, corruption and all kinds of social injustice. Their protests, often resulting in 
riots, are mainly for economic purposes, welfare and medical care, children‘s education, local 
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politics and environmental issues; moreover, the authorities have recently paid greater 
attention and surveillance to these ‗collective actions‘ (a delicate phrase rather than a protest-
related vocabulary delivered by the governmental media). Although white-collar workers are 
categorised as labourers, their form and trajectory of contentions are largely different from 
that of the peasants, laid-off workers or migrant workers. Cyber activism is also one feature 
of their contentions. 
Secondly, the intellectual group, regarded as having the power of knowledge in this 
Information Age, contain students and scholars in higher education institutions and 
universities, academic elites in all fields, writers and freelancers. This group of dissidents, 
both at home and aboard, usually have gained advanced education, been sensitive and 
responsive to the changing world, had a more substantial understanding of democracy and 
attached much more importance to freedom of speech and publication, which is never fully 
enjoyed in China under the strict authoritarian censorship. All these factors determine that 
they have the potential to be a tower of strength in Chinese civil society and the public sphere 
in a broad sense. Their contentions are likely to be deliberatively social-political, pro-
democratic or nationalist. Noticeably the internet has become a new and popular battlefield 
for intellectuals. They, together with a growing number of white-collar workers, are pioneers 
in this new arena of internet contentions. 
Thirdly, religious groups here mainly comprise the underground churches and fellowships 
and religion-related associations, which are excluded from governmental religious networks, 
and who are repressed rigidly and persecuted ruthlessly at times. As a socially and morally 
reforming force, religion is spreading quickly in China both in quantity and in quality by way 
of the internet and other methods of modern media and involving people of all regions and all 
kinds of groups, professions, status and hierarchies. Unauthorised churches have been built 
up in many parts of the country and unofficial religious practice has flourished in recent years,  
even though the Chinese Government places restrictions on religious practice outside its 
officially recognised organisations (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Their grievance comes 
from the fact that the government is violating their religious freedom, but rather than passive 
tolerance, they‘ve also taken non-violent actions to protest and they‘ve appealled to the 
international community for help. Contentious activities from religious group in China have 
the unique nature of combining religious movement with civil society mobilisation and so 
they witness a more exterior influence from the global faith-based communities. 
 18 
The empirical studies conducted for this thesis, which include interviews, internet content 
analysis and case studies on the contentious activities of the three groups, will provide rich 
resources for further discussion and characterisation of the causes and effects, features and 
trends of micro contentions. 
Q6: How does the Party-state respond to different contentions and how can we evaluate such 
state-society-individual interactions? 
The state would show different faces to different challengers and may be more or less 
inclined to support or suppress particular movements (Tarrow, 1996: 41-61) with regards to 
its special interests and to impose its legitimacy and authority over the country. White et al 
(1996: 1-38) argue that the state has practiced 3 strategies – co-optation, toleration and 
repression – to cope with civil society organisations; a similar mechanism also applies to the 
context of contentions. For example, in the case of the patriotic movements with nationalist 
emotions, such as anti-America or anti-Japan or anti-Taiwan independence protests, the 
government would cooperate with the actors and organisations, and even provide material 
support in order to guide the pace of the action to achieve their own goals. In the case of the 
single-event or small-scale regional protests, with similar-background actors, the government 
would to some extent tolerate and try to appease people‘s dissatisfaction and relieve their 
grievances. However, with the cross-regional, cross-group and large-scale movements or 
political dissidents, the authorities would not hesitate to repress them as can be seen in the 
case of the 1989 pro-democracy students‘ movement and the 1999 Falun Gong spiritual 
movement. Yet, there is a fluid variation and combination of different Party-state strategies 
from time to time. 
Another significant fact is that the central and local governments react differently to the 
contentious activities. When it comes to carrying out the policies or commands from the 
centre, the local governments, in fact, have created their own space to bargain for the regional 
profits and some even overtly agree but are covertly opposed to the central instruction. The 
responses also differentiate from place to place depending on the regional development of 
economy, politics and society. It is evident that there is an emergence of real grassroots civic 
discourse and contentious activities wherein events at the local level can affect political 
leadership. There is then a possibility of a mutual dialogue between leaders and citizens 
rather than a strictly top-down communicative interaction between the Chinese central 
government and its people and within the government among its various branches or 
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competing factions (Powers and Kluver, 1999). On the other hand, local officials may prevent 
local grievances from appealing to the higher levels of government and take revenge on those 
who blow the whistles. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate these individual-society-state interactions, one should take 
into account both the effectiveness of state strategies and the cohesion between the central 
and local state towards social and individual contentions. The strategic governmental 
responses inevitably have both positive and negative influences on the multifaceted 
development of diverse contentious activities. Studying in detail the interplay between the 
two and treating the whole process as having a circular, dynamic and progressive continuity 
would definitely help with understanding prospective mechanisms for transitional pro-
democracy movements. Thus the study of Party-state response is directly related to the other 
part of the theme – whether contentious politics will promote a representative government. 
 
1.5 Research Outline 
A brief overview of the structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 is an introduction of 
the research background, topic, hypotheses and questions. In chapter 2 the thesis will 
establish an over-arching theoretical framework by introducing the three-level model of 
contention: 1) opportunity structure and social attribution at the macro level, 2) mobilising 
resource and social appropriation at the meso level and 3) strategic framing and social 
construction at the micro level; and by re-theorising the interaction and power transition 
among the spheres of Party-state, civil society and individuality. Based on the paradigms for 
the research and methodological design, chapter 3 will demonstrate the main methods of 
interviewing, internet content analysis and documentation. In-depth interviews were carefully 
designed to involve all the important elements of the research enquiries. Internet content 
analysis in particular is used to analyse the details of different online cases of contentious 
events and debates. Documentation is in general required to search for related information 
from a wide range of sources including books, journals, magazines, newspapers, websites, 
and documentaries. There will not be a literature-review chapter, since different literature has 
been reviewed and discussed in the following empirical and analytical chapters. 
Chapters 4 to 9 are based on a combination of interview results, case studies and a wide range 
of documents. In relation to Q1 and Q2, Chapter 4 will portray the popular conceptualisation 
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of social-political-economic problems and indicates the social opportunities and threats that 
may trigger contentions. Relative to Q3, Chapter 5 will characterise the development of civil 
society organisations and compare the networking and organisational resources for 
contentions. In order to answer Q4 and Q5, Chapters 6 to 8 respectively focus on the three 
groups‘ contentions and illuminates the causes of their grievances, the way they mobilise and 
the strategies in which they frame contentions. Each chapter will conclude with the role civil 
society (organisation, networking or cyberspace) has played in contentious politics. In 
relation to Q6, Chapter 9 will record the Party-state responses to each group by co-optation, 
toleration and control and also examines the important dynamic between the central and local 
state. Chapter 10 will be the conclusion to summarise the whole thesis, and concludes with 
the results of the test on the hypotheses and answers to the research questions. 
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
As the thesis title states, this research examines the prospects for China‘s democratisation 
during the process of modernisation through an investigation of the contentious politics 
pursued by different groups in China and the responses of the Party-state at all levels. China 
is currently passing through two paths simultaneously: one is modernisation, a vigorously 
government-sponsored process according to grand design along with unavoidable non-
governmental spontaneity, whilst the other is democratisation understood as a significant 
aspect of the political transformation in a more vaguely and markedly fluctuating process. 
Modernisation is regarded as the broad background and an irresistible trend indicating the 
reality in China. This great, though often ungoverned, transformation from traditional to 
modern society and civilisation, is a big opportunity and challenge for the state, society and 
the individuals, which results in the dynamic and contentious activities of different groups. 
Meanwhile, the power transition among three spheres – Party-state, civil society and private 
sphere – resulting in contentious politics is the key to understanding the process of 
democratisation in China. Contention can then be considered as the connecting point between 
modernisation and democratisation through its reshaping of the individual-society-state 
relationship. The macro, meso and micro levels of mechanism are required to contour a 
comprehensive picture of contentious politics.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical basis for the hypotheses and research 
questions in the introduction chapter and to establish a theoretical framework in order to 
describe the dynamics of modernisation, contention and democratisation. The structure of the 
discussion will begin with a clarification of key words followed by an analytical model to 
demonstrate the flows between contentious politics and democratisation.  
 
2.2 Key Words 
To do the analytical modelling, the prerequisite step is to identify and clarify some of the 
most important concepts from the perspective of political sociology with reference to the 
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special circumstances in China. There are four key words requiring explanation: 
modernisation, democratisation, contention and the Party-State response. 
 
2.2.1 Modernisation 
Modernisation is understood as changes resulting directly or indirectly from the industrial, 
technological and scientific revolutions (Moody, 1995: 3). In China the discourse of 
modernisation has replaced that of revolution but brought along with it the revolutionary 
impacts on Chinese state, society and individuals. He Chuanqi (1999) extended the definition 
of modernisation to, ‗Two-Phase Modernisation Theory‘ by identifying the two phases of the 
modernisation process from the 18
th
 century to the 21
st
 century. First-Phase Modernisation is 
the process of the transformation from agricultural to industrial society, economy and 
civilisation, whilst Second-Phase Modernisation is from industrial to knowledge-based 
society, economy and civilisation. The achievements in China‘s modernisation process, 
including the dramatic economic growth and social-cultural development, have stunned the 
world. However, China still shares the characteristics of both phases and has agriculture, 
industrial and knowledge societies co-existing, which makes the transitions from tradition to 
modernity more complicated and uneven. 
Firstly, the remaining agricultural society, much of which is in isolated, remote and in 
underdeveloped areas (in the West and Northwest of China and within the ethnic minorities‘ 
communities) is resistant, consciously or unconsciously, to the industrialisation procedures 
and is unfamiliar with modern organisations. This shares most of the characteristics of 
Gemeinschaft, a concept of the traditional societal entity established by Ferdinand Tonnies 
(1925 in Cahnman and Heberle, 1971). Fei Xiaotong (1947) also illustrates that interpersonal 
relationships in traditional China take the centre of self, emphasises the blood, family and 
native ties, and reflects Confucian ethics and the allocation of natural resources in the private 
sphere. Culture is stable and fixed in this society, and is a highly significant independent 
variable, with traditional values rooted in people‘s minds, customs, language and behaviour, 
and it influences political-economic-social developments and activities. However, the 
symbolic and ethnic dimension of the cultural tradition, the social space of integrated groups 
and the continuity of successive generations, are under great pressure from the emergence 
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and intrusion of modernity and reformation; there is a potential breakdown in the social 
solidarity of traditional Chinese society (Kerr, 2009). 
Secondly, the Chinese version of Gesellschaft (Tonnies, 1925, in Cahnman and Heberle, 
1971), an industrial society, the modern counterpart of Gemeinschaft, is still under 
construction as modernisation proceeds. Within this modernising society, it can obviously be 
observed that the retreat of state power from economy, mobility and other social welfare 
arenas, the diversity of culture with looser ideological control, the emergence of village 
elections and grassroots associations, the construction of domestic legal system and the 
integration into international treaties and laws and rules, all demonstrate China‘s passive and 
positive adaptation to the transforming economic, social and cultural realities. However, there 
are cumulative and intersectional problems at this stage. First, urbanisation and 
industrialisation takes place where traditional networking and the private/family sphere still 
occupy a concentrated power and dominance within the individual-society-state relationship. 
Second, the problems from the rapid transformation of industrial society itself, such as the 
environmental crisis and poor-rich polarity, have been prevailing, which projects an 
impression that the a few privileged individuals enjoy the fruits of reform whilst a majority 
bear the costs.  
Thirdly, the knowledge-based society naturally plays its role of vanguard in the national and 
international currency, and the CPC also commits itself as the representative of the most 
advanced productivity by promoting ‗informationalisation‘ as a leading and crucial part of the 
grand course of modernisation. The internet has speedily entered into people‘s daily life not 
only as a medium for information exchange, a platform for interpersonal communication and 
an absorber and emitter of novelties but also as a lifestyle choice for the new generation. In 
the knowledge-based society, where the popularity of postmodernism and critical perspective 
has penetrated academia, public ethos and social movements, stable and fixed culture does 
not exist anymore. Furthermore, there is a microscopic contextual view of how people and 
groups attempt to further their own interests and jostle for domination by maintaining 
institutional status quo or promoting change
2
. The emergence of heterogeneous cultural 
contexts, contents and discourses are random and unpredictable, and include an increasing 
                                                        
2 This discussion is indebted to the paper ‗Production and Consumption of Chineseness in International Business Studies‘ 
delivered by Can-Seng Ooi at the ChinaWorld International Conference on ‗Made in China vs. Made by Chinese: Global 
Identities of Chinese Business‘, 19-20 March 2007, Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, Durham University, UK. 
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prevalence of contentions with sentiments of anti-society, anti-authority, cynicism, scepticism 
and radicalism. 
The co-existence of the above-mentioned characteristic of society occurs in the contemporary 
Chinese context. The Communist Party-state has set the ‗Three Represents‘ and the 
‗Harmonious Society‘ as two official pillars in order to direct the modernisation process. It 
claims it has defined the core task as improving people‘s quality of life and representing the 
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of Chinese people with positivist and 
functionalist perspectives. The authorities have made strenuous efforts to integrate and 
transform the less developed status of society towards a more advanced one through gradual 
reforms whilst also keeping conflicts to a minimum. However, in practice the ambition and 
grand project of integrating the three societal statuses into a grand harmonious society 
encounters various contentions from the borders and from different conflicting zones of the 
three societies. The character of modernisation in China then becomes the biggest drive 
behind the contemporary contentious politics. 
 
2.2.2 Democratisation 
It is predicted that modernisation, especially economic development and liberalisation, will 
lead to political liberalisation and, eventually, democracy. However, the case of China has 
illustrated so far that development may not lead to democracy and an authoritarian state can 
even be considered a better political system to promote prosperity. Democratisation refers to 
the way, and process in which, democratic norms, institutions and practices are evolving and 
disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries (Hauss, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the definition of democracy is crucial to clarify the meaning of democratisation 
in the context of reforming China. This requires appreciation of China‘s particular 
characteristics and its own conceptualisations.  
There is general agreement that democracy means ‗rule by the people‘ and the liberal view of 
‗the people‘ is all-inclusive, individualist and plural. However, the Chinese Constitution and 
its official ideology still holds firm to the ideal of socialist democracy, which refers to the 
political system using the two seemingly self-contradictory terms: democratic dictatorship 
and democratic centralism. The former term is the outcome and the continuation of the class 
struggle between the people and the enemy classes since ‗the people‘ refers both to the ruling 
 25 
classes and is also a collective or community-centred entity that transcends the interests of its 
individual members (Ding, 2002: 5). The latter term is the theoretical base for the 
organisation of the Communist Party of China (CPC), defined by Lenin, as allowing Party 
members the freedom of discussion but insisting on unity in action once a decision has been 
reached. Although it was supposed to provide balance between grassroots input and executive 
power, in practice centralism was stressed as far more important than democracy (Hunter and 
Sexton, 1999: 102). This mainstream statement of socialistic democracy is a transformation 
driven by both bottom-up challenges and top-down reconstruction. As a result, there are 
certain differences, divergences and competitions among popular, intellectual and official 
interpretations of democracy. 
The popular demand for democracy in China appears in the public‘s growing consciousness, 
voices, actions and powers in defending and protecting their private rights, which publicises 
such efforts for public rights and for better governance. The contention of the people is in 
itself an interpretation of democracy in action.  
As for intellectuals, the ideas influenced by Western-style liberal democracy, which is based 
on a self-conscious dualism that distinguishes between state and society and on a multi-party 
election system, have been on the retreat and been shared mainly among dissidents abroad 
since Tiananmen in 1989. The present situation with numerous cases of poor human rights 
records, repression of contentious activities, violation of religious and press freedom, rampant 
institutional corruption, benefit-driven value system and moral decay have disappointed 
many of these democracy advocates. On the other hand, most domestic academics remain 
optimistic and have developed the concept of democracy as related to the implicitly 
recognised expansion of autonomous social and economic life as indicated, for example, in 
the increasing reform focused on ‗small government and big society‘ (Ding, 2002: 1). There 
are other indigenous ideas such as ‗incremental democracy‘ to engage more with the role of 
the government, initiated by Yu Keping (2002), which differs from both orthodox Marxism 
and liberalism. Incremental democracy sees an autonomous civil society as a pre-requisite for 
democracy; it believes in rule of law; it affirms the critical role of government in promoting 
democracy, rather than seeing democracy as a way of minimising the functions of the state; 
and it tries to build democracy on the basis of co-operation between governments and citizens.  
Another embryo theory is ‗deliberative democracy‘ to prove that one-party states can deliver 
a degree of popular legitimacy in an era of globalisation and mass communications through 
 26 
consultative and deliberative institutions in the form of public hearings (Leonard, 2008). 
There is also an intellectual search for ‗deliberative democracy‘ in China (Leib and He, 2006), 
in which government can be responsive to public needs and citizens can voice their views in a 
context of equality and mutual respect. Other scholars like Zheng Yongnian (2008), also 
propose that there should be top-down intra-party selection (intra-party democracy), bottom-
up social consensus (social democracy) and the orderly interaction between the ruling party 
and society within a legal framework (constitutional democracy). 
As for the official discourse, President Hu Jintao in his report at 17
th
 Party Congress asserted 
that he would unswervingly develop socialist democracy (Xinhua News, 2007): 
―People‘s democracy is the lifeblood of socialism. Political restructuring must be 
constantly deepened along with economic and social development to adapt to the 
growing enthusiasm of the people for participation in political affairs … We must keep 
to the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, and 
integrate the leadership of the Party, the position of the people as masters of the country, 
and the rule of law. We must uphold and improve the system of people‘s congresses, the 
system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the 
CPC, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the 
primary level of society … The most effective and extensive way for the people to be 
masters of the country is that they directly exercise their democratic rights in accordance 
with the law to manage public affairs and public service programs at the primary level, 
practice self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight, and exercise 
democratic oversight over cadres … We will implement the intra-Party oversight 
regulations, strengthen democratic oversight and give scope to the oversight role of 
public opinion, pooling forces of oversight from all sides to make it more effective.‖ 
The report also emphasised improving institutions for democracy, diversification of its forms, 
expansion of its channels and socialist democratic education. In addition, it underlined that 
public hearings must be held for the formulation of laws, regulations and policies that are in 
the interests of the public, while social organisations should be encouraged to help expand 
participation by the public and to report on their petitions to improve the self-governance 
capability of society. This official rhetoric and changes from before have seen reconciliation 
between elite intellectuals within and outside the Party. A harmony among different parties, 
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groups, interests and strata is heavily propagated and promoted. In the meantime, one-party 
leadership and socialistic ideology remains upheld. 
This research refers to the universal values of democracy as defined in the rich literature of 
Western liberal democracy theories: democracy involves the equal rights of access to 
government through popular participation, and contains representative and accountable 
institutions derived from regular and competitive elections by citizens and based on the rule 
of law, so that political decisions have to take into account citizen preferences, be justified 
publicly, and embrace the maintenance and protection of public liberties and citizen‘s rights, 
such as the rights of free speech, publication, organisation and assembly (Wasburn, 1982: 272; 
Linz, 1978).  
Specifically, to study democratisation in China, more attention should be paid to how 
different ideas of democracy can be reconciled by eliminating bias, misunderstanding and 
distortion, and how the Party-state, civil society and private sphere can be reconciled in 
transforming authoritarian rules whilst pushing for the goal of democracy. On the one hand, 
because of various kinds of relations among individuals, organisations and the government, 
the Party-state must be tackled carefully, especially in the issues of how interest 
accommodation and power transfer are centred in democratisation (Dinkelaker, 1997). On the 
other hand, more emphasis is to be put on the empowerment of the people and establishing a 
democratic citizenship through education, participation and deliberation, which can be 
accomplished through the achievement of consensus and respecting disagreement. In this way, 
contentious politics can then provide a starting point to explore such relations among multiple 
factors and to facilitate democratisation. This is based on Joseph Schumpeter‘s (1994: 233-83) 
argument in 1947, that contestation and participation define democracy. As Markoff (1996) 
also states in his book ‗Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change‘, 
democracy is in the process of continually being reinvented rather than an ideal political 
system. Instead of reducing democracy to well-defined and routine practices and institutions 
such as elections and parliaments, he shows how political movements have repeatedly 
challenged and re-made existing institutions. Such elucidations of political mobilisations and 
contentions result in a revelation about China‘s democratic transformation, especially in 
promoting a vigorous civil society and a representative government. 
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2.2.3 Contention and Party-state Responses 
Contention, the key word used in my research, is a broad category and adopts many 
viewpoints from political science compatible with the sociological perspective of the social 
movement. In the literature of contentious politics, contention is extracted by McAdam et al 
(2001: 7), in distinction from institutional politics, as consisting of:  
― … episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects 
when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims 
and the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, at 
least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or at least 
some parties employ innovative collective action. (Actions qualified as innovative if it 
incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes self-representations, and/or 
adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.)‖ 
This definition implies three important criteria: it should involve the interaction with 
government; it should exert influences; it should employ innovation in terms of either identity 
or means. Such understanding is fundamental for both the whole empirical examination of the 
contentious activities of different groups and the complex interpretation of different causal 
relations.  
China is now experiencing collective political struggles everywhere, which is a significant 
characteristic of contentious politics according to the definition and the observable events 
happening in China. Two critical relations in this regard are between contention itself and 
Party-state responses, and between contentious politics and democratisation. McAdam et al 
(2001) also provide a suitable analytical model that can be applied to my research. It 
identifies political opportunity, mobilising structures and framing processes of repertoires as 
the most important factors in contentious politics; it also develops these concepts in such a 
way as to put the mobilisation in motion. In the Chinese society filled with change, conflict 
and resistance, this model will work effectively to identify the complex trajectories and 
recurrent causal mechanisms of China‘s contentious politics. Noticeably, contentious 
mobilisation in China is about people and power – how people perceive, obtain, distribute 
and exercise power – which is far from straightforward. 
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When it comes to Party-state responses to the contentious action the classic approach, in 
political science, centres on the state-society relationship. This perspective is intended to 
achieve a more balanced understanding of political processes, especially concerning 
democratic transition and consolidation, by apprehending not only the structure and nature of 
the state but also the interaction between the state and society (Zhao, 2001: 13). This theory is 
especially appropriate in the case of China with its flourishing civil society within its existing 
authoritarian regime.  
Here I add the dimension of the individual/private sphere
3
 and investigate further the 
relationship between the Party-state and a transforming private sphere. Thus, the specific 
reaction strategies of the Party-state towards the contention such as co-optation, toleration 
and repression (White et al, 1996) can be more dynamically comprehended within the three 
intertwined  spheres of individuals, civil society and the Party-state. The evaluation of the 
Party-state responses will also provide an insight into how the government can be rendered 
more representative and accountable. 
 
2.3 The Analytical Model 
An analytical model of connections in China‘s contentious politics towards democratisation is 
provided in Figure 1. The sequence of the analysis begins from Axis 1 to examine the 
contentious politics. This mainly adopts the contentious structure theories from macro 
opportunity to meso mobilisation to micro framing of specific groups. I use the full line to 
indicate the practical settings, resources and interactions within contentious politics. Axis 2 is 
intended to explore implications for democratisation through restructuring individual-society-
state relationships within contentious politics. Dotted lines are used to indicate how invisible 
power is transferred among the three spheres and how contentious politics can lead to 
democratisation. Through the angle of contentious politics I hope to find out the internal 
driving forces and developmental prospects for China‘s democratisation. The two axes show 
a two-way flow: movement and transition are both from top-down and from bottom-up.  
                                                        
3 According to Habermas (1989), the definition of private sphere has included private concerns/interests of individuals in 
their familial, economic and social life (Kellner, 2000). 
 30 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model 
 
2.3.1 Axis 1: Contentious Politics 
As McAdam et al (2001: 4-5) state, different forms of contention – social movements, 
revolutions, strike waves and more – result from similar mechanisms and processes. This 
research will focus on the causal sequences in contentious politics. I will start from a 
reasonable, if overly structural and static, baseline model for contentions, which includes 
political opportunity bearing on potential actors, mobilising structures that promote 
communication, coordination and commitment within and among potential actors, framing 
processes that produce shared definitions of what is happening and repertoires by which 
participants in contentious politics make collective claims (McAdam et al, 1996). From here, 
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I will take into account the dynamic factors and procedures in order to explain how complex 
episodes of contention come into being in China.  
 
Opportunity structure and social attribution (macro-level) 
The ‗opportunity structure‘ model produces accounts of institutional structures, party systems, 
elite alignments, policy changes, state capacity, legitimacy and the international factors. At 
the macro level, the processes of modernisation and transformation in China have changed 
the social-economic structures, accelerated institutional reforms, facilitated mass 
communications and, as a consequence, empowered different groups of contesters with more 
opportunities and diverse channels for contentions. On the other hand, the emergent problems 
and conflicts with modernisation have also become the direct or indirect causes for public and 
collective grievances. International factors also matter in different episodes of contentions 
and can affect both the contentious groups and the state and thus should be incorporated in 
the explanation properly. Another significant factor is state capacity, which has two 
dimensions: first, the degree of control state agents exercise over persons, activities and 
resources within their government‘s territorial jurisdiction (McAdam et al, 2001: 78) and 
second, the capacity to deal effectively with the rise of new problems, to learn over time, and 
to limit the range of strategic choices of groups or individuals. These two dimensions of state 
capacity can be demonstrated with a central-local complexity.  
However, rather than looking upon opportunities and threats as objective structural factors, 
the dynamic mobilisation model regards them as subject to attribution, since no 
opportunity/threat, however objectively open, will invite mobilisation unless it is visible to 
potential challengers and perceived as opportunity/threat. Attribution of opportunity/threat is 
an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilisation of previously inert 
populations (McAdam et al, 2001: 43). So, particular attention should be paid to the 
conceptualisation of social realities from the viewpoints of challengers and participators 
before and during contentions. 
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Mobilising structure and social appropriation (meso-level) 
This dimension implies the importance of social context and organisational settings in the 
origins of contentions. The structures generally include personal ties, inter-organisational 
linkages and recruitment networks that increase the probability that people will be reached by 
the contention, operating at both an informal and formal level. Research has discovered that 
activists in most contentions tend to be recruited through some pre-existing structures, 
including greater number of affiliations, high propensity to participate, greater density of 
social organisations and social capital, and greater structural potential for social movement 
activity (Kriesi, 1996). The mobilising structures are significant for both individuals and 
organisations in contentious politics. People who belong to groups and who previously 
participated in activism are more likely to join. Participation in an organisation heightens 
their belief in the efficacy of organisations and the more extensive the network, the more 
links people may have with contention, the greater number of people who can be reached by 
mobilisation. 
Nevertheless, in the real world, challengers are more likely to possess organisational deficits 
than resources and therefore the majority of social settings typically constrain rather than 
facilitate contention (McAdam et al, 2001: 44). That is also the case with China‘s 
development in civil society and the cleavages that hold its pace. The informal interpersonal 
connections and networks – guanxi – also prevail within the formal institutions and 
organisations as a Chinese characteristic. Attention then should not only be pointing to pre-
existing mobilising structures, but it should also focus on the active appropriation of sites for 
mobilisation. On many occasions it is not the prior structural propensity that matters, but 
rather the dynamic interaction of groups and individuals within these structures that count. 
The key issue is how to appropriate existing organisations and turn them into vehicles of 
mobilisation and how to turn the private guanxi networks into a public resource for 
mobilisation. Social appropriation is the second mechanism that permits oppressed, 
disadvantaged or resource-poor populations sometimes to overcome their organisational 
deficits and expand their resources for contentions (McAdam et al, 2001: 44). This social 
appropriation of pre-existing organisations, informal networks and spontaneous structures is 
also applied to internet contentions, which have a more fluid and explosive nature. 
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Strategic framing and social construction (micro-level) 
The framing process lies in parallel to the mobilising process. It refers to conscious efforts by 
groups to craft their rhetoric and issues in ways that appeal to potential recruits (Zald, 1996), 
which indicates the importance of individual and social constellations of meanings, 
discourses, cultural symbols, identities as well as moral principles, values, social memories 
and emotions. Although it is difficult to translate mental states into action, the role of culture 
acts as a significant constraint and facilitator of contention and culture can be encoded and 
decoded as people interact in contentious politics. 
As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue, social order, practices, institutions and identities are 
constructed, contested and reproduced through culture and the order of discourse. In this 
‗everything is cultural‘ point of view, discourse is the explaining threshold to understand 
political culture in China as well as the actors‘ identity and perceptions during the contention. 
So to frame means ‗to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described‘ 
(Entman, 1993: 5). The strategic framing in contentious politics also involves transgressive 
and innovative repertoires as indicated in the interpreting and mobilising patterns of a 
particular contention. Jasper (1999: 137, 151, 148, 223) also introduces the idea of cultural 
triggers and moral shock as explanations of how emotional, moral and cognitive processes 
influence the causes of contentious politics and how these change the calculations of costs 
and benefits about joining a contention while also changing the nature and interpretation of 
the information individuals have.  
During China‘s modernisation, the cultural impacts of Westernisation, globalisation and 
postmodernist trends increased quickly and changed people‘s thoughts, behaviours and ways 
of life, causing a collision with traditional values and stability. Contentious culture, identity 
and repertoire has then been shaped, identified and diversified between different groups of 
people during the cultural collision of the three societies and the institutional transformation 
in industrial society itself. When investigating the specific groups‘ (outlined above) identities, 
discourse and culture and their interaction with their own members, with other groups and 
with the state, I will focus more on the power and strength of people and ask why and how 
people‘s mobilisation turns into action. This, together with the structure at macro and meso 
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level, seeks to work out a dynamic picture of China‘s contentious politics and its 
developmental path to democratisation situated in the background of modernisation. 
 
2.3.2 Axis 2: Individual-Society-State Relationship and Democratisation 
Politics has long been divided into three spheres: the private sphere, (civil) society, and the 
State. Democracy presents the interaction of these spheres in the following ways: government 
is empowered by individuals, but in practice the role of the individual is minimised; there is a 
pluralistic system of bargaining between groups and state actors. This pluralism arises 
because the mobilisation of civil society forces an opening up of state to the interests and 
ideologies of these groups. Therefore, democracy (referring to the political system) has 
indeed demonstrated the reciprocity and mutual constraint among the three spheres, rather 
than the character of the state only. Democratisation in China, measured by individual-
society-state relationship, is then another axis running through this thesis. It is intertwined 
with the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis of contentions and signifies the interaction 
of the state, civil society and the private sphere.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, civil society and contentious mobilisation at the meso level and the 
contentious activities and Party-state responses at the micro level both indicate the dynamics 
of society-state, individual-society, and individual-state relations. In a two-way flow, this axis 
of three-sphere interaction defines contentious participants, mobilisation and consequences 
that are in turn being reshaped by the axis of contentious politics. Meanwhile, this interaction 
is under transformation as it is embedded in the process of modernisation and is transformed 
into a balanced power relationship contributing to democratisation at the macro level. I will 
introduce each layer of the relationship: Party-state, civil society and individual-state 
relations and then analyse how power changes within the three spheres.  
 
Party-State 
The nature and development of contentious politics cannot be understood without reference 
to the central role of the state. As the institutionalised centre for the legitimate monopoly on 
the means of violence, the state is the ultimate arbiter for the allocation of socially valued 
goods (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 1). Therefore, the state is simultaneously the object 
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of diverse contentious actions, implicitly or explicitly, and is required to respond actively or 
passively. 
The defining characteristic of the Chinese political system has been the leading role played 
by the Communist Party of China (CPC). Since it came into power in 1949, the CPC has been 
self-improved becoming a mature, powerful and a huge formal organisation that has defined 
the power structure with its organisational principle – the minority is subordinate to the 
majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole and the entire membership 
of the Party to the Central Committee. In theory, the Chinese government is democratically 
elected by a system of People‘ Congresses that convenes and authorises from town to county, 
provincial and central levels. However, in practice, the manipulation by the CPC has turned 
the democratic structure into a facade (Dreyer, 2000: 87). At the top the National People‘s 
Congress elects the State Council, headed by the Premier, but like all other state bodies in 
China, it is entangled with, and subordinate to, the Party apparatus. So the term Party-state is 
applicable in China and indicates the fact that the Party is not parallel to but interlocked with 
the state apparatus. Every element within the government is shadowed by a corresponding 
Party organisation to caucus separately before the decision-making meetings and to ensure all 
the members following the correct ‗line‘. Moreover, the Party controls all major 
appointments to state bodies and most leading state officials are also Party members (Hunter 
and Sexton, 1999: 101). 
Steven Lukes (1974: 1) holds that the exercise of power involves a conflict of interests 
characterised by observable or latent conflict or can take place in a context dominated by 
persuasion, inducement, manipulation or other forms of influence broadly conceived. 
Although the political system has transformed into a mix of authoritarian one-party rule, local 
factionalism, limited experiments of democratic practice and ideological adaptations during 
the reforms and opening up, the exercise of power in China has never been transparent. 
Firstly, manipulation is prevalent, as Party decision-making processes are not exposed to 
public scrutiny and public discussion was forbidden, especially with regard to personnel 
decisions (Yan, 1995). There are hidden and ambiguous rules that govern the processes, 
patterns and hierarchies of daily politics and obvious contradictions among 
institutionalisation, vested interest and arbitrary power. Secondly, conflict of power is also 
common. The fragmentation of authority lies in the threatening competition among different 
factions, the central-local separation and conflicts of power. Weakening Party-state controls 
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and the accompanying accelerating shift of political power from the centre to the regions and 
locals continue to erode the centre‘s authority (Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999: 16).  
Thirdly, inducement is consciously introduced by the CPC as it started to conduct a series of 
democratic experiments such as ‗intra-Party democracy‘4, ‗grassroots democracy‘5, and the 
more appealing political institutional reforms. The key to these reforms is the separation of 
the party from the government. As early as 1988-1989, the reform agenda began to set the 
functional transformation and innovation of government. From Deng‘s time the party has 
proposed to formulate overall national goals and priorities whilst the government makes and 
implements policies to carry out (Fewsmith, 2001: 9), which enhances the authority of the 
NPC. Although this separation had the potential to gradually diffuse the party‘s power by 
shifting some of its function to the governmental administration, it added credit to the party 
and to its solid resolution for political reform and power withdrawal as testified by an old 
Chinese saying ‗to lose is sometimes to gain‘. ‗Small government and big society‘ was the 
idea accompanied by political reform as was the move from political monism (i.e. the 
centralised domination of economy and society by the state) to the ‗dualism of politics and 
economy, the state and society, and the government and citizenry‘, which is regarded as part 
of the process of political modernisation (Ding, 2001: 35). However, as long as the Party‘s 
political leadership towards government – leadership over political principles (four cardinals6) 
– was sustained, their functions, forms of organisations and working methods could not be 
completely distinct from one other. 
Fourthly, but not lastly, persuasion mentioned above in the exercise of power is all about 
legitimacy, which is important for the authorities to maintain the ruling power. The CPC had 
a self-determined destiny, which was to rule and lead the Chinese people from the beginning 
of the People‘s Republic of China. The Communist ideology is the cornerstone for the 
establishment of CPC‘s legitimacy. However, such legitimacy was undermined by waves of 
exhausting political movements under Mao Zedong. Since 1978, when the decision to reform 
set the priority of consolidating economic development and modernisation over ideology and 
class struggles, the performance legitimacy based on economic growth was seen to advance a 
re-justification and re-adaptation of CPC (Fewsmith, 2001: 9). As multiple problems have 
                                                        
4 Refers to reforms relating to the selection of Party officials (Chang, 2001: 215). 
5 Refers to village elections in which peasants got to choose representatives and such elections were even starting to spread 
to the towns and cities. 
6 Four Fundamental Principles for monolithic Party rule: the leadership of the Party, supremacy of Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought, the socialist road and the people‘s democratic dictatorship. 
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been generated during the process of modernisation, Party-state legitimacy is again seriously 
challenged by the enlarging rich-poor gap, social injustice, corruption, unemployment and 
pollution, and, as a consequence, by vigorous social and political contentions of different 
groups.  
As an ideological adaptation, the CPC established the ‗Three Represents‘ theories, which 
have been interpreted broadly and inclusively in the way that the CPC represents the business 
people (advanced productive forces), intellectuals (advanced cultural forces) and the workers 
and farmers (the masses) (Jensen and Weston, 2007: 20). Under the new leadership of Hu 
Jintao, the CPC has also put forward the construction of a harmonious society and scientific 
thinking for development by initiating new policies to solve the rising social problems 
(Zheng, 2004: 87). These adaptations are put forth as the latest progresses in the application 
of Marxism in China and the foundation of shared ideals towards which people from all 
groups in China are working hard. Another change has been the rise of nationalism as an 
assertive and patriotic ideology supported by China‘s increased economic power and 
enhanced national prestige, which is promoted by the CPC to legitimate its power.  
In effect, patriotism is successful in meeting the party‘s legitimate requirement especially in 
its justification of its own position in society by equating the nation with the Party-state, 
stressing the party‘s patriotic achievement, declaring party members to be the most 
exemplary patriots and claiming that the CPC is the best representative of the nation‘s interest 
(Fairbrother, 2003: 10). In fact the form of state legitimacy, which can be justified or opposed 
in ideological terms and also as an unwritten social contract within individual-society-state 
relations, will change a society‘s political culture and slowly become an integrated part of 
that political culture. 
To understand the Chinese Party-state, its dominance in the political system and the way it 
exercises power, will facilitate the comprehension of individual-society-state relations and 
will enrich the analysis of civil society mobilisation and the Party-state responses to different 
contentions. The legitimacy and capacity of the Party-state is also an important component in 
the opportunity structure and attribution at macro level to motivate or contain contentions. 
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Civil Society 
There is a strong correlation between an associational sphere and democracy, since civil 
society acts as a system of checks and balances to the state, even if the formal political 
system lacks them. Civil society has also been understood as a key concept in scholarly 
discussions on the contemporary society-state relationship and on democratisation. It is 
argued that civil society retains a distinctive character to the extent that it is made up of areas 
of social life, which are organised by private, voluntary or autonomous arrangements between 
individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state whist capable of influencing 
public policy (Held, 1987: 281; Lindau and Cheek, 1998: 4). The term itself comes to 
symbolise a combination of economic, social, cultural, and political elements that are 
considered as preconditions for democratisation. These elements include economic freedom, 
autonomous social organisations, a political culture that values individual rights and freedoms, 
equality and independence, and the ability of society to manage its own affairs and to 
participate in the political process (Ding, 2001: 36-9). In practice it is a free democratic 
regime that can assure these features of civil society in which society dominates the 
distribution of power between the state and society (Kang and Han, 2008). Thus, robust civil 
societies are usually embedded in Western states with more mature capitalist economies, 
liberal democratic political systems and well developed legal systems that are characterised 
by the rule of law.  
The emergence and maturation of civil society acts as a growing institutional autonomy 
enjoyed by social groups or organisations vis-à-vis the Party-state and as a crucial 
counterweight to authoritarian tendencies and forces within the Party-state (Wong and Chan, 
2002). Concretely it will facilitate different forms of social participation and engagement, 
including contentious activities, and in the end provide a boost to the values and cultural 
patterns associated with them by furthering participation, trust, and civic virtue among 
citizens (Edwards, 2004: 54; Ertman, 1998). Therefore, theoretically, civil society is the 
organisational origin of contentions and, in the long-term, these contentions will increase the 
recognition of individual rights, be bound by the civil virtues, directed by the rule of law, and 
advance into a robust system of checks and balances on the state. 
In China, in spite of limited freedom of association and vast Party-state interference, the 
concept of civil society was first adopted in China by academics with different translations in 
order to convey some parts of the broad consequences of the changing social realities (Wang, 
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1991; Ma, 1994; B. He, 1997; Deng, 1997; Z. Liang, 2001; Z. Zhang, 2002). This version of 
shimin shehui (urban people‘s society) highlights the role of urbanisation and 
commercialisation in creating a social force of its own to promote China‘s economic and 
political modernisation. The description of gongmin shehui (citizen‘s society) emphasises 
public and civic awareness and the participatory culture that is crucial for building a Chinese 
citizenship conducive to China‘s political future. The talk of minjian shehui (non-
governmental or popular society) stresses that the non-governmental organisations, popular 
participation and mobilisation and public sphere, where private people can exchange opinions 
on matters of public importance, is free from the hand the state (Tai, 2006: 60-2). According 
to Sunyun Ma‘s (1994) review of literature in the field of Chinese discourse on civil society, 
we can have a better idea, from the angle of the ‗right‘ (quanli), of how discourse was 
transformed from a mistranslated conception of ‗bourgeois right‘ to class-neutral ‗civil rights‘, 
how collectivism based ‗mass‘ was transformed into individual rights and equality based 
‗citizenry‘ and ‗civic awareness‘, with the active involvement of the state, and how the 
emergence of the whole range of quasi-autonomous associations could affect the landscape of 
Chinese civil society. 
Wang and He (2004) further explored the upsurge of organised voluntary activity and the 
creation of private, not-for-profit or non-governmental organisations in contemporary China. 
Rather than investigating whether associations are autonomous from state control, they 
looked into what extent people were associated with one another in some structured forms 
and how social capital, i.e. resources embedded in social networks, was accessed and used by 
actors for action. As they put it, ‗China is indeed part of the global association revolution.‘ 
(Wang and He, 2004: 55).  
Apart from civil society organisations, it is worth noting that the ‗public sphere‘ is another 
significant concept interwoven with civil society from Western political literature. Public 
sphere, originated by Habermas and well developed in the contemporary era, is 
conceptualised as a space in which to facilitate maximum public participation and debate 
over key issues in the conjuncture of the time and consequently to promote the cause of 
participatory democracy (Kellner, 2000: 259-60). Habermas also emphasised the role of the 
public sphere as a way for civil society to articulate its interests;  the ‗sphere‘ of the public 
sphere denotes a space that is often a mix of formal and informal institutions and 
organisations (Poor, 2005). In this knowledge society Harbermas‘ insights can be further 
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transferred and fitted into a new technological structure – the internet. The internet even 
solves some of the structural problems that Habermas saw in traditional mass media: it can be 
more open for interactive exchanges and for a wide plurality of voices (Bohman and Roberts, 
2004). In China, the internet has not only been increasingly used as a new media by offline 
social movements in organisation and appropriation, it is in itself facilitating rational-critical 
debates or contentions on public causes and forming an inclusive online public sphere by 
utilising a combination of chat, forums, social networks, the World Wide Web, email and 
other protocols. Virtual association, formal or informal groups, and virtual communities, such 
as the Bulletin Board System (BBS) have been growing rapidly online and claims  the largest 
number of virtual membership (Wang and He, 2004). The internet has greatly expanded social 
space for Chinese associational life and contentious activities. I incorporate the concept of 
‗online public sphere‘ into China‘s civil society dynamics and internet-facilitated contentions.  
There are another two Chinese characteristics for civil society in China. One is the role of the 
Chinese Party-state. The Chinese state has decentralised some of its direct control powers but 
has subsequently concentrated on creating a comprehensive system of governance for the 
large number of civil society organisations. Interference and co-optation from the authorities 
still dominates, and the autonomy and independency of these organisations is in doubt. 
Amongst the scholars who studied the relationship between Chinese civil society and the 
Party state, White et al (1996) developed a mechanism of Party-state co-optation, toleration 
and repression towards civil society organisations of different natures (this mechanism will 
be elaborated in Chapter 9). But interesting findings also came from Qiusha Ma‘s (2005) 
research that Chinese NGOs enjoyed much greater autonomy than might appear on the 
surface and they actually had the ability to obtain official power and resources for their own 
growth. However, the type of NGOs still counted, as the political religious and advocacy 
groups only played an insignificant role in the overall rise of NGOs (Ma, 2005: 10-2). 
Another characteristic is the informal interpersonal networking (guanxi) that has to a different 
extent consolidated or fragmented Chinese civil society. Informal networks as knitted by 
guanxi sometimes play a more active role in mobilising resources and organising collective 
action. Thus, in the particular case of China, the relationship between the formal and informal 
spheres of association is crucial in understanding how individual-society-state relationships 
have evolved within the terrain in which state institutions, social groups and individual 
networks have overlapped and interpenetrated in different mixes, from the official to the 
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semi-official to the popular. Guanxi is an important and very Chinese term that indicates 
social capital and resources are to be built, maintained and developed for the structures and 
purposes within these interconnections. It can also be a disastrous term that disturbs the 
normal interaction within the civil society mobilisation.  
Since the early 1990s the debate about ‗civil society‘ has become heated and both official and 
academic discourse and public opinion found that it could cover an extensive range as well as 
reflect the original meaning. This paper mainly adopts and combines the notions of gongmin 
shehui (citizen‘s society to indicate the non-private, non-state sphere) and minjian shehui 
(non-governmental or popular society) to understand the concepts and values of Chinese civil 
society. The forms of civil society mobilisation in China cover not only the formal civil 
society organisation, but also the informal offline and online networks. According to this 
broad conceptualisation, it is true that in China now more and more people covering all kinds 
of occupations and hierarchies express their grievances through various contentious activities 
via social groups, associations, networks and online forums. Civil society indeed acts as an 
organisational basis or platform for mobilising structures and social appropriation before and 
during contentions at micro and meso-level. 
 
Individual-state Relations 
Maslow (1970) suggested that human needs exist in a hierarchical order and that an 
individual generally attempts to satisfy his needs in sequence. Human beings move from the 
lowest level of needs to the highest level of needs in the following order: physiological needs; 
the need for safety, love and a sense of belonging; self and group esteem; self-actualisation. 
But, individual needs are often discounted in Chinese tradition. At the core of Chinese ethics 
and morality there has always been the ideals of repressing self-interest and glorifying self-
sacrifice for the collective and it is always some relationship, such as position within the 
family or a homogenous group, which determines self-identity. The need for safety, 
belongingness, esteem and achievement can all be realised more fully in the context of 
collectivity rather than individuality. However, this cultural basis is changing and is reshaping 
individual-state relations. The collapse of Communist ideology and a crisis of faith have 
weakened the security of group-based identity and compelled people to worry about 
themselves as individuals, especially after the reformation of danwei (work units). At the 
same time, the encouragement of a free market, personal acquisitiveness and private 
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ownership, and especially an opening up to and exchange with the global community has 
nurtured an environment to inspire a spirit of individualism amongst the modern Chinese. 
As for the Chinese state, there has been a significant withdrawal of the state from the society 
and from individual people‘s lives. However, its legitimacy has been brought into greater 
question because of problems with economic reforms, consequent social instability and the 
way the state deals with them. Tremendous changes have occurred to the moral virtue, the 
worth, the rights and the status of the individual as China goes through its crisis of 
ideological legitimacy, with cracks appearing both in the public‘s awe of the Party-state 
authority and in the general hostility towards individualism (Pye, 1996: 16). There seems to 
be a dual process of ritual behaviour: state‘s actions have become more formalistic and less 
substantive, while the people‘s response to the state‘s authority has become increasingly 
cynical, with general acceptance on the surface, but private reservations, combined with a 
touch of anger underneath (Pye, 1996: 30). The popular dissatisfaction, disappointment and 
grievance in China are illustrated in covert negative attitudes and sentiments towards 
fundamental values, norms, institutions and the leadership of the Party-state (Chen, 2004: 3). 
Individual citizens‘ general ‗belief in legitimacy‘ of the political regime (Easton 1965 in Chen, 
2004: 4) has a huge effect on individual-state relations. In particular, individuals‘ degree of 
satisfaction with the local and central authorities in dealing with social-economic problems 
and in policy-making and implementation also determines their specific attitudes towards 
these performances and policies and affects the probability of grievances turning into 
contentions.  
Therefore, individuals‘ self-needs and identities, their assessments of state legitimacy and 
performance are the two dimensions that manifest themselves in the interactions among 
contention participants and between participants and the state. With the erosion of the 
primary group identity, such as in danwei, individuals, such as workers, migrants, 
intellectuals and the like on an occupational basis, are more likely to reshape their own 
identities in terms of the broad strata of society. Other socio-demographic attributes such as 
gender, age, education, income and political and religious affiliation also matter in deciding 
their needs, identities and social appropriations. The indicators of individuals‘ evaluation of 
personal living conditions and social status, perception of social realities and problems, 
assessment of public policies and their effectiveness on the individual at local and national 
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levels (Chen, 2004: 9) are also linked with the triggers for contention towards different 
authorities.  
It is worth noting that on the one hand, individual citizens are still attached to the tradition of 
being passive, dependent and parochial participants in the face-to-face group structures, no 
matter if this is family or danwei; on the other hand, they are transformed during the 
economic and political modernisation in a direction towards being an autonomous citizen 
capable of political relationships with the Chinese state through independent participation and 
organised mobilisation. Along with this has come a far more pervasive and influential form of 
interpenetration among state, organisations and individuals through informal interpersonal 
networks and connections, known as guanxi as mentioned above. The privatisation and 
publicisation of guanxi can effectively orient the power relations between actors on different 
levels as in the description below:  
―Guanxi facilitates the privatisation of power in situations where people draw on their 
personal ties to strike deals about issues that are of public concern and should have 
involved a public discussion. Guanxi encourages the publicisation of power when 
people recognise their networks to be a public site of collective bargaining. Actors using 
guanxi to publicise power resort to ties with state bureaucrats or other social groups to 
mobilise support in a public negotiation or debate rather than to seek favours for 
personal solutions.‖ (Lo and Otis, 2003: 145) 
As for the implications of democratisation at the macro-level, the complexity and 
contradiction within China‘s political transition is ascribed to the inherent overlapping and 
interaction of three spheres – the Party-state, civil society and private sphere – which is also 
signified in the transitional individual-society-state relationship. The strong private sphere is 
historically introspective, family and connection-centred and dominated by patriarchy, 
hierarchy and traditional morals and rituals, and was once totally ideologically and 
organisationally controlled by the Party-state before reforms. Following the impact of 
comprehensive modernisation, part of this sphere, with increasingly emerging mass 
organisations and interest groups of all kinds and the insertion of modern values of autonomy, 
cooperation and trust, is extending from familial and quasi-familial relationships into civil 
society, notably with the publicisation of guanxi.  
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Civil society itself is vibrant and active but weakened by deep divisions due to private 
barriers, state interference and the enlargement of social inequality: urban-rural, North-South, 
class, wealth, education, age, ethnicity, religion and relationship to power structures. The 
Party-state is the defining characteristic of the Chinese political system since the CPC is 
always dominant and interlocked with every level and aspect of state governance with the 
purpose of ideology and organisation. The Party-state appears monolithic but is one of the 
most faction-ridden and corrupted states in world politics because of the way the private 
sphere penetrates through the privatisation of guanxi and the fact that the immature nature of 
civil society has not yet constituted an effective balance and check of state power. The 
explicit description of contentious politics can illustrate the implicit rules and dynamics of the 
three spheres and can further predict how to transform the individual-society-state 
relationship in the direction of democratisation.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The purpose of the research is to connect mobilisation and democratisation in China with 
contentious politics. This is a highly contradictory macroscopic picture of China today – on 
the one hand an explicit scenario of modernisation initiated by the government and 
developing at an unexpected speed and depth and, on the other hand, an implicit but 
unrecognised scenario of democratisation boosted by modernisation, triggered by the 
concomitant problems and actively involving different social forces with different as well as 
common requests. Underneath the observable dynamic complexities of contentions and 
pacifications, conflicts and tolerance, resistances and repressions in China driven by 
modernisation, there is a normative and ethical presumption in human society that 
contentious politics as a whole promotes representative government with accountability and 
transparency and a mature civil society based on law, this being both the substance of 
democracy and a good way for people to govern themselves. The indications are that the 
greater the pace of modernisation, the greater the disequilibrating forces on the old structures, 
especially among the spheres of Party-state, civil society and private sphere, the more 
pressing the need for measures to promote and achieve a new equilibrium in these complex 
relations towards democratisation. 
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In order to construct an holistic theoretical framework with a conceptual structure, this 
research adopts a political and sociological perspective by associating systematically a 
multiple theoretical basis. An analytical model is in place to demonstrate and predict the 
above mentioned dynamic processes, covering the macro, meso and micro levels of 
contentions and individual-society-state spheres of political transition. As for the 
modernisation-driven contentions, the uneven and fragmented development of agricultural, 
industrial and knowledge-based societies provides opportunity for contentions whilst the 
conflicting zones can be the spaces created and expanded for activism of different contentious 
groups leading to political changes. The vigour of civil society, interpersonal networks and 
online forums can be the mobilising resources to push for public courses, while a 
construction of identity, discourse and strategies within different contentious groups can 
frame the contentions at the micro level.  
On the other hand, this study of China‘s democratisation focuses on the restructuring of 
individual-society-state relationship, which represents the nature and essence of a political 
system and justifies whether it is democratic or not. The Party-state responses to contentions 
and interference with civil society, the dynamics among formal organisations, informal 
networks and cyber space will be investigated in detail. Therefore, China‘s political transition 
and democratisation is not just about opening the state and rendering it accountable and 
transparent;  it is also about transferring ‗power‘ between the other spheres. Arguably the 
private sphere must become weaker, or at least subordinate to legal equality, the civil society 
must be strengthened but also its cleavages surmounted, and the Party-state must be more 
transparent and representative, with the disguised pluralism of factionalism transformed into 
an open political pluralism, which in the end is a three-way transition, not one-way (state 
only). 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The systematic study of the prospects of China‘s democratisation through the features and 
tendencies of contentious politics during modernisation should be based on a reliable and 
valid assessment of three questions: what is out there to know about, what can we (hope to) 
know about it, and how can we go about acquiring that knowledge? (Hay, 2002: 64) Having 
decided on the research topic, specified its scope and developed a theoretical framework, this 
chapter of methodology is designed to answer the question of how to conduct the research 
and obtain such required knowledge. The structure of this chapter begins with a stratified 
explanation of the research paradigm, methodological principles and a practical research 
design. It will then specify the main methods of interviewing, documentation and discourse 
analysis, detail the research procedures and explain any issues rising from the collection of 
data and analysis.  
 
3.2 Research Paradigm, Methodology and Design 
Firstly, the research paradigm is to be set up as the fundamental disciplinary and 
epistemological pattern in order to direct the methodological choices and research design. 
Here I mainly focus on new institutionalism and rational choice after having studied some of 
the dominant paradigms that have shaped political science. Institutions are defined more 
broadly by the new institutionalism ‗as a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally 
follow, whether for normative, cognitive or material reasons‘ (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 9). So, 
new institutionalism sees political behaviour as ‗embedded in an institutional structure of 
rules, norms, expectations and traditions that severely limited the free play of individual will 
and calculation‘ (March and Olsen, 1984: 747). This perspective was based on the idea that 
methodological collectivism of the whole is not reducible to the sum of its parts and emergent 
properties may arise from the collective (Burnham et al, 2004: 24). In the Chinese context, 
the flux and variety of the contentious activities often take place in certain political 
opportunity/threat structures so that institutions serve both as a shaping and a constraining 
force resulting in a dominant one with the asymmetries of power that arises from the way in 
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which institutions work. Historical institutionalism, which leads to an emphasis on path 
dependency resulting from  key historical choices made by states from which initial policy 
choices and the institutionalised commitments emanated so that it was difficult to change 
track (Burnham et al, 2004: 19), is also applicable to the Chinese Party-state system.  
The rational choice perspective was based on methodological individualism – the assumption 
that social situations or collective behaviours are the result of individual actions and can be 
reduced to individual beliefs and dispositions (Burnham et al, 2004: 20-4). Through the 
rational pursuit of their interests, individuals make decisions about how they should act by 
comparing the costs and benefits of different courses of action. Sometimes such individual 
behaviour patterns of utility maximising can make the collective co-operative action that 
politics requires difficult to achieve (Hay, 2002: 9-10). As in China, certain patterns of 
behaviour in both challengers and state officials in contentious politics can be explained and 
predicted based on their rational choice and calculation in accordance to their stable 
preference functions. There is some reconciliation between institutionalism and rational 
choice approaches: rational and utility-maximising individuals might find ‗that their goals 
can be achieved more effectively through institutions, and find their behaviour is shaped and 
constrained by the institutions‘ (Peters, 1999: 44). Rational choice should also incorporate 
cultures, values, beliefs and even historical factors into this perspective in order to explain 
why actors move toward particular outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 956-7). Moreover, an 
actor-centred institutionalism can be also open to game theory (Scharpf, 1997), as the 
bargaining capacities and strategies between the populace and the authorities have become 
the focus of the contentious studies in China. Thus institutionalism and rational choice 
paradigms will be integrated in this research, with more concern paid to how individuals and 
institutions interact with each other to create behavioural and institutional preferences.  
Secondly, methodological principles are to be considered following epistemological 
paradigms. Positivism will be applied with the aim of building an objective empirical 
foundation for knowledge that will produce testable and verifiable statements to explain, 
predict and attribute causality to events and processes (Burnham et al, 2004: 23). The case of 
contentious politics in China should involve the observation of value-free facts and inductive 
reasoning based on quantitative approaches such as statistics and structured interviews to 
depict and reach conclusions on the institutional changes and problems in China and the 
organisational constellation, group profiles and contentious interactions between groups and 
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the Party-state. On the other hand, hermeneutics and constructionism are deemed as more 
important principles to guide the research based on two assumptions: human beings are seen 
as the agents of meaningful acts and as the creators of their social world (Benton, 1977: 12); 
human action belongs to the realm of concepts and is subjected to the social construction of 
meanings (Winch, 1958: 124-8). In the complexity of Chinese politics there is an inevitability 
of conceptualisation and construction/reconstruction from the reliable, plausible or fluid 
evidence including interview results, discourses, events, news and various documents. The 
methodological implications are then directed to situational logic and context-specific 
reasoning based on qualitative approaches, such as unstructured interviews and content and 
discourse analysis, in order to deeply anatomise and interpret the contentious courses and 
Party-state responses in China. The seemingly contradictory methodological philosophies can 
be integrated in this research to encourage methodological pluralism and to establish both 
external/contingent and internal/conceptual relations between different factors and actors. 
Then the qualitative emphasis on knowledge in depth will be reconciled with the quantitative 
capability to make generalisations about the phenomenon as a whole, rather than one being  
at the expense of the other.  
Thirdly, bearing in mind the links and consistency among paradigms, methodology and 
research methods, the purpose of the research design is to propose an operational plan, and to 
ensure that the strategies and procedures adopted within the plan are adequate to provide 
valid and accurate solutions to the research questions (Burnham et al, 2004: 29-33). The 
general aims in carrying out the research are stated as follows: first, to analyse the social, 
economic and political transformations during Chinese modernisation and identifying the 
conditions and stimuli for broad contentions, second, to picture the contentious activities of 
three categories – labourers, intellectuals and religious groups – and their interplay with the 
authorities, and to explain the causes and effects, and third, to learn lessons from the 
contentions for Chinese democratisation by exploring the state-society-individual relationship, 
the development of civil society and the power and strength of the ‗people‘. 
The key issue is which research method (or methods) will be most appropriate to achieve 
these goals? I believe a more comprehensive understanding about Chinese contentious 
politics and a more accurate correlation among modernisation, contention and 
democratisation will be achieved through the reconciliation of new institutionalism and 
rational choice perspectives, incorporation of positivism, hermeneutics and constructionism 
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and a mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The main instruments adopted for 
data collection were interviews, documentation and discourse analysis, which will be detailed 
respectively in the sections below. The use of such a combination of methods will check the 
accuracy of data and provide complementary data that will strengthen the findings. 
 
3.3 Interview Design and Procedure 
Semi-structured interviews comprise a traditional approach that is utilised here to collect 
first-hand information. The subjective perception, conceptualisation and attitudes of people 
from the three groups is important in order to understand in a closer, deeper and more 
practical way the attribution of political opportunities/threats, appropriation of mobilising 
resources and construction of framing strategies in the broader public. The research design of 
the in-depth interview is flexible and open to new ideas and interpretations (Burnham et al, 
2004: 219). Open-ended questions are also valuable in discovering what the respondent really 
feels. Moreover, the data collected will be valuable and useful for further discourse analysis. 
At the beginning of the interview design, who to interview should be decided, since what 
questions will be asked is inevitably shaped by who is going to answer them. The size, sub-
categories and demographic features of samples from labourers, intellectuals and religious 
groups are deliberately defined and sampling methods are accordingly designed. Then comes 
the framing of interview questions and the drawing up of interview schedules. This section 
will involve the real procedures and problems encountered during the interviews, followed by 
the process of coding, transcription and analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Sampling design 
By focussing on the likeness of embarking upon contentious activities, the research was 
conducted on the following sample groups: urban workers (including laid-off workers and 
white-collar workers) and migrant workers to labourers; university/institute students and 
scholars, writers, journalists, lawyers and dissidents from intellectuals; and Falun Gong 
practitioners, both official and underground Christian/Catholic church members and a few 
Buddhist monks from religious groups. With the limitations of time and funding, fieldwork 
was carried out in only two cities in China: Beijing, the national capital and Wuhan, the 
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capital city in Hubei, an inner province. Both are typical locations for Chinese studies. 
Beijing is the political, economic and cultural centre of China with global significance and 
Wuhan is seen as a hybrid mixture with its geographical label as the ‗thoroughfare of nine 
provinces‘ for a national-scale communication, trade and transport centre.  
With regard to interviewing the smaller portion of dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners, it 
is almost impossible to identify them within China and getting access to interview them is 
difficult due to the great security surrounding their identities. Therefore, the interviews were 
conducted abroad with people of such categories and with Chinese nationals living overseas. 
Another reason why I include  samples from intellectual groups abroad is that there is a 
growing and influential Chinese intellectual community outside China. There is long existing 
and evolving Chinese Diaspora mainly dwelling in Western countries, which is composed of 
political dissidents especially exiles from the 1989 Tiananmen movement, democracy and 
human rights advocates, Falun Gong appealers and supporters, other religious and ethical 
critics and radicals. Though greatly differentiated from the native intellectuals in standing, 
viewpoints, goals and directions and seemingly very idealistic with regard to China‘s social 
reality, this community abroad is exempted from mainland surveillance and has thus enjoyed 
a high degree of freedom of expression and they have tried to exert its impact as far as inland 
China through the use of advanced technology such as the internet and telecommunication. It 
also constitutes a broad Chinese intelligentsia, which has its own weight on public opinions 
and especially in the social and political movements both at home and abroad. This 
enlightened but controversial, proportionally small but rapidly developing arena should not 
be ignored and will be paid certain attention. The dissidents‘ involvement will make the 
research result more interesting, diversified and comprehensive. Moreover, political attitudes, 
participation and actions can be clarified and illuminated by comparison with similar groups 
of people in different national and international contexts.  
The sample size was 30-50 people per group depending on the availability and 90-150 in total. 
Though the number is small, it is large for semi-structured interviews. The research not only 
seeks to generalise public opinion, but to see how diverse and unique these opinions are. 
Because of the number and specified groups of samples, I employed non-random sample 
designs i.e. quota sampling and snowball sampling. Quota sampling is applied as the main 
sampling method based on an appropriate mix of demographic features such as gender, age 
and occupation. This is a very popular means of generating information on public opinion 
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and if quota selection procedures are carefully followed it can provide accurate and reliable 
results (Burnham et al, 2004: 39). Quota samples also have the great advantage of being 
quicker, less expensive and more efficient than random samples. In quota sampling key 
variables such as age, gender, residence, occupation and social group status are assigned a 
particular quota, and the interviewer is free to choose any person who fits the criteria. As for 
the procedure of snowball sampling, I employed initial contacts and asked them to 
recommend people in similar circumstances to be interviewed. This is a valuable strategy to 
generate a sample of people or groups and it is more suited to in-depth interview research 
(Burnham et al, 2004: 92-3). In each of the three groups of people, according to the 
availability and accessibility of a certain occupation or category, the interview survey may 
under-represent subgroups. For example, it cannot cover all the occupations in the groups of 
labourers and intellectuals or all religions in religious groups.  
 
3.3.2 Interview questions 
I employed the semi-structured interview that has both more structured and less structured 
parts. The former part takes the form of a fairly detailed list of specific questions, and the 
latter includes just topic headings or general questions to guide the interviewer in a more 
relaxed discussion. Most of the open questions are attached to multiple choices around a 
structured theme. The design of the semi-structured interview is detailed below – its general 
aims, specific research areas and the parameters that define and measure research questions, 
around which the interview questions are framed and the attitude scales are developed. 
According to the general aims of the research, the interviews collect public opinion from 
Chinese people of specific groups (labourers, intellectuals and religious groups) in relation to: 
1) The social-economic-political reality; 2) State-society-individual relations; 3) the waves of 
contentious activities and the Party-state responses. The first one covers conditions, changes 
and problems in a variety of subjects in political, economic and social-cultural themes in 
order to explore the opportunity/threat structure for contentions. The second one  includes the 
interviewees‘ personal autobiography, self-identity, interaction with both formal and informal 
groups and networks and the personal/organisational relationship with the state. This part will 
then investigate the mobilisation structure base for contentions and explore the elements of 
inclusion and cooperation, trust and support, interference and empowerment within the state-
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society-individual relations. The third one includes the interviewees‘ (possibility of) 
participation, forms and strategies for contentions, attitudes and evaluations towards both the 
contentious activities and the Party-state responses. The analysis underlying this part of the 
thesis forms the strategic framing and cultural structure for contentions as well as strategic 
responses and capacity of the Party-state.  
Based on the above three aspects, 14 parameters have been set up to define and measure 
research questions: 
A. The way people obtain or exchange information;  
B. Concerns and comments on any great change or problem within contemporary China‘s 
national/international conditions;  
C. The influence of the social-economic-political environment on people‘s own life; 
D. The objective factors to trigger people‘s grievance; 
E. People‘s value systems; 
F. Relationship with others and relation networks; 
G. Organisations and different cleavages;  
H. The organisational factors for collective activities;  
I. Concerns and comments on state-society relations; 
J. Concerns and comments on state-individual relations; 
K. People‘s own life conditions, self-identity and subjective factors for contentions; 
L. Classification of the ways people release their grievances; 
M. Attitudes and responses towards contentious activities;  
N. Concerns and comments on the Party-state responses  
 
The interview questions are divided into four parts and Part 1 contains structure questions 
about the samples‘ basic information including gender, age, residence, education, occupation 
and political and religious affiliation. The other parts are drafted around the parameters, with 
an indicator in brackets before each question (see appendices). The order and wording of 
questions was modified and finalised after a pilot study. 
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In Part 2 people were first asked about the frequency and the way they obtain or exchange 
information. Then they were asked in detail about the changes, problems and triggers for 
contentions in certain areas and what they are most concerned, close to, satisfied or 
dissatisfied with. All the subjects were listed and presented to the interviewees on cards and 
some of those that have not been mentioned at all will be significant for analysis. 
Interviewees‘ sense of social justice, degree of national pride and esteem, value system will 
also be explored in this part.  
Part 3 aims to examine the state-society-individual relations. The interviewees were asked 
about their network, relationship with others and any organisational membership and 
attendance. The types of organisations, rights and responsibilities of members, cleavages and 
any collective actions were further inquired about. State-society relations focused on the 
freedom of organisational activities and state interference. State-individual relations were 
mainly targeted at the personal trust, support and evaluation of the party and government. 
Part 4 dwells on contentious activities and the Party-state responses at a more micro level. It 
begins with an examination of people‘s personal life standards, self-satisfaction, self-
actualisation and subjective factors that trigger contentions. Then people were asked to talk 
about their experience or likelihood in making contentions, their attitudes and responses 
towards different forms of contentious activities as well as their opinions on the contentions 
of specific groups such as labourers, intellectuals and religious groups. Lastly they give their 
knowledge and attitudes towards different Party-state responses. 
 
3.3.3 Interview procedure 
A pilot study enabled me to test the interview structure and questions, to reveal ambiguous, 
meaningless or embarrassing questions, to discover whether new issues were raised during 
the pilot test and whether new questions needed to be developed. It also enabled me to 
rehearse the actual survey, to alert myself to difficulties that were unforeseen, to give myself 
an opportunity to discover how the respondents would react to the survey and thus to estimate 
the level of non-responses (Burnham et al, 2004: 39). The pilot research was conducted as 
follows: 
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a. Categories of interviewees: Chinese overseas students and visiting scholars, Chinese 
immigrant workers, Chinese religious activists; 
b. Sample size: 3-5 people from each category; 
c. Interview methods: face-to-face interview, telephone interview, email interview, group 
discussion; 
d. Date: 22/5/06 - 12/6/06; 
e. Venue: Newcastle upon Tyne and Durham, UK; 
 
During this trial research, the interview questions and procedures were evaluated and 
finalised after making modifications or corrections, taking into account new topics revealed 
by the trial, and providing solutions to any practical problems. The length of the interview 
was the biggest methodological defect. The longest time to answer all the questions with 
some comments on open topics from the interviews was about two hours. Limited by the 
length of the interview, there is a need to prioritise the topics to be covered. More attention 
should be made to the question order, when to skip particular questions and when to 
emphasise particular words or questions. According to the classification of interview 
questions (Steward, 1997: 155), the essential questions are about interviewees‘ basic 
information, the contentious activities they take and the state responses they know, which are 
two core themes of the research. The necessary questions that are important to the research 
and should be covered as much as possible are those on perception of the problems during 
modernisation, organisational and networking resources and attitudes towards different 
contentions. Finally the desirable questions, which are those on interviewees‘ value systems, 
life experience, comments on particular issues especially the sensitive ones, can be inserted if 
time permits and if the interviewees are willing to share. Attention was also paid to ethical 
problems and the codes of conduct due to the fact that I touched upon controversial themes in 
the interviews. 
The formal interview research was entitled ‗Assessment of China’s Realities, Problems, 
Contentious Activities and Party-State Responses‘ with an introduction letter issued by the 
department of politics at Durham University (see appendices). This fieldwork was carried out 
in the summer of 2006 (26/6-11/8) in the cities of Beijing and Wuhan. At the end of the 
primary data collection, there were 43 labourers, 42 intellectuals and 15 religious people as 
identified by themselves or by the researcher. As stated in the sampling strategy, non-random 
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sample designs were used to select interviewees from certain sub-categories. For labourers, 
15 laid-off workers were chosen from bankrupted or privatised SOEs (state-owned 
enterprises), while 11 white-collar workers came from foreign or joint enterprises, and 17 
migrant workers were sampled from their most common occupations such as construction, 
restaurant, hairdressing and port workers.  
Domestic intellectuals here were composed of university/institute students and scholars, 
journalists and lawyers. The samples of students and scholars mostly came from the most 
famous universities and institutes in Beijing and Wuhan, because these are recognised 
academies and share the incomparable social, cultural, historical, prestige and policy 
resources, assemble and attract the most talented elites and the most cutting-edge thoughts, 
they always closely interact with the government (either central or local) and greatly 
influence mass media, policy making and evaluation, and public opinion as a whole. As for 
the domestic religious groups, there were 11 Christians, five of whom were ministers and one 
Catholic nun; the rest were students, entrepreneurs and retirees, who had stronger religious 
identification to be categorised into this group. There were also four Buddhist monks from 
the temples.  
I made some slight changes to the sample groups during the fieldwork and added five 
entrepreneurs and five cadres. Entrepreneurs were mostly private business owners, one of the 
newly emerged categories and emerging as a powerful interest group (Thakur, 2005). I also 
encountered a few young local Cadres, identified by Thakur (2005) as an upwardly mobile 
group, with a lower mean age, more education and higher technical skills. They could be 
grouped into the urban middle class who have a certain degree of prestige and power, enjoy a 
well-off family and a comfortable life, possess a confident recognition of their own identities, 
cautious attitudes and behaviours and have the least potential to be challengers. There had 
also been a tendency towards alliance between local cadres and entrepreneurs from the early 
stage of reforms and their interdependence with each other either for political protection or 
for economic prosperity. Growth of private wealth in both groups determined that they were 
the most supportive of the political status quo. Therefore, it is interesting to include their 
attitudes and opinions towards China‘s problems, contentions and official responses. 
The email interviews with dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners overseas were conducted 
in September 2006. Five self-conscious dissidents, who resided in the USA and UK, were 
tracked through their online publications and blogs. Five Falun Gong practitioners who 
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resided in Canada and France were tracked via contacts from their news network ‗the Epoch 
Times‘ and interviewed using emails. A particular finding was a special group of Chinese 
intellectuals with religious adherence and the mobilisation of overseas Chinese communities; 
the chapter on contentions of religious groups will detail the overseas Chinese intellectual-
religious movement in the Christianity and Falun Gong related cases. 
All the domestic (110) and overseas (10) samples participated in the interviews. The outline 
and basic statistics of the 120 samples including districts, occupations, and demographic 
factors are listed in the Table 1 and Table 2:  
 57 
Table1: Outline of Samples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Beijing University 
8 Qinghua University 
9 Renmin University of China 
10 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
11 Wuhan University 
Location 
(N=120) 
Labourers 
(N=43) 
Intellectuals 
(N=47) 
Religious 
(N=20) 
Others 
(N=10) 
Beijing (N=61) Laid-off workers (8), 
Migrant workers (9), 
White-collar workers (6)  
Beida
7
 (4), Qinghua
8
 (4), Renda
9
 (4), 
CASS
10
 (3), Other universities (3), 
Lawyers (2), Journalists (2) 
Christian/Catholic (7), Buddhist (3) Entrepreneur (3), 
Cadre (3) 
Wuhan (N=49) Laid-off workers (7), 
Migrant workers (8), 
White-collar workers (5) 
Wuda
11
 (4), Wuhan University of Science 
and Technology (4), Huazhong Normal 
University (4), Other universities (4), 
Journalists (2), Lawyers (2) 
Christian/Catholic (4), Buddhist (1) Entrepreneur (2), 
Cadre (2) 
Overseas (N=10)  Dissidents: North America (3), Europe (2) Falun Gong: North America (3), Europe (2)  
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Table 2: Basic Statistics of Samples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex (%) Age (%) Place of birth (%) Current residence (%) 
Male: 64 (53.3) 20-30: 45 (37.5) Beijing: 27 (22.5) Beijing: 61 (50.8) 
Female: 56 (46.7) 31-40: 44 (36.7) Wuhan: 30 (25.0) Wuhan: 49 (40.8) 
 41-50: 21 (17.5) Other cities in Hubei: 17 (14.2) North America: 6 (5.0) 
51-60: 10 (8.3) Other provinces: 46 (38.3) Europe: 4 (3.3) 
Education (%) Occupation (%)  Political affiliation (%) Religious affiliation (%) 
Primary school: 3 (2.5) Laid-off worker: 15 (12.5) CPC member: 23 (19.2) Catholic/Christian: 30 (25.0)  
Junior high school: 10 (8.3) Construction worker: 8 (6.7) Youth League member: 20 (16.7) Buddhist: 24 (20.0) 
Senior high school: 14 (11.7) Waiter/waitress: 5 (4.2) Member of other parties: 3 (2.5) Falun Gong: 6 (5.0) 
Vocational school: 9 (7.5) Hairdressing apprentice: 2 (1.6) None: 74 (61.6) None/Atheistic: 60 (50.0) 
Diploma: 14 (11.7) Porter: 2 (1.6)   
Bachelor: 46 (38.3) White-collar workers: 11 (9.2) 
Master: 18 (15.0) Scholar: 11 (9.2) 
PhD: 6 (5.0) Student: 29 (24.1) 
 Journalist: 7 (5.8) 
Lawyer: 6 (5.0) 
Ministry: 5 (4.2) 
Monk/nun: 5 (4.2) 
Cadre: 5 (4.2) 
Entrepreneur: 7 (5.8) 
Retiree: 2 (1.6) 
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Stimulating new ideas and in-depth sharing with the interviewees was an important intention 
of the semi-structured interviews. How the interviews were then practically conducted was 
decisive to achieve the goal. In order to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
understanding from the beginning, I first showed the interviewees an introduction letter with 
the purposes of the research explained. I then tried to create a relaxed but purposeful 
environment in which interviewees were willing to discuss issues in greater depth and length 
and enjoy sharing their ideas and perceptions. Different types of probes, for continuation, 
clarification, completion and redirection (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 150), were used throughout 
the interviews, especially for some of the open questions or the interesting points that were 
stimulated. Examples of the probing questions are ‗so what happened next?‘, ‗could you say a 
little more about that?‘, ‗you said earlier that…‘. Rambling, or going off at a tangent, was 
encouraged (Bryman, 2001: 312) in the qualitative interviews, while I was also aware of the 
importance of redirecting the discussion from irrelevant dialogue. A digital recorder was used 
during the interviews, and back-up notes were taken at the same time. All of the 18 
interviewees did not give permission or showed reluctance to using the recorder. 
The sensitivity of this research topic was of great concern to some interviewees, as if an 
inquiry into unrest was in itself rebellious. So one of the biggest problems I encountered 
whist conducting the interviews was resistance, non-response or vague responses to some of 
the questions rather than precise and meaningful answers. There were some sensitive topics, 
such as Falun Gong movements. When interviewees were asked about their comments and 
attitudes towards these contentions, the rate of non-response was high. However, for some 
interviewees, as the rapport developed as the interview progressed, I found we could move 
toward more difficult and sensitive questions. I also noticed that the recorder inhibited 
interviewees from being as frank as they would be in its absence. In the end, only about half 
of the interviewees were able engage in a fruitful dialogue with the interviewer. On the other 
hand, I was continually discouraged from writing about the ‗black spots‘ in China, Chinese 
people, CPC or the government and foreign academia. Such discourses, indicative of 
nationalism, will be further explored in the following chapter.  
Another practical problem was that the interviews were full of multiple choice questions. It 
was strategic for me to clearly present the interviewees with a list of choices in cards to 
choose, but the hints on cards also deprived them of desires to explore their own choices. 
Some terms were unfamiliar, abstract or too general for them, and as a result some of the 
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interviewees only provided generalities or platitudes as answers. The categorisation of groups 
was found to be somewhat problematic in one aspect: the white-collar workers were in closer 
alliance with intellectuals than with labourers in regards of their means of contentions such as 
the use of internet. Therefore in the following chapter on internet contentions my analysis 
will be based on a combination of intellectuals and white-collar workers as the main online 
forces for contentions.  
 
3.4 Analysis of Interview Data 
The first-hand data from qualitative interviews provided the research with richer material, 
valuable quotations to enliven the findings and has made the results more interesting, 
although it is difficult and time-consuming to code. Quantitative data from closed questions, 
such as those in part 1, could be quickly and accurately coded. The data from open-ended 
questions presented more complex coding problems. The questions in part 2, on social 
realities and problems, in part 3 on membership and participation in organisations, and in part 
4 about the contentious activities, attributes towards different contentious groups and towards 
state responses, were mainly open-ended with a large variety of choices and combinations. 
The interviewees were encouraged to talk a little more on the choices they were interested in. 
So it was particularly useful to record the interviews and listen back as soon as possible after 
the interview finished; transcription time (including translation) for a recorded interview was 
much longer than that for a note-taken one.  
In all the interviews, I discovered that the analysis and interpretation of results was far from 
straightforward. As for the open-ended answers, I first coded the data to pick out themes in 
light of the theoretical framework. I then paid more attention to some topical, interesting and 
incisive opinions and did further analysis of the data. The presentation of straightforward 
answers, especially from the multi-choice questions, should be understood with a full 
exploration of related arguments and comments from interviewees as well as the underlying 
meanings. Even the rate of non-selection of choices, non-responses or refusal to answer 
particular questions was of great significance to understand how interviewees reacted to and 
felt about the topic under discussion. The interviewees could provide rather rich and 
meaningful information and valuable insights and understanding on the research themes, 
particularly the sensitive areas. I also found a range of dominant and marginalised discourses 
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were revealed, communised and contested in the interviews. So I analysed the interview data 
in a way so that discourses were organised and categorised in terms of the binary opposites of 
discourses of dominance and discourses of contention (Milliken, 1999). The two are not 
necessarily opposed to each other all the time, but they compete with each other, challenge 
each other and interact and overlap with each other. 
Therefore, qualitative interviewing requires enough attention to the meaning, interpretations, 
and understandings that construct the world-view of the interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 
7). I picked up from the interview data a few transcripts that could be classified and analysed 
according to key words and concepts, and these concepts then could be defined and refined 
with their implications being deduced from the data. A delicate balance had to be maintained 
between understanding the respondents‘ definition of the situation and trying to place that 
definition in the context of a theoretically informed research project (Burnham et al, 2004: 
213-4). I was concerned about the balance between expertise and knowledge, between 
opinions and information, and between the attitudinal questions and factual ones on a wide 
range of social processes and issues gained from the interviews. Some intellectuals are 
experts on topic themselves, with their expressive abilities and scholarship in social sciences, 
while some respondents are information-rich and contributed to the information gathered 
based on a range of personal experiences, both of which require equal attention. With regard 
to the discourses on opinions and attitudinal questions, I needed to exercise judgment of 
people‘s attitudes and responses to contentions. For example, I had to evaluate from the 
discourse whether to draw conclusions about the interviewees‘ present and future social 
behaviour, such as how likely they are to have grievances and how likely they are to take 
individual or collective contentious action. 
It is also noted that representativeness cannot be guaranteed from the small amount of 
samples and interview results, which are qualitative and indicative rather than valid for the 
whole population. Therefore it is essential to use more than one method to collect data so that 
information obtained by the semi-structured interviews may be supplemented by evidence 
from documentation and, in particular, internet content analysis. 
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3.5 Documentation and Analysis of Internet Data 
The collection and analysis of secondary data is a very cost-effective way of discovering 
what research has already been done on the topic and what evidence is available, which 
elucidates areas where new research needs to be performed (Burnham et al, 2004: 33-4). 
Secondary sources, including internet data, are most effectively employed in combination 
with analysis of primary data from interviews. For this research, in order to build a theoretical 
framework and a general picture of China‘s modernisation as well as generate new 
knowledge on the topic of contention and democratisation, documentation is still the main 
method complementary to interviewing. The procedure of documentation research is 
composed of searching for related literature from sources including books, journals, 
magazines, newspapers, websites, internet forums, TV programmes and videos by using 
search tools such as categories, search engines or tracing references. I accumulated the 
necessary materials by taking notes, analysing and sorting out useful and important 
information using a combination of extensive and intensive examination of selected materials 
with critical and comparative perspectives, summarising and evaluating the literature on the 
research topic by integrating different arguments systematically, and developing new ideas 
about the theories and realities in a creative and practical way.  
Among the documents and literature what was worth noting is the Chinese governmental 
discourse, such as pervasive slogans and ideological speeches, which contain rich meanings, 
messages, implications and contradictions. This kind of data can typically be found in the 
largest national news network Xinhua or in the newspaper the People’s Daily. There are also 
valuable government documents and publications including policies, regulations, laws and 
statistics from governmental departments and organisations as well as the official statistics 
bureau. Another useful source is the documentaries made and circulated through non-official 
channels by popular intellectuals, dissidents or independent organisations.  
As for the contentious event analysis, mass media offers a unique approach to the study of 
past events inasmuch as they are time-specific and datable (Wilkinson, 1994: 50). The 
Internet provided an innovative cost-effective way of undertaking this documentation. 
Increasingly, much documentary material is available ‗online‘. The electronic version of 
paper-based media resources and academic resources, online government and civil 
organisation documents, quantitative data such as online polling surveys and qualitative data 
such as online elite interviewing can all be reached through search engines and the 
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‗snowballing‘ strategy. It can be noted that the internet is transforming political research and 
politics itself, especially for analysis of online activism and contentions. The internet can be a 
main and immediate source and provide a synthesis of stories from different news portals 
(such as China.com, People.com, Xinhua net, Sina.com.cn, QQ news, Times online, BBC, 
New York Times, The Epoch Times) as well as perspectives from popular forums and web 
blogs (such as Tianya, China Digital Times, Global Voice, EastSouthWestNorth). 
Since the Chinese government and the Communist Party rigidly control the mainstream and 
mass media inside China including the internet, the availability and authenticity of the 
materials about Chinese political conditions is difficult to guarantee. It is noted that internet 
resources in both English and Chinese are more accessible outside China because they escape 
domestic censorship. However, the resources‘ authenticity, systematisation, reliability, 
validity, impartiality and objectivity should be double-checked. For example, some of the 
internet resources, especially from overseas, might indicate some political bias and list the 
extremes of violent solutions.  
For the sheer range and diversity of documentary sources from online newspapers to research 
reports, from governmental records to documentary materials, from websites to blogs, I 
adopted mainly a qualitative method of content analysis, whereby I made subjective 
judgments about the selection of resources and assessments on the value of content (Berelson, 
1952: 18). The first criterion I used was to choose material that was public, with no problems 
of access or informed consent. I then decided that the material should be appropriate for the 
research themes and able to provide concrete evidence to the background arguments. Texts 
and transcripts of the material were treated as narratives to be understood and interpreted for 
meaning; meanwhile words were also used as data based on the links between specified 
words in known political texts and their subsequent political implications and positions 
(Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003). This qualitative analysis of internet content is primarily 
based on the methodological philosophies of hermeneutics and constructionism. 
 
3.5.1 Collection and coding of internet data for internet contentions.  
Networking and debating in cyberspace has formed a significant online public sphere 
contributing to the mobilisation of civil society  contentions. In this thesis I provide a specific 
chapter on the growing number of recorded online contentious activities that were mainly 
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conducted by intellectuals and white-collar workers. The selection and coding of internet 
resources is based on results from the fieldwork interviews. I first found out what topics 
people are most contentious about and what the most popular trends are. For the former, it is 
the problems during reforms and modernisation, mainly about the dissatisfaction with the 
governance and the overall moral decay of society. For the latter, it is obviously nationalism. 
Then I employed these findings to categorise and construct equivalent online case studies, in 
order to examine how people react to the problems through cyberspace and how they express 
nationalism online. In particular, I examined how contents and discourses are shaped in the 
lead up to the social mobilising process and how groups use the weapon of language to 
impose their assumptions and values on others in order to promote their own interests. 
 
After grouping online cases into administrative and legal cases, moral cases and nationalist 
cases, I targeted governance issues, social moral issues and nationalism issues, respectively. I 
also added the recent Wenchuan Earthquake case as an inclusive case that can integrate 
different interesting elements. I then conducted an internet search based on the key words 
found in the most typical cases in each category. I also collected different online content from 
the news, forum discussions and blogs for one of the cases. Meanwhile I combined them with 
accounts from mainstream media reports to form a whole picture. In the chapter on internet 
contentions, I will also provide detailed sourcing of the text for both internet and media report 
data.  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed how the research was conducted and how the required knowledge 
for the research themes was obtained. Firstly, a research paradigm was set up as the 
fundamental disciplinary and epistemological pattern in order to lead the methodological 
choices and research design. An integration of new institutionalism and rational choice 
combined both methodological collectivism and individualism for a better comprehension of 
interaction between the institutions and the challengers within China‘s contentious politics. 
Based on the epistemological paradigms the methodological principles of positivism and 
hermeneutics/constructionism were applied to deliver both inductive and content-specific 
reasoning, to build up both an objective empirical foundation and a subjective interpretative 
tower. Such methodological pluralism led to a practical research design containing both 
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quantitative approaches, such as statistics and structured interviews, and qualitative 
approaches, such as unstructured interviews and internet content/discourse analysis. The main 
instruments adopted for data collection were interviewing, documentation and internet 
content analysis. Attention has also been paid to semi-structured interviewing with regard to 
the design of sampling methods and interview questions and on the actual procedures of 
sampling and interviewing as well as the problems encountered. The following chapters will 
seek an application of the methods and a full analysis and discussion of the data collected.  
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Chapter 4 – Modernisation and Problems 
4.1 Introduction 
Social movement theories shed great light on the discussion and analysis of the multi-layered 
and multi-faceted nature of contentious activities. The analytical model can be divided into 
three pillars to examine the whole contentious process: political opportunity structure, 
mobilising structure and cultural structure. Each of these is detached by a certain degree of 
independence, yet they are interdependent of each other in forming an overarching and 
penetrating network for analysis. The political opportunity structure, operating at the macro 
level, provides a theoretical skeleton for the influential factors that account for the emergence 
of social-political contentions. This macro-structure is also entwined with the possibilities for 
the preparation, transformation and emergence of mobilising resources at the meso level. 
Lastly, these two structures penetrate the culturally framing mechanism at the micro level.  
In reality, and especially in the complex context of China, the waves of social and political 
contentions fluctuate and are thus difficult to capture, conceptualise, categorise and predict. 
Therefore, the key objective of this research is not only to draw an explicit picture of the 
opportunities and threats of contention, but also to understand the structure itself as dynamic 
rather than static development. Perhaps even more important is the question of how 
individuals and groups themselves perceive, measure and evaluate the opportunities and 
threats as realistic motivations for contentious activities. For this reason, I will start not by 
presenting a single objective macro-level point of view to describe China‘s realities and 
problems, but by adopting a more culture-oriented approach to analyse the characteristics of 
China‘s modernisation. Analytically this means that the reading of literature, documents, 
statistics, news reports and online resources has to be combined and compared with the 
results from the interviews of 120 samples from the groups of labourers, intellectuals, 
religious people, cadres and entrepreneurs. 
The interview questions on China‘s contemporary realities and problems have been designed 
to ascertain any positive change in the form of opportunities and any negative problems in the 
form of threats. Nevertheless, it is soon disclosed that opportunities and threats cannot be 
treated separately, as there are no well-defined boundaries between them; rather, they are 
usually transferable into one another and grow within each other. During the complicated and 
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zigzag modernising course, positive changes may give way to new threats and problematic 
decline may give birth to new opportunities. We should also bear in mind that opportunities 
and threats can be converted into each other; even the state censorship and repression can be 
another kind of opportunity for people to take actions. In fact the threat of repression, 
including being unequally and unjustly treated, is more visible to the participants than 
opportunities (McAdam et al, 2001: 43). The discourse, language and attitudes are full of 
anticipated trends and unexpected inclinations and implications. Opportunities and threats 
generally would not be perceived and realised by people automatically and consciously for 
they are embedded in the transforming system of the modernising process and the 
coexistence of three societies. Social changes have made opportunities and threats emerge, 
flow and intensify, whilst the mass media and various ways of information exchange have 
made them visible, empathetic and influential. It is then that different trends of mentality and 
behaviour are evoked among the populace.  
This chapter provides an account of the interviewees‘ perception of social change and 
problems in section 4.1. It follows with an academic assessment of what these perceptions 
reveal about the structure of potential opportunity and risk of contentions in section 4.2. In 
this way, this chapter tries to answer the two research questions for hypothesis 1 – 
contentious politics is modernisation-driven.  
 
4.2 A Contour of China’s Realities and Problems: Interview Results 
The year 1978 was a revolutionary boundary for China, with its significance being even 
greater than that of the 1949 establishment of the People‘s Republic of China. The launch of 
reform and the opening-up of China can be seen as a milestone both from an historical and 
global perspective. It was from then on that China rocketed off at an unexpectedly high speed 
towards modernising itself and entering the globalised world. The theoretical chapter clarified 
the definitions of the co-existence of agricultural, industrial and knowledge-based society 
during China‘s modernisation, which allow us now to establish a better understanding of the 
grand changes, transformations, opportunities and threats inside the changing structure. 
Furthermore, in the dynamics of this transforming process, how to locate the attributions of 
opportunities and threats and how to draw a close relationship with the contentious framing 
needs to be given a more incisive view. I divide the section into three dimensions – political, 
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economic and social-cultural in accordance with the interview questions and results. 
Questions are open-ended with a range of topics provided from the three dimensions, such as: 
in what area do you think the greatest changes have taken place? Which aspects are you most 
concerned about? What do you think are the biggest problems? What are you most 
satisfied/dissatisfied with? What aspects relate most closely to your life? What aspects have 
greatest influence on your life either in good or negative way? The quantitative analysis of 
the answers recorded any response that touched the topics in a ‗one comment per person per 
topic‘ structure. The statistics also traced the negative comments included in the answers in 
order to indicate whether the issues on the list were regarded as problematic. The next three 
sections identify the most popular and problematic issues in the three dimensions that are 
likely to shape opportunities and threats in contentions.  
 
4.2.1 The three dimensions of change: politics 
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Table 3: Number of responses offered in terms of political issues 
Political issues Labourers  
(% of 43) 
Intellectuals 
(% of 47) 
Religious Group 
(% of 20) 
Cadres 
(% of 5) 
Entrepreneurs 
(% of 5) 
Total 
(% of 120) 
1. International position & relations 13 (30.2) 33 (70.2) 5 (25.0) 3 (60.0) 1 (20.0) 55 (45.8) 
2. Reunification with Taiwan 0 2 (4.3) 3 (15.0) 0 0 5 (4.2) 
3. Minority ethnics and races  0 2 (4.3) 3 (15.0) 1 (20.0) 0 6 (5.0) 
4. Democracy & human rights 28 (65.1) 41 (87.2) 19 (95.0) 3 (60.0) 2 (40.0) 93 (77.5) 
5. Party & state leadership 3 (7.0) 8 (17.0) 6 (30.0) 0 2 (40.0) 19 (15.8) 
6. Governments & bureaucracies 7 (16.3) 15 (31.9) 3 (15.0) 0 2 (40.0) 27 (22.5) 
7. NPC & elections at all levels 20 (46.5) 29 (61.7) 7 (35.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (20.0) 59 (49.2) 
8. Democratic parties & CPPCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9. Policy making & implementation 5 (11.6) 9 (19.1) 2 (10.0) 2 (40.0) 4 (80.0) 22 (18.3) 
10. Rule of law 41 (95.3) 47 (100.0) 18 (90.0) 5 (100.0) 5 (100.0) 116 (96.7) 
11. Political rights & participation 5 (11.6) 33 (70.2) 4 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 46 (38.3) 
12. Ideological & political education 1 (2.3) 9 (19.1) 7 (35.0) 2 (40.0) 0 19 (15.8) 
13. Patriotism & nationalism 0 6 (12.8) 3 (15.0) 1 (20.0) 0 10 (8.3) 
14. Political culture & bureaucratism 11 (25.6) 28 (59.6) 8 (40.0) 0 2 (40.0) 49 (40.8) 
15. Corruption  43 (100.0) 47 (100.0) 20 (100.0) 2 (40.0) 5 (100.0) 117 (97.5) 
16. Party factionalism 5 (11.6) 25 (53.2) 9 (45.0) 0 1 (20.0) 40 (33.3) 
17. Political taboos 0 10 (21.3) 9 (45.0) 0 0 19 (15.8) 
Total comments (average) 182 (4.2) 344 (7.3) 126 (6.3) 23 (4.6) 27 (5.4) 702 (5.9) 
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Table 4: Ranking of responses to political issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals 
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others  
(N=10) 
1 (117) Corruption (43) 1 (47) 1 (20) 1 (7) 2 
2 (116) Rule of law  (41) 2 (47) 2 (18) 3 (10) 1 
3 (93) Democracy & human rights  (28) 3 (41) 3 (19) 2 (5) 4 
4 (59) NPC & elections at all levels  (20) 4    
5 (55) International position & relations  (13) 5 (33) 4  (4) 5 
6 (49) Political culture & bureaucratism      
7 (46) Political rights & participation   (33) 4  (4) 5 
8 (40) Party factionalism    (9) 4  
9 (27) Governments & bureaucracies     
10 (22) Policy making & implementation     (6) 3 
11 (19) Party & state leadership      
12 (19) Ideological & political education      
13 (19) Political taboos    (9) 4  
14 (10) Patriotism & nationalism      
15 (6) Minority ethnics and races      
16 (5) Reunification with Taiwan      
17 (0) Democratic parties & CPPCC      
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Table 5: Ranking of political issues as problematic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals  
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others 
(N=10) 
1 (112) Corruption (38) 1 (44) 1 (20) 1 (7) 2 
2 (92) Rule of law (35) 2 (39) 2 (18) 2 (8) 1 
3 (49) Political culture & bureaucratism (11) 4 (28) 3 (8) 4 (4) 4 
4 (32) Democracy & human rights (13) 3 (8) 5 (12) 3  
5 (21) NPC & elections at all levels (9) 5  (6) 5 (3) 5 
6 (17) Political rights & participation  (11) 4   
7 (12) Governments & bureaucracies     
8 (10) Party factionalism     
9 (8) Policy making & implementation    (5) 3 
10 (8) Patriotism & nationalism     
11 (7) Political taboos     
12 (6) Ideological & political education     
13 (3) Party & state leadership     
14 (3) Minority ethnics and races     
15 (2) International position & relations     
16 (2) Reunification with Taiwan     
17 (0) Democratic parties & CPPCC     
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I endeavoured to build up a picture of the political reality and problems by interviewing 
different groups of people about their knowledge of the political system and its operation, 
their feeling about political roles and institutions and their judgment about the effectiveness 
of government. In table 4.1, the numbers in each column vertically display the number of 
responses people in each group made towards the 17 political issues. It was not surprising 
that labourers were the least talkative on political issues while intellectuals had the largest 
capacity of oral expression on such topics: 182 comments from 43 labourers (4.2 comments 
per person averagely), 126 from 20 religious groups (6.3 per person) and 344 from 47 
intellectuals (7.3 per person) compared to the total average of 5.9 comments per person (the 
total number of comments 702 divided by the total number of sample 120).  
There were some topics that appealed to all or certain groups and others that were unsuitable 
for a semi-formal interview or were too serious for casual discussion, with several least 
popular items at the bottom of the list in table 4.2 still strongly indicating certain political and 
psychological tendencies and implications. Surprisingly, there was no single comments on 
‗Democratic parties & CPPCC‘ even with three members from democratic parties (see table 2 
on the basic statistics of samples). Although the ruling party of CPC always highly 
commended this consultation, supervision and think tank of China‘s top advisory body – the 
Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference – as a form of multi-party cooperative 
and consultative system, people seemed not to have recognised its significance and remained 
indifferent. 
Labourers tended to evaluate social changes, in terms of both progress and problems, by 
referring to their own familiar experiences and from their familiar channel of information and 
exchange. Most of them avoided those unfamiliar or politically sensitive issues such as the 
Taiwan question, the ethnic question, state leaders, political rights, ideological questions or 
political taboos. Instead, they were more concerned with the practical and pragmatic issues 
that would have direct impact on their living and they would talk more on seemingly abstract 
issues if they could find a connecting point with their realities, such as the relations between 
bureaucracy and their experience with officials‘ superiority and inefficiency. However, there 
was also exception with only 11.6% of labourers showing their interest in ‗Policy making & 
implementation‘, which deserved more attention because of its close relation to ordinary 
people‘s lives and its potential and vital impact. A possible explanation might be that some 
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policies were too distant, grand or too moderate for labourers to build a realistic connection 
with or to get excited or annoyed about. 
Intellectuals covered almost every issue but obviously and logically couldn‘t give each an 
equal weight. It was out of the ordinary that less than 5% had interest in ‗Reunification with 
Taiwan‘ or ‗Minority ethnics and races‘, which were supposed to be hot topics amongst 
intellectuals according to news reports and online discussions concerning separatist versus 
nationalist sentiments and activities, and concerning cultural communication and 
multiculturalism. The same abnormality was apparent in the low percentage of intellectuals 
(12.8%) commenting on ‗Patriotism & nationalism‘, which was both a popular ideology 
promoted by the CPC and accepted by the populace; it was a controversial movement 
conducted especially by younger intellectuals and often triggered by international events yet 
criticised by different trends of rationality from different intellectual viewpoints at home and 
abroad. One of the reasons might be that other issues outweighed the importance and urgency 
of these three areas in the mind most of the intellectuals, but such topics could also be 
considered to fall into a certain forbidden zones of expression and discussion. The interviews 
with the five dissidents demonstrated a slightly more radical atmosphere on certain topics, 
such as democracy and human rights, party factionalism and political taboos, whilst on others 
they were trying to hold on to an attitude and a discourse that was rational, objective and just. 
As for respondents from religious groups, they showed a relatively balanced view on each 
issue according to their smaller number within the sample. As reflected by the tendency of 
their own group identity as more spiritual than political, they saw a higher rate (35%) than 
intellectuals (19.1%) when considering ‗Ideological & political education‘ but evidently a 
lower percentage of 20% in ‗Political rights & participation‘ compared to 70.1% of the 
intellectuals. The five Falun Gong practitioners outside China set an extreme and grievingly 
anti-CPC tone by mainly focusing on the issues of Taiwan, ethnic separatism, democracy and 
human rights, corruption, party culture and factionalism and political taboos, and by 
attributing all the problems to the authoritarian ruling of CPC.  
Although there was no statistical significance due to the small scale of the cadre group and 
entrepreneur group, they were still listed out separately as having comparative significance in 
relation to the three major groups. It could be seen that cadres were even a little more 
cautious than entrepreneurs in speech (23 vs. 27 in the number of comments and 7 vs. 6 in the 
number of skipped issues). The cadres, who represented the Party-state at its medium or basic 
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level as local bureaucrats, predictably emphasised the positive changes of their chosen topics 
while lightly mentioning the problematic facets, even on the topic of ‗Corruption‘. In addition, 
they avoided commenting on leadership, governments, bureaucratism, factionalism, which 
were closely related to their work, identity and status, let alone sensitive issues like taboos. 
Entrepreneurs tended to be comprehensive and brief on the political issues and were more 
interested in covering international relations, national institutions and local policies. They 
preferred to pay fair attention to certain issues with moderate language rather than 
pinpointing specific problems, while there were two worrying narratives as victims of 
corruption and policy implementation especially at the local level.  
Tables 4 and 5 represented refinements of the responses in Table 3, to list top five popular 
political issues and top five problematic ones. Table 5 demonstrates aggregated responses 
across all the groups in order of significance based on the comments to the questions ‗What 
do you think are the biggest problems?‘ or ‗What are you most dissatisfied with?‘ According 
to the aggregate calculation the most commonly cited political issues (see table 4) were 
‗Corruption, ‗Rule of law‘, ‗Democracy & human rights‘, ‗NPC & elections at all levels‘, 
‗International position & relations‘. This also agreed completely with the responses from 
labourers. Although the top three topics remained the same among all groups, ‗Political rights 
& participation‘ was added in by the intellectuals and the others (cadres and entrepreneurs), 
‗Party factionalism‘ and ‗Political taboos‘ by religious groups (due to a heated debate from 
the majority of Falun Gong practitioners, though with low overall ranking) and ‗Policy 
making & implementation‘ by the others. All of the top five popular issues also appeared to 
be problematic (see table 4.3) except ‗International position & relations‘, in which people 
indeed showed great interest and 45.8% of the interviewees made comments that were mostly 
positive. This demonstrated a certain degree of national esteem and pride, as well as hopes to 
relocate China on the world stage. 
When asked about the most problematic issues in politics, corruption was overwhelmingly 
ranked in first place among all of the groups, with a 93.3% agreement, except from the cadres 
ironically with only 40% considering it as a big problem. ‗Rule of law‘ followed closely 
behind. 92 of 116 respondents who commented on ‗rule of law‘ considered it as seriously 
absent or problematic and difficult in enforcement and fulfilment. Although 93 respondents 
commented on ‗Democracy & human rights‘, only 32 regarded it as having changed 
negatively. Likewise, 59 commented on ‗NPC & elections at all levels‘, 21 saw this as 
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problematic. On the other hand, ‗Political culture & bureaucratism‘, which was outside of the 
top five list, could be listed in the top five problems because all 49 comments were negative. 
Besides, ‗Political rights & participation‘ was ranked as the number four problem for 
intellectuals and ‗Policy making & implementation‘ as number three for the others. There 
were some general and harsh critiques such as ‗Chinese politics is much darker than one can 
ever imagine.‘  
Many felt corruption was incurable as power had been concentrated in the hands of one party, 
and power in the party concentrated in the hands of a few. Some strongly criticised 
economists and social elites, who defended corruption arguing that corruption was the 
unavoidable cost of reforms as part of the system. The so-called ‗High Salary for Clean 
Government‘ strategy to resolve corruption also received fierce criticism and there were more 
calls on severe punishments and sentences. With deep anger and cynicism towards corruption, 
respondents showed a profound suspicion of those in power and an awareness that corruption 
pervaded the whole system. As for corruption‘s deadly damage to society, a professor raised 
the issue with great anxiety: ‗Yes we hate those involved in the big crime with large amounts 
of money and high rank of officials, but we should also worry about the small corruptions 
everywhere as if we are living in a system or network in which corruption is inevitable and 
people are getting used to it as a habit and mentality.‘12 Most respondents realised that behind 
the tough problem of corruption was a lack of rule of law. According to the comments, 
numerous news reports on laws, regulations and policies were appearing onstage, but the 
inefficiency and deviation in the implementation of these laws (especially judicial corruption) 
became extremely severe. As a white-collar worker ironically put it, ‗how can the party deal 
with the defects from inside and how can it constrain its own power through its own rule by 
law?‘13 
As for ‗Political culture & bureaucratism‘, criticisms were focused on arbitrary and 
dictatorial political culture, as well as inefficient, redundant and arrogant bureaucracies. 
These criticisms showed further public contempt and disappointment towards Chinese 
politics and leadership. One migrant worker even quoted an ancient metaphor to describe the 
dark politics today, ‗A harsh and oppressive government is more ferocious and fearsome than 
even a tiger that comes back.‘14 Another radical complained, ‗All are pseudo and deceptive! 
                                                        
12 Interviewee number 70. 
13 Interviewee number 19. 
14 Interviewee number 6. 
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All the propagandas and statistics are singing a high praise of the policies and situations.‘15 A 
migrant worker who often experienced rude treatment by the Urban Administration (UA) in 
his hometown said, ‗The CPC kept a bunch of bandits and running dogs.‘ More cases depict 
the unpleasant interaction and communication between the local bureaucracies, including 
delay, hindrance, restraint, repression, injustice, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in various 
civil affairs. The complaints also implied the intensifying contradictions between the national 
and local official level on policy implementation and bureaucratic behaviour.  
As for ‗Democracy & human rights‘, some mentioned that the breach of human rights was a 
result of inadequate democracy and a weak legal framework. However, not everyone was in 
favour of Western democracy, in fact under half of the respondents were. Some also argued 
that much of the difficulty in establishing democracy in China was historically and culturally 
embedded. A few Falun Gong practitioners and dissidents believed that the second and third 
generation of leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, who respectively ordered the 
assault on Tiananmen Square and commanded the suppression of the Falun Gong movement, 
were not going to express any regret or bring in authentic democracy. But they had expected 
more from Hu Jintao, who had no involvement in the 1989 slaughter and was unburdened by 
the past, and free to reverse Tiananmen and Falun Gong judgment and modernise China‘s 
political system. However, some also expressed disappointment towards Hu Jintao‘s 
leadership that had tightened media and press controls to a new level, especially on the 
internet, arrested more dissidents, banned more NGOs and repressed more protests. 
Apparently these dissident intellectuals, outside China, turned out to hold a more radical view 
on democracy and human rights. 
Nearly half of the respondents mentioned ‗NPC & elections at all levels‘, of whom one third 
said they were very interested in elections but complained that they were never clear about 
when and how the leaders, especially the national leaders, were selected, or what the NPC 
(National People‘s Congress) and local People‘s Congress were doing, how often the 
meetings were held, and when and where they could have the chance to vote. Others, who 
regarded it as a problem, mainly doubted significance, independence and function of the NPC 
under the shadow of the National Congress of CPC, and they insisted that the leadership 
changes at senior levels were already decided in the Party‘s congress rather than elected by 
                                                        
15 Interviewee number 7. 
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the NCP. Some pessimistic conclusions were made that those elections were useless, just 
formal without any content – the higher the level, the prettier and emptier the vases would be.  
People might tend to exaggerate these problematic aspects, but they still expressed their 
expectations for power separations and checks, accountability and transparency of 
representative politics, and others that were far from achieved. As for the local village 
elections, the respondents‘ views were more controversial and diverging. They were, on one 
hand, affirmative about the governmental intention for direct democracy and the willingness 
of villagers to actively participate in voting their own committee and, on the other, they 
admitted that great enthusiasm from the state or the villagers was not enough by itself, and 
that the local officials‘ cooperation or resistance could often be the key to the success or 
failure of elections. Some intellectuals said they once had the hope that this experiment of 
direct multi-candidate election in villages and townships from the 1980s onwards would 
extend gradually and finally to national popular election. Now they felt disappointed by those 
procedural problems, and started to ask why time, money and human resources should be 
spent on this experiment. Several migrant workers said they always missed the time of 
election in their villages and anyway, they did not care much when they were striving for a 
living. 
 
4.2.2 The three dimensions of change: economy 
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Table 6: Basic statistics in economic issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic issues Labourers  
(% of 43) 
Intellectuals 
(% of 47) 
Religious Group 
(% of 20) 
Cadres 
(% of 5) 
Entrepreneurs 
(% of 5) 
Total 
(% of 120) 
1. Comprehensive national strength 0 6 (12.8) 0 1 (20.0) 0 7 (5.8) 
2. Market economy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Macro regulation & control 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Open-up & international market 5 (11.6) 16 (34.0) 4 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 28 (23.3) 
5. Reform of SOEs 35 (81.4) 32 (68.1) 8 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 4 (80.0) 82 (68.3) 
6. Private & civil enterprises 10 (23.3) 30 (63.8) 12 (60.0) 1 (20.0) 3 (60.0) 56 (46.7) 
7. Job market & recruitment 14 (32.6) 18 (38.3) 10 (50.0) 3 (60.0) 1 (20.0) 46 (38.3) 
8. Pension & welfare 30 (69.8) 20 (42.3) 7 (35.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (60.0) 63 (52.5) 
9. The problems of agriculture 40 (93.0) 43 (91.5) 14 (70.0) 4 (80.0) 1 (20.0) 102 (85.0) 
10. Financial & stock market 18 (41.9) 25 (53.2) 6 (30.0) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 54 (45.0) 
11. Real estate market 20 (46.5) 28 (59.6) 7 (35.0) 4 (80.0) 3 (60.0) 62 (51.7) 
12. Environment & resources 39 (90.7) 45 (95.7) 18 (90.0) 5 (100.0) 3 (60.0) 110 (91.7) 
13. Business competition & ethics 20 (46.5) 18 (38.3) 1 (5.0) 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 44 (36.7) 
14. Poor-rich gap 40 (93.0) 41 (87.2) 19 (95.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 104 (87.7) 
15. Fake goods & poor quality 42 (97.7) 38 (80.6) 14 (70.0) 4 (80.0) 1 (20.0) 99 (82.5) 
16. Power-money exchange 40 (93.0) 45 (95.7) 17 (85.0) 2 (40.0) 4 (80.0) 108 (90.0) 
17. Economic crime 1 (2.3) 8 (17.0) 2 (10.0) 0 1 (20.0) 12 (10.0) 
Total comments (average) 354 (8.2) 413 (8.8) 139 (7.0) 36 (7.2) 35 (7.0) 977 (8.1) 
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Table 7: Ranking of responses to economic issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals  
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others  
(N=10) 
1 (110) Environment & resources (39) 5 (45) 1 (19) 1 (8) 1 
2 (108) Power-money exchange (40) 2 (45) 1 (18) 2 (6) 4 
3 (104) Poor-rich gap (40) 2 (41) 4 (17) 3  
4 (102) The problems of agriculture (40) 2 (43) 3 (14) 4  
5 (99) Fake goods & poor quality (42) 1 (38) 5 (14) 4  
6 (82) Reform of SOEs    (7) 2 
7 (63) Pension & welfare    (6) 4 
8 (62) Real estate market    (7) 2 
9 (56) Private & civil enterprises     
10 (54) Financial & stock market     
11 (44) Business competition & ethics     
12 (36) Job market & recruitment     
13 (28) Open-up & international market     
14 (12) Economic crime     
15 (7) Comprehensive national strength     
16 (0) Market economy     
17 (0) Macro regulation & control     
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Table 8: Ranking of responses to economic issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals  
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others  
(N=10) 
1 (108) Power-money exchange  (40) 2 (45) 1 (17) 1 (6) 2 
2 (101) Poor-rich gap (37) 3 (41) 2 (14) 3  
3 (99) Fake goods & poor quality (42) 1 (38) 4 (14) 3 (5) 3 
4 (94) The problems of agriculture (35) 4 (41) 2 (12) 5  
5 (92) Environment & resources (35) 4 (33) 5 (17) 1 (7) 1 
6 (66) Reform of SOEs     (5) 3 
7 (52) Pension & welfare    (4) 5 
8 (50) Real estate market     
9 (38) Business competition & ethics     
10 (30) Job market & recruitment     
11 (17) Financial & stock market     
12 (12) Economic crime     
13 (9) Private & civil enterprises     
14 (5) Open-up & international market     
15 (0) Comprehensive national strength      
16 (0) Market economy     
17 (0) Macro regulation & control     
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The same methodology of questioning and presentation of statistics was applied to economic 
and social-cultural issues. According to the total number of comments and the atmosphere 
built on each dimension, people were more comfortable to talk about economic issues. Table 
6 clearly demonstrated that, from 977 comments (8.1 comments per person of each group in 
the ‗total and average comments‘) economic issues attracted the widest attention and most 
participants were actively involved in giving opinion towards the economic realities and 
especially the problems that arise. Economy was still most closely related to people‘s basic 
living, working, welfare and security, which were indicated to be the majority of people‘s 
deepest concern. Economic interests and relations still determined the nature and 
development of other human relations and motivated other political and social changes. In 
addition, people were more sensitive to economic issues and gained more information from 
the media thanks to less official boundaries and taboos and thus felt freer to talk about them 
in detail without reluctance or constraint. There were still two nil response here: none of the 
respondents made any comments on ‗Market economy‘ and ‗Macro regulation & control‘, but 
one of the reasons might be that these two terms were too abstract for specific feedback. 
People were obviously obsessed by the concrete presentations and consequences of 
marketisation and state interference – the enlarging poor-rich gap, economic corruption, 
unsatisfactory welfare system, the SOE reforms, agriculture, real estate market, 
environmental crisis, and counterfeit storms, all of which provoked interests from over half of 
the respondents.  
Generally, ‗Comprehensive national strength‘ and ‗Open-up & international market‘ received 
less feedback, with most of them being simple and positive. Only the intellectuals with a 
certain degree of speciality on international economy and WTO expressed some concerns and 
worries on the severe challenges that China was facing in the global competition. ‗Economic 
crime‘ also ranked very low, partly because other economic deviation and transgression such 
as ‗Power-money exchange‘ or ‗Fake goods & poor quality‘ or even the distortion of 
‗Business competition & ethics‘ had a more nationwide and deep-rooted impact than any 
single local special crime or group of crimes. A little surprise arose with the relative low 
concern towards ‗Job market & recruitment‘, interestingly only 32.6% of labourers compared 
to 50% of religious group gave their opinions. While the labourers concentrated on the 
practical difficulties of getting an ideal job for themselves and their children, intellectuals and 
religious groups focused on the intensification, irregularity and imbalance of the job market 
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as a whole, and cadres‘ comments were basically positive on the blossoming of recruitment 
fares and the improvement of re-employment.  
Notably, labourers were much more active and interested in economic issues than in political 
ones and they continued to follow the pragmatic line of thinking and discussion with regard 
to the problems more relevant to their everyday life. Over 90% of labourers, 80% of 
intellectuals and 70% of religious groups all commented about the top five popular economic 
items: ‗Environment & resources‘ (with a totality of 91.7% of respondents‘ comments), 
‗Power-money exchange‘ (90%), ‗Poor-rich gap‘ (87.7%), ‗The problems of agriculture‘ 
(85%) and ‗Fake goods & poor quality‘ (82.5%) (see tables 7 and 8).  
The issues of ‗Reform of SOEs‘, ‗Pension & welfare‘ and ‗Real estate market‘ also attracted 
over half of the respondent‘s attention because compensation, pension, medical care and 
housing were important aspects to personal welfare and social security. Amongst these 
problems, power-money exchange or the rent-seeking phenomenon of corruption was 
rampant in the economic and business field. Respondents expressed their abhorrence and 
contempt in this grey nature of economy and towards some cadres with lucrative posts and 
open doors for bribes, and entrepreneurs who were engaged in offering bribes to achieve 
business goals. The enlargement in the poor-rich gap, reported by state statistics and in the 
media, was also captured by the respondents. It was noted, that besides those privileged 
classes, some heavy speculators in stocks, real estate, other business or trade and even 
adventurers in various gambling industries, gained their buckets of gold and edged 
themselves into the classes of ‗new rich‘. Some commented that polarisation between and 
within urban and rural areas was made worse in some parts of China, as peasants were still 
staying in the lowest level of the society, along with the urban unemployed and retired. Some 
labourers said they had gotten used to the feeling of ‗being abandoned‘16 or the fact that, 
‗we‘ve become the real disenfranchised‘. More complaints came from those migrant workers 
whose wages were delayed and unpaid by urban labour contractors, from those laid-off 
workers who compared their own miseries with those well-off leaders from the same loss-
generating SOE, and from those who were angry and helpless at the unequal opportunity such 
as access to the markets, to resources and to higher education. Even the white-collar workers, 
with good educations and middle-income jobs, still had a feeling of being relatively deprived 
due to increasing life pressures and the increasing price of real estate.  They called 
                                                        
16 Interviewee number 5. 
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themselves ‗little white-collar‘ and even ‗new poor‘, compared with ‗parvenu‘ and the ‗new 
rich‘17.  
Besides the traditional popular enquires into economic corruption, injustice, inequality and 
deprivation of weak groups, the respondents also raised questions about the violation of 
customer rights and the emerging environmental and resources crisis. The goods they 
consumed and the environment they lived in seemed to have a more direct and profound 
impact on their everyday lives. People were actively talking about all kinds of counterfeit 
products they knew about, bought and used. It was the group of labourers that consider this 
problem high in their list as the fake goods, especially food and medicine, would have the 
most destructive and life-threatening damages for them. One said, ‗you cannot find a real 
thing of a real brand in our village shop.‘ 18  As mentioned by some intellectuals and 
entrepreneurs, fake identification, pirated software and other piracy of intellectual property 
were regarded as another prevailing economic problem affecting market consumption and 
competition. As for environmental problems, water and air population, soil deterioration and 
desertification, improperly treated industrial, agricultural and urban waste was listed by 
respondents as a notable problem. Some also exemplified vehicle emission control, south-to-
north water diversion, ‗cancer village‘, ‗black brick kilns‘ and so on, to express their deep 
concerns about the overexploitation of natural resources and appealed for more government 
action and protection. 
Compared to the political statistics, concerns over economic issues were more concentrated 
and intense. For example, in table 4 (except for the top three popular political items) number 
four and number five had less than half the interviewees respond. Obviously, there were more 
economic issues to talk about or worry about, thanks to the emergence and severity of the 
problems themselves, people‘s attitudes and conceptualisation towards the influences, as well 
as the relative freedom and openness of discussion. Table 7 also showed that the three main 
groups of labourers, intellectuals and religious people, shared the same kinds of economic 
issues, but responded with different ideas of significance. The trends also indicated both the 
professionalism of intellectuals, who tended to investigate deeply into some topics with 
specialised knowledge, information and terms, and the pessimism of religious groups who 
were inclined to condemn the evil consequences of material expansion and desire extension. 
The choice of the others, once again, proved that the groups with vested interests in economic 
                                                        
17 Interviewee number 21, 23 and 43. 
18 Interviewee number 4. 
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reforms, such as cadres and entrepreneurs, were trying to avoid involving themselves in any 
conflicts, so that 60% of them ignored the poor-rich polarisation, 60% of cadres, in particular, 
escaped commenting on economic corruption, while 80% of businessmen were silent on fake 
commodities, despite their smaller number and proportion among the respondents as a whole.  
 
4.2.3 The three dimensions of change: social-cultural 
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Table 9: Basic statistics in social-cultural issues 
Social-cultural issues Labourers  
(% of 43) 
Intellectuals 
(% of 47) 
Religious Group 
(% of 20) 
Cadres 
(% of 5) 
Entrepreneurs 
(% of 5) 
Total 
(% of 120) 
1. Mass media 10 (23.3) 33 (70.2) 9 (45.0) 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 57 (47.5) 
2. Official & civil organisations 0 7 (14.9) 1 (5.0) 0 1 (20.0) 9 (7.5) 
3. Charities & endowments 0 2 (4.3) 1 (5.0) 0 0 3 (2.5) 
4. Marriage & family 8 (18.6) 30 (63.8) 7 (35.0) 2 (40.0) 0 47 (39.2) 
5. Human relations 3 (7.0) 9 (19.1) 4 (20.0) 0 1 (20.0) 17 (14.2) 
6. Traditional & modern culture 12 (27.9) 40 (85.1) 15 (75.0) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 72 (60.0) 
7. Religions & beliefs 22 (51.2) 15 (31.9) 17 (85.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 58 (48.3) 
8. Social ethics & morality 24 (55.8) 37 (78.7) 15 (75.0) 1 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 79 (65.8) 
9. Social ethos & public opinion 7 (16.3) 20 (42.3) 7 (35.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (20.0) 37 (30.8) 
10. Entertainments 1 (2.3) 5 (10.6) 1 (5.0) 0 2 (40.0) 9 (7.5) 
11. Problem of population 19 (44.2) 24 (51.1) 6 (30.0) 3 (60.0) 1 (20.0) 53 (44.2) 
12. Migration & social mobility 14 (32.6) 24 (51.1) 4 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 1 (20.0) 47 (39.2) 
13. Stratification of social status 0 29 (61.7) 2 (10.0) 1 (20.0) 3 (60.0) 35 (29.2) 
14. Problem of education 30 (69.8) 30 (63.8) 8 (40.0) 4 (80.0) 4 (80.0) 76 (63.3) 
15. Academic corruption 0 16 (34.0) 2 (10.0) 0 0 18 (15.0) 
16. Juvenile delinquency 17 (39.5) 24 (51.1) 4 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 49 (40.8) 
17. Drugs, gambling & pornography 22 (51.2) 36 (76.6) 11 (55.0) 4 (80.0) 3 (60.0) 76 (63.3) 
18. Gangsterdom 10 (23.3) 11 (23.4) 3 (15.0) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 29 (24.2) 
Total comments (average) 199 (4.6) 392 (8.3) 117 (5.9) 30 (6.0) 33 (6.6) 771 (6.4) 
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Table 10: Ranking of responses to social-cultural issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals  
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others  
(N=10) 
1 (79) Social ethics & morality  (24) 2 (37) 2 (15) 2  
2 (76) Problem of education  (30) 1 (30) 5  (8) 1 
3 (76) Drugs, gambling & pornography  (22) 3 (36) 3 (11) 4 (7) 2 
4 (72) Traditional & modern culture   (40) 1 (15) 2 (5) 3 
5 (59) Religions & beliefs  (22) 3  (17) 1  
6 (57) Mass media  (33) 4 (9) 5 (5) 3 
7 (53) Problem of population (19) 5    
8 (49) Juvenile delinquency     
9 (47) Marriage & family      
10 (47) Migration & social mobility    (5) 3 
11 (37) Social ethos & public opinion     
12 (35) Stratification of social status     
13 (29) Gangsterdom    (5) 3 
14 (18) Academic corruption     
15 (17) Human relations     
16 (9) Official & civil organisations      
17 (9) Entertainments     
18 (3) Charities & endowments     
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Table 11: Ranking of responses to social-cultural issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Overall ranking (N=120) Labourers  
(N=43) 
Intellectuals 
(N=47) 
Religious Group  
(N=20) 
Others  
(N=10) 
1 (71) Social ethics & morality  (22) 1 (34) 1 (12) 1  
2 (65) Drugs, gambling & pornography  (20) 2 (29) 2 (9) 3 (7) 1 
3 (53) Problem of population (19) 3 (24) 4 (6) 5 (4) 5 
4 (49) Juvenile delinquency  (17) 5 (24) 4  (6) 2 
5 (46) Problem of education  (19) 3   (5) 3 
6 (30) Stratification of social status   (27) 3   
7 (29) Traditional & modern culture   (7) 4  
8 (29) Gangsterdom    (5) 3 
9 (24) Social ethos & public opinion     
10 (21) Religions & beliefs   (10) 2  
11 (20) Mass media      
12 (20) Marriage & family     
13 (19) Migration & social mobility     
14 (18) Academic corruption     
15 (17) Human relations     
16 (9) Entertainments     
17 (3) Charities & endowments     
18 (0) Official & civil organisation     
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In Table 9, the total number of comments on social-cultural issues was 771 with an average of 
6.4 comments per person, which were intermediate between political and economic 
dimensions. All groups were unexpectedly more talkative on these 18 items than on political 
ones, except for religious groups who fell from 6.3 to 5.9 comments on average. However, 
statistics of this dimension were mostly scattered and fluid: there was no nil responses or an 
absolute majority consensus since every issue could open a door to a large theme and thus 
invited different people to offer diverse interests and opinions. Generally, it was reasonable to 
expect most respondents to have no enthusiasm in ‗Charities & endowments‘, which was not 
a prevailing action amongst ordinary people. The only three comments on charity were all 
negative (see also table 11) and concentrated on the official embezzlement of endowments for 
calamity-stricken areas or ‗Hope Project‘ (nationwide endeavours to support compulsory 
education in poor and rural localities). ‗Official & civil organisation‘ encountered the same 
ignorance, although the proliferation of organisations especially NGOs could be seen as a 
burgeoning social phenomenon and filled with the hope of transforming the social landscape 
in China. Organisations, official or non-official, had not yet played their deserved and 
necessary part in society, at least not enough to raise more concerns from the respondents.  
On the other hand, that people did not have much enthusiasm for entertainment (only 9 
comments) was not so reflective of the reality. Entertainment in China developed with a 
tendency for being diverse, creative and globalised with flowers and weeds coexisting, while 
the nine respondents all criticised the poisonous effects of pornography or gambling-related 
entertainment without a balanced point of view. Most controversially, 47.5% of respondents 
(including 70.2% of intellectuals, 45% of religious people and 80% of entrepreneurs) 
commented on ‗Mass media‘, though some answers were brief, perfunctory and superficial. 
Some dwelled much on the wide variety and the high-speed nature of information exchange 
and dissemination, the increasing convenience of living, the expanding freedom of expression 
and the explosive influence of the internet. Others noticed that the mass media might be an 
invisible force exerting and strengthening certain negative and destructive influences in the 
younger generation, whilst a few focused on the official restriction on the freedom of the 
press.  
Amongst the top five most popular issues and the five most problematic ones, respondents‘ 
interests and worries were scattered and there was no apparent and strong consensus like with 
the political and economic dimensions. This relatively weak concentration was allocated on 
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the interrelated top three most problematic issues of ‗Social ethics & morality‘, ‗Drugs, 
gambling & pornography‘ and ‗Problem of education‘. As many as 60% of respondents also 
expressed an interest and understanding in ‗Traditional & modern culture‘, while 48.3% 
commented on ‗Religions & beliefs‘, but these two issues ranked only as the fourth and 
second problems, respectively, among the religious groups. Instead, ‗Problem of population‘ 
and ‗Juvenile delinquency‘ were placed amongst the overall top five most problematic issues.  
It was noticed that the top problems in every dimension witnessed a top-down corruption, 
deviation from law and other serious crimes, and thus formed the map of crime in China 
covered up with complex networks that connected countless dots. Behind the scenes was the 
bankruptcy of social ethics and morality from either a traditional or a Communist direction. 
What interviewees found most problematic in social ethics and morality were mainly fastened 
to the growing visibility of phenomena such as cheating, fraud, theft, robbery, burglary and a 
lack of public security. Many interviewees had experienced being robbed of handbags or 
mobile phones on the streets. Others criticised the ignorance or violation of basic moral 
principles such as social courtesy, helpfulness, care for public property, environmental 
protection, and being law-abiding. Some sighed, ‗private, family and public virtues were at 
the lowest ebb.‘19‗Social conscience and human relation was becoming thinner.‘20‗Market 
greed and deception is everywhere.‘21‗Young people are becoming increasing unfilial.‘22‗We 
are dropped and trapped into the moral conflicts and faith vacuum.‘23 Many respondents 
talked of ‗drugs, gambling & pornography‘ not only as crimes but also poisons banefully 
polluting people‘s bodies, minds and souls as more and more cases were prevailing around 
them and some of the victims were their close friends or kin. What‘s more, the scope and 
influence of criminal organisations and mafia (known locally as ‗black societies‘) has grown 
rapidly. The ‗police-bandit collaboration‘, criticised by interviewees, also provided an 
umbrella of protection and conveniently opened the doors to illegal activities and juvenile 
delinquency, which was another worrying concern among the top five problems.  
Senior respondents readily recalled the Chairman Mao era at this point. It was argued that 
since the Maoist controls had been loosened, the vices of old China such as gambling and 
prostitution under many different covers, manufacture, trade and the smuggling of illegal guns 
                                                        
19 Interviewee number 82. 
20 Interviewee number 33. 
21 Interviewee number 23. 
22 Interviewee number 38. 
23 Interviewee number 96. 
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and drugs and the abduction and selling of women and children had reappeared and now 
threatened society. Some others attributed this decay to official values, especially to the high 
moral standard of Communism and the modelling effect of Communist party members, and 
the influx of Western influences in economics, politics and cultures through all kinds of 
resources, connections and information. They said, ‗good role models are still being presented 
but of not much use now in the wave of Western consuming cultures and fashions.‘24Another 
intellectual argued that the root of the moral problem was the pursuit of wealth, which had not 
only become the life goal for individuals but had also been greatly advocated and prioritised 
by organisations, enterprises, classes, local governments, central government and the whole 
nation. It was then suggested that concerns about social ethics were being marginalised and 
the questions ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ were becoming less important. In addition, it was ever more 
dangerous because cunning, profit-driven materialism had been justified by popular morality 
as people were increasingly pragmatic. 
Besides morality, social problems were attached to the fundamental question of there being 
over 1.3 billion people in China, which could not be overlooked. ‗This is the hidden or direct 
cause of many unresolved and difficult problems‘, as one scholar assured me.25 Quite a few 
interviewees contributed to this topic, commenting that the enormous size of the population 
base was proving to still be a bottleneck in economic development, urbanisation capacity, 
poverty elimination, policy implementation, resource utilisation and environment protection. 
Some quoted the negative effects of the ‗One-child policy‘, such as rapid population aging, 
unbalanced sex structure and spoiled children who were treated as little princes and princesses. 
Others were also concerned about rural population, migrants and the residential restraints and 
welfare defects attached to this issue. Another one of the top five problems – education – was 
also closely related to that of population. For individuals, higher education was emphasised as 
a life-changing way out of the villages and small towns into the big cities and even abroad, 
whilst the nation improvement of people‘s holistic quality through education was the key for 
holistic social development. However, faced with the gloomy jobs market after graduation 
and rampant nepotism, people began to doubt, ‗is education still the way that will change life 
as they expect?‘ A second year undergraduate student from Qinghua University expressed his 
worries about future employment. He said, ‗millions of students cannot find a job, even with a 
privileged background of the very top universities, and it‘s particularly difficult to stay at the 
                                                        
24 Interviewee number 61. 
25 Interviewee number 47. 
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capital Beijing.‘26 The national university entrance exam and its related problems drew a large 
amount of criticism. Other problems included the old educational system, teaching and 
learning methods, the obsolete textbooks, random irregular educational charge, teachers at 
universities too busy on funding applications and writing papers to strive for professorships, 
an imbalance of sciences, social sciences, humanities and physical education, and a mismatch 
of scores and values. Fierce criticism was levelled at marketisation, privatisation and the 
expansion of higher education and low public spending financed by central and local budgets, 
the latter resulted in a soaring increase in tuition fees, heavy dependence on private resources 
and less accessibility for the general populace. 
 
4.3 Evaluation and Attribution of Opportunities/ Threats for Contentions 
Modernisation in China is not only destroying the old and establishing the new, it is also a 
painful process which seeks to balance the previously unbalanced and to right the 
accumulative wrongs, to liberate the former bondage and to restrict the new anarchy. This is a 
process of deconstruction, reconstruction and contradiction, which has initiated and triggered 
changes in the political, economic and cultural environment. The positive and negative effects 
of political, economic and social-cultural changes and forces in China should be considered, 
since all the changes themselves are intertwined with each other in exerting a transforming 
influence. How, then, does this model of political opportunity/threat function and operate? 
How – and how much – does social change affect the opportunities and threats bearing on 
potential groups and actors? The mix of support and opposition attributed by a given 
contentious group is conditioned by the perception of opportunity and threat embodied in the 
group‘s self-identities and goals.  
Political opportunity/threat structure is closely related to cultural structures and identities in 
contemporary China. People are performing contentious activities either when they are given 
more opportunities, more freedom and a larger space, or in resistance to perceived threats, 
deprivation of certain rights, restriction and repression, or as a result of a combination of both 
types. The cultural implications of the social change, media interpretation and personal 
experiences are the key to evaluating and attributing opportunities and threats. Moreover, 
insurgents are those who interpret environmental stimuli, attribute opportunity and threat to an 
                                                        
26 Interviewee number 48. 
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evolving situation and act according to these calculations. Therefore, it is necessary to explore 
the popular trends in social perception and mentality in response to the changing social 
realities and problems.  
Popular trends themselves are dynamic and hybrid in their fluctuations. These represent how 
people subjectively regard opportunity, however objectively open, as an opportunity and 
threat as a threat. There are also profound changes lying in mass media and popular discourse: 
language is important and powerful in constructing and reconstructing people‘s worldviews, 
attitudes, behaviours and social realities themselves. Such collective perceptual trends, behind 
the political-economic-social-cultural scene, can be reduced to the discourse itself: social 
ethos, public opinions and faith. The following sections list the practical factors that decide 
the opportunities/threats structure with relation to popular conceptualising trends in order to 
demonstrate the whole evaluation and attribution process. They are demonstrated by the 
sequence of international factors, social-economic transformations, political system and state 
capacities and the role of media - a sequence coherent with the opportunities/threats structure 
in contentious theories.  
 
4.3.1 International environment and nationalism 
International factors were not mentioned much in the interviews conducted, but in contentions 
the analytical model is significant in influencing both the contentious groups and the state. In 
practice, China‘s modernisation is embedded in the process of globalisation; the flux of 
international opportunities and threats has risen since China made itself more open to and 
involved in international society. Thus, the international environment, China‘s position in 
global politics, Chinese diasporas abroad and the transnational political, economic and 
cultural processes can increasingly structure domestic possibilities and should be necessarily 
incorporated. China‘s engagement in the world has benefited China greatly, especially with 
regard to economy, business and trade; on the other hand, with the widening and deepening 
penetration of foreign cultures and values, it has also brought about contradictions between 
nationalism and globalism as well as other economic, cultural, moral and ethical conflicts.  
Patriotism and nationalism (aiguozhuyi and minzuzhuyi respectively in Chinese) has become 
one of the most popular trends in response to the changing international environment. What 
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became apparent from the interviews was that people were claiming to have great pride 
towards the nation. Although ‗democracy and human rights‘ were admitted to be among the 
most problematic issues in Chinese domestic politics, people would assign themselves with a 
different role and perspective when considering it in an international context. Out of a 
nationalist dignity, many interviewees constantly asked the researcher not to expose the dark 
side of China to international society and they sometimes made critical comments on sensitive 
topics after the recorder was switched off. This stand is common and prevalent especially with 
the majority of the younger generation and urban middle class in China. Amongst them is a 
strong self-identity and identity with the nation-state. They are more concerned about the 
speed, pace, width and depth of modernisation, national security and international status than 
which political form the government takes – liberal democratic or authoritarian. It is also the 
authorities‘ strategy to blur the lines and differences, to justify the status quo, to maintain the 
national cultural identity and dignity and to marginalise liberal democracy labelled as 
‗Western‘. The stated objective of the Party‘s political reform turns out to be a gesture 
showing that the Party is more willing and has worked hard to democratise China on its own 
terms in accordance with socialism and Chinese characteristics. The superiority of socialist 
democracy over capitalist democracy and the criticism of new nationalism on foreign 
bourgeois liberalism are still disseminated among the mainstream media within China and 
delivered to the new generations, from elementary schools to postgraduate studies, with the 
compulsory course of politics.  
From the interview discourse, the official terms of ‗peaceful evolution‘, ‗spiritual pollution‘ 
and ‗bourgeois liberalisation‘ and products of the ‗international reactionary forces‘ for the 
swelling influx of exotic heterodoxy, were still quoted and exerted their influences on 
people‘s mentalities. The once sacrosanct principle of liberal democracy as the yardstick of 
modernity and human rights was being questioned as representing no more than the 
imposition of Western values and standards over developing nations like China. Non-
interference was still the classic Chinese maxim. Some doubted, and were alert towards, the 
intention of international interferences and critiques: ‗are they to help China improve its 
human rights record or defame China or even violate China‘s sovereignty?‘27 People were 
especially opposed to theories of ‗China Threat‘ or ‗China Collapse‘ and dissidents were 
usually accused of lacking patriotic sentiment or as worshipping the Western system and 
power. For some scholars, America‘s promotion of democracy in China is designed both to 
                                                        
27 Interviewee number 42. 
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divide China and to weaken Chinese competitive ability (W. Zhang, 2002). Both the Chinese 
authorities and the people can hardly accept the disparaging perspectives and criticisms from 
foreign media, especially American and European accusations, towards China‘s poor human 
rights record – the authorities‘ mistreatments towards minority, religious or dissident 
populations. Therefore nation-building and stability maintenance has been prioritised and has 
guided a series of nationalist movements in the wake of China‘s rise.  
It seems that to some people there are sensitive contradictions between democracy and 
nationalism, and democracy has often to be sacrificed for what Chinese authorities see as the 
higher interest of saving and building the existing nation-state. However, the other side of 
nationalism, with minor voices from dissidents and Chinese diasporas abroad, has attempted 
to combine democracy and nationalism together. Dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners in 
the interviews expressed their passion, patriotism and prospects for the Chinese nation and 
culture, but such sentiments were based on a more globalised solution and they blamed 
Chinese authorities for not fulfilling their promises to the UN human rights charters, also 
thinking that international society hadn‘t done enough to move the Chinese government in 
this aspect of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This side also greatly influenced 
the dissident movements inside and outside China in this era of globalisation and 
informatisation. 
The positioning of the West towards China is transforming too. There is no doubt that Western 
liberalism has been utilised as a kind of weapon to challenge the Party-state doctrines by 
critical intellectuals, notably at the time of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, and has 
initiated an influential tendency towards political pluralism and threatened the party‘s 
absolute monopoly of power and ideology. The pressure on democratisation and improvement 
of human rights record from Chinese communities abroad and Western democratic countries 
is also growing. There is international criticism of the Chinese state‘s repression on social 
political contentions. International governments, NGOs and the media can function as an 
important resource for some challengers, especially the dissidents, but such pressure has been 
indeed less antagonistic than in the period of the post-Tiananmen massacre and focuses more 
on support for good governance to help underpin China‘s domestic stability. More weight is 
also placed on other issues such as climate change, environmental protection, IPR 
(Intellectual Property Rights) protection and anti-counterfeiting, sustainable development, 
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energy and resources, world peacekeeping and so on to engage China as an international 
stakeholder.  
However, it can be argued that in order to be a more responsible regional neighbour and 
global actor, Chinese official rhetoric must undoubtedly welcome increasing openness and 
transparency in the face of the irreversible waves of information globalisation. Yet, this 
current ‗peaceful rise‘ (Zheng, 2005) as a regional and world power may incline the Chinese 
state to be even less willing than in past decades to accept a democratic solution based on 
compromise and power-sharing (He, 2004: 182). As nationalism dominates the national 
project of socialist modernity, people are still attached to different versions of nationalism, 
which can be emotional, cultural, liberal and pragmatic. In fact different groups have varied 
degrees and ways to express nationalism. It can be deduced that the sentiments of national 
Chinese identity are established through an informal, private, casual and vivid way rather than 
completely compliant with official channels. The full range of nationalist contentions will be 
detailed in the following chapters. 
 
4.3.2 Double-edged sword of reform and people’s new request 
As the major part of modernisation China is experiencing a national market economy reform 
and the result is a massive and painful restructuring of industry and society. The profit-driven 
reform is a double-edged sword, which has on the one side raised millions out of poverty, 
changed the existing power relations and provided soil to nourish new classes, associations, 
social roles, identities, values and cultures in favour of more autonomy, freedom and access to 
power and profit. The development of civil society organisations and consciousness is 
undoubtedly a consequence of reform-driven modernisation, which advances opportunities for 
social mobilisation and contention. On the other side, there are new problems generated from 
and attached to China‘s reform and rapid economic growth. The deepest cause is the 
imbalanced processes of modernisation: imbalance between social-political transition and 
economic reforms, between material pursuit and spiritual demand and between human and 
nature. Such imbalance is also a result of the conflicting co-existence of agricultural, 
industrial and knowledge-based societies. As the above tables showed, the cost and side effect 
of reforms can be presented as corruption, injustice, inequality, unemployment, insecurity and 
deprivation of certain groups of people, value vacuums, moral conflict, identity confusion, 
96 
 
environmental pollution, resource shortage and ecological disruption. These problems have 
covered the dysfunction and abnormality of individuals, the society, the Party-state, and 
Nature. As can be understood from the interviews, respondents have different evaluations and 
conceptualisations. Some are afraid that all these are reversing China‘s success in achieving 
the fundamental conditions essential to democratisation while others regard them as both 
threats and opportunities to initiate more critical and radical transformations. Undoubtedly, 
the accumulation and complication of problems has threatened the social, political and 
environmental system and thus triggered new requests from discontented people. 
On the political-economic aspect, market-oriented reform, rapid economic modernisation and 
globalisation have introduced greater economic and social inequalities and led to ‗distributive 
conflicts‘ (Wang, 2000) where social groups and regions have benefited from reforms very 
unevenly. Social stratification and mobility have raised more attention than before. The 
phenomenon of new poor and new rich also represent the inequality of classes, opportunities, 
industries and places and reflect the conflicting coexistence of the three societies with the 
rich-poor gap expanding at the societal borders. Criticism also arose in the interviews toward 
the fact that the state is still a representative of the dominant groups in society with policies 
and rules in favour of them, delicately or directly forcing the subordinate groups to accept 
them. Therefore, the problem of inequality is entangled with that of injustice; people admit 
that there cannot be absolute equality in society, but they cannot tolerate inequality created by 
unjust means and they severely oppose any unjust institution. The most unbearable cause of 
inequality is corruption, which has become an institutionalised injustice. It is commonly and 
widely believed that people with political power divert public property for their own 
economic gain. These always involve complex webs composed of different levels of officials 
from the basic to the top and thus drive ‗rent seeking‘ to new heights, hobbling the emergence 
of a more effective administration (Fewsmith, 2001: 9-10). It can be concluded that corruption 
has wilfully prevailed all state apparatus from civil and judicial to military departments, 
fiercely swallowed the country‘s treasure and severely eroded people‘s confidence in the 
country‘s politics. It is further argued that the lack of a legal and regulatory framework and an 
independent judiciary, the absence of the essence of the ‗rule of law‘, the party‘s continuing 
control over law enforcement and the empty shell of other non-party surveillance institutions 
are the causes of the ineffectual anti-corruption campaigns (Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999: 
14). 
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Therefore, one of the strongest and most popular requests is for equality and justice. This 
opposition against inequality and injustice is most likely to irritate people‘s emotions, 
grievances and agonies. The more people that value equality, justice and equity, the more they 
scorn and detest the problems of corruption, power-money exchange, the rich-poor gap and 
absence of law. More and more contentious cases are appealing for the initial equality of 
opportunities, the procedural fairness of the rules and finally the ultimate justice of results. In 
addition, people‘s strong demands for equality and justice in redistribution are directly 
attached to an inherent need for social security where, in spite of the constant efforts and 
emphasis from the government, a welfare system has still not been completely established.  
On the social-moral aspect, behind the request for equality and justice is a deep 
transformation and demand in the value system. During economic reform, with the 
accelerating tendency of capitalism and globalisation, moneymaking has obliterated other 
values. Official corruption has resulted in the widespread loss of idealism, alienation from the 
people, loss of political vigilance and rampant materialism among senior cadres. The model 
effect of individual actors in the political system, who seek personal financial benefit from 
socioeconomic changes, has even made corruption an excuse as a necessary means for getting 
by in the world and ‗even a little person seeks a favour‘. Attention becomes directed more 
towards how to get along in a corrupted world and how, if possible, to benefit from it rather 
than towards how to change it (Levy, 2002: 49). The incurable corruption of the Party gives 
the Chinese people another kind of freedom – the freedom to feel justified in engaging in anti-
social behaviour to fulfil one‘s own selfish desires – which may be the most harmful legacy of 
this regime in China (Liu, 2002: 28-30). For example, the fake and inferior commodities are 
widespread and uncontrollable, which not only harm the interests of consumers and original 
producers, but also damage the trust, credit and business ethics of society. And this is not 
simply a result of moral failure but of systemic pressures and temptations. 
There are other problems focusing on the cultural and moral conflicts between tradition and 
modernity, between different generations and, particularly, on the deviation and anti-social 
behaviour of the younger generation. Although on the surface the Marxist anti-theism is still 
the philosophic basis for socialist ideology and worldview, it is not rooted any more in the 
minds of the majority, with more and more people converting to other old, new or mixed 
beliefs, faiths and religions. Public security was another big concern that follows with 
increasing variety and quantity of crimes. The profound psychological impact of insecurity 
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along with the stressful pace of modern life has either recalled people to regress back to 
traditional social values or thrown them into the formless flux of information and cynical 
nihilism.  
Social morality related contentions, especially online exposure and contestation (detailed in 
chapter 8), have shown that citizens are falling into persistent habits of entrenched corruption 
and other social-economic-political problems, which will undermine public faith in society 
and its leaders. The last question in the social reality part of the interview was about people‘s 
value system: ‗what do you value and pursue most in your life (money, power, prestige, faith, 
ideals, morality, family, social justice, societal welfare, national prosperity, etc.)? Have you 
ever changed your values and beliefs (if yes, what are the influential factors – family, friends, 
celebrities, changing society, religion, media, the Internet, etc.)?‘ The responses showed that 
over 90% of interviewees affirmed their values were spiritual rather than materialistic, and 
altruistic rather than egoistical, as social justice and welfare have been most mentioned. This, 
though, does not accord with the society often described as crazed with the pursuit of money 
and power, but reflects people‘s good will and a request for a reestablishment of the 
traditional value systems.  
 
4.3.3 Central-local complexity and deconstruction of authorities 
While the centralised Leninist Party-state has made great efforts to remain in control and hold 
China together, it has been challenged and changed by the modernisation process 
accompanied by economic decentralisation. On the one hand, the Party-state has shown its 
capacity for integration by making a massive and largely successful attempt to integrate the 
economies of the localities into the national economy. On the other hand, the mechanisms of 
marketisation have transformed the economic function of central government‘s direct control 
into a more indirect and macroeconomic-based control, with more local decision-making over 
economic activities and affairs. Furthermore, central leadership is resisting any political 
reform that will undercut Party authority whilst at the same time weakening centralised 
functions and the accompanying shift of political power from the centre to the local and 
continuing to erode the authority of the centre (Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999: 16). New 
local alliances are forming united fronts against the centre‘s commands because of their 
divergent interests. The economic protectionism of local interests has also expanded to 
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become a political and a criminal faction. On the one hand the central government has been 
hard-pressed in the delivery of public goods such as public health, education, pension reform 
and protection of the environment, and on the other hand there remains a lack of effective 
enforcement and implementation in the localities (W. Chen, 2007). The application of laws, 
regulations and policies is sometimes biased by corrupt arrangements or is reflecting the local 
balanced interests (OECD, 2005: 24). 
The centre has taken anti-corruption as its incumbent task in order to save the party and the 
nation from deterioration. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the 
CPC have made major progress in ‗digging out big graft cases, improving supervision system, 
curbing commercial bribery and correcting malpractice that harms the interests of the people‘ 
under the principle of curbing corruption by both punitive and preventative measures (Xinhua 
Net, 2007). Thorough investigation might eventually become a deterrent for the corrupt 
officials, however, it encounters barriers, protectionism and interest conflicts on all levels 
below. The way officials stick up for and protect one another is very common, which is 
known as mutual self-interest or nepotism. The corrupt officials from the city, villages and 
township levels all have certain links to higher authorities for their ‗corruption‘ protection. 
The phenomenon of corruption has become institutional. It has penetrated most organisations, 
departments and institutions in the political system and has become a way of  arranging the 
redistribution of political, economic, social and cultural resources used to reduce the inter 
system frictions. Anti-corruption is not merely a punishment and surveillance of corruption, 
but has become a tool for political intimidation and factional struggles. There are 
inadequacies in the court system, such as judicial ignorance of the law, corruption within the 
judicial system, pressures on judges from the local government and CPC officials and an 
inability by the courts to enforce their own decisions (OECD, 2005: 26). Widespread 
corruption and indiscipline have also reduced the general capacity and effiencicy of 
governments, which have allowed sectional interests to capture local governments in some 
parts of the country, empowering kinship groups, chambers of commerce or even criminal 
gangs (OECD, 2005: 69). Since the police may utilise criminal gangs to subdue other 
criminals, the so-called combat-poison-with-poison policy has, in fact, legitimised the 
existing ‗police-bandit collaboration‘ (Liu, 2002: 29). 
Faced with the complex nature of the central-local issue, which has opened both opportunities 
and threats for various contentions, the population perceive the state as both strong and weak. 
100 
 
It is strong in the sense that the centre still makes vital decisions and the use of repression is 
largely under their command. Controls in some social-political arenas have actually been 
strengthened, as the Party-state is fighting cultists, activists, separatists and all other dissidents 
groups with hardly any tolerance for other voices. It is weak in the sense of serious local 
resistance and protectionism in different regions. The central-local conflicts have, to a great 
degree, affected the centre in mobilising resources, delivering social goods, implementing 
policies and laws and managing local interest. A scholarasserted in the 2006 interview that the 
weakening Party-state is less able to handle social problems and unrest with effective 
solutions.
28
 While some people protest against the powerful Party-state violating their rights 
and freedom, others oppose an impotent state to try and solve the problems of inequality and 
injustice. The state response has indicated the intricate central-local relationship, since 
different contentions are treated with toleration or repression from local government 
inconsistently with central ruling. 
It needs to be clarified that there are no direct and open confrontations of central-local or state 
versus the people. The centre does not want a contradictory relationship with localities or its 
people but neither can it afford the growing power of local alliances involving officials and 
interest groups at the expense of weakening itself. However, it is interesting to note that 
underneath the official unification, upholding and complying with the authority, there is an 
irreversible momentum of fragmentation, diversification and deconstruction of authority. The 
deconstruction of authorities has begun not only in the theories and discourse on 
postmodernism but also in practice. Less unquestioning obedience to authorities, less 
dependence on the elites or experts and more initiatives to find alternatives are all around the 
scene of people‘s everyday lives. There are different groups challenging the dominant values 
and Party-state claims that they are representative of society as a whole. Chinese leaders‘ lack 
of moral and practical authority has also been questioned by local citizens, which is shown in 
many aspects of local bureaucracy. The deconstruction and defiance of authority on the one 
hand reinforces the self-conscious autonomy of people to initiate a reconstruction of state-
individual and central-local relationships, while on the other hand it produces a greater satiric 
cynicism, which will have a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the CPC and Chinese state 
institutions. 
                                                        
28 Interviewee number 77. 
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‗People‘, as a collective consciousness, are indeed becoming stronger. The people – the mass 
of ordinary human beings – are believed to have a sense of their own self-worth and of their 
own rights. The self-consciousness of subjectivity and rebellion, along with a tendency 
toward rapid commercialisation, the rise of a diverse popular culture and the gradual 
formation of a private and civic sphere, all provides a pool of expressive and symbolic 
resources for particular individuals and groups to draw from in their attempt to make sense of 
their own situation and create a viable identity when confronting socioeconomic problems. In 
the seven series documentary ‗Unseen China‘ (2003), which has taken a close look at the 
disadvantaged groups of farmers, migrant workers, laid-off workers and retirees by a human 
rights activist, the author and producer was asked the question, ‗Who can fix the problems?‘ 
to which he replied, ‗History. The people will make history and solve their problems 
themselves.‘ 
The state has realised the strength of people and their movements. There is constant 
ideological adaptation, policy orientation and regulation to represent people‘s interests, 
channel people‘s grievances and join contentious forces together. The administrative reforms, 
such as those on appealing institutions and procedures, can be great policy opportunities for 
the dispossessed to appeal to a particular department or higher authority. Such opportunities 
should be carefully balanced against the threat of defection and the inefficiency of policy 
implementation, the local resistance to central decisions, and other political, financial, identity 
or physical risks. This thesis will further discuss how people make use of the complexity 
between the central and local state and interact with the state during their contentions to 
deconstruct various authorities and reconstruct the power of people themselves. 
 
4.3.4 Mass media and the internet 
The transformation of the mass media is part of a wide-ranging social change. The above-
mentioned administrative reform in favour of appealers does not automatically open an 
objective opportunity until it is widely spread, perceived, and subjectively constructed. For 
example, as early as 1990 the Administrative Procedure Law came into effect to make 
bureaucracy function more justly, but at that time many ordinary people neither realise that 
they had the right to bring a suit against rapacious, arbitrary officials nor did they dare to take 
brave action until the media exposed more of these cases. The civil laws introduced to protect 
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people‘s rights and regulate the market economy, the reconfiguration of political structures 
and the gradual blossoming of a versatile civil society have all opened up opportunities for 
further and deeper social transformation and popular movements. However, the people 
themselves have to visualise and conceptualise these opportunities not only through official 
channels but also through various unofficial, civil, exotic, underground and informal ways to 
get a comprehensive view of the whole picture. This requirement, of comprehensibility, 
should also apply to the view and understanding of threats. The media in general have taken 
the important role of making such opportunities and threats visible, promoting both 
apprehension and potential among ordinary people and, in particular, inviting mobilisation 
initiated by some potential challengers. This is one of the vital steps in the attribution of 
opportunities, threats and the distribution of their related information. 
According to the interview question ‗Are you interested in China‘s national and international 
situation?‘, unsurprisingly, all the respondents showed a certain degree of interest at the 
average level or above: 67.2% claimed to be quite interested in daily news and events while 
10.2% were extremely interested in them. From the multiple-choice question, ‗In what ways 
do you obtain or exchange such information as the national or international news‘, it can be 
seen that TV (92.1% of respondents), newspapers (80.6%) and the internet (65.5%) were 
considered to be the top three methods for intellectuals to gain information. Radio (43.8%) 
and magazines (42.4%) are also favourable alternatives for some students and professionals 
(journalists and lawyers), however, few would stop at the community or street bulletin board 
to see what is going on around them.  
Music, films, TV programs, magazines, newspapers and all sorts of media are flourishing in 
quantity, quality and content and their function is considered as the official propaganda tools 
that gradually transform into authentic media and resources for popular cultures or 
subcultures. The press industry has planned major transformations in order to democratise the 
distribution of newspapers to all the population. As stated in the official 11
th
 Five-Year Plan 
Period (2006-2010), efforts will be made to accelerate the transformation from state-owned 
newspapers to ‗enterprises‘, to focus on digital newspapers, in all of its production and 
distribution aspects, to increase government investment towards rural areas and to increase 
the penetration rate, but to strictly forbid the apportioning of newspaper circulation to rural 
grass-roots organisations and farmers (State Press and Publication Administration, 2006). The 
plan also calls for the quality-oriented growth of the press, rather than the current quantitative 
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boom in the number of titles. As always, those points are ideologically conservative and 
economical, and remain at this paper stage, but they are still open to the possibility of reform 
by showing China‘s prudent approach towards a market economy for newspapers, coupled 
with a strong desire for innovation and modernity. 
It is remarkable that the internet is becoming increasingly popular as ‗it is a pragmatic and 
convenient tool for both input and output of information‘, as a 56-year-old scholar 
commented in an interview.
29
 The internet is especially useful for the exchange of information 
(65.5% chose the internet). As a university student said, ‗the anonymity and diversity of the 
online forums or blogs cannot be praised too much as people can find a perfectly safe and 
special space to express their own opinions and appreciate others‘.30 When talking about the 
internet as a means of catapulting China into the future, both the Chinese government and the 
ordinary people, especially the young generation, are exploring it as a unique public sphere 
for discussion and debates and making the best of it during this nationwide craze. The 
penetration of the internet has had an unexpected impact and brought about changes 
unconsciously in every aspect of people‘s lives, and it has also pressed the authorities for 
more transparency and openness. While the traditional media is not free enough to follow and 
report on government behaviour and suffers from government intervention in the topic and 
content of the news and risks punishment, the internet has broken through these barriers with 
its omnipresence, immediacy and creative distribution of information. There will be a specific 
chapter focusing on internet contentions as this is the most popular and effective way of social 
mobilisation for intellectuals and white-collar workers. Since people have increasingly 
recognised and practiced this power of the media, especially the internet, both the deprived 
and disadvantaged groups and the privileged intellectuals can take advantage, seek to express 
their own subcultures, build up coalitions, vent grievances and gain resonance. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In order to operationalise the extensive theorising on contention, this chapter first examined a 
list of indicators from political, economic and social-cultural dimensions through statistics 
and quotations taken from the results of the interview. Thus, the first half has provided a 
                                                        
29 Interviewee number 69. 
30 Interviewee number 58. 
104 
 
contour of China‘s realities and problems, which is ready to be translated into 
opportunity/threat structures for social-political contentions. Based on the descriptive 
categorisation, it is clear that all the political, economic, social-cultural problems interact with 
each other and with the popular trends that perceive and are attributed to opportunities and 
threats.  
There is strong nationalism from different areas in response to China‘s modernisation and 
globalisation. There is an ironically perceived contradiction between the poor/weak and 
rich/powerful in reaction to the fact that the ruling classes, who are more responsible 
historically for the old institution, have gained most of the reforms by benefiting from 
privileged status, unchecked power and corruption, while labourers have shouldered the cost 
of the reforms and benefited much less from them. There is a towering rage towards the depth 
and width of corruption in China, which has threatened economic prosperity and political 
authority. However, there is growing awareness of the party‘s inability to control corruption, 
because of its weak law enforcement and the central-local complexity, which further 
undermines its legitimacy. There is a prevailing recognition of profit-driven cultures derived 
from the poorly regulated market economy and reform opening up the accompanying moral 
decay, ideological collapse and faith vacuum. There is a worrying concern about social safety 
and security and a deep grievance towards the government‘s failure to establish a complete 
security system.  
While people are expressing more concerns on the side effects and problems with reforms, 
there emerges a strong request for nation-state re-establishment, on social equity and welfare, 
on morality reconstruction and on economic sustainability with an emphasis on environmental 
issues. These requests have constituted the popular response to social realities and problems at 
the macro level, which set up a background for the emergence of social and political 
contentions. The international environment, domestic political system and Party-state capacity 
are all interrelated to frame the landscape of contentions. The mass media and the internet 
have also empowered people to challenge Party monism and other sources of authority and 
produced opportunities and threats perceived and transferred to the challengers.  
I have established this broad context of the political, economic and social-cultural dimensions 
from the answers given by the interviewees and set out the main macro-level structures of 
social change in transitional China – the international environment, domestic political system 
and Party-state capacity. The following chapters explore mobilising structures within a 
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framework of state-society-individual relationships, and then demonstrate concrete causes and 
cultural structures for each group‘s contentious activities at meso and micro level, This will 
explain how each group perceives its own position within the multiple transitions that China 
is currently experiencing and how they transform their perception of the distribution of risks 
and opportunities into real contentious mobilisation. 
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Chapter 5 – Civil Society and Mobilisation Structure 
5.1 Introduction 
The mobilising structure at the meso-level is the second mechanism in social movement 
theory to be employed in the analysis of the entire contentious process. As explained earlier in 
the theoretical framework, mobilising structures refer to formal and informal structures. These 
structures are used to manifest the protest by mobilising resources and organising collective 
actions. The formal pre-existing structures and institutional resources are relatively inadequate 
in China compared to mature civil societies, such as those in the democratic world. However, 
networking and organisational resources, especially by means of informal links, on-site 
appropriation and now the explosive resource of internet mobilisation, may be particularly 
helpful within the contemporary Chinese context for transforming state-society-individual 
relations. In the real world of contentions, where challengers may experience organisational 
deficits within the pre-existing mobilising structures, and where prior structural propensity 
may be rather fluid, the dynamic interaction and appropriation of groups and individuals 
within these structures will be highly significant. 
 
A civil society can be the breakthrough point for the mobilising structure of contentions, 
bearing conceptual and practical significance. This civil society with Chinese characteristics, 
involving civil society organisations (SCOs), informal networks and the online ‗public 
sphere‘, is a process of dynamic transformation rather than static social setting. This chapter 
will concentrate mainly on the offline organisations and networks, as well as offer a depiction 
of the new arena of the online public sphere, in order to demonstrate how these civil society 
structures can be appropriated and turned into vehicles of mobilisation for contentions. It will 
begin with the variety and diversity of CSOs in China, followed by a discussion of the 
different cleavages that are influential in organising the operation and mobilisation of 
contentions. Then I examine the individual-society-state relationship by comparing people‘s 
networking resources and organisational resources, and by looking at state interference in 
CSOs. Last but not least, the online arena will be introduced as a new component of Chinese 
civil society and contentious mobilising structure. Interview results with the support of related 
literature will be combined and discussed.  
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5.2 The proliferation of organisations and Typology 
Table 12 Organisations and activities 
  
Organisations  Membership Leadership Attendance of 
organisational 
activities 
1. Business association 2 0 9 
2. Professional association 3 0 1 
3. Academic and alumni 
association 
65 3 31 
4. ACFTU 22 1 16 
5. ACWF 0 0 5  
6. Political group 40 7 22 
7. Neighbourhood 
committee 
1 0 1 
8. Township-based 
community group 
17 1 22 
9. Religious or spiritual 
group 
22 7 45 
10. Cultural group or 
association 
11 1 7 
11. Sports group 4 0 2 
12. Youth volunteer group 7 2 5 
13. Non-governmental 
organisation or civic 
group 
13 0 11 
Total  207 22 176 
 
Amongst the multiple-choice questions for the 21 types of organisations proposed during the 
interviews,
31
 13 of them have been selected with different densities of organisational 
affiliation amongst the interviewees (see table 12). It is not surprising that rural-based 
organisations such as farmer/fisherman groups or co-operatives, village committees and burial 
societies or festival societies (which enjoy more popularity in the countryside) are absent 
                                                        
31   Farmer/fisherman groups or cooperative, other production groups, business associations, professional associations, 
academic and alumni associations, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Women‘s Federation, political groups, 
neighbourhood/village committees, community service group, township-based community groups, ethnic-based community 
groups, religious or spiritual groups, cultural groups or associations, burial society or festival society, finance, credit or saving 
groups, education groups, health and medicine groups, sports groups, youth volunteer groups, non-governmental 
organisations or civic groups. 
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from the table as the interviews were mainly conducted in metropolitan cities such as Beijing 
and Wuhan. Other production groups, community service groups, ethnic-based community 
groups, finance, credit or saving groups, education groups and health and medical groups are 
also deselected. However, the results from small-scale interview surveys do not rule out their 
existence and potential for development in the real world. A whole range of CSOs have 
sprung up as the Party-state‘s reach shrank considerably. This mushrooming proliferation of 
organisations also meets the newly emerging social demands and deals with the complicated 
mediation of interests between the state and private spheres. To take the ‗finance, credit or 
saving group‘ as an example, rural small-credit issues (providing financial services for 
productivity purposes towards ordinary farmers with medium or low income) were first 
managed under the governments Poverty Alleviation Office and then moved to the 
Agricultural Bank and Rural Credit Cooperative with main funding from governmental 
allowances. After 2000, more and more non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private 
foundations were gradually established and prospered in order to provide such services for 
disadvantaged farmers. This was in accordance to the growing demand from rural areas with 
their flexibility and various resources of funding (Xie, 2005).  
 
Referring to table 2 on ‗The Basic Statistics of Samples‘ under the categories of ‗Occupation‘, 
‗Political affiliation‘ and ‗Religious affiliation‘, it is evident that these three mentioned 
variables are still the decisive factors for respondents with different occupations and social 
status to join different types of organisations. All of the business associations mentioned by 
the respondents are different industry associations with members and attendants mainly from 
entrepreneurs and white-collar groups, with organisational activities covering exhibitions, 
training and conferences. The attendance rate is obviously higher than that of membership. As 
for journalists, lawyers and other professional white-collar workers, only three of them 
possessed memberships in related associations and the attendance rate is low. Instead, some of 
them prefer to join Non-governmental organisations or civic groups, which represent more 
elements of public interest, charity and volunteerism. On the other hand, 9 out of 11 
researchers, lecturers and professors and 17 out of 26 students have joined various local, 
national or international associations for academics. Moreover, the alumni associations at all 
educational levels are not limited to campus but open to all groups of people, and have thus 
gained the highest membership in spite of the relatively low attendance. Noticeably many of 
the alumni associations are network based and operational in cyberspace and thus recruit 
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members and participants online.  
 
22 of the respondents were clearly aware of their membership in the official All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). One national leader proudly claimed that the ACFTU 
in the new era of reforms has been transformed and is preparing to respond to new industrial 
development. This creates a new space of independence and freedom for itself and its 
commitment to labour law and economic democracy. Ironically, over half of these 
respondents were from elite groups such as intellectuals and cadres, while amongst the 
labourers 17 migrant workers were excluded from the trade union and most of the 15 laid-off 
workers were also detached from their original organisations. Due to its special organisational 
structure, which accepts only a collective membership in the All-China Women‘s Federation 
(ACWF), no interviewees regarded themselves as members of this national official 
organisation with its numerous local branches, but several said they had attended the activities 
organised by ACWF or had approached them for consultation, help and support.  
 
Questions about political groups in the interviews primarily referred to political movement 
organisations, excluding China‘s formal party organisations such as the CPC, Communist 
Youth League or other existing political consultative parties. However, most respondents with 
these political affiliations identified with this category. This interesting result meant the 
boundary between political organisations, within and outside the institution, was indeed 
obscure among the Chinese public; politics also linked closely with parties in Chinese 
discourse. The activities organised by the CPC or Youth League were largely compulsory and 
formalised, including frequent study seminars on current policies and theories, meetings, 
visits, celebrations and so on. None reported to have joined any political movement 
organisations or attended any organised political contentions inside China. Only two 
dissidents in this category claimed to have joined political groups outside China. Concerning 
politics, most interviewees were still cautious about affiliations and labels and preferred 
playing politics safe within officialdom than joining popular political organisations that are 
subject to restriction and even persecution. However, beyond the formal one-party politics and 
direct organisational pro-democratic confrontations, indirect and spontaneous political 
challenges are everywhere with a burgeoning popular consciousness and participation in 
everyday life and contentious activities.  
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Migrant workers have spontaneously established and voluntarily taken part in alternative 
organisations to strengthen mutual contacts and protect their rights based on their original 
townships in the present communities. Nine out of 17 migrant worker respondents have such 
memberships while 13 of them have even joined organised activities spanning bargaining for 
migrants‘ rights, friendship networking and festival celebration. More details will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. All the 20 self-conscious religious people belong to either 
formal or informal religious groups such as churches, fellowships, temples, religious study or 
evangelical groups and spiritual movements, while seven of them are ministers or spiritual 
leaders. Besides day-to-day religious interaction, outreach and services, there are silent 
protests and accumulative rage against government persecution of house churches and radical 
demonstrations from Falun Gong groups abroad. Cultural groups, NGOs or civic groups, as 
well as Youth volunteer groups, recruit mainly intellectuals, from university students to a few 
professionals. Some of them have religious backgrounds. Popular cultural groups have 
covered people‘s interest and professions in literature, arts, music and various other forms 
with casual meetings and collective sharing. NGOs or civic groups mentioned by the 
respondents include non-government charity and welfare groups, environmental groups and 
anti-AIDS associations, all with different scales of campaigns including public education and 
fund-raising activities. 
 
The flourishing of civil society has been primarily and obviously presented by the 
proliferation of civil society organisations. Between the time of Mao and the Reform Era, all 
social organisations were under strict state control. More than 100 nationwide associations 
and more than 6,000 local associations existed before and during the early 1960s until they 
were paralysed by the Cultural Revolution (Wu and Chen, 1996). It is argued that the 
economic reforms introduced in the 1980s brought with greater freedom for individuals in 
China. The country witnessed a resurrection of civil organisations when the state relaxed 
some of its controls over organisational management. By June 1996 there were more than 
1,800 such registered national organisations and nearly 200,000 local ones (Wu and Chen, 
1996). Individuals were also granted greater freedom to assemble and form private or popular 
organisations. Chinese civil society organisations include a variety of groups, such as national 
mass organisations, that the Party authorities created and funded, smaller citizen associations 
registered under national regulations and loose networks of unregistered grassroots 
organisations (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005).  During the Reform 
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Era, new mass societies and associations appeared and proliferated into an increasing number 
of fields with diverse titles and definitions. According to official Chinese statistics, the 
number of registered CSOs increased from 289,432 in 2004, 354,393 in 2006 to 413,660 in 
2008
32
. One Chinese source estimated the number of unregistered organisations could be as 
high as three million (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2004; 2006; Zhao and Dong, 2005).  
 
The interview results provide a total account of memberships, leadership and attendance 
which prove to be useful statistics.  Except for the 14 respondents who had nothing to do with 
any organisation, the remaining 106 respondents had joined on average 1.95 organisations and 
attended various organisational activities 1.66 times. Amongst those over 10% were leaders 
ranging from alumni administrators to church ministries to group chairpersons. It is found 
through the interviews that the membership, with its requirements, responsibilities and rights, 
is highly related to the socio-economic-political features of the interviewees. For example, the 
groups of intellectuals and religious people have shown a stronger associational attachment 
than labourers. Meanwhile, not all of the CSOs, CPC/Youth League and ACFTU 
organisations account for more than one-third of total membership. It cannot be denied that 
the mentality and consciousness of a number of respondents towards organisations remains 
within the range of formal and governmental organisations, such as the party and even work 
units. Despite that, relative attendance is not proportionate. On the one hand, organisations 
such as business associations, Women‘s Federations, township-based community groups and 
religious or spiritual groups have attracted more attendance from non-members and involved 
them in group activities. On the other hand, the rest of the organisations consciously or 
unconsciously limit their activities within membership, and demonstrate a deficiency of 
attendance or sometimes a lack of willingness to attend. Some argue that China does not lack 
associations in all aspects of people‘s daily life, but still lacks some kind of underlying value 
akin to Habermas‘s ‗civil society‘ – a humane society (Lindau and Cheek, 1998: 6). Therefore, 
according to either Western and Chinese interpretations or realities, civil society is not only 
about organisations. It is necessary to look into organisational cleavages, cultural and power 
relations that lie behind, or within, the organisational proliferation in China, into the 
qualitative essence of the quantitative prosperity, and into delicate and profound changes as 
well as the stubborn obstacles. 
 
                                                        
32 Source from the official website of Chinese Social Organization, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/, hosted by the Bureau of 
Nongovernmental Organization Management under the Ministry of Civil Affairs.   
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5.3 Different cleavages within civil society organisations 
The interview question examining organisational categorisation is:  
 
 There are differences in characteristics: age (generation), gender, place of birth, residence 
(and duration), dialects, ethnic background, education, occupation, income, social status 
and religious and political beliefs. To what extent do any such differences divide your 
organisations?  
 
The main answer (with 72.3% of the valid responses) can easily lead to the conclusion that 
their organisations are based on a form of similarity rather than differences. As long as they 
have one of the categories in common – the same hometown/religion/political 
affiliation/interest/other social goals – this is the most significant factor defining the nature of 
their organisations; other demographic or social-economic-political features seem not to 
matter at all or get excluded in the first place. It is not difficult to understand that when people 
prioritise harmony and solidarity as traditional merits, differences may be accepted but 
separation or division (which are in Chinese traditional discourses related to conflicts) would 
be mentally avoided and practically prevented. The principle of inclusion rather than 
exclusion is usually praised in the organisation. However, for a minority of the interviewees, a 
few complaints have still actively covered almost all the factors. State and non-state sectors 
have also been mentioned as sources of deep psychological cleavage distinguishing group 
members from each other, especially in the alumni associations. Disagreements and conflicts 
during the organisational decision-making process persistently emerge from different social 
backgrounds or experience, and economic status represents the primary conflicting factor. 
One minister quoted an example that the explicit division and implicit comparison in 
occupation and income among church members may more or less influence the spiritual 
health of the church as a whole
33
. The generation gap is another divisional factor between the 
elder and younger believers as different generations, with different experience of the historical 
periods, may have wide gaps in perspectives, knowledge, perceptions, concepts, value 
systems and culture
34
. 
 
                                                        
33 Interviewee number 92. 
34 Interviewee number 92. 
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Besides objective factors that form cleavages within organisations, the Chinese are also 
presented by Bo Yang (1992) in his book ‗The ugly Chinaman and the crisis of Chinese 
culture‘, as a nation of people best at inner-organisational dissensions, small factions and 
internecine struggles. It can be further argued that differences in characteristics might not be 
automatically turned into cleavages but that these are sometimes encouraged at the 
establishment stage of the organisation. However, as long as the organisations are not based 
on the modern social contract and obligation of civil society but on the enlargement and 
extension of the private sphere with its emphasis on personal connections and networks, the 
cultural origins of prejudice, jealousy, clique, exclusion, indifference, selfishness, distrust and 
rivalry will sustain the objective differences to a level significant enough to produce 
cleavages and even conflicts that may divide an organisation. The reality of civil society 
development and organisational mobilisation has exposed different cleavages and 
organisational deficits that many participants suffer, and this is vividly represented in the 
fragmentation within and among organisations during contentions. 
 
The cleavages within civil society organisations are deepening with reference to social classes 
and groups, regional differentiation, age groups, ethnicity and religion that possibly lead in 
turn to the stratification, contradiction and exclusion within social contentions. Some of these 
were caused by the grand social and economic transformations of the post-reform era while 
some were shaped by historical and cultural factors. For example, as social inequalities have 
been aggregated rather than weakened during reforms, the conceptions of class and hierarchy 
still have strong roots and influence in society. There are also cleavages in the understanding 
of democracy or foreign involvement that distinguish the pro-democracy groups from other 
domestic NGOs. By comparing urban residents with farmers, young people with elder people, 
strata of higher educational levels with those of lower ones, people in developed coastal areas 
with those in mid-West regions, it is clear they all have different demands for autonomy and 
freedom. It is also noticeable that there are some forces of instability, though these are also the 
weaker groups such as the laid-off workers, migrant workers, underground religious groups, 
dissidents and unhappy intellectuals. There is a gradual tendency for different social groups to 
integrate with one another, to form a broader social network and mobilise more resources to 
claim people‘s voices and rights, to overcome the participatory indifference or distorted 
factions and to limit authoritarian power. These will be discussed further in the following 
chapters.    
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5.4 Resources of networking and organisation: a comparison 
By contrasting the two interview questions below, the author goes on to further explore the 
expansion of networking resources and organisational resources in China and the interaction 
between the two:  
 
 ‗What kind of people make up your networks? How is your relationship with others 
(frequency of contact)? How do you understand the function and influence of informal 
networks and relationships in your own life and in China?‘  
 ‗How deep is the relationship within your organisations and how is the leadership? Do 
you trust each other? Will you have financial links with or support from other members?  
 
The first question deals with the formation, density, function and influence of people‘s 
networks. With reference to the previous question about information exchange it can be seen 
that there is a dynamic of communication within people‘s relational networks. 76.5% of them 
would like to have occasional or regular discussion on certain news and topics with their 
families, friends, classmates, teachers or colleagues. Among the factors that form people‘s 
networks, familial, alumni and occupational attachments remain strong and count for up to 
90%. The geographic connections such as hometown are popular among university students 
and migrant workers while neighbourhood is often ignored by urban residents. On the other 
hand, respondents‘ views towards informal networks and human relations or connections 
(guanxi) varied. Some typical opinions are that, ‗it is impossible to put an end to ―depending 
on connections‖ in China.‘35 ‗I don‘t regard it as a social evil but rather as a deep-rooted 
tradition.‘36 ‗Sometimes it is necessary or even beneficial as long as the result turns out to be a 
win-win situation (to both sides of the connection) no matter what method you use.‘ 37 Others 
take critical views against guanxi as an essential tool to achieve any personal goals in every 
aspect of social life and they argue it is a very abnormal, distorted and helpless social 
phenomenon that has accelerated the destruction of commitments towards social equality, 
justice and rule of law. Certainly, these criticisms differentiate such malfunctioned guanxi 
from the normal human relations people have with each other. There are also worries that the 
                                                        
35 Interviewee number 67. 
36 Interviewee number 40. 
37 Interviewee number 67. 
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boundaries between the two have been gradually obscured.  
 
In the field of academic discussion considering China‘s lengthy, complex and sophisticated 
cultural traditions (Moody, 1995: 1-15) as well as the growing popularity of egoism, the 
strength of the private sphere is still perceived as wielding its influence through the Chinese 
characterised informal relationship or connection – guanxi – which historically prevailed in 
all aspects of life. Guanxi, as ‗social connections‘, is based on a blend of exchange and 
mutual affection that create feelings of responsibility and obligation on the one hand and 
indebtedness on the other (Ma and Ortolano, 2000: 77-96). In general, guanxi is maintained 
by trading favours over long periods and such exchanges are often viewed as creating a 
resource that can be used to ‗get things done‘. As the reforms have deepened without a 
complete regulatory system, this resource of networking, involving a broad range of activities 
and strategies held to be widespread in Chinese business, has interacted with political power 
and progressed from advancing the interests of friends and family, or performing services in 
exchange for future favours, to outright bribe-taking (Wank, 2002). When complex chains of 
obligation, created by the exchange of favours, have developed to a delicate degree and when 
the private sphere is penetrating into the Party-state without proper power checks or 
surveillance from the society, the practice can easily turn into corruption. Normal political and 
economic operation can be replaced by the illegal and unfair measures of goal-achievement. 
Furthermore, patriarchal or familial relations tied by blood as another dimension of guanxi 
would create an attenuated citizenship that has encouraged paternalism and elitism (Lindau 
and Cheek, 1998: 9). This would weaken the potential sociality of civil society by 
marginalising volunteerism and autonomy. This aspect in turn has made it difficult for civil 
society to become formalised or institutionalised under the principle rules of law and 
organisation. This strong private sphere on the one hand inhibits the already-difficult process 
of the development of mutually trust-based co-operation and supporting networks among 
strangers within civil society organisations and on the other hand, the broader sense of guanxi 
has indicated a deep-rooted Chinese philosophy of relational humanism and Chinese 
relational morality (Y. Liang, 2001). This focus on the harmonious relationship among people 
emphasises communication and empathy, and encourages sharing from the core family to the 
whole society. This ethical networking resource, through utilisation rather than privatisation 
of guanxi, might be ideally transferable and complementary to organisational resources, based 
on the morality of responsibility and obligation. As implied by the interviewees, sometimes 
116 
 
guanxi is unavoidable, indispensable and can be beneficial to both the individuals and the 
society.  
 
The second question focused on the trust and credit of inner-organisational relationships. 
88.3% of the respondents (106) belong to more than one organisation, about half of whom 
join in semi-governmental or non-governmental organisations with varied degrees of 
attachment. These respondents are not all keen on describing in detail their relationship to or 
the leadership of their civil society organisations. Most comments generally lean toward 
complaining about unfamiliar leadership or loose relations without much interaction, 
commitment, responsibility or activity. This is particularly the case in occupation-based 
organisations such as business, professional or academic associations. The main problems lie 
in the dissatisfaction with government-assigned leaders, small intimate or core groups that 
seek to exclude others, lack of vertical or horizontal contact and lack of knowledge about the 
organisational operation. Under such conditions, credit and trust are not easily built up, let 
alone financial linkages or support. One lawyer referred to the lawyers‘ association he took 
part in and said, ‗To trust each other we must have known each other very well. But I seldom 
have other kinds of contact with my colleague members apart from business, so how can I put 
trust in them?‘38 One entrepreneur as a member of a business association said, ‗I don‘t trust in 
people, but I trust in interest. I often get business information from them but I have to discern 
which is true or false based on their interest compared to mine…. Money is about doing 
business and we don‘t have financial relations personally.‘ 39 Another student, an initiator in 
an alumni group, said, ‗I trust my previous classmates and schoolmates, but I won‘t share 
with them my financial difficulties or loan money to them except if we are very best friends.‘ 
40
 Many interviewees‘ distrust the organisations they joined. It has much to do with the 
decline and even destruction of social trust, credit and morality as a whole, which has been 
attributed largely to the expansion of egoism and materialism. Furthermore, the ill-regulated 
money-driven market, the bankruptcy of Communist collectivism and the misuse of guanxi 
have greatly motivated a prevailing pursuit of egoistic interest by taking advantage of others 
at the cost of others. This has significantly devastated the reliability of relationships between 
people.  
 
                                                        
38 Interviewee number 83.  
39 Interviewee number 112.  
40 Interviewee number 45.  
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However, the situation is quite different in most religious groups, art and cultural groups and 
some active NGOs. Because of common faith, hobbies and ideals, members and leaders have 
more confidence and enthusiasm towards their organisations and the leadership. The contacts 
among members within the groups are more comprehensive from daily communication to 
business, which have strengthened interpersonal relationships and helped establish a 
trustworthy platform. Some church members stated that they would not hesitate to provide 
financial support to their fellows when they are in trouble.
41
 It cannot be denied that the well 
managed informal social relationship (guanxi) has played an important role as glue in 
enhancing the solidarity of the organisation and the trust among its members as well as its 
leaders.   
 
5.5 State interference in civil society organisations  
The following question deals directly with state interference in organisations and respondents‘ 
personal lives:  
 
 ‗Do you think people have the right to form organisations freely? Have you ever heard of 
or experienced governmental interference in your organisation or in others? Did you feel 
or experience any (unpleasant) interference from the state power in any area of your own 
life?‘ 
 
78.3% of the respondents (94) believed that Chinese people have the right to form free 
organisations. Although with different degrees of certainty and cautiousness, some of them 
avoided a straight answer about the reality and quickly ended their comments by quoting the 
Constitution that guarantees such a right.
 42
 Some also added that ‗As long as your aim of 
organisation is not anti-CPC, anti-socialism or anti-society you can form any organisations 
within the legal process.‘ 43 The remaining 26 interviewees thought that people have not 
enjoyed full freedom, if any at all. Some argued that certain forms of organisations are strictly 
forbidden such as political parties,
44
 underground religious groups
45
 and gay/lesbian clubs.
 46
 
Others complained that the registration requirement and process is too complicated and some 
                                                        
41 Interviewee number 95, 101, 20, 44, 76 and 81.  
42 Interviewee number 14, 28, 69 and 117.  
43 Interviewee number 69.  
44 Interviewee number 87.  
45 Interviewee number 87, 107 and 110.  
46 Interviewee number 57.  
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large-scale organisations are even required to establish grassroots party branches within the 
organisation.
 47
 Most interviewees kept away from detailing any concrete state interference 
either in the organisations or in their personal lives. A few bold replies focused on the fact that 
the party or government officials are assigned to be the leaders of the business, professional or 
academic associations, though many, in contrast, have nothing to do with the speciality or 
expertise.
 48
 Others revealed police intrusion into the underground house church and detention 
of their ministries.
 49
 Falun Gong is a case in point as some fierce criticisms were targeted on 
the state violation of both their organisational and religious freedom in contravention of the 
Constitution.
 50
 
 
According to the historical development of social organisations, Deng‘s reform era allowed 
numerous social organisations to emerge relatively free of political control. The dynamics of 
these social organisations have gradually undermined the authority of organisations sponsored 
by the state and the CPC. This is a contradiction confronting the CPC in promoting economic 
reform, which will eventually weaken its capacity in exercising organisational control (Leung, 
2002). From 1976 to 1988, confusion reigned as there were no unified procedures for 
registering or monitoring social organisations until the State Council charged the Ministry of 
Civil Administration with bringing order to the situation. After the spring of 1989, the 
government realised the importance of controlling this domain closely, and issued new 
structures and regulations for registration and administration to put civil organisations under 
state patronage and control (Saich, 2000). The control apparatus has worked through double-
lines of management – that means any civil society organisation is required to register with a 
national professional organisation, as well as with the Bureau of Civil Administration (Wu 
and Chen, 1996). In 1998, the regulations were further tightened to eliminate any loopholes. 
The double registration system is effective in ensuring two lines of control through two state 
organs.  
 
Most of the registered CSOs are under the guidance and control of the state. Many others are 
officially registered as businesses because the registration process is easier, while others 
simply remain unregistered rather than facing the difficulties of registration and 
administration that are characteristically made in China. In order to minimise risks, most 
                                                        
47 Interviewee number 64.  
48 Interviewee number 61 and 114.  
49 Interviewee number 94 and 104.  
50 Interviewee number 107, 108 and 110.  
119 
 
people are likely to be members of organisations that are legalised and promoted by the 
government rather than joining or setting up a grassroots NGO. As a result of strict 
registration regulations and other interferences, many CSOs are driven to operate without 
government recognition. However, in practice, unregistered groups generally experience little 
or no government interference as long as they avoid financial misdeeds or overt political 
challenges.  
 
As another important part of the organisational and institutional control, the state adopted a 
traditional measure to ‗clear and readjust‘ all the CSOs for censorship, qualification and 
approval at a fixed time periodically. The State Council has organised several clearing and 
readjusting measures towards CSOs respectively in 1984, 1990, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004 
(Yan, 2007). In the early 1990s, scholars at home and abroad argued that a uniquely Chinese 
version of civil society allowed for greater intrusion of the state into social organisation 
(Wakeman, 1993). As the Party-state seeks to modernise and find ways to allow the 
emergence of CSOs without facing direct competition for political power, it has also 
rationalised its administration of this arena by investigating how to build party organisations 
into the CSOs as early as 1994. It has further been regulated that if there are more than two 
CPC members in the standing committee of an organisation, then a grassroots party 
organisation should be built in (Yan, 2007). In a word, though reforms have to a great extent 
undermined the CPC‘s political and organisational control mechanisms and altered the state-
society-individual relationship, state administration and interference is becoming more 
regulatory, systematic, strategic and flexible rather than simply weaker. Because of the 
dynamics of simultaneous loosening and strengthening of state power, there is a process for 
CSOs to gain autonomy as well as for the state to incorporate them (Solinger, 2002: 276; 
Ogden, 2002: 280-302).  
 
Generally CSOs‘ relationships with the state are determined by their group interests, 
functions, organisational resources, the provision of public services or goods and the 
capability for challenge. Example organisations from the interviews, including most business, 
professional, academic and cultural associations, are representatives of the interest of the 
elites in the fields of economy, knowledge and art. Such functional organisations possess a 
fair capability for mobilising resources, providing public goods and organising collective 
activities under state encouragement. Yet, at the same time, their compliance with the 
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government‘s registration and regulation system has neutralised their challenging potentials. 
Although trade union, women‘s federation, neighbourhood committees and village 
committees have stronger challenging potentials, in practice they have been directly 
controlled and co-opted within the structure of government. Another example is religious 
organisations that may provide and practice alternative systems within the value and moral 
realm. This unique function of faith and ritual, as well as the interest of a broader public, 
provides them with varied channels of resources and greater challenging capabilities, which 
provokes state restriction and even repression.  
 
The community groups based on original townships for migrant workers and university 
students show a strengthening tendency of friendships based on geographic connections, and 
have provided relatively less public goods and limited organisational vehicles and are 
therefore relatively free from state management and censorship. Other grassroots NGOs or 
civic organisations, which either provide little public necessity or have no capabilities to 
challenge, do not face much interference by the state but are generally not legalised either. 
Basically, underground religious organisations, political opposition and movement 
organisations, and those challenging human rights are most likely to be marginalised or 
repressed. In December 1998, when the key leaders of a number of pro-democratic groups 
tried to register as the China Democratic Party, the party was declared illegal. In the same 
manner, Falun Gong was declared illegal and was forced to de-register and be banned. The 
chapter on Party-state responses to contentions further details the official strategies based on 
White et al‘s (1996: 1-38) framework of incorporation, toleration and repression.  
 
5.6 A new arena: the online public sphere 
As mentioned in the last Chapter, there is an increasing tendency to exchange information 
online for those people who have internet access. The growing popularity of internet activism 
also sheds new light on the theoretical and practical revitalisation of the public sphere, 
providing a social forum for legitimate, normative consensus to be reached through public 
discourse, rational debates and open discussion (Edwards, 2004) that are taking place on the 
internet. Internet technology provides the traditional media with multiple resources and 
activates citizen participations by creating a space for numerous networks of interest and 
interaction to overlap and intersect (Putnam et al, 2003: 293-4). In the Chinese context, the 
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public sphere is immature because 1) it is still greatly manipulated by state propaganda and 2) 
an increasingly commercialised mass media has brought both liberation and limitation. 
However the hi-tech medium of the internet has enlarged and strengthened the Chinese public 
sphere by providing a social arena for individuals and groups to critically and rationally 
discuss public affairs of common concern and to contest notions of social welfare and charity, 
nationalist identity and claims, to contest against the coercive and oppressive forms of state 
power, against social injustice, immorality and other problems.  
 
One of the most outstanding features of this online public sphere is, ‗mobilisation exigency‘, 
in the form of online discussions, debates, protests, form letters and signatures which can 
come together instantly – typically in a matter of days or even hours – and that the internet‘s 
non-hierarchical structure makes it possible for individuals to bypass ‗standard procedure‘ to 
allow information to be circulated both to a widespread user base and to specifically targeted 
responsible individuals and high-level leaders (Gurak, 1997). In this way, the internet has 
actualised the concept of public sphere. In spite of the internet‘s own weakness, the online 
public sphere has gradually transformed its function from a marginal complement to 
traditional media to a mainstream arena for critical thought and debates especially relished by 
the young and educated middle class.  
 
This arena has also become part of China‘s emerging civil society. During the process of 
China‘s modernisation to a new knowledge-based society, people‘s social affiliation in the 
traditional concepts of a work-unit, the university, the neighbourhood and all kinds of 
organisations has increasingly intertwined with the identity of cyberspace societies and 
communities. On one hand, online networks have formed a significant channel for offline 
organisations and mobilisation. Many organisations have their own websites, which greatly 
facilitate recruitment, participation and interactions. A large number of offline social 
contentions also began with online debate and appropriation. On the other hand, the online 
public sphere in itself has disseminated and promoted democratic and civic merits in bonding 
the loose and anonymous relationships amongst strangers in virtual realities through open, 
equal and rational online debate and networking. Civil society in this sense is no longer 
merely limited to formal organisations or informal networks, but should also include the fluid 
structures of the online public sphere. Meanwhile, this online public sphere was also subject 
to Party-state interference and control the moment it came into being. The interaction between 
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the authorities and the online public will be detailed in the following empirical chapters.  
 
5.7 Summary 
Civil society with Chinese characteristic consists of civil society organisations, informal 
networks and the online public sphere. This chapter first focused on different types of SCOs 
and an informal networking resource – guanxi. It explored the individual-society-state 
relationship by examining how private guanxi penetrated into the associational sphere and 
how the state interfered in it. It can be concluded that governmental, semi-governmental and 
non-governmental organisations broadly exist in people‘s everyday lives. Located between the 
still strong private sphere and Party-state, China‘s currently striving organisational realm can 
be attached with a stronger sense, although not complete, of civil society than in the early 
stages of reform. However, formal organisational and institutional resources are still not 
evident or significant to most Chinese people, because of deviant penetration of guanxi, 
different cleavages and state control. Among the interviewees, only a few made use of the 
organisational resources by developing a strong sense of belonging, being actively involved in 
group activities, and enjoying sociable, trusted and supportive relations with each other; even 
fewer motivated and mobilised the existing organisational resources to achieve collective 
social goals.  
 
People continue to depend on the wide-ranging informal networks that provide necessary 
social capitals, resources and relations. Ideally this pervasive, influential and very Chinese 
characteristic form of guanxi should be properly built, maintained and developed within the 
organisational structures in cultural and ethical directions. The publicisation of guanxi can 
even create the space and mobilise the resources for public causes, as can be found in the 
cases in the following chapters.  Therefore, the state-society-individual relationship has 
evolved within a terrain in which informal networks, state institutions and social organisations 
have overlapped and inter-penetrated in different mixes. Notably, the emerging arena of the 
online public sphere has further enriched Chinese civil society and made it more dynamic. 
Online networks and forms also shed new light on the social movement theories about the 
meso mobilising structure. Chapter Seven will form a detailed discussion about internet 
contentions based on China‘s fluid online structures.  
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Chapter 6 Labourers in contention  
6.1 Introduction: Contentions in general 
Acting as a more practical and specific continuation of the last two general chapters, this 
chapter leads the investigation into those three groups‘ conceptualisation, expression and acts 
of contentions and generates the features and trends from each group‘s mobilisation and inter-
group interaction. The investigation is based on various episodes of land/house eviction 
disputes, salary appeals, nationalist parades, rights defending suits, cyberspace mobilisations, 
spiritual movements and so on. The incidents that are quoted in the interviews took place 
around the nation with ever increasing cross-group engagements, innovative actions, follow-
up appropriations and waves of influence. This typically results in a ratcheting up of shared 
uncertainty among all parties to an emergent conflict including challengers, their opponents, 
elements of the state, third parties and the media (McAdam et al, 2001: 44-5). Besides 
interview results, related information was also collected from other literature, documentaries, 
news reports and in particular online resources, in order to analyse and examine the 
contentious cases more extensively.  
 
Out of the theoretical fluency from macro attribution of opportunity and threat, meso-level of 
civil society mobilisation and micro-level strategic framing, the following three chapters 
dwell on individual and social constellations. The micro dynamics include discourses, cultural 
symbols, identities, moral principles, values, social memories, emotions, mobilising patterns 
and arts of leadership, all of which shape contentions. The aim is to find out how ‗framing‘ 
works as a collective process of interpretation, attribution and social construction at the same 
time as it mediates between opportunity and action (McAdam et al, 2001: 41) for each group. 
It is also worth noting that from the interviews many people were quite conservative or 
reluctant to talk about this politically sensitive topic of contentions. Therefore, when 
analysing the discourse from the interviews, attention was paid to their tones and worries 
behind their reluctance. The group of labourers was the most cautious in expressing 
willingness to take any contentious activities. However, in reality they were the main actors in 
generating the majority of the ‗collective actions‘ and most violent confrontations recorded by 
the official statistics (Kang, 2008). The subjective factors, including different cohorts‘ own 
life condition and status, self-identity and value system, have been very important in 
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understanding entire episodes of contention.  
 
From the answers to the question about their personal life standards and their self-
categorisation, it was evident that most interviewees had a strong self-consciousness of their 
own group identity and status into low, low-middle, middle, or middle-high social strata. 36% 
of them were satisfied with their status while 61% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. 
Likewise, 42% were confident that they were able to make some changes to their families or 
the society whilst the rest showed different levels of uncertainty or pessimism. Thus, the 
contentions, which may include resistance and protests, could be viewed as beyond the 
boundary of overt group acts of opposition to state authority. In fact, it may also exist at the 
individual level, in the thoughts, attitudes, expression and dispositions of some groups who 
have disadvantages or grievances towards the passive acceptance of present social realities 
and self-status (Fairbrother, 2003). They could well form a set of critical and constructive 
conceptualisations of their own, as well as their contentious strategies, repertoires and 
innovations of actions. In turn they influence the authority, the media, public discourse and 
social culture.  
 
There were two other multiple-choice questions. The first focused on interviewees‘ 
possibilities and forms of actions: ‗What would you like to do (did you do) to release 
grievance over anything?‘ The top five choices were ‗Give vent or resort to families and 
friends‘, ‗Resort to the judiciary or consult with solicitors‘, ‗Use the internet to sign petitions 
or express opinions‘, ‗Appeal to the local or higher governmental department‘ and ‗Expose to 
the media‘. It was no surprise that the intellectuals and white-collar workers were more 
dependent on the media including the internet and the labourers showed incremental 
consciousness of using legal and administrative channels. Only five respondents had chosen 
to ‗resort to the civil organisations‘ or ‗establish interest group with other victims‘ in 
comparison to the 85% choosing to turn to families or friends. This shows the marginal status 
of civil society in the actual mobilisation of formal or informal organisations and the strength 
and dominance of the private sphere. As for taking public actions such as signing petitions, 
strikes, demonstrations or sit-ins, only 10% of the 110 people interviewed showed some 
interest. On the contrary, the ten dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners were much bolder in 
sharing the information about their international experiences and mature strategies in 
contentious techniques.   
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The other question targeted their attitudes towards contentions. Over 80% of those 
interviewed were adamant that people have the right to take contentions, while some 
expressed concerns that the aims, measures and courses of contention should be righteous
51
. 
According to the sample cases of the laid-offs‘ sit-in, most expressed their understanding, 
sympathy and support. Anti-Japanese demonstrations had aroused a few rational reflections 
among intellectuals themselves while the Tiananmen student protest, although evoking 
sympathies as well, was more controversial and more of a political taboo.   
 
The Falun Gong movement was the least popular one in that it evoked instant objection and 
blame from domestic respondents, only around 8% of whom showed their confusion and 
sympathy. Overall the group of labourers received the most identification and support from 
other groups. This chapter examines the three sub-groups of labourers – peasants, migrant 
workers and laid-off workers, who are self-identified and pragmatically categorised as the 
most economically disadvantaged groups. They were generally of low status, and they were 
sensitive and affected by the transformation in reforms, therefore likely to take contentious 
action triggered by various causes and problems.   
 
This part leads to the description and generalisation of contentious activities of different 
groups based on categorisation. It begins with the labourers. 
6.2 Peasants  
Although the interviews took place in cities, comments about country life could still be 
obtained through communication with migrant workers and others. In the meantime, news 
about the peasants‘ contentions could be accessible and influential in urban cities. Inequality 
still dominates a grand picture as the urban-rural income gap has increased and reached 3.3:1 
by the end of 2006 (Yang and Gu, 2007). Among 900 million peasants, the stratification of 
classes and groups is accelerating while the basis for new integrations and new orders is under 
construction and is transforming the traditional society towards modernity. The polarisation 
rate in the countryside has risen from 3.61 in 2000 to 5.70 in 2005 (Yang and Gu, 2007) and 
the rural Gini Coefficient is exceeding the 0.4 alert (Guo and He, 2007) with considerable 
regional disparities in the growth rate.  
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Some migrant workers expressed their dissatisfaction towards the hardship of life in the 
countryside, complaining that living expenses kept rising sharply in the countryside while 
income hardly ever went up
52
. Some also revealed they were floating in cities for a better-paid 
job partly because many Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were now on the decline 
with a shrinking capacity to provide employment
53
. Although economy and living status 
proved to be the main cause, the sources of peasants‘ grievances and contentions are manifold 
and intertwined with other social-political factors.  
 
Land requisition was one of the biggest problems during social transition, industrialisation 
and urbanisation. This is most closely related to peasants‘ livelihood and sustenance. The land 
of compulsory expropriation has been increasing by three million acres each year, which has 
forced two to three million peasants to lose their land and resulted in a total number of 40 to 
50 million ‗three-no‘ peasants (no land, no job and no social insurance) (Huang et al, 2007). 
In the documentary ‗Unseen China‘, produced by Jiang Xueqin and Brian Keeley in 2003, 
one of the peasants who had lost his land to greedy developers and corrupt officials disclosed 
that:  
 
―It was the police who hired the mafia thugs, killing someone for 30,000 yuan and 
causing injury for 15,000 yuan. They were looking for me all day and said I was a 
saboteur, a leader of peasant protestors, because I refused to give up my land, which 
caused delay of the road construction … I dare never challenge again. We ordinary 
people are doomed to suffer. How to live? There is no hope. Now I have no land and 
didn‘t get any money …‖ 
 
Collective actions emerge because of the low compensation, relocation of the displaced 
peasants and violent enforcement during and after land requisition.   
 
The contradictions between local cadres and peasants are severe. Apart from land requisition, 
other policies, implementations and obligations are the elements  that easily provoke peasants‘ 
grievances. A migrant worker in the interview has quoted a countryside saying that, ‗what did 
the state want from peasants? Grain, money (fees and taxes) and life (family planning 
                                                        
52 Interviewee number 4, 5 and a few others. 
53 Interviewee number 7 and 24. 
127 
 
policy)!‘54 Peasants‘ traditional resistances include refusing to meet quotas, failing to pay 
taxes or local fees and resisting birth control laws. Spontaneous riots take place and they often 
involve violence among angry peasants against local cadres and sometimes result in the 
intervention of the militia. In their confrontations and bargainings with the highly organised 
authorities that have unsymmetrical power over information, human resources and even 
violence, scattered peasants need to lower the cost of consensus among themselves by 
increasing the degree of organisation and their bargaining abilities to form a more effective 
balance and pressure on the authorities. 
 
As for the individual-society-state relationship in the countryside, one extreme of the rural 
grassroots authority structure is the dominance of state organs and party branches. This results 
in a scarcity of popular organisational resources, which has led to the monopoly and abuse of 
public power by local officials. On the other extreme, numerous villages have been dominated 
by the re-emergence of clans, various cults and sects, as well as criminals, who can form 
independent authorities or organisations that paralyse primary-level Party organisations and 
administrative units (Blum and Jensen, 2002: 27-8). However, recently, many new functional 
organisations including new clan societies and civil groups have emerged to provide social 
networking resources for their members and bear some of the responsibilities in negotiating 
with the local government about excessive burdens or unsatisfactory public services.  
 
There have been healthier interactions between the state‘s administration, ideology and 
culture and the historical clans, religions and village cultural networks in transforming the 
traditional rural social structure and reshaping of the state sphere in the countryside (Li, 2004). 
The use of law and state policy as the basis and instrument of their resistance has become 
more popular and effective for peasants (Li and O‘Brien, 1996; Yu, 2004). They utilise 
legitimate and policy-centred strategies more frequently such as appealing politically or 
legally to a higher authority if local officials are corrupt or break the law. Peasants have also 
been able to collaborate with policy researchers, the media and rural delegates to the NPC to 
push their grievances forward. 
 
As an extension, and also consequence of peasants‘ contentions, the movement towards 
village self-government is flourishing. Guaranteed by ‗the Organic Law of Villagers 
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Committees‘, it is pushed by central officials with the aim of improving the quality of local 
leadership and implementing state policies. Such experimental democratic practice reflects the 
needs and interests of a broader public. It is also for individual peasants to go beyond their 
narrow or egoist interest and to establish the power to balance and check the state. The 
experimental practice of the grassroots democratic election of a seven-member committee 
takes place every three years in rural areas. The villager committees – the local autonomous 
institutions elected and operated by the peasants themselves – are established widely at the 
grassroots level to govern village affairs and form the middle level between households and 
townships. It is also interesting that the government sometimes uses these committees as a 
sort of channel of social control, while the committees often expand their power through the 
support of the authorities (Wang, 1998).  
 
The self-governance institution for villagers is propitious for promoting the development of 
rural civil society and establishing a basis for rural political modernisation (Li, 2004). 
Optimistically we might say that a balance of power among the three spheres is progressing 
and a healthy relationship between state-society-individual is a prospect. However, the 
internal source of social legitimacy and the external institutional guarantee from the state have 
together determined the contradictory nature of villagers committees, opening a dynamic field 
for the state and peasants to encounter, to contend and to interact. Moreover, the contentions 
around grassroots elections and self-governance are also dynamic and sometimes intense, 
with regard to the candidates, procedures, election results and dismissals, since these can 
challenge the vested interests and abuse of power by the local and township officials.  
 
Another serious problem in the countryside is that of social security, where the weak welfare 
and medical care systems have received a lot of attention from the state. According to the 
statistics from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, only 55 million peasants, 5.8% of 
the total rural population, were covered by pension insurance in 2006 (Song, 2006). One 
migrant worker just sighed:  
― … those peasants (in my village) especially the elders are so pitiful as they don‘t have 
any social security or welfare. Their children also earn very little through farming. I also 
saw some old men over 70 years‘ of age still doing farm work in the field and I really 
sympathised with them. Yes, the government has done quite a lot to solve the rural 
problems such as regulating the taxation. But I think the government should provide a 
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life guarantee for people over 60 or 70 in the countryside.‖55 
 
Although the rural medical system has regularly seen improvement, there are still grave 
complaints about the unaffordable medicines and unqualified services.  
 
One of the negative consequences of the reform is the structural deterioration of the 
environment. Environmental problems have been increasingly hazardous recently, especially 
as demonstrated by the escalating cancer rate in rural areas and emerging ‗cancer villages‘ 
exposed by the media. Water and soil have been seriously contaminated and over 300 million 
peasants have no access to – or cannot afford – safe and clean water according to the Hygiene 
and Irrigation Department investigations (Yang, 2007). Regarding further research, conducted 
by the Beijing Normal University, into 64 villages nation-wide in 2006 (Yang, 2007), various 
types of factories have caused various pollutions and ecological damage, while the degree of 
pollution is completely decided by the type of the factory rather than the strength of 
supervision by environmental departments. The only cure for the local environmental problem 
seems to be the contentious activity by the peasants themselves. As peasants are more 
concerned about the environment and more aware about their own survival and sustainable 
rights, the number of collective actions is growing. They were largely organised by sprouting 
popular organisations and led by local environment activists. One typical example is that the 
villagers in Shanxi Fenhe collectively kneeled down for 3 days in front of an illegal chemical 
factory, which wantonly emitted exhaust gas and liquid waste and caused serious sickness and 
symptoms amongst the villagers, to protest and urge the closure of the factory (Xinkuai 
Newspaper, 2008).  This action of kneeling down shows the greatest sincerity, humility and 
helplessness in the confrontation, which effectively caught the eyes of the national media, the 
environment department and the government.  However, the power and effect of peasants‘ 
contentions is inadequate especially in terms of social function, since most of the contentions‘ 
result in material and economic compensation rather than the protection of the ecological 
environment.   
6.3 Migrant workers 
Migrant workers mainly consist of peasants who have left their land in the suburban and rural 
areas to pursue a better life in the cities and have thus become an independent interest group. 
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A scholar in the interview said that migrant workers were a group of disadvantaged people, 
the contributors and cost-bearers to urbanisation and rapid economic development
56
. They 
were the disadvantaged class to whom more concern should be given, especially to their 
problems, needs and demands. The statistics of ‗White Paper on China‘s Employment 
Situation and Policy‘ revealed that there were 15 million peasant workers in 1990, increasing 
to over 98 million in 2003 (State Council Information Office, 2004), but by the end of 2006 
that figure had dramatically escalated to 200 million (J. Liu, 2007). A lecturer in economics 
said that:  
 
―The labour cost in China is the lowest in the world but in essence the wages should 
contain the living expense for labourers themselves and family maintenance, education 
fee for their children, medical insurance, pension and other welfare cost. However, 
exploitation is severe in China during the capitalist transition as most labourers in the 
factories set up by joint ventures in the coastal cities get their pay and welfare below the 
social average level. This is even more phenomenal for the migrant workers of the 
inland.‖ 57 
 
As a disadvantaged and marginalised group of people, migrant workers encounter some major 
problems in connection with their living, working and welfare. Discrepancy between their 
expectations and realities, between stereotyped urban and rural identities, were fully 
expressed in the interviews as obvious and influential. It was also indicated that their 
dissatisfaction was directed towards the backlash of market transitions and government 
policies. The targets of their contention were mainly the local government, their workplace 
managers, service providers including job agencies, and the urban residents and the major 
causes were centred around basic social and economic interests. 
 
The most common and visible trigger for migrants‘ contentions was still unpaid wages. It was 
often heard that workers who were owed over a year‘s worth of back wages, or have been 
injured, received no compensation. In particular, China‘s construction boom has left a tangle 
of debts between developers, contractors and sub-contractors, which often resulted in workers 
not getting a paycheck. The Chinese government evaluated unpaid migrant wages for 2003 
alone at an extraordinary US$12.1 billion. Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan revealed in September 
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2004 that a total of 360 billion yuan (US$43 billion) in unpaid wages remained outstanding to 
migrant workers and thousands of projects invested in by the government or real estate 
developers accounted for 70% of the total unpaid wages (Fu, 2004; Magnier, 2004). Accidents, 
industrial diseases, work injuries and medical compensation were another major cause for 
contentions among migrant workers. As a result of such aggravated grievances, they were 
utilising and developing all kinds of eye-catching strategies, inventive activities as well as 
self-destructive reactions. Petitioning the labour or related departments, sit-ins, kneeling, 
parades, strikes, blockades, threats and violence against the contractors, destruction of 
property and so on were not uncommon phenomena. The group of over 20 migrant wives 
travelling a long way from Sichun to Yunnan requesting unpaid wages for their husbands (R. 
Wang, 2007), the Guangxi construction workers writing a bilingual petition letter of Chinese 
and English to the media (News Clue Network, 2007) were examples of creativity mixed with 
helplessness. Moreover, the unwritten rule of contention for these disadvantaged groups was 
that, ‗making big trouble will earn a complete settlement of the problem, mild trouble partial 
settlement, no trouble no settlement‘. They had developed the strategic and delicate 
experience to know and keep the action within the bounds of state toleration. However, some 
took risks to show desperation by demonstrating on tower cranes or highway bridges to draw 
public attention. Suicides by jumping off high-rise buildings had become such a regular 
occurrence among unpaid construction workers that a mandarin expression, ‗tiao lou xiu‘ 
(literally, jumping off buildings to show) was coined to name these desperate attempts to draw 
attention to their plight (Kahn and Yardley, 2004; Toy, 2006). Killing and murder were also 
extremes in the struggles for unpaid wages. In October 2005, a migrant worker, Wang Binyu, 
was executed after killing four people in a rampage over unpaid wages (Toy, 2006). Such 
cases were by no means rare.  
 
Hukou (registration system differentiating and managing residents in urban and rural areas) 
was still the biggest stigma to essentially deny full citizenship rights in the city in terms of 
public resources and social welfare, including subsidised housing, medical care and education 
for their children (Yardley, 2004). Although there was an increase in the availability of 
purchased hukou all over the urban cities, some of which even had floating migrants 
accounting for one quarter to one-third of the total population (Mallee, 2003: 148), it 
remained difficult to make such purchases in provincial capital cities like Wuhan and 
extremely hard in the national capital Beijing. Despite the efforts from groups of people like 
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intellectuals and the resulted experimental reforms, this stubborn institution, born with the 
establishment of New China, still played an important role in shaping unequal life chances 
across the urban-rural divide.  
 
The temporary residence permits (zanzhuzheng) introduced since the mid-1980s, as a 
complementary measure to the hukou system to control the mobile population, was another 
source of contradiction and conflict. This condemned the already marginalised group to 
further vulnerable status, additional fees and the threat of being sent to a detention centre 
(shourongzhan). There was an inevitable contention between migrants and related officials. 
During the interviews, 7 out of 17 migrant workers mentioned their unpleasant experiences of 
applying for the costly, but seemingly necessary, permits and certificates as well as encounters 
with the urban management teams who checked their papers and treated them hideously. One 
migrant worker said:  
 
―There are no human rights in Beijing for migrant workers. I remember when being 
checked for the temporary residence permit, migrant workers were never treated as 
human beings. They were scolded by rude language, forced to kneel and even beaten 
violently. One of the workers I know once experienced this in 2000, and had a severe 
confrontation with the civil defence officers (they are not police officers).‖ 58 
 
However, their weak and disadvantaged status meant that any overt protest or individual 
confrontation towards the officials would end in further suffering. On most occasions, 
migrants usually relied on ‗invisible‘ resistance, or attempts to take refuge elsewhere in order 
to weather the storm and remain at a distance from the authorities (Mallee, 2003: 149-52). 
The resolution lies in the reform of the institution itself, which requires pressure from 
different social groups including labourers themselves and a combination of both bottom-up 
and top-down efforts, as exemplified in the Sun Zhigang case (to be detailed in the next 
chapter). 
 
Among all the side effects of the residential registration system, children‘s education has been 
prioritised. As a universal belief and dream shared by Chinese parents and revealed in the 
interviews, education was the only way for their children to rise out of poverty and 
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humiliation. Therefore, some of the families were willing to throw themselves into the lowest 
social level of work so their children could have a good education. The number of school-age 
children accompanying migrant workers to the cities was counted in the tens of millions and 
their educational problems had become a public topic. However, one of the greatest 
difficulties for these children was the restriction of the registration institution, which set 
limited permission for migrant workers‘ children to go to local schools. After a long struggle 
by the migrant parents and other social forces, more and more cities opened their doors to 
accommodate these children in public schools following public and central government 
pressures. But potential difficulties still lie in the requirement for over-elaborate certificates, 
the underlying discrimination of the selective procedures, various additional and illegal fees 
and the limitation of vacancies for the children of migrant workers (Yuan, 2008). Special 
schools were individually and privately set up for these children, but they were not brought 
into the nationally and formally recognised educational system and they faced strict official 
supervision and sanctions, were forced to move and close, had insufficient financial backing, 
poor conditions and facilities and inadequate teachers (Song and Li, 2006). This was another 
area that caused contention for different parties, including the self-established schools, and 
demanded urgent institutional reforms.  
 
The conflict between migrant workers and city residents turned out to be complicated during 
China‘s increasing urbanisation and economic liberalisation, with both parties regarding 
themselves as victims. There were wide gaps in defining and expressing the rights of both 
parties. During the interviews some migrant workers stated that they felt rural life was too 
constraining, dull or unrewarding so they travelled a long way to Beijing, Wuhan and other 
big cities to pursue wealth, new perspectives and a new identity for their children and 
families. But the deep inferiority complex, and the extreme hardship they had encountered, 
often added to the difficulties and hopelessness in achieving their goals. The migrant workers 
felt that without them the economic boom of local cities would have been impossible. They 
believed they had been unfairly treated on different occasions or were being deprived of what 
they deserved. What‘s more, these former peasants mentally lack a sense of belonging to the 
cities. For example, in Beijing the city was proud of its skyscrapers, luxury stadiums and 
places of interest and some of the buildings had been constructed by migrant workers. 
However, they still could not say ‗this belongs to my city‘. Therefore, the social identity 
problem and discrimination they experienced remained largely unchanged and became worse 
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in some circumstances when they were blamed for the overcrowded communities and 
deteriorating public security, environment and hygiene, especially in the advent of the Beijing 
Olympic Games. As concrete demonstration of these contradictions, some urban residents 
complained in the interview that mobilising and group-renting migrants filled the community 
with noise, rubbish, insecurity and risk of fire.
59
 When some local schools were open to 
migrant workers‘ children, the urban parents collectively protested in front of the schools to 
exclude these children‘s ‗wicked‘ influence on their own ones (Yuan, 2008). 
 
Such an unpalatable combination of distorted self-identity and discrimination easily generated 
deep grievances, depression and antagonism towards the city, especially amongst the younger 
generation. It was calculated that the new generation of the post-1980s had exceeded half the 
total population of migrant workers, some of whom were relatively better educated, more 
socially active, had more of an identify with the city lifestyle and were more concerned about 
their rights than their fathers. But, because of their rural hukou, they could hardly melt into 
the city nor were they willing to go back to the countryside. Instead many chose to wander 
between different jobs and different cities (Lai, 2007). Many others just finished junior high 
school and were still struggling, as their parents did, in the understratum of cities on a 
minimum wage. What was worse was that some of the girls were helplessly turned into 
prostitutes and boys misled into gangsterdom. The research conducted by Outlook Weekly 
described that the mental deviation from this second generation of migrant workers led to a 
sharp increase in juvenile delinquency, suicide and other anti-social behaviour (Xiao and 
Yuan, 2006). The migrant workers had less intellectual, economic and social networking 
resources than the local population, and their ability to get access to these new resources was 
limited. Therefore, migrants were more likely to become the victims of illegal and criminal 
activities. According to the statistics, half of the targets of migrants‘ crimes were the migrants 
themselves (Yang et al, 2006). When there was a lack of proper means to defend their 
legitimate rights and interests, or the cost of such a defence was too high, they might yield or 
be silent in order to avoid greater harm, or take other measures to protect themselves 
including resorting to illegal organisations and even the mafia, becoming criminals 
themselves and illegally conducting extreme revenge or violating others‘ rights. The 
vulnerability of such a population would induce more criminal acts by and against migrants. 
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If we turn to empirical research, there was a floating population of 5.4 million in Beijing 
alone by the end of 2007 (Ma, 2007) and nearly one million in Wuhan (Jiang and Hu, 2008). 
The occupations of the 17 migrant worker interviewees were in the fields of construction (8), 
restaurant (5), hairdressing (2) and porter (2). Based on the official statistics, the largest group 
of migrant workers (about 30%) earned their living on construction projects, most of whom 
worked seven days a week under difficult conditions, camping out on the construction site, in 
makeshift barracks or on unfinished floors of the construction projects (Wang, 2003), and 
living harsh and isolated lives. On the contrary other migrant groups such as waiters and 
waitresses, apprentices in hairdressing, porters, peddlers, traders, garbage collectors and 
domestic workers had much more frequent interaction with the local population and more 
possibilities to get into direct contact with the authorities, not necessarily the state and local 
government, but also the local police station, semi-official management organs and 
neighbourhood committees (Mallee, 2003: 149). Such overt division of occupation within the 
group of migrant workers had more or less distributed their social networks and resources, but 
the main organising principle of migration chains was formed on the basis of kinship and a 
native place. 
 
Blood ties and native ties – such elements of traditional agricultural society as a ‗differential 
pattern‘60 to form human relations and social capital – still determine the conception and 
behaviour of migrant workers facing grievances and solving problems. These township-based 
community groups (Laoxianghui)  were fraternities in nature, but they had taken up the 
various functions that formal institutions did not cover or failed to respond to. In the 
interviews over half of the migrant workers were members of Laoxianghui and most of them 
attended their activities. Statistics show that migration operated at a very low organisational 
level: 93% of migrant workers seek jobs through families and friends or by themselves with 
only 7% being introduced through organisational labour output or the labour market (Fan, 
2004). It is not surprising that construction workers were organised in teams along native 
place lines, they lived in the same dormitories on the site and in the manufacturing factories 
and the whole team or workshop was comprised of migrant workers from the same township. 
The percentage of contracting labourers was even lower, which made it difficult to defend 
their rights. Without organisational or contracted protection, most migrant workers were 
pushed into resorting to Laoxianghui when being injured, deceived, had deducted or delayed 
                                                        
60 Based on Fei Xiaotong‘s ‗Peasant China‘, differential pattern refers to a social relationship is traditionally defined by the 
distance to, and affiliations with, one‘s family line and relatives (Fei, 1947; Wu, 2007).  
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wages or were ill-treated. 
 
In this way, occupation-based mobilisation and township-based spontaneous organisations 
become the main organisational and leadership resources for the fragmented contentious 
activities of the weak against the powerful. Popular Weiquan (defending rights) organisations 
were built up from the soil of prosperous Laoxianghui and other friendship groups within the 
same occupation, and developed an alternative behaviour model to defend the rights of 
migrant workers. Sometimes the team leaders and middle managers, who became the 
representatives of the weiquan institution, dwelled in the spontaneously-formed laoxianghui 
(Mei and Huang, 2005). That ‗Laoxiang (people with native ties) should help laoxiang‘ is a 
traditional concept. A leader of such an organisation in Beijing for migrant workers coming 
from Henan said in the interview, ‗we had duty and responsibility to demand rights and fight 
if necessary for our fellow men of the same origin and it is free of charge to register as a 
member‘. 61  A member also mentioned they would first think of laoxianghui when 
encountering any hardship and laoxianghui would represent them to negotiate with the 
workplace managers if the problem was very serious
62
. Generally these negotiations have a 
high possibility of winning and sometimes the leader led a group of members to the 
workplace and won the negotiation through sheer numbers and even violence, whilst at other 
times the representative got the advantage and attention over the dialogue by the strong 
identity of such a representation. Their appearance was effective in problem solving because 
the message had been passed to the manager that hundreds and thousands of laoxiang were 
standing and supporting behind them. Besides negotiation, they occasionally led strikes and 
mass protests of migrant workers in front of the companies or local government buildings. 
6.4 Laid-off workers 
If the migrant workers are those peasants who are discontented with their status and actively 
flow to cities to find a better chance in life and then face regulations and institutions that fail 
to accommodate the acceleration of social mobility and other emergent social-economic 
problems, then these laid-off workers have passively fallen into this category and have to bear 
the cost of reform on state-owned and collective-owned enterprises (SOEs and COEs) and the 
adaption of the industrial structure. The urban unemployed increased dramatically as a result 
of the government‘s program to privatise and downsize state-owned enterprises. It seemed 
                                                        
61 Interviewee number 8. 
62 Interviewee number 17. 
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impossible for laid-off workers to form alliances with migrants in the ruthless competition of 
the job market. Nevertheless, together they comprise the sub-category of the new urban poor.  
 
There was no consensus to gain an accurate total of laid-off workers because of the 
fluctuation in the aggregated figures from new additions, continuing unemployment and 
return to employment each year. During the peak period of SOE and COE privatisation, 
restructuring, regrouping and bankruptcy from 1996 to the end of 1990s, according to the 
statistics collected and compared, the number rose from 8.96 million in 1996 to 11.51 million 
in 1997 (Yao and Ai, 1999) and then up to 14-16 million in 1998 (Ding, 1999). The 
accumulative number of laid-off workers (including re-employment) amounted to 30 million 
people before 2000 (Zhang, 2000). The tendency of this dramatic increase has slowed down 
since 2001 (Yang, 2003), and the problem of re-employment of the laid-off has also been 
given more attention. There were still over 14 million laid-off workers unemployed in spite of 
the fact that the rate of re-employment has begun to rise quickly, reaching 5.05 million in 
2006 (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2007). The entire condition of the labour 
market was still under enormous pressure, with an excessive supply of over 12 million 
labourers beyond the total demand every year (Liu and Liu, 2007).  
 
10 out of 15 laid-off workers in the interviews had been unemployed for over five years, and 
found it difficult to be properly re-employed through the labour market or agencies. Eight 
laid-off workers are now self-employed as vendors or operating small business, but they had 
also led difficult lives and suffered from inflation, business risks and security risks. Only three 
of the young laid-off workers, aged under 35, felt contented about their status in the new jobs, 
but they admitted that the contracts could not be achieved without strong personal relations. 
Generally they had long accepted the fact that the old ‗iron rice bowl‘ system (lifelong 
guaranteed employment) was breaking down, that some SOEs and COEs were indeed old, 
inefficient, obsolete and in great need of reform. However, those laid-off workers aged above 
40 or 50 with over 15-30 years of service had inadequate education and narrow working 
experience, especially in manufacturing factories. They could hardly find a new job and they 
bore heavy family burdens, having to pay a large sum of pension and medical insurance by 
themselves (3,000-5,000 yuan per person per year) until the age of retirement and were easily 
disturbed by any social-economic changes. They felt the most difficulties, weakness, injustice 
and unfairness, which were likely to kindle their contention and public sympathy. 
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As summarised from the interviews and the protest profiles from other sources, the largest 
cause for laid-off workers‘ petitions and insurgency was the controversial economic, welfare 
and labour relationship between themselves and the enterprises that dismissed them on issues 
of wages, pensions, severance pay, medical reimbursement, refundable funds, social insurance 
and rearrangement. When they were forced into the job market again, they shared common 
problems with the migrant workers such as the unregulated labour relationship without formal 
or fair contract, non-fulfilment of pensions, work injury and medical insurance and security 
protection and high work intensity with low or unpaid wages. Without better education and 
strong knowledge of law, individual victims were unclear about how to protect and defend 
their rights and became inferior in negotiations with employers when signing the contracts 
and when victimised. Besides individual petitions and appeals, those who were owed wages, 
pensions or medical compensation by their previous work and dissatisfied about the 
rearrangement or mistreated in the new working places were prone to take collective actions. 
These could be organised by selected or voluntary worker representatives in order to negotiate 
with the managers to solve problems, to collectively appeal to the higher administrative and 
judiciary departments and to expose incidents to the local or central media or to consult 
various legal aid centres (Ye, 2007). It was not shocking to see tens or hundreds of laid-off 
workers sit in and demonstrate at the front door of local government buildings. A combination 
of various resorts and resources were utilised and the most popular organisational resources 
for laid-off workers to take contentious activities and defend their rights were still grassroots, 
popular and spontaneous wenquan organisations based on work units and communities. It was 
noticeable that the trade unions had not exerted their importance and influence, as they should 
in the labour unrest, though they were under transformation to be more representative for 
labourers.  
 
It was noted that public interest in an individual enterprise was also a strong concern for the 
deprived workers, because it was closely related to these workers‘ private rights and benefits. 
News about the unregulated privatisation process in selling enterprises at the cost of the 
collective interest of the workers and the state was often widely disseminated among the 
grassroots organisations and regarded as intolerable. Some revealed the scandals that the 
managers turned the enterprise into their own property without any cost (or with the money 
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from the state-owned banks)
63
, and some workers were even asked to contribute money to 
buy the company shares otherwise they would be laid off.
64
 There were acute criticisms 
against the whole unregulated process of restructuring and privatisation under the motto of 
‗Cross the river by feeling the stones‘, since the relations between local officials, SOE 
managers and private entrepreneurs (who purchased or merged SOEs) were knotted and they 
were conspiring to ‗seek rents for power‘65. There were comments such as ‗practice does not 
make perfect and now it still follows the wrong conceptions and directions‘66 and ‗the flowing 
out of state capitals has only fulfilled the money pockets of the individuals.‘67 In addition, the 
fact that those SOE managers, who might be responsible for the loss-generation or bankruptcy 
of the enterprise, enjoyed the luxury of housing, car and living conditions, and those who 
should be punished for their corruption and misconduct became beneficiaries of the reform, 
which caused psychological imbalance and resentment in the workers. As a way to unleash 
grievances, there was a great number of anonymous informants‘ letters sent to local 
procurators and the Central Party Discipline Committee to expose corrupt managers and the 
collusive officials (Xu, 2008), many of which have been published on the Internet
68
.  
 
More radical and cynical attitudes towards the Party-state itself were driven by the belief 
some laid-off workers held, especially those remaining unemployed, dissatisfied about the 
minimum living allowance or unhappy about their re-employment, that the proletariat was 
now being abandoned and oppressed by the Party who had turned to represent the 
entrepreneurs and the new rich. Many collective protests and even riots were taking place and 
multiplying through spontaneous mobilisation with such resentful sentiments at their heart. 
One laid-off worker in Wuhan, who was originally from Sichun, supported such a statement 
by noting that: 
 
― … about 100,000 workers gathered in protest in Mianyang City, Sichuan Province, 
after their factories declared bankruptcy and it was found that officials had embezzled 
their unemployment relief funds. The armed police were called in to suppress the 
                                                        
63 Interviewee number 11, 13, 36 and 38. 
64 Interviewee number 36 and 37. 
65 Interviewee number 62. 
66 Interviewee number 58. 
67 Interviewee number 94. 
68 For example, a complaint letter collectively signed by 3000 workers, including laid-off ones in a Nanyang Medicine 
Company to the Central Party Discipline Committee against the local government department and company leaders in regard 
to the privatisation of the company and compensation to the workers, was published online and cited by many websites, bbs 
and forums. The content of the letter can be found from the Web-blog of Kaidi Lawyers‘ Window.  
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protestors with force, resulting in many arrests and injuries.‖69  
 
Another one said confidently that, ‗the government‘s unemployment relief funds are being 
ravaged by corrupt officials‘. 70 Some believed the government only cared about the vested 
interest of their own group, stating ‗SOE restructuring made so many old workers redundant 
with little or low income, while the bureau restructuring still entitled an advanced retirement 
and good welfare for those just over 40.‘ 71 Others also felt they were being cheated by such 
statements that ‗the system has brought more positive benefits than negative liabilities‘ and 
‗there is still a long way to go and to fight against certain problems‘ when they were fighting 
against their own hardships.
72
  
 
Laid-off workers‘ grievances and discontent were not only caused by economic relations in 
connection with the economic structure reforms but also in various cases where they were 
forcefully evicted from their houses, ill-retreated by officials when running small businesses 
and they encountered problems regarding medical care or children‘s education or with the 
inconstant stock market and inflated housing market, which were all detailed in the interview 
stories. Home eviction undoubtedly affected and seriously victimised laid-off workers 
because many of them lived in the old welfare housing provided by their former work-units 
and now faced either sale or reconstruction of the factory/dormitory sites or the overall 
makeover of the urban landscape. This prevailing phenomenon worsened the already grave 
situation for them when they were sometimes violently forced to move out of their houses 
with little compensation. Two laid-off interviewees had such experiences in Beijing. One of 
them, who was forcefully evicted their house because of the new green belt built for the 
Olympic Games, said in despair, ‗I‘ve worked for decades but now jobless. I‘ve lived there 
for a lifetime but now homeless. No job, no house, no money, I have nothing at all.‘73 Another 
one said, ‗it is adding insult to injury and we six people now lived in my father‘s small two-
bedroom apartment.‘74  Although there were numerous appealers and petitioners everyday 
queuing at the national petition office for housing eviction disputes, with many having 
travelled from other provinces, these two interviewees regarded lodging petitions as useless 
and ineffective. This was especially the case in the capital Beijing with a strong emphasis 
                                                        
69 Interviewee number 35. 
70 Interviewee number 34. 
71 Interviewee number 33. 
72 Interviewee number 10 and 14. 
73 Interviewee number 11. 
74 Interviewee number 15. 
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placed on control and stability when it prioritised exalted project such as the Olympics to urge 
the ‗laobaixing‘ (common people) to sacrifice compliantly. There was also an opposite case, 
as one Wuhan laid-off worker complained:  
 
―Our house has waited for demolition for around ten years. This building block was too 
old, small, shabby, dangerous and dirty with public toilet shared by eight households 
and not fitted in the surrounding business centre at all. We expected a fair compensation 
to buy a house elsewhere after the demolition and we appealed to the urban planning 
office every year with other households collectively. But the office just ignored this 
urgency, and put off our appeals every year.‖75  
 
The two contradictions both targeted the government‘s decisions, behaviours, effectiveness 
and justice, and were aimed especially at the urban design department. On many occasions, as 
told by the interviewees as well as exposed by the media, ordinary residents became the direct 
sufferers under the power-money exchange between urban planners and estate developers 
(and sometimes with SOE managers). This also involved the violence combined by public 
security forces and mafia forces hired by the developers. According to the statistics, 
throughout China, disputes over home evictions as well as land confiscations had led to 
violent clashes, which occasionally escalated into local insurrections. The Chinese 
Construction Ministry also admitted to having received three times as many complaints in the 
first quarter of 2004 as in the same period the previous year, and by the end of June 2004, 
4,000 groups and more than 18,600 individuals throughout China had lodged petitions over 
allegedly illicit housing demolition and compensation (Cody, 2004; Kurtenbach, 2005). 
 
The arbitrary urban administration was another trigger to fuel the anger of the laid-off 
workers who earned their modest living as peddlers, vendors, and tricycle drivers on the 
streets. Interviewees mentioned the pervasive phenomenon of street violence exerted by the 
urban and economic law enforcers, who are regarded not as executors of the law but just as 
antagonistic bandits upon those small traders.
76
 One incident on the evening of September 4, 
2007 in Chongqing municipality highlighted that such conflicts of unbalanced power could 
also spontaneously cause large-scale public contentions with all groups and audiences taking 
part: 
                                                        
75 Interview number 37. 
76 Interview number 10, 37 and 38. 
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―It began with the urban administration officers maliciously beating a street vendor after 
smashing his push stall and created such dissatisfaction among the present crowd that 
city residents themselves began attacking them. The incident escalated into one urban 
administration vehicle being set on fire, and local citizens of over 2000 crowding 
around and cutting off all traffic. The violent conflict continued to escalate and get 
worse when the police came and clashed with the masses, the fire-fighters showed up 
and then the anti-riot squad warriors sealed off the area.‖  (Kennedy, 2007, internet 
resource)  
 
There were also furious comments that followed online such as, ‗the UA don‘t just smash 
people‘s rice bowls [means of living], but their dinner tables too … not letting people eat, not 
even letting them earn a living…‘. Such street protests and riots showed that people‘s 
grievances were mounting over injustice and the violation of the human rights of the poor and 
weak. Certain government officials, such as the eviction officials and urban administration 
officials, had become the personal or collective targets of social grievances. 
 
The urban workers, who were more privileged in pre-reform status than peasants and migrant 
workers, still gained more social resources in experience, information and networking 
(guanxi). They also developed better self-consciousness and tactics in using the law as a 
weapon. The radical popular movements in the Cultural Revolution, the post-Mao democratic 
movement and Tiananmen protests from 1960s to the end of 1980s, all affected the collective 
social memory and participants‘ experiences. These influences on the different generations, 
from late 30s to over 50s, in the urban cities had shaped their leadership building, cultural 
framing and repertoire construction during contemporary contentions. They realised that, to 
meet their collective goals within the limits of state tolerance, collective action rather than 
individual contentions would exert more pressure on the state, which was more concerned 
with local stability.  
  
6.5 Reflections 
From the fieldwork research, the obvious causes and triggers of grievances and contentious 
activities for peasants was land requisition, power abuse by local cadres, conflicts around 
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grassroots elections and self-governance, lack of social security and environmental problems; 
for migrant workers the problems were unpaid wages and compensation, problems with 
temporary residence permits, difficulties in children‘s education and conflicts with city 
residents; for laid-off workers the issues were also unpaid wages and other welfare funds, 
unregulated privatisation of SOEs, corrupted managers and officials, house eviction and 
arbitrary urban administration. Building the analysis from their profile and interview results, 
this chapter has discussed the fundamental causes of their psychological deviation, their 
vulnerability and strength for contentions. 
 
The popular demand for equality and justice lay in the gulf between rural and urban societies, 
and between ordinary citizens and the privileged class. Labourers‘ perceptions of the social 
realities were easily turned into triggers of contentions when this group was in a 
disadvantaged situation. When inequalities were generated through unfair manipulation of 
rent-seeking, the marketisation of power and corruption, they were rendered as unacceptable, 
and it was then that contentions with disadvantaged groups arose to indicate a class tension. 
There even emerged anti-social behaviours, terrorist activities, personal damages to the rich 
and sabotage of SOEs. Anger had further been driven towards the Communist Party itself that 
once fought alongside the workers against capitalist exploitation but was now supporting the 
capitalists in their struggle against the workers, and that once seized property from rich 
landlords and redistributed to the poor, but was now taking lands from the poor and passing it 
on to the developers and the enterprising local governments (Broudehoux, 2007).  
 
As a whole the group of labourers could be characterised as both scattering and gathering, 
which greatly affected their contentious strategy. Generally they lacked the necessary social 
protection and effective channels to relieve their grievances, so they were disadvantaged in 
the processes of bargaining and contention (Song, 2007). The loose organisational base, or 
even a lack in organisational resources, meant that the cost of establishing a formal leadership, 
collective strategy and consensus was relatively high among the dispersed labourers who were 
more concerned about their individual rights. But private concerns could also be publicised, 
scattered forces be gathered and individual appeals collected. The catalyst for the emergence 
and growth of collective contentions and popular organisations was the increase of weiquan in 
the consciousness of labourers. Another feature of the gathering of labourers was the 
spontaneous organisation of Laoxianghui, noticeably popular within migrant worker 
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communities. Since migrant workers were connected with each other in everyday life through 
this informal township, kinship and friendship network for housing, hunting jobs and other 
social activities, information and grievances were usually shared and spread quickly and 
emotionally, and in certain cases more effectively within these small circles. This was likely 
to bring into play spontaneous contentious activities with a natural tendency towards 
escalation and, in some instances, such snowballing collectivity would become violent. Other 
weiquan organisations among migrant workers, peasants and laid-off workers were also 
prevailing and some involved people of other social status and classes.  
 
It was noted that leadership was of greater significance in a collective contention or in an 
organisation. A few middle-aged, experienced and active individuals were likely to become 
leaders and the factors causing them to ‗appear and lead in public‘ included a sense of justice, 
social and community pressure and confidence (O‘Brien and Li, 1995; Cai, 2002；Ying, 
2001). ‗It could be very difficult sometimes,‘ as commented by the same leader in the Beijing 
Henan Laoxianghui.
77
 Organisers, like him, were usually required to give a great personal 
commitment, sacrifice and a large amount of time, energy and money. They also bore a higher 
risk of being punished or arrested once they were labelled by the authorities as dangerous to 
social-political stabilities. Therefore, there was an unavoidable unsteadiness in the leadership 
regarding the willingness and perseverance of individuals to become leaders.  
 
As the experiences and social memories of this group revealed, defending rights first needed 
righteous causes and nominal justification, which should be both compliant with the law and 
justice and constrained within the official boundary of tolerance (Shi, 2005). In the 
contemporary context, familiarity with laws and policies was becoming increasingly 
important. As one lawyer said in their interview:  
 
―Though most of the laws and policies were neither taken seriously by the officials nor 
the populace, if the victim groups used the strategy of ‗taking them seriously‘ as a 
justification for their contentions, such laws and policies could become very powerful in 
exerting pressure on the local and higher level of government to force them to solve the 
local problems.‖78  
 
                                                        
77 Interviewee number 8.  
78 Interviewee number 82. 
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However, it was very rare for ordinary citizens to win a lawsuit against the local government 
and, moreover, if they lost the case they were also deprived of legitimacy for further appeals. 
So, using the weapons of law often meant seeking administrative intervention rather than 
appealing through courts. Petitions to the higher administrative level (shangfang) also 
required the framing of the art of contentions, including timing, place, opportunity, number of 
petitioners and presentations, in order to both raise the higher authority‘s attention and save its 
face. The actors‘ consciousness in law and policies was growing and they became more and 
more sophisticated in the use of strategies to distinguish boundaries and to evade punishment. 
For example, they were increasingly aware that devastating activities on infrastructures, 
buildings, vehicles, machines and equipments was equal to disturbing public order and 
unacceptable in higher authority‘s eyes (Ying and Ji, 2005). Such violent or radical actions 
were then contained by the actors themselves both for self-protection and to provide an 
effective resolution to their problems. Another strategy, ‗constant pestering and nagging‘, 
mentioned by a laid-off worker in Wuhan who appealed for the shabby building they lived to 
be demolished
79
, was often adopted as a follow up to contentions, to react and to avoid the 
related officials‘ tactics of ‗protraction and inaction‘. It meant constantly appealing and 
pressing the authorities in order to accelerate the resolution, though one problem could still 
take several months or even years to be finally resolved.  
 
A deep-seated reason for popular weiquan was in fact the high threshold for labourers to 
defend their rights through channels provided by the authorities, which meant the normal 
administrative or legal resort was ineffective, inefficient or costly. At present many non-state 
enterprises have still not complied with the regulations and established trade unions and even 
where a trade union was founded, the chairman was employed by the enterprise and could not 
fully guarantee the labourers‘ rights. In addition, contractors, managers, developers, local 
tyrants and government officials, with whom labourers were contentious, were far more 
advantaged and powerful during the normal bargaining process, let alone when they used 
illegal measures to repress and silence the appealing labourers. Clearly there was complexity, 
delay and ineffectiveness in the arbitration of trade unions, labour departments and the 
procedure of court judgment that restricted labourers‘ individual appeal channels, and further 
drove them to take on popular collective weiquan. 
 
                                                        
79 Interviewee number 37. 
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In order to direct the future contentions in a democratic and peaceful way, and make it a real 
vehicle to push for representative governance and promote civil society, groups of labourers 
need to increase their organisation, manage and converge their scattered forces, lower the cost 
of achieving consensus among themselves, improve their self-consciousness of rights, make 
good use of networking and all kinds of resources, and enhance their negotiation capabilities 
through empowerment within themselves as well as inclusion of other groups.  
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Chapter 7 Internet Contentions of Intellectuals and White-collar 
workers 
7.1 Introduction  
Looking specifically at the intellectual group, it appears that these sub-groups of scholars, 
students, lawyers, journalists and dissidents have largely shared in and contributed to the new 
tendency of contentions brought about by the internet – in social-political, nationalist or pro-
democratic movements. Driven by the social, economic and technological development of the 
post-reform era, the internet has become the most convenient and fastest-spreading way to 
connect various groups in China and for them to make use of prevailing internet contentions 
that are different from actions and movements on the streets. Based on the interviews, most 
intellectuals and white-collar workers were using the internet as their tool to communicate 
and also as their weapon to express, deploy and impose their different demands and ideas on 
social realities. Internet networks and online forums, what is called the public sphere online, 
has also become an important part of Chinese civil society dynamics. 
 
As of January 2001, the total internet population in China was 22.5 million (China Internet 
Network Information Centre, 2001); by April 2006 China had a population of 123 million 
internet users, over 80% of whom were under the age of 35 and over half of whom were well-
educated (China Internet Network Information Centre, 2006); by February 2008 the number 
had reached 221 million, exceeding that of the USA, and China was ranked first in the world 
(Feng and Zhou, 2008). Based on the growing population of internet users, a new term 
emerged and was normalised – ‗netizen‘, a portmanteau of internet and citizen, coined by 
Michael Hauben in 1992 (Hauben et al, 1997) and this was used to refer to people who used 
internet resources to engage in online communities through participation, contribution, 
creation and other responsible actions. Netizens were believed to be distinguishable from 
other internet users in that they focused on: 1) using the internet as a social tool to participate 
in various social activities, 2) making use of the opportunities the internet provides in order to 
expand social involvement and influence, 3) forming connections that would otherwise be 
impossible (Hauben et al, 1997). Millions of Chinese have been attracted to the internet, most 
aged between 20 and 40. They have gained college-or-above education with stable 
occupations and income. They have gone beyond the functions of merely information 
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receiving or entertainment, but explored deeper into the network power of information and 
discourse, and they have formed numerous discursive communities in the virtual world from 
the mid-1990s to the present. The components of Chinese netizens were mostly from the 
group of intellectuals as well as the sub-category of the white-collar labour group, and the 
locations of these netizens were mostly limited to the urban cities.  
 
As for intellectuals, Xu (1999: 12-3) has stated in his book ‗Disenchanted Democracy‘ that 
many intellectuals intended to adopt a new strategy of indirect criticism towards serious social 
and statist problems by advocating humanist spirit and new Chinese nationalist studies, and 
by describing monumental problems like corruption and social injustice in moral and 
professional terms, as the erosion of general moral standards and breakdown of professional 
integrity. This strategy, though not sharp enough to penetrate the deep institutionally 
problematic core of the Party-state, still provided an alternative discussion that was more 
acceptable to the authorities and more accessible for the populace. Now such discourse, 
discussion and criticism has been moved online. The internet has become a better stage for 
intellectuals to conceptualise and to express their thoughts, ideals and dissatisfactions for both 
themselves and for other disadvantaged groups. On this new stage they are born to be advisors, 
representatives, coordinators and leaders in the contentions and find it easy to mobilise and 
unite with other different groups under different circumstances. 
 
Besides students and scholars, white-collar workers also comprised a large proportion of 
netizens while they were divided in different self-perceptions: more than half of them had 
strong self-consciousness to categorise themselves into middle class and to distinguish clearly 
from the grassroots in education, profession, prestige and influence, as shown in the 
interviews. On the other hand, rising living standards and higher pay also caused a few 
manual workers to adopt middle-class values and lifestyles and more instrumental forms of 
behaviour in the process of ‗embourgeoisement‘ (Goldthorpe et al, 1968: 54). In the same way, 
some white-collar workers still regarded themselves to be salary-man, working class even a 
class of ‗migrant workers‘80, just differentiating from blue collar in the type of work, not in 
terms of privilege or status. The white-collar workers had their own problems and grievances 
as their families, friends and themselves set high expectations for them, which becomes a 
great pressure
81; the three mountains of ‗medicine, education and housing‘ are also overloaded 
                                                        
80 Interviewee number 22. 
81 Interviewee number 20. 
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on them
82
, which reinforces vulnerability. Though most of them believed that social chaos and 
political instability would definitely result in economic setbacks and people suffering, they are 
more and more likely to participate in contentious activities or to identify with other 
insurgents. The anonymity, freedom and creativity of the online sphere were perfectly suited 
for them to take such contentions.    
 
This term of netizen has been used recently in China most frequently referring to the vigorous 
netizen movements. Since the internet has penetrated into every aspect of Chinese society 
with revolutionary and empowering effects, the growing offline contentious activities have 
fuelled the online discussion with various topics and problems and interwoven these with 
internet contentions. On the other hand, the involvement and even initiative of the internet in 
various contentions has blurred the boundaries between virtual and real communities, 
redefined existing social relations and propelled existing civil forces into new possibilities 
(Tai, 2006: xx). Generally netizens are participating actively in online forums and discussions, 
in building and disseminating blogs, in breaking through the governmental blocks of 
information, in using the human flesh search engine (Renrou sousuo yinqing, detailed later), 
in signing online petitions and organising a mixture of movements in a fashionable, collective 
and united way, showing a new tendency for social and political contentions.  
 
Therefore, instead of a categorised analysis of the sub-groups of intellectuals and their types 
of contentions, this chapter is going to investigate their domain of contentions – the internet - 
and how intellectuals as well as urban white-collar workers mobilise internet resources in an 
enlarging online public sphere to influence real life and interact with the government on 
different occasions. The investigation into the micro dynamic framing of internet contentions 
is based upon the internet content analysis of administrative and legal cases, moral cases and 
nationalist cases, with the Wenchuan Earthquake case seen as an integrated and maturated 
example.       
 
7.2 Administrative and Legal Cases 
Administrative and legal cases are directly related to the quality and legitimacy of governance. 
Justice, accountability and transparency are the core of good governance in many people‘s 
                                                        
82 Interviewee number 22. 
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judgement. As anger and defiance against social problems and injustice were prevailing, the 
danger of social unrest increased, as demonstrated in the large number of collective actions in 
public. As a more acceptable and safer platform, the internet and cyberspace then provided a 
channel for Chinese netizens to express their feeling that they should do something for social 
justice and create pressure on the problem-solving process. Recently many important civil and 
criminal cases have been made public online, local cases being given nationwide coverage, 
with follow-on arguments full of suspicions, exposures, controversies, protests and 
recommendations. Administrative cases of inefficiency, deficiency, corruption, rent-seeking 
and other malfunctions often involved individuals or a group of officials and intertwined with 
the legal cases being targeted and explored by netizens. Since there was no judicial 
independence and courts often colluded with governmental officials, netizens might 
understandably redress what they perceived as unfair or unjustified decisions by taking issues 
into the virtual court of appeal on the internet and thus swaying the tide of public opinion (Tai, 
2006: xvi). They were concrete and pertinent criticisms targeting the most specific problems 
in which lay the general social and political ills, as well as governance deficiency. On the 
other hand, online activism and activities to a certain degree evoke, organise, mobilise and 
energise offline contentions. 
 
The tragic death of Sun Zhigang, a 27-year-old man, on March 2003 was first revealed and 
reported online by Southern Metropolitan Daily one month later.  
 
This university graduate and graphic designer from Hubei Province was arrested on the 
streets of Guangzhou for not carrying a temporary resident ID permit, and brought to a 
‗custody and repatriation‘ centre. After 3 days he was dead in a penitentiary hospital 
caused directly by savagely beating of his body 72 hours before the death and indirectly 
by the abuse of police power under the custody and repatriation system. (Chen and 
Wang, 2003, media report)  
 
Immediately following the news becoming public, newspapers and websites throughout China 
republished the account, chat rooms and bulletin boards exploded with outrage, substantial 
public discussion of the flaws of the repatriation system was heated and legal experts 
intensified calls for the abolition of the abuse-ridden ‗custody and repatriation‘ centres (Beach, 
2005, internet resource). Within two months, the State Council declared that the government 
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would replace the system and rescind the regulation that once allowed police to detain people 
who failed to produce local residence permits. This showed the rare speed and efficiency of 
the authorities responding to public opinions and movements (Cai, 2003, media report). It was 
the first time in China‘s entire history that an improvement in law was initiated from the 
bottom to the top with online initiatives, and finally the government made a compromise. 
 
The Xu Ting Case was another legal case in which waves of online discussions pushed for a 
real change in court decisions and for the legal system. 
 
In April 2006, when Xu Ting, a 24-year-old young man, took out cash from an ATM in 
Guangzhou, he discovered every time he took 1000 RMB only 1 RMB would be 
deducted in his card. Thus he took out money for 171 times of totally 175,000 RMB 
($23,000) and then escaped. One year later, he was captured and got life imprisonment 
in the first trial under the law of ‗theft from financial agency‘ (Huang and Li, 2007, 
internet resource).  
 
Immediately after the trial thousands of netizens urged the media to take up the case, mounted 
pressure on the court and brought the case to a second trial, which changed the life sentence to 
5 years. Not only was this young man‘s fate and future altered, but the existing legislation and 
judiciary system had also been challenged and been subjected to debates from all kinds of 
professionals, experts and even the insiders of the system. The court had to give special 
judiciary explanations, and discussions were heated on how this law should be modified. 
There was no doubt that the next People‘s Congress meeting would mention such a case that 
had seized so much public attention and would hopefully bring forth an adjustment to the law. 
There also appeared a Yunnan ‗Xu Ting Case‘ and a ‗Xu Ting Case‘ with similar causes and 
consequences (a life sentence) which pressed for retrial and justice (Yin, 2008, media report). 
 
Dahe.com, a famous news portal and online community based in Henan Province, published 
an open petition letter on June 6, 2007 (online resource) from a group of 400 parents, striving 
to retrieve their lost sons, who had been captured as forced labourers in the many notorious 
brick kilns in Shanxi, China.  
 
These 400 fathers of missing boys from the central province of Henan had joined forces 
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to find their sons at kilns hidden deep in the mountains of neighbouring Shanxi for the 
past 2 months and rescued over 40 children. However, still hundreds were in the hands 
of the black factories. The parents sought help from village, county and city officials 
from police and labour departments, only to find indifference and red tape. Then their 
seeking for help online in extreme desperation had raised grave concerns all over China. 
After the letter being published for 5 days on the internet, it had received more than half 
a million hits. Many posts in forums expressed anger and shock with accusations of 
collusion between officials, police and the kiln owners and calls for establishing popular 
organisations to rescue child labourers. (Bu, 2007, internet resource)  
 
Such scandals directly brought attention from the central government and influenced 
governmental policies and decisions: on June 9 Zhengzhou (Henan capital city) police soon 
started a one-month campaign against abduction and forced labour and set up an information 
system for all missing/abducted persons in the municipality. Henan police also reported the 
incidents to the Public Security Bureau in order to foster collaboration from their Shanxi 
counterparts (Z. Liu, 2007, media report). Up to October 2007, 95 Party officials were 
punished, including the head of the department of labour and security of the Shanxi provincial 
government and two responsible mayors, after more than 1,000 people, including children and 
mentally handicapped people, were rescued from Shanxi brick kilns. Meanwhile, life and 
even death sentences were given to five kiln owners, managers and guards (Xie, 2007, media 
report). 
 
The South China Tiger (‗Zhou Tiger‘) photo controversy case came into focus when netizens 
accused officials of using fake photography to promote tourism, and the ensuing firestorm 
pushed the national media to investigate the possible fraud.  
 
In October 2007, Zhou Zhenglong, a Shaanxi farmer, shot pictures of a rare South China 
tiger in the wild that was thought to be extinct and was then called a hero. Two months 
later, however, he was very likely to be, along with the Shaanxi Forestry Department, 
the biggest liars in 2007. They were exposed by millions of netizens that got to the 
bottom of the matter: there were professional photographers that scanned every pixel of 
the photos to question their authenticity; there was a botanical expert from the China 
Academy of Science who, based on the plants around the tiger, put forward his 
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questions; there was even a netizen that managed to fumble out an age-old picture that 
was recognised as the original copy by which Zhou made a fake, flat tiger on a poster 
cut-out. Also present were sceptics that analysed the financial gain of the Forestry 
Department once the existence of the tiger seemed proven and the sizable reward 
granted to the farmer (Ding, 2007, media report; Tan, 2007, internet resource).  
 
This consequently spurred a heated debate over cover-ups, culpability and corruption, as well 
as whether Zhou was forced to take the fall for powerful officials. During further investigation, 
mainly initiated and demanded by netizens and involving all kinds of experts and scholars on 
the South China Tiger case, it was revealed that:  
 
Mr. Hao Jinsong (the founder of the Public Interest Lawyer Centre) even sued the 
National Bureau of Forest for their administrative review decision and said that the aim 
of his litigation was to urge the national administration to respond to the public appeal. 
This litigation was still meaningful, though Beijing Second Intermediate Court made a 
decision not to place this case on file (C. Zheng, 2008, media report). 
  
As one blogger wrote on 11 October, 2007 on Tianya BBS (internet resource), ‗the 
government agency‘s credibility is on the edge of extinction in China‘. In this credit-losing 
age, an amazing number of netizens undertook finding out the truth as their responsibility, 
venting their indignation towards liars and boodlers while Zhou and the Ministry had hitherto 
withstood the inquiry. The Southern Metropolis Daily acknowledged the popular dissidence, 
saying that ‗the era when people blindly believe what the government tells them is over. 
Likewise, the era when the people are too afraid to speak out is also over‘ (Duerme, 2007, 
media report). Not until the end of June 2008 did the controversy finally settle down, and it 
was confirmed that the photo was a ‗paper tiger‘, staged under pressure from the central 
government. Netizens were able to celebrate the ‗late victory‘:  
 
as in June 2008 Zhou Zhenglong was arrested on suspicion of fraud, and 13 officials in 
Shaanxi province were fired or disciplined, including media officials who were sacked 
for dereliction of duty and the Provincial Forestry Department deputy head, the official 
in charge of wildlife preservation (C. Zheng, 2008, media report).  
 
154 
 
The rapid and heated popular inquiry into the tiger fabrication was in sharp contradiction to 
the nonfeasance or malfunction of the government performance and administration. This 
spontaneous mobilisation has gradually transformed into demands of surveillance of local 
governments‘ behaviour as well as just punishment for abuse of public power.   
 
7.3 Moral Cases  
It is undeniable that there has been a loss of moral values in contemporary China since the 
early 1990s – as reflected in corruption, commercialism, crime and hedonistic lifestyles. 
Some intellectuals stated during the interviews that the ‗spiritual vacuum‘ 83  and ‗moral 
crisis‘84 resulting from fundamental contradictions in ideology and the decline of Chinese 
traditional values have become one of China‘s most serious problems. On one hand, netizens 
were condemning certain macro-level issues that clearly and truly existed: the unfairness of 
the judiciary, moral degeneration, and the ills that were attacking and degrading the system. 
On the other hand, most moral cases of contention on the internet were targeted on questions 
of individuals‘ social immorality by ways of debates, criticisms, exposures, explorations and a 
mass tool more unique to China – large-scale human flesh search engines.85 This tool has 
mobilised a large number of young and well-educated netizens to participate in search and 
punishment on the individual perpetrators of morality crimes (Fletcher, 2008, media report). 
With the convenience of the internet, netizens who uphold the value of righteousness have 
taken matters into their own hands and wield influence in the real world through a process of 
moral consensus-building and spontaneous online/offline organisation that has been motivated, 
dominated and led by some of the strongest and most earnest voices yearning for the re-
establishment of morality in the civic sphere. 
 
On the internet, netizens fiercely attacked individual or chain corruption within the 
government, the polygamy of high officials (D. Li, 2006, internet resource), the extravagance 
and even burning money of the wealthy classes (Huang, 2006, media report; Zhang and Peng, 
2006, media report). They also detected and exposed sexual scandals, domestic violence and a 
dilemmatic internet charity (Beijing Youth Daily, 2005, media report). Apart from judgmental 
                                                        
83 Interviewee number 90. 
84 Interviewee number 47 and 70. 
85 An internet term: Netizens searched out all the private details of leading roles in the cases, and publicised the privacies and 
contacts while calling upon the public to participate in the attacks towards individuals, not only limited to discursive abuse 
but also expanding to insults, disturbance and harassment in real everyday life. 
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moral condemnations, the powerful human flesh search engines were often applied in these 
cases. Once the personal information of moral criminals appeared online, those implicated 
were bombarded with curses, threats and even ‗execution orders‘.  
 
In an early case in 2006, a woman now dubbed ‗the kitten killer of Hangzhou‘ posted a 
video of herself stomping a kitten to death with her stiletto heels. China‘s netizens 
erupted with rage and hundreds of amateur sleuths traced the video to Hangzhou, a city 
south of Shanghai. They discovered the woman‘s name and that she had recently 
purchased a pair of high-heeled shoes on eBay. They attacked her until she apologised 
on a local government website and lost her job (China Daily, 2006, media report). 
 
A civil case involving an ordinary Nanjing citizen drew a strong response on the internet as a 
good-deed-earned-a-bad-end example.  
 
At around 9:00 am on November 20, 2006 in the eastern city of Nanjing, an old lady, 
Mrs. Xu aged 65, was waiting for a bus and fell down during the jostle to get on the bus, 
with her left collarbone fractured. Citizen Peng Yu, a 26-year-old man, came off the bus, 
helped her get up, then took her to the hospital for treatment and gave her 200 RMB; 
Mrs. Xu then sued Peng as the person who pushed her and sued him for a large amount 
of medical expenses and compensation for emotional suffering; Peng Yu claimed that he 
was only a kind-hearted citizen trying to help a fellow citizen in distress. On September 
7, 2007 at the 4
th
 session of the case, the district court finally released its verdict: Peng 
Yu, partially liable for the accident, would pay 45, 876.36 RMB (US$6,076), about 1/3 
of Xu‘s claim to Ms Xu (Martinsen, 2007, internet resource; Web-blog of Global Voice, 
internet resource).  
 
The court‘s sentence was based on the following analysis:  
 
As the first passenger off the bus, it was most likely Peng who slammed into Ms. Xu. 
And according to ‗common sense‘, if Peng had not been the one who collided with Ms. 
Xu, it is reasonable to assume that instead of sending the old woman to hospital, even 
giving her 200 RMB, he would have caught the real troublemaker. As Peng‘s actions ran 
contrary to common sense, it was ruled that Peng Yu held responsibility for Ms. Xu‘s 
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injury. Therefore, the court based its judgment entirely on ‗common sense‘ in the 
absence of sustainable facts or any witnesses. Unfortunately, this ‗common sense‘ to 
which the chief judge referred was precisely the coldness and non-involvement that 
mainstream values have long opposed (Cai, 2007, media report).  
 
A fire was immediately lit on the blogosphere, with many netizens and bloggers protesting the 
ruling, most of them inclined to see Peng Yu as innocent, and lamenting what impact this 
immensely-discussed incident would have for society when future roadside or traffic injuries 
occur (Web-blog of Global Voice, internet resource), and the danger to directly damage social 
trust in the law and the sanctity of the law itself. The netizens, in a response much more 
severe than the local media, also created a campaign of human flesh search and called on 
netizens to ‗give integrity one more chance‘ (Martinsen, 2007, internet resource). With 
information collected and accumulated from various channels through the search, and more 
inner stories untouched by the court dug out by netizens, half a million netizens had 
participated in the discussion, analysing the evidence, recreating the scene demonstration, 
appealing for more witnesses and discerning every detail until the truth was basically 
retrieved. Finally the spearhead of the netizens‘ anger was targeted at the old lady, her 
policeman son and the court officials (Web-blog of Global Voice, internet resource) and some 
also accused the hospital over the unreasonably high charge of over 40,000 RMB for treating 
the fracture (Y. Li, 2007, internet resource).  
 
In this case, Chinese netizens were playing the role of civil jury, though without judiciary 
efficacy, providing an alternative way to some kind of justice outside the untrustworthy court 
system. The eventual result of the case was announced by the judge of Jiangsu Provincial 
Superior Court that both sides had agreed for reconciliation and withdrew the appeal; it was 
also revealed that Peng Yu still had to pay over 10,000 RMB to Ms. Xu (Ou, 2008, media 
report), apparently not satisfactory to concerned netizens and leaving stains on both the law 
and morality.  
 
The Peng Yu case was different from other moral cases because it was transferred to legal 
channels. However, the executor of law made a distorted judgment that ran against public 
moral values, which endowed the case with a typical meaning – how the law system should 
protect and preserve the judgment made by the social morality. Another moral case also 
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involved a judiciary trial, but pointed to the immorality of the human flesh search engine itself.  
 
In December 2007, a 31-year-old Beijing woman named Jiang Yan jumped off the 24th 
floor balcony of her apartment. A post on her blog before her suicide blamed her death 
on her husband‘s extra-marital affair. News of this ‗death blog‘ spread on the Chinese 
internet and soon, a mass of outraged netizens launched a human flesh search engine to 
track down the guilty parties. Within days, every detail of her husband‘s personal life 
was all over the internet. For months, this man, his alleged mistress and their parents 
were bombarded with attack messages and even death threats. In March 2008, the 
husband sued three websites for cyber violence and privacy violation. On April 17, a 
Beijing court began deliberating the case – the first anti-‗human flesh search‘ case to 
come before the Chinese courts (Youth Weekend, 2008, media report).  
 
This case has raised heated discussion and reflection over the powerful strategy and tools 
provided by the internet, as is understandable as a consequence of China‘s ubiquitous 
manpower and ingrained tradition of ‗people‘s war‘, tracing back to Mao. An intellectual‘s 
comment in the interviews could also be applied to the internet contention: ‗We don‘t need 
violent revolutions; the real revolution is a quiet revolution from within and it is to 
revolutionise ourselves and make ourselves stronger, wiser and more tolerant, rather than 
depriving others of their freedom or life.‘86 As netizens organised to support, speak and act in 
the name of truth, conscience and justice, their actions were transient and their organisations 
were loose without a roadmap for how these moral forces should progress. Therefore, in 
practice, the waves of public anger and emotion of strong disapproval or harsh criticism were 
easily stirred up and widely spread. Furthermore, they contained a certain unstated risk 
because they lacked self-reflection, rationality and order, which meant they could exhibit 
violent tendencies. 
 
7.4 Nationalist cases 
From the interviews, justice, morality and nationalism were three strong sentiments among 
intellectuals, both domestically and abroad. As for nationalism, people did have, to different 
degrees, an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of duty to the nation, the precedence 
                                                        
86 Interviewee number 65. 
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of national over individual and regional interests, and a desire for China to be a more 
powerful nation. Since national identity involves a relationship between the individuals and 
the party, state and nation, the intellectuals‘ relations with the state and with society have been 
transforming, but have also been highly delicate in the post-1989 era. One university lecturer 
commented about Tiananmen 1989 and said: 
 
The Chinese government reported on how the PLA soldiers were beaten and killed by 
the rioting students and crowds while the foreign media focused on how cruel was the 
repression and slaughter towards innocent people. It is difficult to judge which side is 
more biased – those are all precious lives, gone and left behind only numbers and news. 
So no matter what is the worth of death and sacrifice, no matter what is the cause of 
such tragedy, we are all Chinese people struggling for our own country.
87
  
 
At the start of the new century, liberalism and demand for democracy still persisted and had 
even shown new vigour, but it was no longer the common faith of intellectuals. The new 
intellectual discourse emerging in the 1990s was largely independent of politics, a genuinely 
societal discourse and more tolerant and even supportive implicitly or explicitly of the 
government (Fewsmith, 2001: 159). The justification and emphasis on accelerating the 
process of modernisation with a nationalist call had largely outweighed cultural criticism and 
oppositional thinking, and had shown a reconciliation of intellectual inquiry with the 
prevailing political orders or an intentional avoidance of sensitive socio-political issues (Xu, 
1999: 1-3). This new atmosphere tended to push democratic activists to the margins of 
Chinese intellectual and social life (Fewsmith, 2001: 160). During the interviews, though 
democracy and human rights were still regarded as two of the most problematic issues in 
politics, respondents tended to assign themselves a different role in an international context. 
Many interviewees showed strong nationalist dignity and constantly asked the researcher not 
to expose the dark side of China to international society, and they only made critical 
comments on sensitive topics after the recorder was switched off. They were alert and 
suspicious towards the intention of international interference and critiques: to help China 
improve its human rights record or defame China or even violate China‘s sovereignty?88 They 
were especially antipathetic towards international opinions of the ‗China Threat‘ or ‗China 
                                                        
87 Interviewee number 77. 
88 Interviewee number 53, 71 and 85. 
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Collapse‘.89 
 
It is also noticeable that since information flow has overcome the boundary of geography, the 
discord among intellectuals at home and abroad has more to do with generational and social 
memories. The dissidents, still with deep national identities, were more likely to develop 
nationalism in a cosmopolitan sense and integrate it with universal values of human rights and 
democracy to transform China. However, domestic young students and scholars were more 
internalised with a belief in the importance of patriotism over internationalism. The 5 
dissidents in the USA and UK participating in the interviews were all aged over 40 and 
involved in the expanding overseas Chinese intellectual community. They regarded 
themselves as having inherited and borne the burden of Chinese history, especially social 
memories of 1980s liberalism. Some of them portrayed the post-1980s and post-1990s 
Chinese students studying abroad as a generation of loyal and fervent followers of the Party-
state line on nationalism, who echoed the governments‘ anti-Western and nationalist 
propaganda in a series of debates over human rights, Taiwan, Tibet and Falun Gong.  
 
Dissident cyberspace activists were mainly established in the Western developed countries, 
taking advantage of the environment for intellectual movement, freedom of speech and press 
and the access to information. They regarded themselves as more objective, precise and 
critical in what happened in China and the outside world, and as both actors and outsiders in 
the patriotic movement. As they believed in democracy as the fifth modernisation
90
, the most 
direct and farthest-ranging proposals for democratisation and political reform since 
Tiananmen emerged, such as calls for multiparty democracy, direct elections of legislative 
bodies at all levels, the acceptance of international economic and political norms, freedom of 
the press, respect on human rights and an improvement in China‘s international relations.  
 
The internet was chosen as their battlefield to reveal the existing problems of an authoritarian 
China, to circulate their viewpoints and ideals, and to influence overseas Chinese students. As 
one of the interviewees commented,  
Since 1989 the student and scholar exiles initiated early waves of movement in Hong 
                                                        
89 Interviewee number 53 and 77. 
90 The other four are modernisations of agriculture, industry, technology and defense. 
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Kong and America and there have been various pro-democracy associations and even 
the creation of a Democratic Party. There have been numerous demonstrations and 
rallies, publications and online websites and forums along with other international 
appeals.
91
  
For nearly two decades, their influence seemed to be limited to a small circle of intellectuals 
and it was difficult to break through the mainland information block and reach a wide 
audience. This is partly because, as indicated by one interviewee,   
Some dissidents do not have a decent reputation among mainland Chinese, but are 
regarded as being simply cranks and lonely people in exile whose minds have gone 
wobbly. What‘s worse, dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners are always viewed as 
just making every effort including asylum seeking to get the green card abroad.
92
 
 
Though the overall intellectual ethos showed that nationalism outweighed democratism, 
dissidents‘ contentions indicated a tendency for their increasing union with domestic human 
rights defenders, other disadvantaged groups and victims of brutal land grabbing, forced 
eviction, exploitation of labour and arbitrary detention (their interconnection with Chinese 
Christians and Falun Gong practitioners abroad will be further discussed in the next chapter). 
This was shown in the list of demands in a typical open letter published online to Chinese 
leaders before 2008 Olympic Games: 
 
1. Declare amnesty for all prisoners of conscience so that they can enjoy the Olympic 
games in freedom.    
2. Open China‘s borders to all Chinese citizens who have been forced into exile for their 
beliefs, expression, or faith, so that they can re-unite with their loved ones and celebrate 
the glory of the Olympics in their motherland.    
3. Implement the government ordinance to allow foreign journalists to conduct 
interviews and reporting without pre-approval by authorities before October 17, 2008, 
granting Chinese journalists the same access and independence.    
4. Provide fair compensation to the victims of forced evictions and land appropriations 
that have been done in order to construct Olympic facilities, and release people who 
have been detained or imprisoned (often violently) for protesting or resisting such 
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actions.    
5. Protect the rights of workers on all Olympic construction sites, including their right to 
organise independent labour unions; end discrimination against rural migrant labourers 
and give them fair compensation.    
6. End police operations intended to intercept, detain, or send home petitioners who try 
to travel to Beijing to complain about local officials‘ misconduct; abolish illegal 
facilities used for incarcerating, interrogating, and terrorising petitioners; end the ―clean 
up‖ operations aimed at migrants that demolish their temporary housing and close down 
schools for their children.    
7. Establish a system of citizen oversight over Olympic spending and provide public 
accounting and independent auditing of Olympics-related expenditures; make the 
process of awarding contracts to businesses transparent, and hold legally accountable 
any official who embezzles or wastes public funds (Asia News, 2007, media report). 
 
On the other hand, it was true that inside China popular nationalism and nativism persisted 
among China‘s growing middle class and its college students. This was demonstrated 
graphically in the popular protests against the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade in May 1999 and in the uproar surrounding China‘s downing of a US spy plane in 
the spring of 2001 (Blum and Jensen, 2002: 16). The over 20,000 strong anti-Japan rally on 
the streets of Beijing in April 2005 was still fresh in some of the interviewees‘ memories. 
Some of them had attended or witnessed the largest state-sanctioned protests since 1999, or 
had signed the online petition on their own
93
. In fact, nationalist movements and contestations 
were prevailing both offline and online.   
The large-scale internet nationalist campaigns against Japan‘s UN Security Council bid 
among Chinese netizens in February 2005 proceeded into the public demonstrations 
(Duffy, 2005, media report). With the supportive involvement of national media and 
their official websites such as people.com.cn (Tai, 2006: 275, academic literature), and 
with netizens‘ spontaneously setting petition stands on busy streets of major cities to 
collect signatures from non-netizens, over 22 million signatures had been gathered by 
the end of March (Kahn, 2005, media report). In April 2005, as Chinese authorities 
endorsed a series of anti-Japanese public demonstrations throughout China such as in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Wuhan, allowing people to 
                                                        
93 Interviewee number 48, 49, 67, 60 and others. 
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voice their anger after the publication of a new Japanese history textbook that played 
down Japan‘s wartime atrocities, the internet has played an essential role in organising 
public protests of the major cities regarding the time, venue, route, slogans and other 
instructions (South China Morning Post, 10/4/2005, media report). Online messages 
about real-time protest pictures and information were circulated via internet forums, 
BBS, emails, SMS and texts, and called for ongoing recruitment (Yardley, 2005, media 
report).  
 
However, as the anti-Japanese protests began to gain momentum over a period of several days, 
the state discovered the important risks carried by such diversion tactics, and realised that 
public discontent, once unleashed, can be difficult to contain (Broudehoux, 2007, academic 
literature).  
All Chinese media were then forced to stop coverage of the public protests (South 
China Morning Post, 6/4/2005, media report), websites participating in the 
organisational efforts and spreading protest information were shut down (Xinhua 
Financial Network News, 2005, media report), and the author of a text calling for 
protests in Shanghai was even arrested and sentenced to five years in prison, which 
triggered all kinds of online posts against the government‘s impotence and manipulation 
with law experts challenging the legality of this imprisonment based on current laws 
(Tai, 2006: 280, academic literature).  
 
As the waves of demonstrations eventually died down in May 2005, internet protests and 
boycotts against the Japanese commodities continued. As the protesters wished, the Chinese 
government was pressured to take a more rigid and tough posture in its diplomatic relations 
with Japan, such as Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi‘s sudden cancellation of her scheduled 
meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (China Daily, 23/5/2005, media report). In 
this light, the protest achieved success: activists were pleased by the changes in the Chinese 
government‘s foreign policy; students were satisfied with the rightness of their patriotic 
enthusiasm; other urban white-collar workers and marginal groups also achieved the exercise 
of their civil rights and gained social attention (Zhou, 2007, academic literature). 
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Apparently the radical anti-Japan sentiment in Chinese cyberspace became a landmark of 
‗internet nationalism‘ in China (Liu, 2005, academic literature). Since then, nationalism has 
reshaped the crucial elements underlying most popular political communication in cyberspace, 
and the offline nationalist movements have become more connected and intertwined with the 
online activism. The literature also showed that there existed two divided, competing yet 
interrelated types of nationalism – official and popular. While the official nationalism was 
trying to include all the social classes into a common national goal under the Communist 
Party‘s leadership, the intellectuals and the populace towards pluralist nationalism often 
challenged and transformed this monopolistic leadership. However, during the state-society 
bargaining, the fact that the survivability of public opinion and popular nationalism could 
only be guaranteed when it was aligned with the interest of the state strongly demonstrated 
that the internet could also function as a state activation apparatus in online domestic as well 
as international political communication (Chow, 2007, academic literature).  
 
2008 had seen a year of increasing unrest and threats from within and outside China prior to 
China‘s hosting of its first ever Olympic Games.  
Tibetan protestors were the most violent and radical as Buddhist monks and other ethnic 
Tibetans erupted in March 2008 following the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan Uprising 
of 1959 and reached the climax in their clash with Chinese security forces in Lhasa, the 
Tibetan capital. The 2008 Olympic Torch relay from March is another uneasy course. 
When the torch was lit on the Ancient Olympia Mountain in Greece on 24
th
 March, 
2008, the ceremony was disrupted by the members of ‗Reporters without Borders‘ and 
‗Free Tibet‘ activists; clashes went along the torch route in London, Paris, San Francisco 
and India and even Hong Kong. (Synthesis of media reports and internet resources)  
 
The contentions upon Tibetan turmoil and the Torch Relay had driven the nationalist 
movement to a new climax, taking the form of public demonstrations, newspaper editorials, 
online petitions and other internet activism which directly involved the overseas Chinese, 
especially students.  
 
Chinese netizens showed their support for Chinese sovereignty and administration of Tibet by 
collecting and spreading evidence of ‗the true face of Western media in the Tibet riot‘ 
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(YouTube, 20/3/2008, internet resource) to disprove and criticise perceived biased Western 
coverage of Tibet.  
The whole campaign began with an individual effort initiated by an aged-20 Canadian 
Chinese young man who first created the video ‗Tibet was, is and always will be a part 
of China‘ (YouTube, 18/3/2008, internet resource) to ‗tell the world a real Tibet‘, which 
after two weeks received over 2 million clicks and tens of thousands of comments, was 
reported on CCTV, forwarded by bloggers and major Chinese portal sites, followed by a 
spontaneous establishment of particular forums/websites such as www.anti-cnn.com and 
a series of further analysis by Chinese scholars on Western media agenda (Coventry 
Journalism Review 2008, media report).  
 
Overseas Chinese, mainly students, also organised and called for demonstrations for anti-
Tibet independence and anti-Western media distortion as they also managed to support and 
protect the Olympic torch relay against the pro-Tibet protesters and other anti-Chinese 
government forces in major cities of Canada, Australia, the USA, the UK, France and 
Germany through online websites, forums, instant messaging and emailing mobilisation, 
which were widely reported by the Chinese domestic media while mostly ignored by its 
Western counterparts (BBC News, 10/4/2008, media report).  
 
When Chinese authorities first removed the ban on the BBC after the Tibet riot and opened 
domestic access to other foreign media, massive negative online comments were spreading in 
China against the BBC and others, unexpectedly antagonistic to the habitual thinking and one-
sidedness of coverage by Westerners (BBC News, 25/3/2008, media report). This indicated 
that there was a wide gap between the formation of information about Tibet in China (shaped 
by the assumption that Tibetans were backward, feudal, superstitious, and badly in need of 
Chinese style modernisation) and Tibet in the West (shaped by notions of Shangri-La, 
religious freedom and the authoritarian Chinese government‘s poor human rights record) 
(Bajoria, 2008, internet resource). When Western journalism met Chinese populace, especially 
in the coverage of Tibetan insurgence and the Olympic torch relay, there came the peak of the 
credibility crisis, undermining confidence among Chinese in Western reporting, who once 
firmly believed in its reliability, impartiality and objectivity. The government quickly learnt a 
lot from this and its practice was turning in a direction to let people judge for themselves. The 
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authorities also realised that China needed strategic, external and genuine communication 
with the outside world.  
 
Creative strategies by netizens emerged for nationalist expression and protests inside and 
outside China.  
The ‗I (Heart) China‘ movement spread like wildfire over MSN to millions of Chinese 
netizens in two days. ‗Don‘t be too CNN‘ – a ditty of musical retort to the Western 
media outlets such as CNN and the BBC also caught the imagination of the Chinese 
blogs and chat-rooms and were disseminated throughout the online communities. 
(Synthesis of internet resources)  
 
The offline activities also quickly converged with the online information flow. For example, 
Olympic protests in Paris during the torch relay had drawn particular indignation in China and 
led to calls for a boycott of French goods resulting in a large-scale Carrefour boycott in 
Beijing, Wuhan and other major cities (People‘s Daily, 15/4/2008, media report). With 
nationalist sentiments heating up, printed T-shirts with creative nationalist slogans, which in 
Chinese are called wenhua shan (cultural shirts), suddenly became very popular in the free 
markets of Beijing in the few months before the Olympics. There were even anti-CNN T-
shirts and a line of products released immediately after the CNN host‘s insulting words 
shocked and infuriated Chinese at home and abroad, proving that in certain situations in 
China, politics quickly becomes fashion (Goldkorn, 2008, media report).  
 
Human flesh search engines were also politicised and widely applied during the waves of 
nationalist explosions. Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University in the USA, was 
one of the most prominent targets.  
On the day of the Olympic torch relay in San Francisco, Wang encountered a handful of 
students gathered for a pro-Tibet vigil facing off with a much larger pro-China counter-
demonstration (Dewan, 2008, media report). She had written ‗Free Tibet‘ on a 
protestor‘s back and later defended her action in the Washington Post, saying that ‗I did 
this at his request, and only after making him promise that he would talk to the Chinese 
group.‘(Eberlein, 2008, media report) Being spotted by other overseas Chinese as 
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betraying her country and siding with Tibetan independence, instantly, some angry 
Chinese students launched a human flesh search engine witch hunt on the Chinese 
language online portal Tianya, found personal information about Wang and her family 
and began the torrents of horrid abuse (BBC News, 17/4/2008, media report). Grace 
Wang says her parents had to go into hiding in China, with no help from the police 
(Eberlein, 2008, media report).  
  
The internet has given nationalists more power to vent their anger and these recent incidents 
have particularly shown the huge influence of the Chinese Diaspora and students in southeast 
Asia, Europe, and North America and their close contact with mainland residents through an 
easy flow of information and nationalistic rhetoric facilitated by the internet. On the other 
hand, the Chinese government can also employ the internet to activate or make use of what is 
begun by the citizens through the medium of the internet to advance national interests in the 
international arena (Chow, 2007, academic literature). It is revealed that the dualistic 
framework of China versus the West still hid the problematic assumptions of Chinese 
uniqueness, so that nationalism may be obsessed with Chinese uniqueness and concomitant 
defensiveness against criticisms against China. Therefore, nationalist contentions are always 
under reflection and criticism within the intellectual circle. 
 
7.5 Wenchuan Earthquake  
The May 12
th
 Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 filled the internet with numerous critical themes 
for hundreds of millions of netizens to debate and to facilitate actions. Since this devastating 
earthquake happened under the condition of a society with highly-developed knowledge, the 
internet, living broadcast, mobile communications and other technologies greatly facilitated 
and affected the way people received and spread information. In a very short time the 
destruction caused by the earthquake was well-known and became the focus of the world, 
covering the hot topics of death toll, emergency measures, rescuing capability, international 
aid, management of donations, collapse of schools, economic loss, reconstruction and 
reflection after the disaster. The maturity and power of netizens could be seen in their aid 
participation, charity contribution, appeals, critiques and revelations of the truth. 
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Firstly, the scale of the earthquake brought about heated discussions. On May 12
th
 the Sichuan 
Earthquake Bureau held a press conference through Sichuan Satellite TV and announced it 
was an 8-degree earthquake, though it was soon reported by CCTV as 7.8 degrees. It was 
believed that Chinese authorities made such an adjustment out of concern for ‗face‘ because 
the international convention for international aid to obligatorily enter the region meant the 
degree of earthquake had to be 8 or above. Doubted by many netizens and with the 
international aid already entering to help, the national official media corrected the degree to 8 
again on the 18
th
 of May (Tianya BBS, internet resource). Others also defended the 
government that these were technological adjustments and the official information channel 
was much more transparent than that in the period of SARS (Tianya BBS, internet resource). 
It was also discussed that the government at the beginning was truly reluctant to admit 
international professional rescue teams, but after 72 hours and with massive pressures from 
netizens, the government finally opened the door (Tianya BBS, internet resource). Grievances 
flooded over the online forums towards the authorities for the latecomers; when the Russian 
rescue team saved a trapped survivor after 127 hours on 17
th
 of May, all the netizens were so 
moved and expressed their treasuring and caring for every single life along with their appeals 
for international aid (Tianya BBS, internet resource).  
 
Secondly, on the 18
th
 of May the State Council decided that the whole country would mourn 
for tens of thousands of earthquake victims for 3 days from the 19
th
 to the 21
st
 of May. During 
the mourning period, all national flags at home and at Chinese missions abroad would fly at 
half-staff, and public recreational activities would be cancelled. Netizens including professors 
and experts actively expressed approval in the forums and blogs for such governmental 
behaviour. This was an extremely rare experience in China, regarded as the precious and 
meaningful first time that the CPC had established a national mourning on behalf of ordinary 
people. Internally the Government had shown more concern about people‘s livelihoods, 
embodied in the concept that ‗your pain is my pain‘ (the government is also suffering the pain 
of the people) (Global Times, 2008, media report). Externally, it was also in line with 
international practice, which showed that China had learned from international experience, 
and was looking to be more easily acceptable to the world. The three-day pause of the torch 
relay was also confirmed so that the Olympic Games could give way to the tragic loss of life 
(Global Times, 2008, media report). When this regime, often regarded as ignoring and 
violating human rights by the West, paid great respect and poured love into every life under 
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the ruined town, China‘s national image was beginning to be transformed towards an 
enlightened and humanistic one.  
 
Thirdly, netizens were on the front to trace the responsibilities of the State Earthquake Bureau 
officials, to demand all the donations be properly and transparently applied to the disaster 
areas and victims, and question why there were as many as 7000 school buildings collapsing, 
killing more than 11,000 children and teachers (BBC News, 1/6/2008, media report), while 
the government offices and commercial buildings were kept intact. The media also took the 
initiative to report and record in an open, transparent and courageous way what was 
happening and echoed the suspicions and appeals of netizens (Web-blog of Rights-defending 
Alliance for Chinese Citizens, internet resource). When the supervision of the collaborative 
media was strengthened, problems were exposed and explored more easily and promptly. 
 
Fourthly, netizens had automatically and spontaneously organised a range of activities to 
search for the lost, disseminate touching stories, give blood, raise funds, transport materials 
and provide medical support, as well as organising a psychological consultant service. The 
eroded social ethos, value vacuum, worship of money and materialism had been transformed 
to empathy, mercy, selflessness, caring, mutual trust and help through a volunteer ethos. 
Moreover, when the contemporary nationalist youth experienced the catastrophe of 
earthquake, and recalled the keenly felt pain, they also learnt to understand the catastrophes of 
other countries. The grave experience melted away the public rage, cruelty, and violence 
relating to the Tibet turmoil and disturbance of the Olympic torch relay, and made the 
nationalist youth more tolerant to different voices in the international community. As for the 
cohesion and maturation of Chinese nationality, it found the pivot of revitalisation for 
rationality, tolerance, democracy and civilisation.  
 
Fifthly, apart from spontaneous individual and collective contributions, hundreds of NGOs 
were also active in varied types of help and support during the Wenchuan Earthquake. Aided 
by the proliferation of online bulletin boards, blogs and on-the-ground coordination centres, 
unregistered grass-roots organisations, considered weak due to their lack of a supportive 
environment, were functioning as legitimate earthquake-relief NGOs and helped manage the 
crisis (Fan, 2008, media report). Some had teams of volunteers in the quake zone almost as 
fast as the military troops, and they showed effective organising and enforcing abilities in the 
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rescue work, proving themselves as healthy and positive forces in society. Experts and 
professors also participated in the discussion about the previous sensitive relationship 
between state and grass-roots NGOs, and they found though many self-organised social 
networks were not formal organisations, their resources and roles in society were much larger 
than the government officially allowed in the past. Commentators noted that with this disaster, 
the government came to realise the power of grassroots organisations, which could be helpful 
in establishing and managing a law-based civil society; they also expected that a system 
would be built for NGOs so they could take part in an orderly way (Fan, 2008, media report).  
 
The earthquake also reminded people of the snowstorms in southern provinces in early 2008, 
the Jiaoji railway train crash in late April 2008, and the disastrous Tibet insurgency and 
Olympic torch relay protests. China was surely revitalised through great sufferings and 
struggles, especially during the Wenchuan earthquake; the disasters had recharged the 
collective values and nationalist sentiments among Chinese people. It also helped people to 
regain social consciousness and release the tension of the individual-society-state relationship.  
However, a complete transformation still has a long way to go. To avoid going backwards, 
this process of transformation should be institutionalised: the already opened media reporting 
and internet forums should not be blocked again; the already tolerated NGOs should not be 
forced underground again; the citizens who defend their, or others‘, rights should not be 
arrested or punished under the crimes of subverting state power. All the setbacks should be 
bigger challenges than the earthquake itself. 
 
7.6 Reflections  
Clearly the internet has speedily entered people‘s daily life not only as a medium for 
information exchange, a platform for interpersonal communication, a tool for updated 
entertainment and an absorber and emitter of novelties, but also as a platform for new forms 
of civic activism, with which people can fulfil what they may not be able to fully enjoy in 
reality — the freedom of speech, public participation, the pursuit of justice and the direct 
influence on governance and policy. I therefore call it an online public sphere, as part of 
China‘s civil society mobilisation. Although the internet has not dramatically disrupted the 
basic constellation of power relations among state, society and individuals, it has 
fundamentally reinvented grassroots social and political activism by breathing new life into 
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networks in cyberspace and by decentralising the power into the hands of the individuals and 
marginal social groups in different ways (Tai, 2006: 259). As shown in the above cases and 
many more, the internet can facilitate the formation of public opinion, the orchestration of 
popular political movements and the production of a trans-boundary public sphere.  
 
The virtual identity of netizens and the real identities of intellectuals have been combined by 
means of disseminating information and organising online petitions and offline protests, and 
in turn extracting varying degrees of responsiveness and accountability from the authorities 
and affecting government decision making on important social, political, economic and 
diplomatic issues (Tai, 2006: xxi). Netizens have engaged in all forms of online social 
activities, such as exchanging viewpoints, reporting and discussing recent news and 
information and engaging in social interactions for either intellectual goals or pleasure – 
mostly in regards to their social affiliation or the subject of their social group.  
 
The phenomenon of ‗experts turning to the internet‘ has also become more and more 
commonplace for the group of intellectuals. Intellectuals have begun to rethink their own 
academic and professional endeavours and reassess the aims and obligations of their critical 
engagement for social-political changes under new circumstances. Celebrities from elite 
intellectuals and popular intellectuals have both their space and influence on the internet and 
the internet has blurred such variation. They have been writing blogs online, giving internet 
lectures, getting involved in popular focuses and providing expert explanations and 
suggestions, all of which has had an impact on public opinions and policy makers while 
bringing themselves more publicity, prestige and influence beyond university campuses. They 
were made opinion and press leaders in the enlarging online public sphere and enjoyed the 
title of ‗public intellectuals‘ or even ‗opinion leaders‘. Since local institutions and governance 
have been closely monitored online, the internet has in fact created more connections, 
communication and cooperation between the local political elite and intellectuals. It has also 
reflected the greater role intellectuals play in policy formation in contemporary China and 
suggested the increasing need to respond to, refute and encourage views growing up 
independently among the intelligentsia and broader public (Fewsmith, 2001: 186). 
 
As discussed before, a typical and popular behaviour in most cases was the utilisation of the 
human flesh search engine, a vivid description of the frequent phenomenon that online crowds 
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gathered via China‘s bulletin board systems, chat rooms, and instant messaging to collaborate 
on a common task of an intensive and effective human-assisted search that sometimes 
bordered on a lynch-mob mentality (Shirky, 2008, media report). There has been growing 
intellectual reflection on such assumption of moral superiority and involvement of harassment. 
The attacks on the individuals‘ immorality cannot be based on a form of collective violence. It 
falls into the vicious circle of ‗an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth‘. In this way public 
opinion may change from the angle concerning the immorality to the focus on the netizens‘ 
collective violent behaviour. The new terms such as ‗internet punk‘ or ‗internet mob‘ have 
been invented to harshly criticize how human flesh search engines have degraded their 
original moral advantages to a new type of immorality.  
Therefore some rational and reflective netizens opposed the use of such moral 
contentions as an outlet for indignation, and wished to regard them as opportunities to 
rebuild the Chinese national value system and save China from moral crisis. They called 
upon more complete internet laws, the termination of cyber violence and collective 
expressions of netizens‘ rationality for social conscience. They also tried to prove that 
netizens can also establish the milestone of democratic spirits, social justice, and the 
rule of law as an independent force. (Synthesis of internet resources) 
 
Nationalist contentions have also been under reflection and criticism within the intellectual 
circle. The anti-America or anti-Japan demonstrations and parades earlier had made Chinese 
students and white-collar workers the most radical and active vanguards in nationalist 
movements; the following protests, boycotts and all types of online activism showed their 
heated patriotic enthusiasm for the nation. 
Experts say from the Tibet turmoil to Olympic torch relay disruption the public outrage 
and rising nationalism appears to be more genuine, instigated by perceived unfair 
treatment by the West rather than stoked by the Communist Party. This change could 
pose challenges not only to the West that is coming to terms with a rising China, but 
also for the Chinese government that tries to maintain peace and stability within its 
borders (Bajoria, 2008, internet resource).  
 
Inside and outside China there have also been intellectuals trying to adopt a broad sense of 
nationalism, not negatively exclusive, revengeful or arrogant, but a positive, inclusive and 
comprehensive nationalism, a self-renewing nationalism to learn from other countries and 
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cultures during the era of globalisation, re-discover and preserve its own national merits and 
reconstruct Chinese national identity. The online public sphere is undoubtedly a new platform 
for such a communication and learning process. 
 
The internet has also gradually transformed the function of the traditional media from official 
propaganda tools to provision of authentic popular media resources. When an issue became 
the focus of netizens‘ attention, traditional media would probe the issue and provide in-depth 
reports. Likewise, reports by a traditional media agency about an individual event might cause 
intense debate in online forums and rapidly elevate it to the public agenda (Wang, 2008: 56). 
Many reporters from the print media in China, including the leading official People‘s Daily, 
often searched for new clues to stories or new perspectives on a story by browsing online 
posts and feedbacks. They were prone to explore news and seek publications with the 
audience input and participation (Tai, 2006: 265). Once a piece of influential news burst out, 
the reports and following stories would come from multi-channels, but especially cyberspace.  
For example, the disaster of the railway accident in April 2008 has converged officials, 
workers, victims, experts, eyewitnesses, popular heroes and even evictees behind the 
accident. Those stories became more than media reports but revealed the deep 
explorations and evaluations of the institution involved. (Synthesis of internet resources) 
 
More and more high-profile events occurred with the course changed by opinions and actions 
from massive numbers of Chinese netizens, and this rise of public opinion mobilisation has 
generated a new catching phrase of ‗network opinions‘ among both online and offline media 
(Tai, 2006: 293). Therefore, the phenomenal growth of the internet has also greatly facilitated 
the internationalisation of Chinese discourse and democratisation of Chinese public opinion. 
Now public opinion tends to be more fragmented and pluralised, with the periphery elements 
exploiting this new opportunity provided by the internet far more actively than the 
mainstream. 
 
The online public sphere and internet resources of communication have inadvertently framed 
the discourse for participation and movements. As Chinese language has such power and 
charisma of wit, acuity, satire, metaphor and implication, it has been rhetorically and 
delicately applied into the online public sphere with a growing consciousness making changes 
to unsatisfactory realities. The versatile forms of the Chinese internet language, including sets 
173 
 
of numbers, symbols, letters and abbreviations, all represented the netizens‘ intelligence and 
creativity (Shenzhen Daily, 2006). Internet contentions have also shown an increasing 
prevalence of discourses of anti-society, anti-authority, deviation, cynicism and scepticism. 
But they are more than mere contention of discourse, but contain the whole process of 
attribution of social threats and opportunities, social appropriation and mobilisation, strategic 
framing and social construction. The state-society-individual relations have also been 
enriched and deepened with these new dimensions of knowledge society, where the trends of 
globalisation as well as the opening of borders have replaced the verticality of hierarchies 
with the horizontality of communication (Castells, 1996). 
 
As for censorship, there were still ideological taboos that continued to restrict public 
discussions, with topics banned including the Tiananmen Square events of June 1989, the 
Falun Gong movement and any explicit criticism of China‘s leaders (Wacker, 2003: 68-70). It 
is well known that the Chinese government indirectly controlled Chinese cyberspace by 
developing an attitude of voluntary self-control and self-censorship among netizens and 
service providers. Because of commercial interests, firms, whether Chinese or foreign, 
complied with government requirements (Mengin, 2004: 51-70) and there was a whole range 
of sensitive words banned in BBS and online search engines. As for the big corruption cases, 
smuggling abroad, local problems, and certain international topics, decisions of censorship 
were still made on a case-by-case basis (Tao, 2001). However, due to the vast size of China, 
the spread and influence of information often goes beyond the controlling capacity of state 
hands, no matter how much the surveillance technology has been made up-to-date. Netizens 
always can and do find ways to outsmart government blockades and restrictions through 
methods such as using proxy-servers overseas to access banned addresses (Wacker, 2003: 71). 
They also use nicknames or initials or spaces between letters as substitutes for sensitive 
language. The freedom of expression has expanded considerably and the limits of tolerance 
are constantly being tested and re-negotiated. 
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Chapter 8 Religious groups 
8.1 Introduction 
Communist China officially regards science and materialism, not idealism, as the sole 
accurate way to explain the world, so atheism has become the instrument of ideology. From 
the 1950s to the 1970s there was strict prohibition and forceful repression on all traditional 
beliefs, religious organisations and activities, which reached a peak of religious destruction 
and persecution in the Cultural Revolution. However, the man-made spiritual vacuum during 
these three decades and people‘s subsequent disillusion with Communism generated a rapid 
and fierce rebound in religious movement and strength after the reform and opening up of 
China from the 1980s. As the CPC failed to provide answers for those seeking meaning in life, 
as in the Mao era, more and more people have turned to religious or quasi-religious 
organisations to find spiritual and ideological sustenance. Religious expression has become an 
increasingly notable phenomenon and gained more attention from the state, academia and the 
populace.  
 
In China there are five official and institutional religions: Islam, Daoism, Buddhism, 
Protestantism and Catholicism. According to the State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
the official statistics of religious believers remain high, and the figure has reached ‗over 100 
million‘ in recent years. However, research conducted by East China Normal University in 
2005 revealed that 31.4% of Chinese aged 16 and above, or about 300 million people, were 
religious, of whom 67.4% were believers of the five aforementioned major religions. Other 
forms of religion included ancient folk religions, ancestor worship, popular charismatic cults 
and traditional practices such as fortune-telling, the study of the Book of Changes (Yi Ching) 
and Geomancy (Fengshui); it has also become difficult to draw clear lines among religion, 
superstition (mixin) and tradition. Apparently religious and spiritual life has become 
extremely diverse in contemporary China. As commented by a professor in the interviews
94
, 
China is flourishing, not only materially, but spiritually as well. The opportunity attribution as 
a whole for religious contentions has greatly changed, with the distinctive character and 
tendency toward multi-culturalism. The sharp contrast between the official statistics and the 
survey results indicates firstly, a large number of unregistered adherents of major religions, 
                                                        
94 Interviewee number 51. 
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secondly, a wide range of revitalised traditional and folk religions and third, a popularity of all 
forms of quasi-religious and superstitious activities. Those official religious traditions are 
thoroughly enmeshed with the unofficial, popular religions, some of which lie far outside the 
radar of official government acknowledgement (Blum and Jensen, 2002: 309). Thus the 
existence and growth of religious affiliations outside the official statistics, which is 
transforming the social, political and cultural landscape of many parts of the countryside as 
well as in cities, has become the source of contentious forces and the problem of social-
political-religious instability in the eyes of the authorities.   
 
The Chinese constitution explicitly affirms the freedom of religion, especially within the 
context of established and, most importantly, officially acknowledged religions. An important 
prerequisite of China‘s policy of religious freedom is that faith is a personal thing and must 
not interfere with other people or any organisation (Kerr and Swinton, 2008: 127). However, 
as a socially and morally reforming force, religion is no longer merely personal, inward, 
isolated or closed: religious groups are spreading quickly in China by ways of modern media 
and the internet and involving people from all kinds of groups, professions, status and 
hierarchies. Such features have added both difficulties and enlightenments to the research on 
religious contentions, as it is intricate and sometimes impossible to separate the elements of 
their religious movements from contentious activities, to discern religious factors from the 
social-political context and boundary, or to single out the religious individuals from their 
backgrounds and connections with other groups. Indeed, the identity of religious groups is an 
elaborate practice of judgment for the researchers to define as they have overlapped identities 
in the interviews and in broader social realities.  
 
The interviews in the 120 samples (10 of whom were from abroad) have shown an even 
higher rate – 50% of respondents were affiliated with religions to different degrees, while 
there were 20 people with clear self-consciousness for religious movements and contentions 
who were categorised into the religious group. Among the three sub-categories (labourers, 
intellectuals and religious group), notably Christianity has attracted most adherents, 
accounting for 25% (30) of the whole sample and 55% (11) of the religious group including 
five ministers. As for Buddhism, most of the 24 (20% out of 120) people, who were just 
temple visitors, believers of fortune tellers or worshippers of Bodhisattva, claimed themselves 
to be affiliated with Buddhism; so only four monks/nuns, including two Tibetan Buddhists, 
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were classified into the religious group. As for Falun Gong, five members of this domestically 
banned quasi-religious organisation were identified from outside China. No adherents of 
Daoism or Islam were identified for interview. The border between religious and non-
religious spheres has become obscure, as the groups of labourers and intellectuals have 
increasing religious attachments. Religious groups shared the conceptualisation of 
transforming opportunities and threat structures in social-political change, especially the 
money-worshipping, moral decay and corruption as well as loosening central control and the 
maturing civil society. The organisational mobilisation of religious groups varies from one 
religion to another and creates different gaps between formal and informal organisational 
spheres, which depend on the limitation of official boundaries and religious groups‘ 
bargaining power. In their unavoidable encounter and interaction with authority, they also 
developed diverse and combined strategies to mobilise and integrate all kinds of resources 
and forces of both mainland and overseas Chinese communities, using both traditional and 
modern techniques. Notably religion has played an important role in Chinese society, evident 
in the Chinese domestic religious movements of Christian house churches and the rise and 
suppression of Falun Gong. The appeals for religious rights are also interwoven with other 
human rights requests.  
  
The prosperity of religion has not only influenced the public and community sphere of the 
ordinary populace, but it is also interesting that officialdom has begun to develop a delicate 
and intertwined relationship with both the five orthodox religions and other cults and 
activities. It is becoming difficult for the government to control people‘s pursuit of religious 
and spiritual life through coercive measures. It is common that officials and Communist party 
members join the unregistered family church or have practised Falun Gong, and more and 
more officials, especially the corrupt ones, go for fortune-telling, Fengshui and other 
superstitious activities under different covers of Buddhism or Daoism. Some intellectuals are 
even worried that the religious challenge towards the official ideology will put the root of 
CPC legitimacy at stake
95
. Some also believe that religious groups usually do not press for 
political power, and if the authorities adopt tolerant attitudes or methods, there will not be 
major conflicts between religion and politics
96
. On the contrary, if the government takes tough 
or forceful measures, such conflict will probably impact on the regime stability
97
.  
                                                        
95 Interviewee number 51 and 63. 
96 Interviewee number 89, 91 and 101. 
97 Interviewee number 63. 
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The contentions of religious groups contain first the religious movement itself as a 
counterbalance to the excessively materialistic drive and the accompanying spiritual vacuum. 
Secondly, there is also the knotted process of their confronting and bargaining with the 
government to demand religious freedom or protesting against any forms of repression. This 
chapter will look into the twin tendency of religious contentions from two large groups who 
are most likely to take active contentions – the unofficial underground Christians and the 
outlawed Falun Gong practitioners. Along with the religious blossoming and conflicts, both 
Christians and Falun Gong practitioners have attempted to resist political orthodoxy, engage 
religion and spirituality in many aspects of contemporary Chinese life and stake out 
independent moral positions. The focus of this research will be on the recent intellectual 
religious movement flourishing abroad oriented respectively by Christianity and Falun Gong. 
Besides the methods of documentation and interview interpretation, the content analysis on 
‗China‘s Confession‘, ‗The Cross‘ and ‗The Nine Commentaries‘ will also be utilised as case 
studies to reveal constructive conceptualisations and innovative contentious repertoires of 
these two groups.  
 
8.2 Overseas and Underground Christians 
Christianity has never been considered as a strong tradition in Chinese history and has often 
been regarded as the vanguard of imperialist invasion. From the official statistics, Catholicism 
was introduced into China intermittently from the 7
th
 century while Protestantism was first 
brought to China in the early 19th century, but they did not spread widely until after the 
Opium War in 1840. Notably and most strikingly, Christianity, given its foreign origins and 
relatively short history in China, has experienced an astonishing and quite unpredictable 
explosion in membership in recent years among both rural and urban areas.  
 
At present, according to official figures, the number of Christians rose from less than 10 
million in the late 1990s to 16 million in 2005 in the officially sanctioned ‗patriotic‘ 
Christian churches, including Catholic churches in China. China has over 4 million 
Catholics, over 4,000 clergy and 5,400 churches and meeting points, while there are 
about 10 million Protestants, over 18,000 clergy and 37,000 churches and meeting 
points throughout China (source from State Administration for Religious Affairs of 
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PRC).  
 
However, the East China Normal University survey in 2005 found 12% of all believers, or 40 
million people, were Christians. The number of China‘s Christian believers is a hotly 
contested issue as Christianity has recently been the most active and fastest-developing of the 
five religions in China. Different guesses showed there were between 40 and 140 million 
Christians (Ramzy, 2007), since no one knows how many unofficial, underground Christians 
exist and it is assumed to be 2 to 8 times the number of official Christians. 
 
The intellectual-political-religious feature of Chinese Christian movements and contention 
has become more prominent as more intellectuals turn to, or find sympathy for, Christianity. 
The connection between intellectuals and religiosity and the transcendental role of religion 
has empowered the movement with new energy and unprecedented strength. During the 
interviews, intellectuals, especially those with Christian belief or interest, were inclined to 
explain Chinese social realities and problems from a religious perspective. One in particular 
raised the question of the ‗biggest ever vacuum in the national mentality, spirit and soul‘98. 
The social-political problems such as corruption, coercion, structural domination and violence, 
lack of social and political consensus, profiteering and selfishness were readdressed as moral 
issues dwelling in ‗the lust and ugly side of the culture‘99 and ‗the loss of zhongji guanhuai 
(the ultimate concern)‘100. It was not only the unpleasant consequences of commercialisation 
but also the deviation/loss of values in general that drove many intellectuals to search for 
meaning. Some famous intellectuals, such as Liu Xiaofeng, turned to Christianity for an 
absolute truth that transcends socio-historical and cultural-ethnic boundaries (Fewsmith, 2001: 
107-108). As another famous writer Zhang Chengzhi claimed, religious faith is now the last 
resort for a conscientious writer to keep his moral integrity and his commitment to the 
transcendental value of literature (Xu, 1999: 46).  
 
This nationalist depression and spiritual despair has led to the painful conversions to 
Christianity among both overseas and domestic intellectuals, along with the strengthening of 
links between inside and outside China. On the other hand, the self-assigned mission of these 
groups to carve out a ‗space of faith‘ independent of the state, and to revitalise and renovate 
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Chinese civilisation based on enlightenment ideals (Fewsmith, 2001: 12) was also combined 
with religious consciousness and embodied in a nationalistic religious response to China‘s 
problems and modernisation. 
 
8.2.1 Shen Zhou (China’s Confession)  
In the 1989 movement the intellectuals showed democratism, grievance and boldness in 
challenging corruption and oppression as two of China‘s root problems. There were other 
cultural influences inspiring the protesters as the intellectual groups ignited the flames of 
Wenhua Re (cultural fever) of the late 1980s, epitomised by the TV documentary He Shang 
(Yellow River Elegy). As showed in the film, China has a closed, changeless, arid land-bound 
and ‗yellow‘ civilisation compared to the Yellow River, isolated from the world by the Great 
Wall and governed by despotic, semi-divine emperors. This contrasted to an idealised image 
of the West as an open, dynamic, fertile and ‗blue‘ civilisation, enlightened by science and 
democracy, conquering the seas and trading with the entire world (Buruma, 1999). He Shang 
promoted a cosmopolitan and Westernisation orientation to discard China‘s nostalgia for past 
glory, linking domestic reform with opening to the outside would, based on its nationalism 
directed towards economic development and a critique of traditional socialism (Fewsmith, 
2001: 93). This also reflected a deep intellectual introvertive self-criticism and self-reflection 
of Chinese tradition and history under a global perspective. 
    
As the 1989 protest was repressed by Beijing authorities and the authors of He Shang were on 
the wanted list, most student leaders and intellectual dissidents were forced into exile. He 
Shang, a social phenomena of the 1980s, was thought of as discursively obsolete while any 
radical and liberal voices related to it were largely silenced or marginalised in public 
discussion in the post-1989 era. However, new He Shang has emerged from the middle of the 
1990s as four of the five writers of He Shang escaped to the USA; two became evangelical 
Christians and one seriously considered it. Su Xiaokang, the most famous author, said to the 
New York Times in California that the Westernisation of China, which was advocated in He 
Shang, was superficial and simply lacked the one most important element – religion. ‗If China 
wants to be as great as the West, we have to go to the root of Western civilisation.‘ He also 
stated, ‗We intellectuals in exile, all struggling with Christianity‘. (Buruma, 1999)  
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Another producer of He Shang, Yuan Zhiming, was converted to Christianity and became a 
theological scholar as well as a priest in the USA. He became prominently involved in the 
production of the grand TV documentary Shen Zhou (China‘s Confession, literally the Land of 
God), exploring deeply the journey of faith  that China had taken over 5000 years. It was an 
embodiment of a new He Shang with the injection of a Christian perspective and religious 
eagerness to fill the intellectual vacuum created by the government‘s suppression of dissent 
(Source from the organisation website of ‗China Soul for Christ Foundation‘). 
 
The contrast between the cradle of Chinese culture and Western civilisation in He Shang was 
re-interpreted in Shen Zhou. The new version recounted the long-forgotten deep-rooted devout 
traditions and legends during the first 2400+ years of Chinese 5000 year history and 
demonstrated how China was going astray in a tragic circulation of exploitation and internal 
warfare produced by self-centeredness from the time of the ‗Spring and Autumn‘ and 
‗Warring States‘ Period (BC770-221) until the arrival of the contemporary Communist regime 
(Documentary: Shen Zhou, 2000). The hidden message in He Shang, that Communist rule 
was as oppressive and closed as the old imperial system, was further explored in Shen Zhou in 
the way that limited and sinful men were worshipped and exalted as Gods from dynastic 
emperors to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaopeng, and how they still failed their people‘s 
expectation and became tyrants throughout history. Shen Zhou also presented the early 
contacts and spiritual communications between China and the West, highlighting the fact that 
numerous foreign missionaries sacrificed their life to bring the Gospels to the Chinese and 
emphasising that God has never abandoned China (Documentary: Shen Zhou, 2000).  
 
When the film summarised the bitter lessons from the painstaking attempts to reach salvation 
through human efforts and when it pointed out China‘s potential crisis of today and the 
solutions for tomorrow, it looked beyond the simple pursuit of wealth, power, and even 
democracy, which could not keep China from turmoil and suffering if she did not return to 
faith in God (Documentary: Shen Zhou, 2000). The film has greatly reflected the alternative 
path and efforts taken by a group of overseas Chinese intellectuals and received a good 
hearing and a strong response in both the religious and intellectual circles from outside China, 
spreading to the Chinese mainland. As a Christian student from Beijing mentioned in the 
interview, ‗we often watched documentaries, videos and sermons in cafes and in private 
fellowship gatherings. Shen Zhou was one of the most striking and inspiring ones; many 
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students turned to Christianity just because of it, their parents were greatly influenced too.‘101 
   
Having something in common with the zealotry of former Chinese revolutionaries, Yuan 
Zhiming believed that China could be free only when all Chinese have received Jesus, and he 
believed in the wholesale spiritual transformation of China, in which it was Yuan‘s aim to 
spread God‘s word to his people in order to save China. Discussing his patriotic ministry with 
the New York Times (Buruma, 1999), Yuan said he loved China more than ever after being 
saved by Jesus. He noticed the unhappiness and emptiness in people‘s hearts during the 
reforms and modernisation and he realised that China could not be changed purely 
economically or politically. As he addressed it in an essay, ‗Democracy is not merely an 
institution, mechanism or simply a concept, but a profound structure of faith. The root of 
democracy is the spirit of Christ.‘ (Source from the organisation website of ‗China Soul for 
Christ Foundation‘). As stated in Shen Zhou as well, the Western democratic principles began 
with the idea of human equality and value before God and the emphasis that God endowed 
people with power, and then people endowed the ruler/emperor with power from the 
Renaissance and Religion Reform. The cultural revitalisation in the West brought forth the 
fruits of science, democracy and social-economic development, but behind this success was 
the enormous spiritual impulse of religion, morality and ethics. Shen Zhou was a powerful and 
prevailing medium to outreach and transform the existing world view and historical 
perspectives of the Chinese intellectuals so that many rational intellectuals began to face 
religion with their hearts and spirits. 
 
Like Marxism before, Christianity can be a vehicle for Chinese nationalism. Besides Yuan 
Zhiming, many other famous Chinese dissidents and 1989 student leaders such as Zhang Boli, 
Xiong Yan, and other enthusiastic promoters of science and democracy have become pastors 
and ministers after going into exile abroad. As those former dissidents took a religious view of 
their political missions and wanted to affect a moral transformation of China, they, together 
with other Chinese immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore or Malaysia have led 
prominently evangelical movements for overseas Chinese such as theological training, 
biblical teachings, campaigns, conferences, concerts and sermons. There were Chinese 
churches and fellowships in big cities of the popular countries for international students. 
These devout overseas Chinese Christians spread such evangelical activism and passion for 
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their motherland and set up various organisations to promote Christian faith and disseminate 
information, music, publications and other resources. There were also Chinese magazines 
such as ‗Zhong Xin (Chinese Today)‘, ‗Haiwai Xiaoyuan (Overseas Campus Magazine)‘ – the 
most popular Christian gospel periodicals dedicated to reaching out to overseas mainland 
Chinese students, scholars and professionals for Christ. So it is not rare or eccentric for more 
and more people from Mainland China to join in Christian fellowship and get newly baptised 
in churches around Europe and North America. Immigrants and refugees, students and 
scholars, having escaped from their own authoritarian doctrines and being alone in a foreign 
country, are always receptive to the promises of salvation and fraternity in a religious 
community. As a journalist in the UK commented, church could be the most comfortable and 
safe place for Chinese people who came in a new contact with the exotic world.
102
  The 
influence was built up on the outbound Chinese from the first contact. This Christianity effect 
was further fed back to China with the flows going back home. A few interviewees mentioned 
the presence and impact of those ‗back-from-abroad‘ guest speakers or fellow Christians in 
their own communities
103
. 
 
8.2.2 The Cross 
After the great success of Shen Zhou, the ‗China Soul for Christ Foundation‘ established by 
Yuan Zhiming and Xie Wenjie, another Taiwan-born Christian entrepreneur, was transformed 
from its for-profit company status to a non-profit association based in the USA and engaged 
again in another 4-episode documentary film Shizijia zai Zhongguo [The Cross: Jesus in 
China] from 2001 to 2003 to record the development of underground churches (usually 
quoted as clandestine family churches or house churches located in private homes, improvised 
halls or anywhere away from the beady eyes of authority) during the domestic Christian 
evangelical movement. This group of keen Christians had made many trips to China, travelled 
to more than 18 provinces and major cities, and shot over 400 hours‘ footage of several 
hundred underground churches and Bible training schools. They had interviewed nearly 100 
underground Christian leaders, several hundred ministers and ordinary Christians (Source 
from the organisation website of ‗China Soul for Christ Foundation‘).  
 
It is known that the official sanctioned religious associations such as Christianity have been 
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tightly controlled by the CPC over the past five decades under the principles of self-
administration, self-support and self-propagation of the Three-Self Patriotic Churches. Not 
only are they hardly adequate in numbers to serve increasing believers, but all their activities 
are also closely monitored by state authorities to comply with the Communist leadership‘s 
doctrine, which requires that they be free from charismatic expression of worship, sermon on 
Christ‘s Second Coming or any open evangelism (Aikman, 2005: 135-45). For many reasons 
a great number of faithful Christians refused to register as members of the patriotic churches. 
Some interviewees mentioned that they didn't have a feeling of close community in big 
churches; some didn‘t like the church formations, rules and restrictions for them to practice or 
evangelise their faith
104
. Fearing that they might have an anti-government bent, the 
Government was deeply antagonistic to ‗house church‘ Protestantism, which involved 
informal gatherings of unofficial believers beyond party control, and many house church 
pastors were persecuted. A Christian pastor in the interview depicted how his fellowship was 
cautiously moved from one private house to another to avoid police harassment and how he 
himself was questioned by the university authority and security (his fellowship was on 
campus and mainly appealing to students and staff members)
105
. So there was a wide gap and 
dilemma between China‘s officially sanctioned churches and the illegal house churches that 
existed outside the limited sphere of religious freedom in China. The production process of 
The Cross in China was also filled with state interference and uncertainty, since they were 
sometimes under hidden surveillance, and at other times were openly followed and on one 
occasion their camera was confiscated (Source from the organisation website of ‗China Soul 
for Christ Foundation‘). 
 
In the four episodes of the documentary The Cross, ‗Seeds of Blood‘ followed the bloody 
footprints of the Chinese missionaries of the older generation after the Boxer Rebellion, 
particularly in the past fifty years. ‗The Bitter Cup‘ abounded with compelling testimonies by 
missionaries of the younger generation. Their dedication, suffering, faithfulness, and 
thanksgiving led to an unprecedented revival of the Chinese Christian church. Some of the 
elderly Christians interviewed in The Cross had been imprisoned for more than 20 years, and 
many young Christians had been arrested repeatedly. However, persecution of the faithful had 
contributed to a sense of martyrdom (Madsen, 1989). ‗The Spring of Life‘ recounted the 
rebirth that the Gospel had brought to a broad spectrum of people in modern China, including 
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testimonies from farmers, students, officials, criminals, orphans, actors, writers, scientists and 
entrepreneurs. ‗The Canaan Hymns‘ told the amazing story of a farm girl Xiao Min, who was 
a high school dropout with no musical training; nevertheless, she created nearly a thousand 
hymns by the power of the Holy Spirit. Xiao Min‘s hymns, also called the Canaan Hymns, 
were popular in house churches and even in official churches
106
. In these ways the house 
church movement had shown the spiritual needs and prosperity of all social strata from the 
illiterate countrywomen to highly professional groups. The movement prevailed in both urban 
and rural areas. While the residents of China‘s cities have turned increasingly to matters of 
faith in addressing the attendant anomie of rapid modernisation (Jones, 2002: 301), travelling 
house church evangelists have introduced Christianity to numerous villages and towns for a 
religious revival (Aikman, 2005: 138).  
 
Both Shen Zhou and The Cross re-interpreted Chinese history, culture, politics and society and 
wanted to tell both ordinary Chinese and the government officials/leaders that Christianity is 
related to Chinese culture and people‘s lives, rather than a mere Western religion (Aikman, 
2005: 249). Such moral and faith construction for social-political transformation had a strong 
link with the broader populace in Mainland China and certainly had a great impact on 
contentious framing for the underground Christian groups. A number of Christian 
interviewees have mentioned these two documentaries and have indicated the intellectual 
input to indigenise Christianity and the house church movement.  Being widely disseminated 
in Mainland China through different ways, these documentaries, as well as other media 
products such as recordings of sermons, have been frequently used by evangelicals as 
powerful tools to spread the message and they themselves have formed part of the religious 
movement repertoire.  
8.2.3 Human rights tendency  
While the interviewees were delighted with the rapid growth of the number of Christians in 
China, some were also aware that such growth did not mean a sign of increasing religious 
freedom
107
. The ongoing restriction and authoritarianism particularly aroused routine criticism 
in international society against the Chinese government regarding human rights violations and 
repression of religious freedom. International human rights and Christian organisations such 
as Amnesty International, Release International and the China Aid Association (a US-based 
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advocacy group for mainland Christians) have also played active roles in addressing religious 
persecutions and other human rights violations. But one of the interviewees also realised that 
the international criticism created little pressure on the Chinese government under China‘s 
non-interference principles.
108
 Therefore, the struggle for improvement of the religious 
situation has to depend on the Chinese people.  
 
It is also noticeable that the organisational basis for religious groups demonstrated greater 
inclusivity and inter-connectivity than other groups. They had a more inclusive membership 
based on the identical group motivation and function, and a more interactive relationship to 
overcome deep cleavages among social classes and facilitate their activities. As for Christian 
intellectuals, they had more opportunities to be bound with labourers, entrepreneurs and other 
social groups through faith. Furthermore, intellectuals often took the leadership role to appeal 
for religious freedom during their interaction with the government, combining both the 
religious evangelical movements and the social-political contentions. There were mainland 
Christian scholars such as Yu Jie and Ren Bumei devoted to social justice, ethics and 
spirituality, and regarded as being among the 100 public intellectuals who most influenced 
China (Web-blog of Inside China Today, internet resource). 
 
Christian intellectuals, especially the Christian lawyers, have greatly supported and defended 
numerous house churches, advocated human rights, criticised the Party‘s persecution and 
appealed to international society. A case in point was Gao Zhisheng, a Christian, and also a 
Chinese human rights lawyer renowned for his outspokenness, courage and righteousness 
(Web-blog of Inside China Today, internet resource).  
He was the director, founder and star litigator of the Beijing-based Shengzhi Law Office 
since 2000, one of a few Chinese law firms being involved with human rights issues, 
and seeking justice for vulnerable groups such as the poor, the disabled and the 
persecuted. He dealt with land dispute cases against village officials, sued local 
authorities over coercion in implementation of China‘s family planning policies, 
appealed against the sentence of cyber-dissidents, wrote open letters to Chinese leaders 
to criticise the persecution of Falun Gong, and provided legal help for Falun Gong 
practitioners and underground house church members (Synthesis of internet resources). 
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His committed involvement with such cases was strongly bound with the emphasis of his 
Christian identity on morality and compassion (Finney and Xiao, 2007). There were constant 
physical threat and police surveillance for both Gao and his family; undeterred and unyielding, 
he has responded in the non-violent tradition of Gandhi by launching nationwide hunger 
strikes to intensify the call for justice and human rights in China.  
 
8.2.4 Cultural and humanist tendency 
Since Christ resurrected from the Chinese intelligentsia, apart from the conflicts between their 
faith and the authoritarian realities, Christian intellectuals had to further face a secular world 
of ordinary non-Christian populace, and in dealing with such relationships they were often 
held back from wielding more active and healthier influence in the public political field. 
Another tendency for Chinese Christian intellectuals, rising from abroad as well, was related 
closely to the questions of cultural transformation and the creation of a religion and volunteer 
motivated civil society for China.  
 
One of the leading activists is Dr Liang Yancheng, a Christian, who established the Cultural 
Regeneration Research Society (CRRS) based in Canada in 1994 as a non-profit, non-political, 
non-denominational academic organisation, and at the same time a quarterly academic journal 
Cultural China was published in Chinese. The motivation behind it was his Christian 
perspective and passion, intellectual background, nationalist sentiment and experience abroad. 
He noticed that many intellectuals, with or without religious affiliation, had a solemn and 
sublime sense of mission for the revival of Chinese nationality and the flourishing of Chinese 
culture. They had very high expectations, confidence and endless love for the motherland and 
should break through the stereotyped thinking of conflict between Chinese and world culture 
and re-establish the concept of cultural dialogue. Dr Liang has played the role of pioneer in 
this great tidal current by initiating the work abroad and practising measurable actions in 
mainland China through three working bases – universities, the government agencies 
(including CPPCC) and the countryside. This organisation was first mentioned by a dissident 
outside China
109
, who once attended the public evangelical conference chaired by Dr Liang. I 
then searched and collected information about the organisation and its leader from the internet. 
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First, this organisation tried to achieve an understanding of the latest developments in 
contemporary Chinese culture, its possible future direction and its harmonisation with 
Western culture, spiritual disciplines, religious thoughts and contemporary philosophies 
through academic dialogues, interchanges, publications and subsidisations. Dr. Liang himself 
had also travelled around universities and Christian evangelical camps around the world as 
well as in China. Speeches and lectures were held in big cities, with new themes in moral and 
cultural fields being brought forth with a mission in promoting Christianity and its culture in 
China through academic research. They were warmly welcomed and met with a positive 
response, especially amongst young university students. Second, Dr. Liang has been invited 
by senior officials to address the Chinese government on many occasions and he has always 
seized the opportunity to offer constructive suggestions on governance, education, moral 
transitions and promotion of a new Chinese consciousness to be a force for positive world 
change and renewal. This Canada NGO was funded by the Canadian government for the 1999 
research project ‗Chinese and Western Anti-Corruption Cultural Research Study‘, and it 
especially cooperated with Shanghai Fudan University and the Shanghai Committee of 
CPPCC on such projects as advocating uncorrupted political culture. Third, besides leading 
the tide at the university and governmental level, CRRS has been raising funds from abroad in 
a series of charity activities and supporting the ‗Basic Education Program‘ in some extremely 
poor rural areas in China. All these actions and movements were not to scold China or 
complain about its problems and leadership, but to be involved in China, be with Chinese 
people and offer positive help and support. On the other hand, the cultural dialogue movement, 
moral education movement and uncorrupted political culture movement were initiated to 
combat the utilitarianism of culture and the disorder of social-economic-political morality 
since the reform. These movements also echoed the official education and propaganda of ‗rule 
by virtue‘, with the hope to bring forth the regeneration and renaissance of Chinese ethics and 
culture.  
 
As a charitable tendency of the development of Christianity in China, there have been more 
and more Christian-run homes for old people, Christian-run orphanages and hospitals and 
Christian private schools throughout the length and breadth of China (Aikman, 2005: 10).  
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8.3 Falun Gong Practitioners  
Falun Gong in China is a native cultivation movement with an organisational, disciplinary, 
belief and doctrinal system drawn from Buddhism and Taoism. The Buddhist elements are 
embodied in Falun, ‗Wheel of the Dharma‘ (‗Law Wheel‘ in some other translation versions), 
referring to teaching Buddhist truth and ideas. Gong refers to the partly Taoist-inspired 
practice – its yoga practice of Qigong, which is a Chinese healing art with a range of 
physical/spiritual exercises and meditative components (Ching, 2006: 42-3; McDonald, 2006: 
15). Falun Gong, founded in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, a former minor provincial government 
official, began to sweep China and mushroomed in the 1990s along with the evidently 
growing popularity found in the sets of Qigong practices, a host of other New Age religions or 
cults of human betterment, and the fascinating merging between the language of science and 
the languages of mysticism (Blum and Jensen, 2002: 310). Their intention was to explain the 
world entirely by means of purportedly traditional Chinese beliefs and, even more importantly, 
to demonstrate how scientific those beliefs are (Blum and Jensen, 2002: 17). Falun Gong 
cannot therefore simply be defined as a religious movement, and it claims that ‗it does not 
have any religious formality, cult or worship‘ (Li, 1997: 104). It registered itself with the Civil 
Administration Bureau under the category of Qigong, which was the responsibility of a sub-
section of the State General Administration for Sports (All-China Sports Federation). 
Therefore it was able to escape the government‘s scrutiny in the beginning because it fell 
outside the realm of responsibility of the state‘s traditional apparatus used to scrutinise 
religious organisations (Leung, 2002). In fact it was impossible for Falun Gong to be 
registered as a religion, as the government only recognised five religions (Buddhism, Taoism, 
Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism) with all others considered to be cults. Although Falun 
Gong did not perceive itself as an organised religion, in reality it is a quasi-religion with an 
eclectic blending of Buddhism, Taoism, classical folk religion and magic (Li, 1997: 50), and 
poses a greater challenge to the government and the CPC than any state-recognised religion in 
China. 
 
8.3.1 Before the national ban 
The emergence and flourishing of Falun Gong was in accordance with the social-economic-
political structure changes in China. During the Deng Xiaoping–Jiang Zemin era of 
modernisation, economic reforms further brushed away the state-provided social security 
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apparatus, leaving no alternative healthcare system for low-income, semi-retired and retired 
workers. It is noticeable that Falun Gong and other similar associations and groups stepped in 
to fill the gap (Leung, 2002). On the other hand, during an era when ideological conformity 
failed, other belief systems emerged to fill the spiritual vacuum, and Falun Gong was one of 
these (Schechter, 2001: 3-4), claiming moral authority through teaching the cultivation of 
truth, compassion and tolerance. On the other hand, the Falun Gong movement had taken 
advantage of the social disorder caused by accelerated and uneven reforms and the CPC‘s 
decaying leadership and inability to deal with underground dissent. It had also taken 
advantage of China‘s opening up to the modern world and global technology by using mobile 
phones, e-mail and the internet to communicate and organise meetings.  
 
The organisational capacity of Falun Gong revealed the state‘s weakening organisational 
control and the movement‘s modern characteristics. Many areas of daily life were beyond 
party control, especially after the reforms and economic liberalisation. Communications and 
instructions were effectively conveyed both horizontally and vertically: when the membership 
of a particular Falun Gong group increased to a certain number, a new group was formed 
under new leadership, forming part of a network. Thus, horizontal expansion was possible 
even when vertical communication was interrupted and the upper and middle levels were 
harassed. A movement that expands horizontally was more difficult for the state to suppress 
because it was harder to target the leadership (Leung, 2002). As repeatedly claimed by Falun 
Gong practitioners in the interviews
110
, it was not a membership organisation, charged no fees 
and there was nothing about Falun Gong to be considered as rapacious, seditious or dangerous 
to the regime. 
 
However, its size and components disturbed the authorities in the first place. Falun Gong had 
claimed 60 million adherents in China, twice the officially estimated number, and gained total 
worldwide followers of 100 million (including Taiwan, Singapore, the USA, Canada, Europe 
and Australia) before the 1999 national ban (Pappas, 1999). In Beijing alone it had over 2000 
practice stations (Fang, 1999). An interviewee also mentioned that 10 years ago (i.e. 1996) 
every open space in Beijing was filled with people practising this Taiqi like exercise
111
. It was 
the largest voluntary and loosely-organised association of the alienated, the dispossessed, the 
middle class, the entrepreneurs, the upwardly mobile and the Party member (Blum and Jensen, 
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2002: 310). Individuals were provided with a sense of belonging and bound to a group in 
which they found support and identity (Leung, 2002). The strength of Falun Gong lay in the 
devotion and loyalty of its members, most of whom were not profiting from China‘s 
economic modernisation. 
 
The main body of this organisation is from the bottom of Chinese society. The second 
cohort constitutes members coming from the margins. This group of people, although 
not found at the bottom of society, are still absent in the mainstream of society. They are 
primarily retired and semi-retired cadres, teachers and medical doctors, who have been 
ignored and marginalised by their working units as the state abandons the traditional 
structure of all-embracing state-owned enterprises and organisations and adopts 
commercial and privatised structures. The third cohort is made up of a small group of 
very influential members. They have high social positions in the Party, civil service, 
military and professional life. However, for a variety of reasons, they have felt 
unfulfilled in their professions, and been victims of power struggles. Having been 
stripped of power they have become very antagonistic to the present socio-political 
system (Leung, 2002: 775). 
 
Because of its self-discipline and healthy approach – practitioners employed slow exercises 
and meditation good for health, did not smoke or drink alcohol and had a rigorous moral code 
– it was encouraged by the authorities at the beginning as it received the support from the 
powerful elite and even attracted spouses and family members of some of China‘s top leaders, 
including Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji (Hanson, 1999). The unprecedented embracing of an 
alien ideology by CPC members and senior state officials itself represented a direct challenge 
to the CPC, which should firmly hold the grip of ideological control. 
 
As the authorities became cautious about the popularity of Falun Gong, its potential for 
transforming into a political organisation and its potential for rebellion from 1996 onward, 
they banned the sale of its publications and hardened policy towards all Qigong groups 
(Chang, 2004: 6-7). Li emigrated to the US in 1998, and TV programs and newspaper articles 
occasionally singled out Falun Gong for special criticism, which resulted in thousands of 
Falun Gong devotees surrounding and protesting in front of TV stations and Newspaper 
editorial offices. An example of the latter took place in April 1999 in Tianjin and escalated to 
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a 6000 people protest before the municipal government, with one protestor beaten and ten 
arrested by the police, which became the catalyst for a massive demonstration on April 25 in 
Beijing (Pappas, 1999).      
8.3.2 1999 Breakout and suppression  
On April 25, 1999 10,000 to 16,000 Falun Gong devotees coming from across China to 
Zhongnanhai, the CPC headquarters in the heart of Beijing, peacefully demonstrated and 
asked for freedom of assembly, the government‘s legal recognition of their status, the lifting 
of bans on their publications and release of their fellows in Tianjin (Hanson, 1999). The angry 
astonishment of the top leadership turned into immediate repression by mobilising the state 
apparatus for a massive anti-Falun Gong campaign. It began with the blacklisting by Beijing 
police of the participants of the demonstration and then interrogation of hundreds of them in 
May (Ownby, 2007: 103); a ban was launched alongside the confiscation of Falun Gong 
publications and all the audio and video materials (Chang, 2004: 9) from Beijing to the rest of 
China. On June 10, 1999 a special task force - ‗6-10‘ office (named after its foundation date) - 
was authorised into action by Jiang Zemin with its sole mission to suppress Falun Gong. 
Local government officials were ordered to arrest Falun Gong members by quota, and they 
held personal responsibilities if they failed to stop the protests flowing to Beijing (Leung, 
2002; Johnson, 2000). As the state officially outlawed it in July 1999 and further in October 
labelled it through legislation as a ‗Xiejiao‘ (evil cult) that endangered society and that should 
be eradicated, the state media also began to unceasingly orchestrate criticism about the 
characteristics and evidence of such an evil cult. The leader, Li Hongzhi, was described as 
someone just using his followers to amass wealth and power (Schechter, 2001: 3) and there 
was also a death toll of thousands of practitioners caused by Falun Gong‘s teachings, which 
led to people‘s demon-possessed madness and forbade the sick from seeing physicians. As 
arrests and detentions went on, practitioners were identified publicly and forced to study 
Communist party documents and renounce Falun Gong allegiances, including thousands of 
party members (Faison, 1999), which contributed to another toll of renouncement.   
   
The reasons why the Chinese government reacted with such alarm and urgency resulted from 
several aspects. First was Falun Gong‘s politicisation. Despite Falun Gong‘s self-avowed 
apolitical nature, such large-scale silent and disciplined protest had caused the biggest 
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political earthquake since 1989 on the top authority circle
112
 and was conveyed startlingly to 
the Western audience as well. Boldly, surprisingly and perhaps unwittingly, the less educated 
and middle-aged Falun Gong devotees appeared to have taken up the torch of freedom and 
demanded greater human rights compared to those closely scrutinised intellectuals and 
democrats (Leung, 2002). It is argued that Falun Gong effectively and automatically became 
politicised since all demonstrations were forbidden unless they had state permission (Chang, 
2004: 8). The happenings outside China and beyond the party‘s controlling hand also added 
an unexpected twist to the contention, as indicated in the increasing number of converts to 
Falun Gong in the Chinese Diaspora of major Asian and Western cities with their sympathy 
and protest, in the US and Canadian politicians‘ moderate criticisms on the Chinese 
government‘s anti-Falun Gong campaign (Ownby, 2007: 104-5). In the public and academic 
pronouncements there were even suspicions that Falun Gong was a plot designed by foreign 
anti-China forces and financed by the US (Schechter, 2001: 66-91). 
 
Second was its organisation and resource mobilisation. Undoubtedly the movement‘s ability 
to gather over 10,000 members to Zhongnanhai from across the country to take part in an 
orderly protest needed an organisational network and a disciplined code of conduct. The 
following active reactions from the Falun Gong also added to the regime‘s fear for an 
organised force: in July 1999 some 30,000 Falun Gong devotees led by 70 to 100 leaders 
staged nonviolent protests in a dozen cities around China against the official decree of 
suppression (Ching, 2001); in late October many assembled in Beijing again and carried out 
silent protests at Tiananmen, trying to influence the National People‘s Congress in session at 
the time, and some of them even held a secret press conference for seven foreign journalists to 
appeal for international support (Ching, 2001). Falun Gong had infiltrated all levels of 
Chinese society, including the military, police force, academia and even the government itself. 
It was estimated by internal government sources in 2001 that there were four to five thousand 
Falun Gong sympathisers in the 200,000-strong air force alone (Murphy, 2001). Since the 
party itself had only 55-60 million members, Falun Gong seemed to compete for popularity 
with the party (Ching, 2001). So the CPC found Falun Gong more threatening when it could 
mobilise more human and various resources than any organised religions or other spontaneous 
organisations in China.  
 
                                                        
112 Jiang Zemin‘s speech on June 7, 1999 identified Falun Gong as ‗the most serious problem‘.  
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Third was its religious characteristics and especially its millenarian nature. Though the 
leadership of Falun Gong insisted that it merely promoted physical, spiritual and moral 
cultivation, rather than being a religion, the Party portrayed it as a religious ‗evil cult‘ 
composed of the worship of the cult leader, spiritual manipulation of members, the spreading 
of evil teaching, illegal collection of funds and harm to people and society (Ching, 2001). The 
authorities also fiercely attacked on Li Hongzhi‘s tone of a catastrophic ‗end of the world‘ to 
refer to our age as a final one before this end, as well as his own exclusive claim of himself as 
part of the cosmos and the ‗yuan shen‘ (primal spirit). 113 This reminded the Party of the 
danger of secret religious societies and millenarian movements of the past, all with 
charismatic leaders and the language of religious messianism, and all involved in peasant 
rebellions such as the White Lotus Society and the Taiping Rebellion
114
. Being a millenarian 
movement in origin itself and familiar with its potency, the CPC viewed Falun Gong at least 
as a quasi-religious organisation which could help accelerate any socio-political movement, 
and decided to nip it in the bud.  
 
Horror stories about Falun Gong practitioners saturated the Chinese media and reached a 
climax at the happening on January 23, 2001, when 5 people including a child committed 
self-immolation by fire in Falun Gong style meditation gestures at Tiananmen Square. This 
dreadful incident shocked the world and stirred animosity against Falun Gong amongst the 
Chinese public. This was mentioned in the 2006 interviews as the main evidence for 
interviewees to denounce the sect
115
. When the CPC confidently asserted this to be a crime 
committed by Falun Gong followers, the latter immediately denied overseas that any member 
took part in the event because of Falun Gong‘s opposition to violence and suicide (Ching, 
2001). Later on Falun Gong deflected the criticisms by pointing out the suicides were planned 
and staged by the government in order to discredit Falun Gong with a detailed analysis of the 
video clip and the whole episode
116
. However, as these practitioners were deprived of any 
debates or presentations inside of China, their voices were rarely heard and were 
automatically blocked. 
 
The intensive anti-Falun Gong campaign had rapidly expanded to a nationwide anti-cult and 
                                                        
113 Some argued it as misleading since Li believed rather in universal participation in this spirit, showing a certain pantheism 
(Ching, 2006: 45).  
114 For a more detailed analysis, see Chang, M. (2004: 46-59).  
115 Interviewee numbers 3, 6, 11 and a few others. 
116 See www.clearwisdom.net, ‗Staged Tiananmen Self-Immolation‘, for Falun Gong‘s version of the immolation. 
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anti-superstition movement involving the general public. The China Anti-Cult Association 
was formed to collect a million signatures in support of the ban on Falun Gong. Especially 
after the 2001 self-immolation, school children were required to attend anti-cult classes; 12 
million Chinese youths were mobilised to sign a ‗civil convention in the anti-cult struggle‘; a 
large number of adults, from intellectuals to labourers, also attended mass meetings and 
signed petitions to denounce the cult, and thousands of anti-Falun Gong fighters were 
rewarded by the government (Inside China Today, 1/2/2001; 18/2/2001; 26/2/2001).  
 
The above-mentioned ‗6-10‘ office had organised a ruthless crackdown on Falun Gong since 
1999, issuing instructions to deal with the sect: active practitioners were to be sent to prison 
or labour camps; those who refused to renounce their beliefs were to be isolated and watched 
over by their families or employers (Chang, 2004: 9). There was also a careful distinction 
between sect organisers and ordinary followers according to the court admonition; the former 
should be treated harshly as criminals and the latter should be extricated from the cult, 
educated and then reintegrated into society (Human Rights Watch, 9/11/1999). However, the 
loose organisational structures of Falun Gong with numerous stations and training points all 
over the country had entitled many common practitioners to be low and media-level leaders. 
They were exposed to prosecution and huge pressure tactics were also used against those 
individuals who stuck to their faith: physical mistreatments were common during the 
detention and imprisonment with some practitioners tortured, resulted in awful injury, death 
or suicide (Turner and McCarthy, 1999).  
 
On October 30, 1999, special legislation against this ‗evil cult‘ was passed at the Standing 
Committee of the National People‘s Congress; after a further revision of the criminal code in 
November 1999, Falun Gong adherents were rendered as liable to prosecution for murder, 
fraud, endangering national security and other crimes and for longer prison terms and severer 
penalties
 
 (Human Rights Watch, 9/11/1999). Thus, the term ‗evil cult‘ and the anti-cult law 
legitimised the use of stronger measures to control Falun Gong compared to other religious 
groups (Leung, 2002) and made those arrests or imprisonments constitutional, despite the fact 
that the denunciation and labelling was made by political officials on political premises rather 
than by any religious authority (Ching, 2006: 46-7). In 2001 onwards, more new guidelines 
and legal directives were issued by China‘s top court and procuratorate citing special laws to 
punish Falun Gong followers, such as defamation or libel laws against those who attack 
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President Jiang Zemin in their propaganda material or spray-paint names of police officers 
who allegedly tortured sect adherents (Inside China Today, 11/6/2001). Such practices had 
shown great flexibility and dependence on the ‗rule of law‘ with Chinese characteristics to 
serve the Party-state interests. 
 
8.3.3 ‘The Epoch Times’, ‘Nine Commentaries’ and ongoing combat 
The tragedy of the 1999 Zhongnanhai incident was not only a fate of destruction to be faced 
by the phenomenal success of Falun Gong, but also revealed the general fate of mass petition. 
This was the only way for mass protest and became the object of mass suppression, as had 
been seen previously in the 1989 student movement a decade ago (Ching, 1990). However, to 
the government‘s greatest surprise, the brutal suppression didn‘t bring Falun Gong to its knees; 
rather it encountered stubborn unyieldingness and its actions fanned stronger protests even 
including some anti-Communist sentiments and campaigns. If the Tiananmen self-immolation 
was not conducted by Falun Gong devotees as an extreme way to defy the governmental ban, 
there were still waves of uncompromising challengers undertaking bold acts of civil 
disobedience across China. Tiananmen Square had become a special and hot spot for their 
public defiance in individuals or groups, unfurling banners such as ‗Truth, Compassion, 
Tolerance‘ at special anniversaries and national celebration occasions, despite the rigid 
security checks around the Square (Hitchens, 2000; The Economist, 29/4/2000; San Francisco 
Chronicle, 11/12/2000; Washington Times, 1/1/2001). There were also prominent collective 
hunger strikes in several labour camps (Inside China Today, 10/8/2001). However, these open 
confrontations, though raising the authorities‘ embarrassment and frustration, were easily 
subjected to a fiercer repression and cruel punishments by the much stronger state machinery. 
The domestic contentious activities then gradually turned more underground and utilised more 
soft strategies than hard measures and built more attachments and resources from outside. 
 
Since there was no debating or bargaining space for the voice of Falun Gong inside China and 
its leader Li Hongzhi had already moved to the US, the battlefield was from the beginning 
diverted to the international arena. Falun Gong around the world kept on protesting to the 
international public, to foreign media, to various foreign governments, to Chinese overseas 
embassies and consulates, to human rights groups such as Amnesty International and to the 
United Nations. They actively lobbied with press conferences by victims to recall the hysteria 
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of being publicly humiliated, forced to confess and exposed to torture as well as female 
practitioners who accused the police of sexual harassment and abuse (Schechter, 2001: 11-2). 
The internet and other modern technology also helped the group to react quickly abroad and 
dynamically to the domestic media‘s stigmatising portrayals of Falun Gong and the ruthless 
repression and to effectively disseminate information of ‗the truth‘. Falun Gong volunteers 
established several media groups including an international newspaper (the Epoch Times), a 
TV (New Tang Dynasty TV) and radio channel (Sound of Hope) as well as several websites. 
The Epoch Times was founded in May 2000 with the headquarters in New York and a wide 
network of local reporters throughout the world, aiming to provide what they saw as 
uncensored coverage of events in China with a focus on human rights issues. It was gradually 
blossoming into a larger operation and was distributed free-of-charge in roughly 30 countries 
worldwide, and maintained print editions in 10 languages, and 17 on the internet, with a 
weekly circulation of over a million (Associated Press, 1/2/2007). The Chinese government‘s 
brutal tactics were criticised with evidence and witnesses supplied. Persecution stories and the 
death toll of the victims were published and updated. Falun Gong‘s contentions, 
demonstrations and rallies in the West and their various kinds of international appeals were 
made known and reported in detail. It became noticeable that though at the beginning it was 
established by Dafa disciples for validating the Fa, it was not merely a Falun Gong 
newspaper but rather a means for the Falun Gong to expand its outreach to non-followers 
especially in the intellectual groups and embed itself into global civil society for influence and 
legitimacy (Associated Press, 1/2/2007). So at the same time, they gathered the views of 
Chinese intellectual elites abroad, revealed China‘s poor human rights record and official 
corruption, called for the release of prisoners of conscience and demonstrated the grievances 
of other domestic deprived groups such as underground churches, demolition victims and the 
unemployed. 
 
Therefore the severity of the Chinese government‘s repression and persecution of Falun Gong 
had not only triggered the overseas movement at a synchronous pace, but also connected 
more tightly the Falun Gong communities at home and abroad. With the help of outside 
fellows, domestic Falun Gong adherents in some major cities posted handbills on power poles 
and blanketed mailboxes with fliers to tell the truth about self-immolation and criticise the 
government (Inside China Today, 2/3/2001); city residents were also bombarded with 
videodiscs and automatic phone calls about Falun Gong; sporadic actions emerged now and 
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then, such as hacking attempts into China‘s local and national television network (Pan, 2002; 
Washington Post, 20/9/2002; Bodeen, 2002; San Francisco Chronicle, 2002; McDonald, 2006: 
16). Moreover, Li Hongzhi in the fall of 2000 re-emerged from previous silence and 
encouraged his disciples to face suffering and persecution with perseverance in Dafa (great 
Dharma) cultivation in order to achieve consummation – regarded as the highest reward for 
martyrdom. At the same time he sent further apocalyptic
 
messages to urge his followers to 
escalate their struggle against the government and fight against evil (Smith, 2001).  
 
While the 2001 Tiananmen self-immolation incident marked an important public victory for 
Chinese Party-state within China, the turning point in the Falun Gong‘s counter-attack against 
the Chinese authorities lay in publications and heavy promotion of the series of editorials 
entitled ‗The Nine Commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party‘ in November 2004 by the 
Epoch Times and an invitation to party members to renounce their membership. Based on a 
discourse analysis of ‗The Nine Commentaries‘, it undisputedly blasted the strongest criticism 
against the CPC, its history and the Communist movement worldwide. In the series, it 
illustrated that rather than being chosen by the Chinese people, the CPC emerged, and ganged 
up, forced Chinese people to accept it, eventually seized power by conquering all in its path in 
contemporary China and thereby brought endless catastrophe to China. The 55-year history of 
the CPC was written with struggles, blood and lies. The stories behind this bloody history 
were not only brutally inhumane but also rarely known. Under the rule of the CPC, 60 to 80 
million innocent Chinese people had been killed, leaving their broken families behind. What‘s 
more, the CPC had devoted the nation‘s resources to systematically and violently destroying 
China‘s rich traditional culture, its spirit and moral foundation of the entire nation. The 
commentaries also developed in great length on the collusion of Jiang Zemin with the CPC to 
persecute Falun Gong, labelling this as a genocide crime. They argued that the CPC was in 
itself an evil cult that harmed mankind and it matched every single trait of a religion: at the 
beginning of its establishment, it regarded Marxism as the absolute truth in the world, 
worshipped and exalted the top leadership and exhorted people to engage in a life-long 
struggle for the goal of building a Communist heaven on earth. ‗The Nine Commentaries‘ 
claimed that the sudden invasion by the Communist spectre in China had created an extremely 
malevolent force against nature, humanity and the whole universe, causing limitless agony 
and tragedy and pushing civilisation to the brink of destruction; it was also stated that the 
demise of the CPC was only a matter of time and the evils of the Communist Cult would be 
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punished by God at Judgment Day. As president Jiang Zemin was believed by the Falun Gong 
as the one who led the charge against them and should be held responsible for the persecution, 
the Epoch Times in May 2005 also published a follow-up to ‗The Nine Commentaries‘, 
entitled the ‗The Real Story of Jiang Zemin‘, which portrayed the former Chinese President in 
a completely negative lights, calling him a ‗lowlife who betrayed his own nation‘, and a 
power-hungry political opportunist who sold China to foreign powers and created domestic 
chaos (Da Ji Yuan, 2005).  
  
The Epoch Times had began a peaceful ‗truth‘ campaign against the regime and stepped up a 
continuing political campaign of ‗Three Renouncements‘ since it encouraged members of the 
CPC as well as two major subordinating organisations of the CPC, the Communist Youth 
League and the Young Pioneers of China, to renounce their memberships. According to its 
web edition in October 2005, over 5 million members had resigned from the CPC and its 
affiliations, whilst in July 2008 the number escalated to 40 million on the Tuitang (quitting the 
CPC) website and was celebrated and supported through large-scale public rallies in the US. 
The cases receiving international attention included Chen Yonglin, a CPC diplomat and Hao 
Fengjun, a former police officer of the 610 Office of the Tianjin Bureau of State Security, 
influenced by ‗The Nine Commentaries‘ and defected from the Chinese embassy in Canberra, 
Australia in 2005 (The Epoch Times). In October 2006, Jia Jia, Secretary General of the 
Shanxi Provincial Expert Association of Science and Technology, also made Epoch Times 
headlines due to his supposed renunciation of the CPC (The Epoch Times). It was undeniable 
that the campaign brought a powerful effect into people‘s life and perspectives, especially 
those in China‘s Mainland when they touched such astonishing stories and interpretations of 
the CPC. However, the inflammatory and revealing discourse and the historical revisionism of 
‗The Nine Commentaries‘ and related materials have triggered great controversy in the 
academic and journalist arena of debates especially on its objectivity, credibility and 
independence from Falun Gong propaganda. What‘s more, the Epoch Times obtained the 
number by tallying renunciation statements submitted to them via internet, fax, email, or 
telephone; this methodology was regarded as not scientific or valid and widely disputed.    
 
As the combat between Falun Gong and the Chinese government began, the government 
acknowledged that some diehards remained and that the struggle to destroy the sect would be 
‗long-term, complex and serious‘ (The Economist, 29/4/2000). As the repression and 
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resistance went on and fluctuated, Falun Gong‘s organisation has seen more secrecy as 
devotees were driven underground and abroad by the official terror and public hostility within 
China. Its religiosity element has developed towards a more apocalyptic and mystic direction. 
The moral tenets of tolerance and endurance have been transformed towards rightful measures 
to eradicate the utterly inhuman Communist evil (Meyer et al, 2001). Its politicisation has 
also been intensified from its earlier status as a non-political movement. It can be argued that 
the Falun Gong phenomenon has generally reflected the social and cultural changes in 
contemporary China and taken on the critical characteristics of global movement and 
embraced the key dimensions of an emerging global model of social organisation as well 
(McDonald, 2006: 141). On the other hand, in the process of seeking justice for its own group 
existence, Falun Gong has become a political force with its members developing advanced 
political consciousness under persecution and has also been greatly involved in pressuring 
China to democratise
 
by overthrowing the Communist ruling (Ching, 2006: 52).  
 
8.4 Reflections 
As the Chinese are pursuing modernisation, new belief systems are the natural by-products of 
modernity, especially if modernity in the economic sense of prosperity does not satisfy 
people‘s needs but leads to spiritual or internal emptiness. On the other hand, after the reforms, 
though the economy saw great liberation, popular demands for political participation were 
crushed, most notably in 1989. Religion is all that is left when the expression of secular 
politics is blocked (Buruma, 1999). Therefore the triangle of politics, intellectual development 
and religion has been established and solidified in the presentation of the intellectual religious 
contentions and in the changing nature of the relationship between religious beliefs, 
intellectual and popular consciousness and CPC problems of governance.  
 
As for the multi-directions of the Chinese Christian movement, the intellectuals‘ role of 
enlightenment overlaps with their Christian identity when they are striving for democracy, for 
religious freedom and human rights and for the meaning of life and ultimate concern. The 
humanistic conscience and charitable culture they promoted was interlocked with religion and 
often became a substitute for political expression (Chen and Jin, 1997). So the apostle era of 
the Chinese Christian intellectuals and democratic transformation era of authoritarian China 
have historically overlapped each other. As illustrated by the above cases and documentaries, 
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the impact from Christianity has come to transform China from the outside inward. Most of 
the overseas Chinese intellectuals are very disappointed with the Marxism, materialism and 
the unlimited personal power without a God, and at the same time they are deeply influenced 
by the Western values and faiths. The bounds of faith and religion have also surmounted the 
regional, cultural, psychological, age and language differences amongst Chinese from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong or the mainland in a greater Chinese Diaspora, which in turn connected and 
nurtured the domestic Christian movements. The thriving of churches and fellowships among 
the overseas and domestic Chinese intellectual communities indicate that on one hand the 
political despair, material erosion and faith crisis have turned into bouts of new religious zeal 
with an upsurge in the popularity of Christianity. On the other hand, a growing number of 
intellectuals both inside and outside China have realised that the Christian moral foundation 
of social and cultural life was what made possible the emergence of capitalism and the 
successful transition to democratic politics (Aikman, 2005: 5).   
 
The Communist Party has a particular fear of the evangelical zeal that combines faith and 
political subversion. The religious groups such as Falun Gong claimed that they have no 
political ambitions; but their movement can impact the political discourse and contribute to 
the political transition in China, as indicated in the history of their contention with all kinds of 
innovative strategies. Public responses both inside and outside China towards the Falun Gong 
movement and governmental suppression are still very diverse. It is obvious that Falun 
Gong‘s views and arguments are absent and easily repressed by the powerful state propaganda, 
policy and police machinery from the beginning of the crackdown. Based on the revision 
from the literature and my 2006 interviews, some interviewees, significantly influenced by the 
governmental statement, still deny Falun Gong‘s right to exist or to practice its beliefs freely. 
Some people still believe that the US had a hand in trying to use the Falun Gong to destabilise 
or bring down the Chinese government (Fewsmith, 2001: 234). A few were confused or found 
misrepresentation and distortion in state news reports after they received the information CDs, 
leaflets or even junk emails from Falun Gong. Others argued that the government should not 
infringe with people‘s inner spiritual freedom, let alone rendering judgements of good or evil, 
legality or illegality; more respect and tolerance on the government‘s part is needed (Ching, 
2006: 49-53).  
 
Whilst the preceding chapters have given public perception of mobilisation and contention 
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from different groups, it is necessary to consider state responses, which follow in the next 
chapter.  
202 
 
Chapter 9 The Party-state Responses 
9.1 Introduction  
Social contentions, as exemplified and described in the last three chapters, are spreading all 
over China and engaging all sorts of different groups. The Party-state‘s conceptualisation of 
the different processes of contention has determined its attitudes, strategies and responses 
towards these contentions. Some are regarded as just a vent to channel people‘s grievances; 
others are considered as problematic in endangering social-political stability. To avoid falling 
into a simple classification that attaches each category of groups to a certain governmental 
strategy, this chapter will review the different contentions of labourers, intellectuals and 
religious groups, and test a variety and a combination of concrete Party-state strategies. These 
suggest directions of co-optation, toleration and control, derived from the approach of White 
et al (1996), who developed a theoretical framework on the theme of Chinese civil society. 
Equally, the local-central context of cohesion, interaction and conflict of interests has also 
greatly influenced the official reaction to, and consequences for, particular contentions. The 
following figure 2 has enriched the theoretical framework of White et al to demonstrate the 
direction and level of Party-state reactions. The cases of each contentious group will be tested 
to prove or challenge this structure.  
 
Figure 2 Level and direction of Party-state responses to contentions 
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According to Gordon White et al’s research on the Chinese civil society constellation, the 
powerful state impetus has ranged from incorporation to toleration and repression in response 
to different patterns of social organisations. First, various degrees of incorporation have been 
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employed to construct the old-style mass organisations, such as the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) and the All-China Women‘s Federation (ACWF), as well as the new 
strata of officially recognised social organisations such as trade associations, professional 
associations, academic societies and cultural clubs, with an emphasis on social stability, 
integration, regulation and harmony. Second, more or less intermittent toleration was in 
accordance with the irreversible proliferation of semi-formal, informal and interstitial 
organisations with less explicitly political forms and increasing social influences and spaces 
beyond the Party-state control, such as artist salons, lineage, clan or ethnic groups and 
Laoxianghui. Third, punitive surveillance or active repression has been targeted most 
evidently at those underground and independent social organisations which are perceived as 
potentially dangerous. In this category are the All-China Qigong Association and banned and 
illegal organisations classified as hostile forces as related to the 1989 democratic movement, 
secret societies and gangs (White et al, 1996: 26-37). As for the local-level politics, 
relationships between the authorities and social organisations especially of the interstitial 
category vary a great deal, ranging from mutual suspicion and uneasy co-existence to active 
co-operation and mutual support (White et al, 1996: 35). 
 
Organisational mobilisation is the key element of China‘s social contentions, so the Party-
state reaction towards this mobilisation is largely a reflection of its responses to the formation 
of civil society. We found that 10 years after the research conducted by White et al, the social 
contentions have become more diverse, complicated and fluid, and the Party-state has also 
become more sophisticated, using combinations of strategies of co-optation, toleration and 
control, with ongoing reconstructions and adaptations. Local politics is much more 
complicated than before, demonstrating elements of both centralism and localism, unification 
and segmentation, harmony and conflicts. As shown in figure 2, co-optation contains the 
transformation of ideology, institution and policy. The primary change in the state response 
took place in the ideology area. Ideological amendments are not new to the Communist party 
in its shift from Marx, Lenin and Mao to a problem-solving strategy of contemporary times. 
The ‗Three Represents‘ concepts developed by Jiang Zemin is regarded as one of the biggest 
inventions of the official ideology, which has been written into the Party constitution since 
2002, while ‗the construction of harmonious society‘ as well as ‗the scientific outlook on 
development‘ being proposed by the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabo has been 
adopted as a new resolution on social change, leading to further amendments to the 
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constitution five years later. The ideological changes have been applicable to all groups‘ 
contentions with slightly different emphases. The sponsorship, regulation and management of 
state institutions, the policy-making and implementation process are now practised more 
specifically between groups to actively co-opt and co-operate within emerging social 
contentions.  
 
The limits of toleration are also expanded in some areas and reshaped in others. This is 
becoming an arena of more disputes and bargains. Passive toleration includes ignorance and 
delays in problem-resolving, while positive toleration mainly means pacification and effective 
problem-resolving with the aim to ameliorate the tensions between state and society and 
channel growing pressures for access and participation (White et al, 1996: 26). 
 
As there are still acute tensions between all levels of state and a number of groups, the Party-
state needs to take control in order to rein in the conflicts, exclude any officially unacceptable 
forms of social contentions and eliminate the political dangers posed by a decline in 
governability and control (White et al, 1996: 26). Soft control in this strategy contains 
economic means and surveillance and hard control implies all kinds of hard repressive 
measures such as imprisonment, violent suppression, physical threat, detention, house arrest, 
forced labour camps and police terror-tactics, some of which are suggested in the interviews. 
It is also noticeable that official and mass media has played an increasingly important role to 
deliver and stage all the Party-state strategies while being an arena for social contentions itself.  
 
Table 13 presents a list of Party-state responses based on the three categories to test 
interviewees‘ awareness, attitudes and conceptualisation of these responses. As for the 120 
interviewees, only 74 (61.7%) of them answered the question on ‗what kinds of state 
responses towards contentions have you been aware of?‘ There were even fewer replies to the 
question ‗to what extent do you agree with what the government has said or done?‘ Such a 
low response rate, caused by hesitation and rejection, also indicates the sensitivity of the topic, 
the unwillingness of the public to criticise the regime and the invisible and powerful pressure 
from the state. The top three common state measures known to the interviewees were 
‗financial sanction‘ (68), ‗pacification‘ (62) and ‗policy change‘ (60), which indicates that the 
public has general awareness of all the three official strategies. However, the ‗media 
promotion‘ and ‗financial support‘ of the social contentions from co-optation strategy sounded 
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unfamiliar to the interviewees, compared to the fact that more concerns and objections had 
targeted the strategy of control from ‗media criticism‘, ‗surveillance‘ and ‗financial sanction‘ 
to ‗imprisonment‘ and ‗armed suppression‘. While there was a certain degree of identification 
with the official responses on ‗policy change‘ and ‗pacification‘, there were also quite a few 
negative and even fierce criticisms, mainly against the ineffectiveness of problem-solving, the 
local misuse of power, inadequate implementation of central policy, any forms of violence 
and violation of human rights. The contradictions between the local and central levels of state 
had also been fairly perceived by the interviewees. 
 
Table 13 Interview results on ‘Party-state responses’ 
 
Party-state responses Known  Agree  Disagree  
1. Establishment of specific department 34 22 5 
2. Policy change 60 41 3 
3. Media promotion  6 1 3 
4. Financial support  3 0 0 
5. Ignorance 46 2 32 
6. Pacification  62 46 0 
7. Media criticism  59 11 16 
8. Surveillance  57 10 27 
9. Financial sanction  68 8 35 
10. Imprisonment   55 3 52 
11. Armed suppression 53 5 41 
 
Therefore, taking into consideration all the complicated and intertwined factors, this chapter 
will provide a more analytical account of the dynamics of Party-state motivation, ideology, 
policy and behaviour towards contentious groups and activities across the spectrum, based on 
both the documentation and the 2006 interview results. The author will then provide 
evaluation of the state performance and capacity in the light of the state-society-individual 
relationship by ranking the weight of different strategies and examining the coherence and 
effectiveness in implementation.  
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9.2 Labourers: evaluation of Party-state responses 
9.2.1 Co-optation  
The fulfilment of economic needs is one of the basic human rights recognised by both the 
authorities and the populace in China. This group is most likely to take acts of contentions in 
accordance with their economic status, since some have been in the worst economic situation 
or have faced various difficulties in making a living and meeting the basic needs of education, 
medication and housing. As for the mental and psychological aspects, 83.7% of the labour 
interviewees were in their youth and middle age, an age that should be coupled with fullness 
of dreams and strength and resolutions, but all of them had varied grievances, helplessness 
and appeals. The rest comprised senior citizens who contributed much to the Communist 
revolution and transformation of Chinese society during their younger days and often felt that 
they were not profiting from the country‘s economic progress. The Party-state, claiming to 
represent the vanguard of workers, now struggled with theoretical orthodoxy and practical 
fears of labourers‘ unrest. The co-optation strategies have therefore been put into full practice. 
Starting with ideological change we see that one of Jiang Zemin‘s ‗Three Represents‘ was to 
represent the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. ‗The 
scientific outlook on development‘ from Hu and Wen further put people first as its core, 
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement, and overall 
consideration as its fundamental approach. So the labourers, who accounted for the majority 
of Chinese people, were given more special attention ideologically through the official 
statements and mainstream media.  
 
As for the institutional co-optation, the government consistently worked to co-opt this group 
by improving its own organisation, i.e. trade unions, to allow for legitimate interest expression 
and political participation. For example, the migrant workers and the re-employed laid-off 
workers were disadvantaged within labour-capital relations and found it difficult to fight 
against problems such as unpaid wages, unfair contracts and poor working conditions on an 
individual rights-defending basis. Therefore the government tried to adopt more of them into 
the local level of trade unions and deal with the labour-capital conflicts through the mediation 
of the state-controlled trade unions. There were 21 million migrant workers joining in the 
official trade union, accounting for 13.8% of the nationwide membership by the end of 2006 
(China Discipline Inspection News, 26/1/2007). This enlarged recruitment and official 
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mobilisation granted a greater extent of representation, autonomy and bargaining power to the 
official-sanctioned trade unions and other labourer organisations. Another important function 
of the official organisation was training, which was intended to empower this vulnerable 
group with self-respect, self-confidence, self-support and self-protection through training and 
consultancy on general and specific knowledge, technology, laws, policies and regulations. 
On the other hand, a series of the legal, consulting, psychological and educational 
programmes and services, though in their infancy, had been provided by the civil organisation 
sponsored by the government to make labourers aware of legal ways to express and deal with 
their distress rather than resorting to methods such as protest or suicide. 
 
Policy co-optation had been most widespread with evident and proactive effects, as the 
government set up policies favourable to labourers and strengthened related legislation for 
protection and prosecution. There were stronger official responses towards inequity, 
inequality and poverty, with more emphasis on ‗harmonious society‘ and ‗human-centred‘ 
policy orientation and more attention paid to social protection of vulnerable groups. The new 
Labour Contract Law came into effect in January 2008 with the purpose of promoting 
people‘s welfare and protecting workers‘ rights, which tried to establish a new relationship 
between enterprises, workers and the state.  Chinese trade unions were also transformed and 
empowered by the new legislation to be able to act more like their Western counterparts, 
weighing in on discipline, safety, remuneration and working hours. They had also been 
granted the right to litigate (The Economist, 27/7/2007). It was reported that some industry 
remuneration negotiations had been initiated by trade union or women‘s federation. As 
labourers‘ problems with social welfare and social insurance became more acute and severe, 
the authorities had also taken more responsibility in their social security provisions for 
pension, medicare and injury insurance, though the OECD (2005: 35) advised that the whole 
social insurance system needed to be revised with a view to actual mobility patterns in the 
labour market. Up to the end of 2007, 201.07 million people joined the urban residents‘ 
pension system, including 151.56 million workers and 49.51 retirees, a rise of 13.41 million 
in total from the year before. 116.45 million joined the unemployment insurance scheme by 
2007, 4.58 million more than that of 2006. Meanwhile 220.51 million joined the urban basic 
medicare insurance by 2007, including 31.31 migrant workers, with an annual rise of 7.64 
million (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). The ‗New Rural Cooperative Medical 
System‘ had been put into experiment since 2003, and about 730 million farmers (accounting 
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for 85.7%) joined the new system by 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). The 
‗Safety Plan‘ for migrant workers had also been fruitful: the number of migrant workers 
joining in injury insurance was rising from 12.51 million at the end of 2005, 25.37 million in 
2006 to 39.66 million by the end of 2007 (China Economic Times, 2007; Bai, 2007; Labour 
News, 2007).   
 
The problem facing the floating population was still institutional: there was a lack of explicit 
legal provisions to protect their rights. Since the abolition of the custody and repatriation 
system in 2003 after the Sun Zhigang case, further reforms on household registration systems 
(Hukou) were launched in October 2008. There had been a relaxation of standards and 
conditions for migrant workers to settle down in small and medium-sized cities in order to 
turn the farmers with stable residences and employment into urban residents in an orderly 
manner and gradually realise their equal rights and social welfare as urban citizens. A rural 
reform policy had also been announced for the first time that would allow farmers to lease or 
transfer land-use rights, a step that advocates said would raise lagging incomes in the Chinese 
countryside, reduce illegal land grabs or local corruption and avoid the danger that tens of 
millions of farmers would flock to cities in search of work, leaving plots of land to be tended 
by their elderly parents (Yardley, 2008). Besides these proactive strategies to act as a 
responsible authority and prevent labourers‘ potential appeals and protests, the Party-state also 
reinforced a formal and orderly appeal system within the labour department and other state 
departments, such as the visits and letters of petition offices. The regulation for visits and 
letters system had been established since 1995 and refurnished in 2005 so that citizens could 
lodge complaints to governments at all levels and the relevant departments at or above the 
county level through correspondence, e-mails, faxes, phone calls, visits and so on. It has been 
regarded as an important administrative and complementary channel to the formal 
administrative and judiciary route for the settlement of grievances. 
   
9.2.2 Toleration   
Passive toleration was obvious in the ignorance and delay in local officials‘ problem-solving 
strategies, as defined as ‗inaction‘ 117  and ‗nonfeasance against central rules‘ 118  by the 
interviewees. However, with the increasing resolution from the central state to harmonise  
                                                        
117 Interviewee number 37. 
118 Interviewee number 36. 
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society and pacify the labour unrest, the local state, especially the coastal provinces and 
metropolitan cities, had tended to take a more positive stand within the enlarged limits of 
Party-state toleration. The pacification had further regulated the governmental administration 
and accelerated the problem-solving process. Therefore, the Party-state responses to 
labourers‘ contentions have shown both toleration towards the bottom-up mobilisations and 
interest in attempting top-down pacification. 
 
For example, regarding the wage disputes, the main forms of actions migrant workers had 
taken were sit-ins, containment, exposure to the media and appeals to the higher authority to 
seek unpaid wages. The state had generally tolerated most of these contentions, encouraging 
the resolution of problems through legal processes. On the other hand, the central state also 
launched so-called ‗pay recovery movements‘ before spring festival to chase the arrears for 
migrant workers especially in the construction sector and put forth administrative punishment 
on those who were responsible (Yang et al, 2006; China Discipline Inspection News, 
26/1/2007). The official control on the social organisations for migrant workers, laid-off 
workers and farmers had also been much loosened. Laoxianghui for migrant workers with 
native ties were generally tolerated and some have turned into rights defending organisations. 
It is also noticeable that the Party-state responses were dynamic and transformable rather than 
static, depending on the development of the contention trend itself. As mentioned in the sixth 
chapter, the individually and privately established schools for migrant workers‘ children were 
struggling to exist, survive and to be recognised. The state reaction for them had been through 
3 stages: first, driving them away and closing them down; second, toleration and passively 
coping with them; third, positively engaging and regulating them (Song and Li. 2006). 
  
9.2.3 Control   
The co-optation strategy to promote official trade unions was still in partnership with strict 
restriction and occasional repression of the popular or underground organisations for 
labourers‘ rights-defending activities. The contentious issues such as illegal confiscation of 
land, house dismantlement, local corruption, problems of state-own enterprises, pollution, 
AIDS, working safety and food safety could invite both toleration and control at particular 
occasions depending on the cases‘ sentimentality, popularity, influence and the governmental 
officials involved. There were public lawyers or solicitors who had the commitment and made 
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it their missions to set up legal aid working groups for migrant workers regarding unpaid 
wages, injury compensation and contract conflict cases. These individuals and groups 
periodically faced surveillance and repression, as told by a dissident journalist in the 
interview
119
. 
 
According to the toleration strategy, all levels of states had shown a certain degree of 
toleration to collective contentious activities, but the central instruction of the boundary still 
acted as the guideline. When the contentions were regarded as beyond such a boundary, they 
would be repressed by the local authorities with no chance of winning any sympathy or 
support from the central authorities, as mentioned by a laid-off worker in Wuhan
120
. For 
example, the central government generally tolerated the populace‘s traditional practice of 
appealing to Beijing, but strictly controlled and prohibited such contentions on the National 
Day or any sensitive anniversaries, which would have embarrassed the central authorities.  
 
Interviewees were also aware that the party-state perception and evaluation of the contentions 
according to the authority standards and boundaries were very important in deciding the 
responses and results. It was also revealed that those making big trouble ran the risk of going 
beyond the boundary and causing problems, and such troublemakers would be subject to both 
soft control and hard repression. Many migrant workers‘ unpaid wage cases, collective in 
nature, were easily turned into mass incidents such as blockading government buildings or 
main forms of transportation or committing suicide in public, when badly dealt with. Some 
pursuing repayment activities were regarded as driven by evil intentions and seen as a public 
nuisance. However, the rights of interpretation and definition of such incidents were in the 
hands of authorities, so guises and excuses for repression under criminal titles were becoming 
common. It is interesting that the use of economic means as part of the soft control was 
practised by the state in two ways: one was to exert economic sanctions and punishments 
towards those challengers; the other was to offer money to people with grievances in the hope 
of defusing protests because most people, the government assumed, ultimately put profit 
before principle (Wong, 2008). 
 
Generally the application of strategies of restriction, prohibition and repression was done in a 
relatively covert way to avoid further resistance and unrest. As one interviewee mentioned, 
                                                        
119 Interviewee number 86. 
120 Interviewee number 34. 
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the authorities made use of Guanxi too.  
In order to control particular right-defending cases, some local officials often used all 
kinds of Guanxi (social relations and networks) to separate contentious leaders from 
ordinary participants or disintegrate participants‘ trust and support from the leaders 
through bribes or threats. When the leaders‘ credit was collapsing or under control, the 
whole collective activities would be easily controlled
121
.  
 
Another example of adaptive control was controlling the floating population in metropolitan 
cities like Beijing, which included the initiative to demolish their compressed shelter places, 
strengthen housing and renting management and improve the efficiency of the monitoring 
system. The practice of frequently changing living quarters by migrant workers, which might 
be an effective way to resist control from the authorities a decade ago, no longer worked well 
because of the decreasing availability of cheap accommodation, the increasing cost of moving 
and the tightening management on private-renting, as shown from the interviews
122
. Without 
enough available and acceptable retreats at both physical and psychological levels, random 
open conflicts between migrants and authorities were on the rise, as described by several 
interviewees
123
. Such conflicts invited more control and repression in a vicious circle. 
 
9.2.4 Local/central 
The labourers‘ cases witnessed great inconsistency between central and local government. 
First, there was a huge unbalance in state responses and policy implementation towards labour 
problems and unrest among different levels of the state‘s departments and localities. In the 
broad rural areas, local interests often led to resistance by the local Party organisations to the 
upper-level administration of the Party (Liu, 2002: 28). On one hand, local officials might 
hinder or sabotage the village committee elections; on the other hand, the local CPC power in 
some areas might even side with the peasants when they organised spontaneously, refusing to 
sell grain at low prices or to pay heavy taxes to the state.
 124
 As for the management of the 
floating population, Beijing had fully computerised the rental housing system by the end of 
2007 (Beijing TV News, 7/8/2007) to register and manage migrant workers through computer 
networks. Beijing had issued over 530,000 identification cards to migrant workers mainly on 
                                                        
121 Interviewee number 15. 
122 Interviewee number 1, 4, 7 and 8. 
123 Interviewee number 1, 4 and 8. 
124 Interviewee number 25 and 30. 
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construction projects since April 2007 to make sure they were paid, utilising a monitoring 
system for firms to wire salaries to the workers‘ cards (The Reuters, 2007). Other cities and 
districts lagged behind in applying such hi-tech tactics. There were also problems with the 
operation of official trade unions at local levels: such institutionalised channels for workers‘ 
complaints were rarely independent from political powers or enterprise management in 
localities, as more than one interviewee stated
125
. As also summarised from the interviews, the 
local government had distorted the good intentions of some central policies or instructions.
126
 
Because of the varied power scopes and interest drives of state institutions at all levels, there 
existed vertical and horizontal conflicts between different levels and different departments in 
the whole administrative system (Ying, 2001). This had greatly influenced the implementation 
of policies and the reinforcement of laws. 
  
Second, as some interviewees commented ironically
127
, the Party wanted to further engage 
and infiltrate private businesses in line with its ideological amendments; one of the practical 
implications was the popular alliance of local cadres and local entrepreneurs. When labour 
disputes arose, the local government seldom supported the workers‘ claims, especially when it 
was likely to discourage foreign investment (Leung, 2002). As for the SOE reforms, it seemed 
the workers of SOEs rather than the managers, most of whom were appointed by the 
government, had born the consequences of the reforms. Privatisation as the remedy for SOEs 
had immediately brought about a massive sell-off of smaller businesses for the local officials‘ 
own benefit, and this continued to infringe workers‘ rights and welfare and trigger their 
contentions. What‘s worse, these breaches of rights were usually connected with corruption, 
resulting in the universal loss of trust of the populace towards the local state. When the 
contentions were targeted against the local authorities‘ violation of the law and labourers‘ 
interests, and their collusion with managers, entrepreneurs and developers, the contradictions 
between central and local authorities became even deeper. 
 
Third, because of the authoritarian characteristics of the state itself, the rule of law could not 
be normally operated in all localities. The results of many contentious cases were not that the 
local elites received punishment according to the law, but rather the appealers and protesters 
were labelled and targeted. As exemplified by interviewees
128
, some victims were negatively 
                                                        
125 Interviewee number 26 and 27. 
126 Interviewee number 26 and 28. 
127 Interviewee number 11, 16 and 35. 
128 Interviewee number 8 and 37.. 
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labelled by the local government as activists, and even personal enemies to the local 
authorities, because they had become more active and experienced from the constant struggles 
in their own contentions, and had also become the natural leaders to help defend others 
against a similar injustice. Laoxianghui and other popular rights-defending organisations were 
also regarded by some local states as unstable factors for building a harmonious society.
129
 
Certain individual leaders and organisations were subject to local surveillance and persecution.    
 
Last but not least, the central state was still largely in control, and was the only authority that 
could take the lead. In the countryside, there was still central control of three indispensable 
policy areas: food supply, taxation, and population. The central and provincial states had also 
tried to create a bond of obligation between leaders and villagers by removing incompetent or 
corrupt village leaders. Moreover, in the name of maintaining social stabilities, the Party-state 
had adopted a special indicator for competition for every province leadership during the 
promotion title match – the number and frequency of petitioners to Beijing. According to 
blogger Xu Zhiyong, a young professor of law and strong advocate for human rights, many 
supplicants to Beijing were actually intercepted by local officials on the way to the State 
Bureau for Letters and Calls, the Supreme People‘s Court or other departments, forcibly taken 
to some makeshift house of detention and locked up without any legal process. As the places 
that confined the petitioners were always hidden amongst ordinary buildings, people called 
them ‗Black Jails‘ (Web-blog of Global Voice, internet resource). The central guidance had 
unexpectedly justified and increased the local practice of violence towards the petitioners.   
 
9.3 Intellectuals: evaluation of Party-state responses 
9.3.1 Co-optation 
Stratification within the intellectual group could be defined as largely ideological, i.e. those 
inside the system, those outside the system and those opposed to the system (Thakur, 2005). 
The first group was also called establishment intellectuals who served and operated within the 
governing institution, in contrast to non-establishment intellectuals – public and critical 
intellectuals (Fewsmith, 2001: 15). Theoretically, the Party-state had different strategies – co-
optation, toleration and control, respectively, towards the three sub-groups. Nevertheless, in 
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practice, the combination of official strategies had shown a complicated relationship between 
the intellectuals and the authority and a versatility of features in the broader arena of 
intellectual contentions during the internet era.  
 
The crisis of faith in the Party‘s socialist ideology and a rising political apathy was 
increasingly prevailing, generated by corruption, abuse of power, income inequality, regional 
differences and other problems. From the interviews and online public opinions, many 
intellectuals were expressing scepticism or dissent towards the ideological doctrine. Some 
cared more about instrumental policies and material benefits, with individualism exaggerated 
and distorted towards egoism and utilitarianism. Others, especially the youth, were turning a 
negative and cynical attitude towards the –isms in the Party constitution and towards so-called 
‗socialism with Chinese characteristics‘ by disputing controversial issues, criticising realities 
and pinpointing social injustices. When the party was faced with such a crisis of the Marxist-
Leninist legitimacy (Chen, 1995: 17-20; Ding, 1994: 13-21) and ideological deviation 
towards a market economy after a series of political campaigns, it began to interpret Marxism 
more flexibly. Co-optation at the ideological level was obviously intended to restate that all 
the intellectuals were an integral and vigorous social force, and they were still symbolic 
bearers of a historical burden, cultural identity and moral standard. As the party was claiming 
to represent the orientation of China‘s advanced culture as part of its ‗Three Represents‘ 
theories, it endeavoured to re-establish the claim to legitimacy and morality, too. On the other 
hand, as a rejection of the Marxist notion of class struggle, the party had made efforts to 
revive traditional culture as a way of giving China more cohesion, in its state of rapid 
economic and social flux. The term ‗harmonious society‘ then became a new party mantra, 
sounding like an allusion to classical notions of social order in which people did not challenge 
their roles in life and treat each other kindly.  
 
Such official ideological and macro institutional rearrangements presented by successive 
leaderships had worked well with bureaucratic and intellectual elites, who were optimistic 
about the future of Chinese democracy and have high expectations for the leadership to press 
for further reforms. Most establishment intellectuals believe that the attitudes of Chinese 
leaders in the reform era were positive towards democracy and rule of law (Guo, 2003). They 
therefore did not think that bottom-up contention was necessary, effective or constructive, as 
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commented by some interviewees,
130
 and such conceptions and attitudes to contentions had in 
turn influenced the policy-making of the Party-state. In addition, many were afraid of chaos 
(luan) to an extent that some argued that the strategies of co-optation and even censorship 
were good and important for the moral health of the policies
131
.  
 
Another important official co-optation strategy was the promotion of new nationalism, aiming 
to rebuild China‘s national identity, restore the nation-state and foster national unity. The 
‗state-led‘ nationalism, as it was called by some Chinese scholars (Zhao, 1998), not only 
equates the ‗nation‘ to ‗state‘ but also emphasised the government-defined ‗Chinese 
characteristics‘ that encompassed such core norms of the regime as the necessity of one-party 
rule, the absolute priority of stability/order over individual freedom and the necessity of 
‗gradual‘ (if any at all) democratisation in China (Zhao, 2000). The Party-state was greatly 
concerned that the youth might turn to moral corruption, as an official in the interviews said
132
; 
rather, it wanted Chinese youth to have strong patriotic and nationalist sentiments and to 
understand the importance of the interests of the nation as a whole, so it used schools as a 
means of propaganda to cultivate the minds of young pupils with its specific political dogma. 
On the other hand, the nationalist movements of young students and the middle class fully 
enjoyed the constitutional rights and freedoms of organisations and demonstrations. Legal, 
organisational and material support had been offered by the authorities to the nationwide anti-
America and anti-Japan protests in 1999 and 2005 to ensure and co-opt these large-scale 
movements with justified courses under the official line. During the recent Tibet riots, 
interruptive Olympic torch relay and the global human rights protests related to the Olympic 
Games, the authorities further lifted the restrictions on the domestic media, including on the 
internet, and tried to guide public nationalist sentiments against the Western media and 
China‘s critics. 
 
9.3.2 Toleration 
It was argued by a few students and scholars in the interviews that greater space for social and 
political expression, that in the past were regarded as sensitive or even taboo, was now 
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allowed.
133
 First, the Party-state could afford toleration since there was deep division of 
thoughts and schools among intellectuals themselves. So an invisible counter-balance was 
formed during heated arguments, disputes and dissidences that was publicised in the media or 
exposed on the internet. For example, liberals and dissidents might well argue that a more 
democratic government could deal with those severe political, economic and social problems 
much better than China‘s authoritarian regime, but this view was not necessarily shared by a 
majority of China‘s intellectuals and reformers or even by ordinary people (Ogden, 2002: 38-
9). As for cyberspace itself, some viewed it as a relatively free environment where people 
could experiment with various identities without fear of social, political or legal 
repercussions
134
. Such a conceptualisation gave rise to discourses that opposed intervention 
such as the so-called ‗Great Firewall of China‘135. For others, cyberspace was a dangerous 
environment where people were tempted into immoral or even criminal behaviour, which 
gave rise to discourses that supported the establishment of ‗national borders on the internet‘ 
and justified official censorship (Hockx, 2008).  
 
Second, the Party-state had flexibly used the passive toleration and positive pacification 
towards the emerging and new fangled intellectual discourse and contentions. For example, 
the consciousness of tax-payers was getting stronger amongst white-collar workers and the 
middle class as a whole. Since governmental expenditure mostly comes from tax revenues, 
some think that tax-payers should have the unrestricted right and legitimacy to question and 
criticise the government, as mentioned by a few white-collar workers in the interviews
136
. The 
concept of weiquan (defending rights) also helped define a growing consciousness of 
constitutional rights among scholars, lawyers, dissidents, and others. Such topics and concepts, 
with original sensitive status, were gradually accepted and to a degree legitimised by the 
authorities. Along with the increasing consciousness and discourse contention, people‘s 
demands for the rule of law, most often expressed in online forums, had largely escaped 
official censure because they often addressed issues within the government‘s own evolving 
policies such as legal reform and anti-corruption efforts.  
‗In human rights cases that are not too sensitive, public scrutiny falls within the grey 
areas of what is legal,‘ the famous Beijing-based writer Liu Xiaobo said in a recent 
essay. ‗The people‘s wisdom is good at using this ambiguity to create a space to advance 
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134 Interviewee number 54 and 74. 
135 Interviewee number 80. 
136 Interviewee number 18 and 22. 
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their own interests‘ (Beach, 2005, internet resource).  
 
Not only being tolerated, these contentions were more and more often positively dealt with by 
the authorities. As Chinese netizens were communicating daily beyond national borders on 
numerous issues concerning China‘s politics, international relationships with world powers 
and developing countries, and the prospect of Chinese civilisation as well as the local 
administration, judiciary and personal morality, the government was increasingly forced to 
take critical public opinion into account because of the mobilising potential inherent in it. The 
scope of a more obvious dialogue between state and society had significantly widened 
(Fewsmith, 2001: 161). 
 
Third, and more specifically, it has long been observed by researchers that the internet 
provided an officially tolerated outlet for nationalist sentiments as long as the postings were 
not directed against the Chinese government and did not challenge state policies (Wacker, 
2003: 70; Hughes, 2000). Although they were policed, bulletin boards and chat rooms were 
places where opinions can be expressed more freely. China‘s web users were under no 
illusions about the limits on their freedoms, but they remained hopeful for change 
(Sommerville, 2006). Relating to Chinese problems in all aspects from the general to the 
specific, the cases of Sun Zhigang, the Shanxi Black brick kiln, the South China Tiger and 
others were able to gain the attention of relevant state departments because of the concern and 
participation of netizens. Policy-making about people‘s livelihoods such as non-increase of 
train fares during spring festival, decrease of mobile roaming charges, the adjustment of the 
golden week holidays and so on could not have been achieved without the courageous 
suggestions and opinions from netizens (Tianya BBS, internet resource). When emotional 
netizens flooded major portal sites with postings and messages, expressing their disgust and 
demanding punishment for those directly responsible, their calls and voices were increasingly 
heard and responded to by local and national officials. 
 
9.3.3 Control  
The strategies of control were applied to those critical intellectuals who were opposed to the 
authorities and the present system amongst the media and through internet discourse. They 
were used sometimes when establishment intellectuals challenged their clientelist relationship 
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to the party leadership and tested the boundaries of the arbitrarily set ‗limited zones of 
freedom‘, mentioned by one scholar137. Though there was a certain amount of toleration when 
intellectuals disputed the state-defined paths to economic growth and development or when 
ordinary citizens made jokes of official slogans, there was still a heavy use of controlling 
strategies, mainly in the means of censorship and repression when contentions moved out of  
toleration boundaries.  
 
The act of censorship was an example of permanent risk-management in Chinese traditional 
media institutions.  
Some editors feared losing their position and carefully abstained from publishing 
anything that might be too critical. Some journalists felt that the new freedom of the 
media was illusory and that the new possibilities were limited to the politically 
irrelevant field of consumption (Sather, 2006: 49).  
 
When journalists at China‘s national broadcaster CCTV logged on, one of the first things that 
popped up on screen was a notice about what not to report, as told by a journalist in the 
interviews
138
. These notices were often short and seldom said who had authorised them, but 
they all contained strict instructions about how to report a story. Certain subjects were always 
out of bounds in China, such as speculation about China‘s national leaders. Other issues, such 
as health, education and inflation, are closely monitored because they were potentially 
controversial (Bristow, 2008). 
 
There were also government regulations and strict censorship towards the internet, especially 
the content. It was easy for censors to delete comments deemed offensive or dangerous, as 
observed by a few regular internet users in the interviews
139
. Supervision and control 
mechanisms on the information flow in the form of preventive regulations as well as 
repressive actions were implemented at the state, local, institutional and individual levels. It 
was argued that the state was good at providing some new ways of engaging in old practices 
(Lyon, 2003) and that the internet reinforced surveillance and social control and strengthened 
the ideological state apparatus (Mengin, 2004: 7). However, it was increasingly difficult for 
the government to control every website, chat-room, forum and BBS as they were growing in 
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number.  
 
As for the repressive strategies, ongoing repression against outspoken journalists, cyber-
dissidents, critical writers, liberal intellectuals, labour activists and socially engaged lawyers 
had instilled a climate of fear throughout China, which sought to intimidate potential 
protesters and encourage self-policing (Broudehoux, 2007). There was a perception of the 
social, political and economic manifestation of authoritarianism and oppression, as also 
indicated by the interviewees. This perception on one hand provoked further conflicts and 
constant struggles as shown in more evidence collection and exposure by dissident 
intellectuals and more criticisms of China‘s poor human rights record and infringement of 
freedom, especially on the international stage. On the other hand, it led to a feeling of 
powerlessness in the face of authority among the domestic intellectuals in general, despite 
their elite status at that time. Certain taboos still remained frozen. As a dissident mentioned, 
When some intellectuals are bold enough in further bringing forth the problems of the 
unknown or misinterpreted facts of previous political movements, such as the Cultural 
Revolution, June Fourth 1989, or the unfair political-economic system, the single-party 
rule and its suppression of social and political dissidents, they will invite more 
repressions such as tighter surveillance, house arrest and imprisonment under different 
criminal charges.
140
 
 
Nationalism was clearly a double-edged sword, of which the government was fully aware 
(Fewsmith, 2001: 13). Nationalism and patriotism that was deeply rooted in the souls of 
overseas Chinese intellectuals also motivated them to be involved in continuous pro-
democracy movements outside China, and it was still a nationalist sentiment that was 
advanced by the Chinese Party-state to disclaim them as anti-China plotters in association 
with hostile foreign forces. On the other hand, the excessive encouragement of patriotic 
feelings had also dangerous and negative aspects as many youths were nationalistic to a 
certain, sometimes even fanatical extreme, with the mood of indignation and radicalism. So 
the co-optation and support of the nationalist movements in recent years was also combined 
with tight surveillance and occasional repressions. The authorities were fully aware that they 
should be particularly careful if this impacted its most important strategic relationships, as 
with the attacks on the US Embassy following the Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1999, or the 
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attacks on French businesses following Tibet protests during the Olympic torch relay in Paris.  
 
9.3.4 Local/central 
The local/central interaction and potential for conflict occurring during the intellectual 
contentions was similar to that during the labour ones. The regional imbalance and 
departmental divisions were obvious. With more intellectual contentions occurring on the 
internet, the Party-state was facing unimaginable energy from the omnipresent internet, the 
power of netizens‘ participation and the multifaceted propensities of contentious activities and 
discourses on the internet. The equally significant fact was that central and local governments 
reacted differently to the contentious activities. One university research student mentioned a 
famous grassroots AIDS activist Grandma Gao Yaojie.
141
 As in the case of Gao Yaojie, who 
had been honoured by the United Nations and Western organisations for her AIDS prevention 
work in Henan province, she revealed that the rapid spread of the HIV virus during the 1990s 
in Henan among the impoverished rural population, with infection rates of more than 50% in 
some villages, was mostly due to the exploitative blood collection, transfusion
 
and recycle 
program (China News Digest, 2001; Beech, 2006). The local government tried to cover up the 
situation of illegal blood collection and the condition of the villagers until 2003 when the 
central government decided to intervene to regulate the unsanitary blood centres and 
designate Grandma Gao on the CCTV ‗Ten People Who Touched China in 2003‘. However, 
Gao was still under constant house arrest by the local government. Her blog was occasionally 
hacked by detractors and people were paid to leave negative comments on it. Though in 
public and the media she was visited and presented with flowers and best wishes from the 
party head and governor of Henan province, she was covertly pressurised by these local 
officials to sign a statement that she was ‗unable to travel due to poor health‘ to the United 
States to receive the ‗Global Leadership Award, Women Changing Our World‘ in 2007 
(Yardley, 2007).  
  
Unlike labourers‘ contentions, which mostly occurred offline, the virtual environment and 
communicative convenience had facilitated internet contentions to be rapidly exposed and 
tracked beyond limits of location and time. The local elite politics, intra-party conflicts and 
factionalism, known as an open secret to the public, were also entangled with the intellectual 
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internal contentions. It was observed by a few interviewees
142
 that internet contentious cases 
targeted at the local officials and powers were resolved more easily with the pressure from 
higher authorities and from the public and the media, but when it came to the provincial levels 
or higher, the bottom-up anti-corruption petitions were either repressed or ended without a 
substantial outcome or made use of as political manoeuvre for internal power struggles within 
the authorities
143
. Moreover, a top-down movement was sometimes mobilised to serve 
different interest groups in the factional combats, noticeably between Jiang-Zeng (Jiang 
Zemin and Zeng Qinghong) Shanghai Gang and the Hu-Wen Youth League network during 
the power transition from the 3
rd
 to the 4
th
 generation of leadership (Li, 2002; Shi, 2003). For 
example, Chen Liangyu, Jiang‘s ally, a former core member of the Shanghai Gang, party chief 
and formidable critic of Hu‘s macro-economic policies was brought up on charges of 
corruption in the pension fund scandal in 2006. His fall was regarded as a major political 
victory for Hu Jintao‘s camp to step up and reshape China‘s political landscape in ways that 
consolidated and expanded Hu‘s authority at both the national and provincial levels (Li, 2007).   
 
On the other hand, local governments, especially in developed and coastal cities, had used the 
internet to distribute information and promote community interests, and their responses to the 
online public sphere and internet contentions had become more active and engaging. Some of 
the officials were transformed from passive receivers of complaints, critiques and pressures to 
members of a more and more proactive agency by paying gradual attention to the internet 
forums, utilising the internet as an information resource and for problem-resolving strategies 
and opening itself to the supervision of the broader audiences and populace.  
For example, on June 2
nd
 2008, Su Rong, secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Party 
Committee met with 28 selected netizens face to face and 8.4 million netizens though 
web broadcasting, assembling their opinions and suggestions related to the economic, 
political and cultural development and problems in Jiangxi. At the briefing, Su Rong 
was asked by netizens about questions including the building of Central Poyang Lake 
ecological and economic zone, Jiangxi‘s opening up strategy, urban planning and how to 
select officials and so on. Turning to the problem of the selection of officials, Su Rong 
frankly admitted that besides the standards of both ability and political integrity there 
was the influence of unspoken rules such as social relations and indeed some people 
have tasted the sweetness. In response, Su Rong said, the future selection of Jiangxi 
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officials will be based on the election system, mechanism and institutional innovation to 
limit the role of unspoken rules (Synthesis of internet resources). 
 
It is evident that there was an emergence of the real grassroots civic discourse and contentious 
activities on the internet at the local level that could affect the political leadership and 
transform the strategic grassroots governmental responses. The internet has facilitated the 
connection and communication between the Chinese government and its people and, within 
the government, among its various branches and competing factions. There is the possibility 
of mutual dialogue between the leaders and the citizens rather than a strictly top-down 
communicative interaction.      
  
9.4 Religious groups: evaluation of Party-state responses  
9.4.1 Co-optation   
When religions were blossoming in contemporary China, either in a normalised and officially-
recognised way or in a contentious, controversial and confrontational manner, the Party-state 
had to respond with, respectively, the consideration of immediate effects and long-term 
consequences. The biggest strategic co-optation was the constitutional and institutional 
regulation. The constitutional respect for and protection of the freedom of religious beliefs 
was also setting its boundaries. By compulsorily legitimising and defining five religions 
Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, the atheistic Party attempted to 
exclude folk religions, superstitions and cults from the bounds of protection (MacInnis, 1989: 
385-410). On the other hand, the Constitution said, ‗the exercise by citizens of the People‘s 
Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, 
of society and of the collective.‘ (Constitution of the People‘s Republic of China, 2004: 36) 
Obviously it was the ruling party that defined such interests and what constituted an 
infringement. Therefore, to protect the ‗official‘ and ‗normal‘ religious freedom within certain 
boundaries was to co-opt people with religious beliefs into state provided institutions, require 
them to comply with imperatives of Party leadership and social stability and strengthen these 
believers‘ self-censorship by clarifying religious policies in constitution and Party documents. 
Notably in 1991, the CPC Central Committee/State Council‘s ‗Document No. 6‘ expressed the 
regime‘s policy was in an effort to co-opt religious adherents while also repressing challenges 
to Party power (CPC Central Committee/State Council, 1991), with limitations on 
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proselytisation, recruitment, fund-raising and other activities in support of organised religion 
(Spiegel, 1992: 8-13). Dissemination and enforcement of Party policies on religion was the 
responsibility of an intersecting network of Party and governmental organisations, 
incorporating the State Council‘s Religious Affairs Bureau, the Propaganda Department, the 
United Front Work Department and the Public Security Ministry (MacInnis, 1989: 1-5). 
 
The official organisational networks had been set up nationwide and locally for the purpose of 
religious administration to strengthen the state‘s organisational authority and national 
construction over religions. Eight national religious organisations (the Chinese Islamic 
Association, the Chinese Daoist Association, the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Three-
Self Patriotic Movement Committee for the Protestant Churches of China, the China Christian 
Council, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the Chinese Catholic Bishop College, and 
the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church) were established by 
the CPC to monitor the activities of the five world religions in China. Party authorities on 
religion focused on strengthening administration of religious affairs according to law (Luo, 
1997), which also kept the official religions dependent and framed within the state system for 
legitimacy, organisation, personnel and material resources. These five religions had all 
developed official and specific institutions to train personnel, with officially approved 
curricula incorporating state policy into religious instruction (Human Rights Watch, 1997; 
Nanbu, 2008). Such officially sponsored and inspected education of clergy also aimed at 
ensuring that religious leaders remained loyal to the principles of the Party-state (Potter, 2003). 
For example, through increased education and indoctrination of state-approved clergy, the 
Protestant Three-Self Patriotic movement (self-governance, self-support for financial 
independence from foreigners and self-propagation for indigenous missionary work) 
underscored its submission to Party leadership, support for the authority of the state and the 
socialist motherland, and obedience to the constitution, laws, regulations and policies of the 
state (Potter, 2003). Such nationwide movement had allowed the government to infiltrate and 
control much organised Christianity (Patrick, 2001: 164) and to prohibit any interference from 
foreign forces using religions. 20 out of 30 people with Christian beliefs in the interviews 
joined the ‗Three Self‘ local churches. The actual strong public attendance at patriotic 
Christian churches had on one hand revealed a shortage in the number of churches, but on the 
other shown believers‘ compliance to the Party‘s religious policy, which became a public 
norm for religious behaviour (Potter, 2003). 
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On the ideological aspect of co-optation, in the 1990s the Party leadership had actively 
advocated the adaptation of religion and socialism
144
 as an important composition of a 
national united front work in order to engage minor ethnic groups and Chinese nationals in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and all over the world. The common elements of patriotism and 
adherence to socialism had been emphasised to bind those who believe in religion and those 
who do not (Zhen, 1989: 109). To introduce conventional religions against underground 
religious groups, in December, 2001, Jiang Zemin, in a speech to an important national 
meeting on religion, acknowledged that religions could help to stabilise society (Leung, 2005), 
and they should continue to exist as a fundamental component of human civilisation (Chan, 
2004). More recently the Party had begun to put a more positive spin on the role of religion to 
echo its propaganda concerning the need for a ‗harmonious society‘ and how to build it up. 
This concept of a ‗harmonious society‘ was also applicable to recognising the function of 
religions to generate and strengthen the cooperation between socialism and religion when the 
authorities were searching for ways in which religion could effectively contribute to 
modernisation (Nanbu, 2008) and to the solutions of accompanying social problems.  
 
Intellectuals and the academic sphere were actively involved in exploration, justification and 
demonstration of such changes in the official tune. Specialised religious institutions were 
working in cooperation with higher education institutions to offer programmes for the training 
of those in charge of regulating religions as well as scholars (Nanbu, 2008). University 
connections had been established to research on the religion‘s impact on the society and the 
positive influences were regarded as part of establishing harmonious society. The dialogues 
between religious leaders, scholars and higher level authorities had also been initiated in 
many directions, which were especially embraced by cultural and intellectual Christians as 
detailed in the last chapter. Especially in the moral and spiritual direction, the contentions of 
religious groups contained first the religious movement itself. It was regarded, as some 
interviewees put it,
145
 as a counterbalance to the excessively materialistic drive and the 
accompanying spiritual vacuum, which was also one of the biggest concerns of the Party in 
the reform era. As a continuation of state co-optation towards intellectuals in the religious 
field, the authorities tried to make use of the union between the intelligentsia, religion and the 
appeal of religion to serve the regime, but also to minimise its potential threat to the regime. 
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By addressing the positive function of religions and by retrieving morals, the Party also 
attempted to re-establish both the moral foundation of society and the authority of the CPC.  
 
9.4.2 Toleration  
On the spectrum from co-optation to suppression, the strategy of toleration was utilised from 
time to time and place to place withies a part of the negotiation between state and religious 
groups. The CPC document stated that ‗implementing administration of religious affairs is 
aimed at bringing religious activities within the bounds of law, regulation, and policy, but not 
to interfere with normal religious activities or the internal affairs of religious organisations.‘ 
(CPC Central Committee/State Council, 1991). The reference to such non-interference 
seemed benign and often indicated a general guidance of toleration at the local level as long 
as religious followers remained loyal to the country, supported the CPC and obeyed the law 
(Yang, 2004). What‘s more, China had made a gesture along with the harmonious society 
themes to permit to some extent a dialogue on the moral and cultural roles of religion in civic 
life. Therefore deliberation arose around the degree to which religious expression and 
activities would be permitted and tolerated without infringing on the CPC‘s political control 
for both the governmental and religious sides. The limits were constantly challenged by the 
pro-religion intellectuals and the existing fact of religious prosperity.  
 
Passive and positive toleration was evident especially in some southern and coastal provinces 
where temples, mosques and churches were rapidly rebuilt and religious activities revived in 
the reform era. Faced with such proliferation, the mentality of most local states was to avoid 
any trouble, outbreak and confrontation and try to maintain a peaceful contact and 
relationship with diversified religious groups. Taking Christianity as an example, the house 
churches grew larger and more deeply entrenched in Chinese society than the patriotic 
Christian churches associated with norms of compliance. The relative fluidity of Protestant 
organisational structures, particularly the role of lay clergy, had made it harder for the 
government to control (Pomfret, 2002). Some Christian interviewees also stated their 
dissatisfaction with official churches‘ dependence on the government and confirmed that they 
sensed little restriction or repression when joining in family church activities.
146
 Moreover, as 
some Christian entrepreneurs, notably in the coast cities, were building up churches inside 
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factories or companies for their workers, local officials, eager for their investment and 
technology, often allowed the religious activities as long as the ministers did not attract a 
crowd out front.
147
 Such unorthodox arrangement, toleration and ignorance happened in the 
centre as well. The metropolitan city of Beijing, as the interviewees revealed, was a 
multicultural capital where not only Buddhism and other traditions were promoted and well 
reserved
148
, but foreign population and Christian ministries were also on the rise along with 
the soaring foreign investment and population inflow. Some university students mentioned in 
the interviews that those Christian evangelists, especially from the USA and South Korea, 
often reached out to students on the campus or in the cafes for gatherings and gospel 
sharing.
149
 The authorities showed a high degree of tolerance to such secret or even public 
evangelism. Beijing even allowed Chinese Catholic believers to accept the Pope‘s ‗spiritual‘ 
leadership, though it insisted that the Vatican must break diplomatic ties with Taiwan and ‗not 
interfere in China‘s internal affairs‘ (Gittings, 2001). 
 
The long-lasting suppression of Falun Gong also exhausted the local governments, as it was 
difficult to identify, convert, discipline or punish these adherents who were going increasingly 
underground. There existed a grey area full of delicate bargains on the limits of tolerance and 
repression, as indicated by the interviewees who had some contacts with mainland Falun 
Gong practitioners
150
. Inaction from the local government was common as long as they did 
not provoke or incite the local public or appeal to the central government. So the regime did 
not only tolerate compliance-based religious activities but also struggled with the boundaries 
between normal practices and the underground and even outlawed heterodoxies.  
 
9.4.3 Control 
The main challenges for the authorities came from Falun Gong and underground churches 
with their inter-group natures, which entangled religious rights and human rights issues and 
threatened the mainstream ideology. The officially atheistic government prohibited 
proselytising and was worried that if the spread of religion went unchecked, believers, 
especially those led by the intellectual elite, might ultimately challenge the Communist 
Party‘s authority. It was argued that the union of intelligentsia and religion could be a big 
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threat, said one local official. Some also argued that China‘s restrictions on Christianity were 
not necessarily a fear of religion, but of the possible threat to the Party‘s leadership that came 
from any organised group (Ramzy, 2007). As one interviewee put it, ‗whether people believe 
in Jesus or Buddha, the government is not really bothered; what they are afraid of is that they 
meet together underground in a certain number without registration but under some unknown 
influential leadership.‘151 Such was the case with the governmental initiative to repress Falun 
Gong. The authorities had firstly illegalised the existence of any religions or cults other than 
the five official ones generally, and Falun Gong in particular, as well as any underground 
assemblies including the house church movement, to justify different types and degrees of 
suppression, soft or hard, of these illicit groups. Registration of all religious sites was 
government-mandated and official interference in the management of religious organisations 
widely existed. 
 
Some interviewees from Christian and Falun Gong groups criticised that the state treated 
religion as a political matter in terms of its surveillance and controlling strategies.
152
 
Repression under the name of controlling illegal ‗sects‘ (Xiejiao) was common (Li and Fu, 
2002). Regarding the unofficial house churches and underground evangelical activities, it was 
well-reported that their house gatherings and services were periodically raided, interrupted 
and prohibited by local police. Their leaders were risking fines, surveillance or even arrest. 
Active members were also likely to face administrative detention without trial or being 
charged with conducting ‗illegal‘ religious activities. Bibles and other related publications 
were confiscated, and restrictions on contacts between them and their foreign counterparts 
were strengthened. As an interviewee mentioned
153
, all kinds of incidents and repressions had 
intensified the contradiction between the unofficial Christians and authorities, and triggered 
further contentions. The climax of the conflicts often involved the closing down of house 
churches and the demolition of church buildings, which were seen by many as an unwarranted 
intrusion in social affairs.
154
 
  
The suppression of Falun Gong was more overtly conducted. As summarised from the state‘s 
controlling and repressing strategies towards the Falun Gong movement, it saw strong 
emphases on the monopoly of discourse – propaganda criticism, legitimate justification, 
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national-scale mobilisation and a people‘s war.  It was known that the ideological, 
institutional and legitimate resources were all used by the government to mobilise the anti 
Falun Gong campaigns, which began with discursive condemnation through media 
propaganda, which itself played an active part in serving Party-state strategy of co-optation. 
However, this further justified the cause of governmental control especially over the Falun 
Gong. As described by Amnesty International, it was a ‗massive propaganda campaign‘ 
(Amnesty International, 2000). Through portrayals of the early history of the founder Li 
Hongzhi and Falun Gong, as well as reports on the deaths of 1,400 or more devotees, the 
official media had evidently charged Falun Gong as a superstitious and hypocritical cult, as 
harmful to people and society, as illegal and criminal and even as treasonous and seditious. It 
had been linked with Tibetan and Xinjiang separatists and to threats to Communist Party 
leadership and the stability of China. The US had been accused of being the headquarters of 
the banned cult (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
 
The China Anti-cults Association had been founded mainly against Falun Gong since 2000, 
and anti-cult education and re-education campaigns were organised and targeted respectively 
towards the general public and Falun Gong followers in particular. The anti-cult exhibit in 
Beijing in July 2001 had collected signatures of more than a million citizens in support of the 
ban. So Beijing‘s suppression of Falun Gong was claimed to be a response to popular 
demands and the people‘s will (People‘s Daily, 2001). Stories of successful re-education of 
Falun Gong addicts flooded the official media at the early stages of the anti-Falun Gong 
campaign. The official sources claimed to have made over 2 million followers give up Falun 
Gong.  
 
The Party-state had put together the legal framework for the explicit prosecution of Falun 
Gong, starting by labelling it as an ‗evil cult‘ (Ownby, 2007). The hard repressive measures 
towards Falun Gong were justified after the legislation and practised mainly under the 
specifically established department 6-10 office. Politically motivated charges, unfair trials, 
harsh sentences, administrative detentions through labour camps and forceful detentions in 
psychiatric hospitals were systematically and sophisticatedly applied by the government, 
courts and police at all levels of government (Schechter, 2001: 181-95). Since 1999, reports of 
torture, illegal imprisonment, beatings, forced labour and psychiatric abuse had been 
widespread (Leung, 2002). 66% of all reported torture cases in China concern Falun Gong 
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practitioners, who were also estimated to comprise at least half of China‘s labour camp 
population (U.S. Department of State, 2007).  
  
Since the state controlled the major resources and power in the media, institutions and 
legislation, every aspect of society was mobilised against Falun Gong, including the public 
discourse, police force, education system, families, and workplaces. In a Cultural Revolution 
style, practitioners would lose their party memberships, jobs, education opportunities and 
pensions and even faced severe jail sentences. The interviewees, especially the Falun Gong 
practitioners
155
, cited with anger and grievance various stories which concerned their or other 
members‘ experiences of torture in detention, including the abuse of female practitioners, 
water cells, solitary confinement in dark rooms, electric batons, etc. They repeatedly asserted 
that such violation of human rights was uncivilised, notorious and unacceptable all over the 
world. 
 
The suppression and reaction from the government also saw features of fluctuation and 
differentiation: first, the propaganda against the movement gradually faded out, and violence 
became restricted as the legislative regulations were strengthened. For example, new rules had 
been implemented to define illegal users of the internet in regard to evil religious cults and to 
make China‘s rapidly growing cyberspace free of Falun Gong-related information, as one 
dissident journalist mentioned
156
. Second, taking into account the factors of place and time 
sensitivity, authorities often tightened control around some sensitive dates and anniversaries 
such as the National Day, June 4
th
, April 25
th
 and so on, while hot spots like Beijing and 
Tiananmen Square were also under heavier surveillance. Third, ordinary practitioners had 
been strategically separated from the so-called Falun Gong diehards. The latter were still 
under the tightest supervision and subject to various severe coercive measures. For example, 
in December 2005, the author of the ‗Nine Commentaries‘ was identified as Zheng Peichun, a 
Chinese dissident, who was arrested on the charge of crimes against the state and was 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment (Web-blog of China Affairs, internet resource).  
 
9.4.4 Local/central 
The overarching purpose of the central government was to confine religion to the limits of 
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law and policy, and it had put great emphasis on the distinction between normal religious 
belief and activities that the state purported to protect, and on challenging religious 
contentions or ‗illegal and criminal activities being carried out under the banner of religion‘ 
(Constitution of the People‘s Republic of China, 2004: 36). This classification determined 
different strategies such as co-optation, toleration and suppression to be adopted towards them. 
However, at the local level of governance, there was both coherence and conflict with the 
centre. The Religious Affairs Bureaus of China‘s provinces and major cities were empowered 
to issue local regulations on the control of religion. These generally echoed the tenets of 
central edicts (Madsen and Tong, 2000). At the same time, such edicts had also been localised 
and interpreted diversely to serve different purposes. Regional policies towards grassroots 
religious organisations varied significantly, some showing more tolerance than others while 
some were more repressive, as shown in the feedback from interviewees of different origins 
and localities.  
 
There has been a bargaining process happening during the registration between the state and a 
large number of Christians, and the situation varies from place to place. Some of the 
interviewees did not yet feel any danger or inconvenience if joining an unregistered house 
church and thus remained doing so
157
; some were on great alert by regularly moving locations 
to protect their leaders
158
; others found the local officials indifferent or even favourable 
towards the unofficial evangelical movement
159
. Though the local governments were only 
allowed by the centre to authorise state-approved churches under strict conditions and had 
attempted to crack down on underground spontaneous churches, they had little success. This 
discouraged those officials to adopt an active confrontational strategy. Being aware but 
winking at the resurgence of house churches, some local authorities preferred minimum or not 
any interaction with house churches. They were often fearful of triggering unrest in their 
jurisdictions by enforcing unpopular policies that were not vital to the party‘s interests. It is 
therefore not surprising that there was often cooperation between the official and underground 
churches at the local level (Gittings, 2001). Some interviewees who came from rural areas 
also mentioned popular religions and local rituals. In the spatial politics, especially in rural 
areas, many government officials had bent the rules or turned a blind eye to popular religions 
despite the fact that some were underground and outlawed. It was also very common for them 
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to support these unofficially religious or ritual organisations as a part of local traditions or 
cultural attractions, and some even routinely took part in spiritual and ritual ceremonies. Even 
for the Anti-Falun Gong campaign, the authorities had in certain ways softened their strategies, 
especially at the local level. There was an unstated deal between local officials and Falun 
Gong practitioners, revealed by a Wuhan origin interviewee
160
, that as long as they did not go 
to Beijing to protest or cause trouble for them, they would ignore their underground status and 
exercises. Since the central government had assigned the duty of dealing with the conflicts to 
provincial governments, the centre did not really want to know about the contestations and 
unrest unless they became a direct challenge or went public to catch the attention of the 
international media.   
 
On the other hand, as for the hard control, Party documents directed public security organs to 
take forceful measures to curb those who used religious activities to ‗engage in disruptive 
activities,‘ ‗stir up trouble, endanger public safety, and weaken the unification of the country 
and national unity‘ or ‗collude with hostile forces outside the country to endanger China‘s 
security.‘ (Chan and Hunter, 1995) Local officials were given unrestrained authority to 
implement the central government‘s directives and to achieve the success without questioning 
the process, which could lead to enormous abuse of power (Hutzler, 2001). Torture and 
mistreatment of religious detainees from detention centres, re-education camps and labour 
camps was also locally revealed and internationally reported. These transformation-through-
labour (Laodong Gaizao) administrative commissions were operated under provincial or 
municipal governments and contained widespread abuse of local power. A typical case 
occurred when some Falun Gong practitioners were bewildered by the government‘s ‗evil 
cult‘ pronouncement and tried to appeal to Beijing to correct this official inaccurate 
impression. After being arrested, fined and sent back home with a warning not to associate 
further with the movement, some still stuck to their principles and ended up being identified 
as diehards and were subjected to risks of imprisonment, torture and even death at the local 
prisons, as some interviewees revealed
161
.  
 
9.5 Reflections 
As one might conclude from the above discussion concerning Party-state responses towards 
                                                        
160 Interviewee number 67. 
161 Interviewee number 107, 108 and 110. 
232 
 
the contentious activities of the three groups, the Chinese authorities placed different levels of 
emphasis, in terms of the main three strategies, with respect to each group. As described in 
figure 3, strategic toleration was ranked top for labourers, as in the case of single-event or 
small-scale regional protests with similar-background labourer actors, and the government 
would largely tolerate and attempt to appease their dissatisfaction and relieve their grievances 
with positive pacifistic methods. Co-optation strategies were more commonly applied to 
intellectuals because of the ideological adaptations and the co-optation of the internet. 
Moreover, during nationalist and patriotic movements, such as anti-America or anti-Japan or 
anti-Taiwan/Tibet‘s independence protests, the government had cooperated with activists and 
organisations in order to guide the pace of the action and therefore achieve the government 
goal. However, the implication of repression attracted much attention as the authorities did 
not hesitate to repress the cross-regional, cross-group and large-scale Falun Gong spiritual 
movement as well as the underground house churches. Similarly, it could be observed that 
institutional and policy co-optation was also widely utilised and directed towards labourers 
and religious groups in general. The controlling measures such as censorship and repression 
applied to pro-democracy dissidents were also heavily conferred upon intellectuals. Though 
ranked as the least prioritised strategy, control of labourers still occurred when the contentions 
expanded to a larger scale or involved other groups, and more often at the local level when 
contestants appealed to the central state. Likewise, toleration for intellectual and religious 
groups could be largely observed. So are the C-T-C strategies really working? Are they 
coherent, effective and committed? Based on the conceptualisation of how different cases fit 
together with regards to the response of the authorities, such ranking of strategic emphases 
indicates the activity and capacity for the Party-state as well as its passivity and limits.  The 
authorities made great efforts to claim, win and maintain legitimacy, and at the same time, the 
Party-state might be just coping with conflicts, with its authority waning and weakening.  
 
Figure 3 The ranks of priority in Party-state strategies towards the contentions 
associated with the three groups. 
 
 Co-optation Toleration Control 
Labourers 2 1 3 
Intellectuals 1 3 2 
Religious groups 2 3 1 
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The activity and capacity of the Party-state was demonstrated by the public identification of 
the necessity of these strategies, marginalisation of dissident voices and a high degree of self-
censorship. The Party had been both adept and sophisticated at moulding its ideology to fit 
practical reality (Chang, 2001: 67) with great flexibility and adaptability. Many citizens felt 
the government had been more open, adaptive and positive in dealing with problems, and they 
still believed that it was necessary for the government to take action such as suppression, as 
shown in both the 1989 and Falun Gong movement, as became clear in the interviews. 
Ideological configuration and dissemination exemplified the Party-state capability in 
controlling the propaganda machine as well as mass media. For example, the earlier stage of 
the anti-Falun Gong movement featured a rapidly expanding to nationwide anti-cult and anti-
superstition movement, and this was a great success. The atmosphere created by the intensive 
anti-Falun Gong propaganda and education saw nationalistic responses and support by the 
majority of the general public, particularly by the youth. The pro-democracy and anti-CPC 
sentiments were marginalised from the general public as they were contrary to nationalism 
and social stability. There was a popular belief that only a strong, centralised authority could 
provide the required socio-political tranquility (Chen, 2004: 106). 
 
As a result of the regime‘s historical practices of identifying and enforcing norms of social 
conformity by denigrating and attacking nonconformists, the present government promised 
tolerance for the compliant and wielded repression for the resistant (Potter, 2003). It could be 
seen that the leadership has always resisted any reform that would undercut Party authority 
and is always on guard against any erosion of its power and ideology. These were certain 
premises and boundaries that could not be compromised by the Party-state, and this is why 
China has always fought hard against cultists, activists, splittists and all other dissidents with 
little tolerance for deviated voices. As a result, self-censorship had been reinforced among the 
public both mentally and physically, and in a sense the Chinese Communist leadership was 
holding a diverse China together, having contentions largely under control, and maintaining 
an orderly and stable society. 
 
On the other hand, the passivity and limits of the Party-state could also be understood with 
regard to the ongoing resistance, popular cynicism and the great incoherence and 
ineffectiveness of the official responses themselves. This was a circle that could turn vicious: 
what the authorities said and did to respond to various contentions had a direct effect on the 
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population‘s conceptualisation and subsequent reaction. The deepening modern 
communication had also facilitated state-society-individual interactions. The ‗harmonious 
society‘ sentiments had given rise to ironic criticisms of the government for the continuously 
disharmonious social problems and its inability to manage conflicts. The ‗scientific 
development outlook‘ was another co-optation strategy that put people first to improve their 
well-being in terms of pension, education, healthcare and housing and to guarantee social 
equality and justice. However, the effectiveness of these policies depended on a normative 
consensus around both the content of policy and law and the processes of enforcement 
(Scharpf, 2000), which had often not met people‘s expectations. Some interviewees presented 
a negative evaluation of the official responses by implying that the state was good at paying 
lip service
162
 or that repression was too harsh
163
. Though the dissent voices had been 
marginalised by the official controlling strategies, at the same time they were driven 
underground or outside of China, and were even becoming the seeds for mobilisation into new 
secret societies or the basis for miscommunications between China and international society. 
Unsurprisingly, popular protests and contentious activities still rise frequently despite tight 
control by the Party-state.  
 
Such increased public cynicism, quiet resistance or public defiance appeared to be 
unpreventable (Perry and Selden, 2003: 1-19). This had been further reinforced by the 
perceived official incoherence and ineffectiveness when implementing those strategies. The 
central-local inconstancy was remarkable when the central authorities and activists found 
themselves to be partners in the same struggle against local government, such as in unpaid 
wages and anti-corruption contentions and when the local state was functioning as a buffer 
with regards to central decisions and strategies. As for the complaint and petition system, only 
a small percentage of those who filed grievances this way ever had their problems resolved 
(Weston, 2007: 74). Petitioners travelled to Beijing in large numbers with the belief that 
central government officials would be more responsive than the local ones, while Beijing, 
unable to cope with the increasing flood, made various efforts to force local officials to take 
greater responsibility. Additionally, during the official pacification or controlling actions 
applied to different contentions, law often gave way to administrative power, while the 
dysfunction of bureaucracies was unavoidable without rules of law and democratic 
supervision. This was why the local labour department or government sometimes failed in 
                                                        
162 Interviewee number 33. 
163 Interviewee number 107, 108 and 110. 
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efficient arbitration and the court judgments were badly implemented. However, on the 
contrary, making trouble could raise attention and seeking a higher authority could sometimes 
lead to a satisfactory outcome. Such a circle of practice weakened the strength of law in 
comparison to powerful administrative intervention and enlarged the space by ‗rule of man‘ at 
the legislative, regulative and institutional levels. Interviewees further claimed that there were 
new local allies such as cadres with non-state entrepreneurs and police with gang leaders 
forming united fronts against the centre‘s commands and being autocratic over ordinary 
people.
164
 Because of the divergence of the local groups‘ vested interests from the central 
government, economic protectionism could be expanded to criminal protectionism. 
  
The Party-state was contradicting in itself. It was problematic to co-opt all social groups for 
the interest of the ruling party and for the purpose of ruling. It was also paradoxical to 
maintain political control while preserving an image of tolerance. The aim of contention 
management had been strategised for maintaining a restrictive political environment that kept 
social movements at a low profile and non-confrontational status and avoided small cases 
turning into riots. The authorities also tried to achieve this goal through self-imposed 
censorship and a set of moulding and responsive methods. Though the strategies were 
sometimes deemed as necessary and justified by the public, the process of local 
implementation and practice of power towards varied contentions was in itself questionable; 
cases of abuse were frequent. The relationship between the state and society contained 
missing links and a lack of mutual understanding or reflection. This was why the co-optation 
– toleration – control strategies did not work very well to channel the storms of popular 
grievance, nor did they work consistently to coordinate conflicting interests among different 
hierarchies of governance. An old Chinese proverb says, ‗to lose is sometimes to gain‘: 
Chinese authorities should learn how to wisely lose control to the society, give up power to 
the people, build up mutual negotiation and dialogue and explore mechanisms to provide 
more social space for these interactions to take place, not passively but actively, after which 
can they gain genuine authority, legitimacy, popular support and social stability. However, 
China has experienced the converse situation: to gain (the control) was sometimes to lose, as 
the authorities were good at moulding and controlling while bad at institutionalising and 
channelling. 
 
                                                        
164 Interviewee number 26, 35 and 89. 
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In conclusion, the political system has made significant adaptations by performing new 
functions and strengthening regulatory capacity to the challenges of an increasingly diverse 
society. Because of the interaction between the authorities and different contentious groups, 
the power structure has been changed to some extent, which has changed the political-
ideological environment and has urged the party to improve its leadership and governance. 
However, based on the examination of state response to the contentions of different groups at 
both central and local level, the co-optation – toleration – control strategies work neither 
coherently nor effectively. Adaptive moulding is the most significant feature of these 
strategies, which has short-term gains, but it cannot eradicate the roots of the problem or 
prevent grievances from becoming accumulated, organised and publicised into large-scale 
contention. Rules of law and democracy, to transform the existing legal and political system, 
are the only alternatives to solve and channel the unstoppable wave of contentions in the long 
term, leading to social justice, good governance with transparency and accountability and 
protection of freedom. 
 
Chapter 10 Conclusion  
 
10.1 Restatement of the topic 
 
This thesis began with an intellectual curiosity and enquiry into the question of how China‘s 
rapid modernisation might be connected with its potential democratisation. There are 
unsolved puzzles as to why development did not promote democracy in China, whether China 
can sustain its rapid economic progress without democratisation, and whether the liberal 
democratic model of government suits China‘s political reality at all. However, there is 
academic consensus that China‘s political transformation is moving forward and showing 
dynamic progress rather than being simply static and frozen. The question of how this 
dynamic political change should be conceived and where it will lead to, if not towards the 
Western model of liberal democracy, has inspired a wide range of discussion and arguments, 
such as on incremental democracy, constitutional democracy and deliberative democracy in 
China. By adopting the universal values of liberal democracy and the contextualised 
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characteristics of Chinese versions, this research has tried to develop a new conceptual 
framework with both theoretical adaptability and practical feasibility to explain and predict 
how China‘s modernisation can generate democracy. The connection key word is contention.  
 
As various types of contentious activities are emerging, growing and expanding quickly all 
over China, this contentious politics signifies new, unconventional, different and oppositional 
expressions and activism. With growing consciousness, people have strived for their rights 
and interests and truly challenged the Party-state to different extents. Contentious politics has 
direct connection with modernisation. The three-decade economic reforms and marketisation 
initiated by the Communist Party-state has decentralised the economic and political power, 
diversified social roles and classes, granted more civic freedom to the populace and increased 
public access to information, especially through the new medium of the internet. As a result, 
the modernisation process has facilitated the growth of civil society and the mobilisation of 
public contentions. On the other hand, a diversity of political, economic and social-cultural 
problems have been engendered and intensified by the uneven transitional process of 
modernisation. The incrementally severe inequality and injustice can turn into threats to 
people‘s lives and rights and easily trigger people‘s perceptions of grievance. Contentions 
then take place in reaction to problems, which will palpably lead to social unrest and demand 
proper official responses. This research has further explored the connection between 
contention and democratisation.  I regard contention as a presentation and amplifier of 
people‘s power, and a congregation of social forces to transform individual-society-state 
relationships, and in perspective it is directing China towards a robust civil society, a more 
representative government and a democratic transformation of the political system. I‘ve 
chosen three contentious groups – labourers, intellectuals and religious groups – and their 
interplay with the Party-state as case studies, and I present comprehensive discussions at 
macro, meso and micro level to capture the dynamics of a transforming individual-society-
state relationship and the dynamics that are moving Chinese society from contention to 
democratisation.   
 
Therefore, this research examines the prospects for China‘s democratisation during the 
process of modernisation through the investigation of China‘s contentious politics pursued by 
different groups and responded to by the Party-state at all levels. Chapters 2 and 3 
respectively provide the theoretical and methodological infrastructures for the research. Two 
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main theoretical frameworks are employed for the research: first, the macro, meso and micro 
level as a form of mechanism (macro opportunity structure, meso mobilising structure and 
micro strategic structure) are formulated to contour a comprehensive picture of the 
contentious politics. Second, the power transition among three spheres – Party-state, civil 
society and private sphere - happening in contentious politics is the key to understanding and 
measuring the process of democratisation in China. An analytical model is then provided in 
Figure 1 to show the interaction of these two axes. Axis 1 is to indicate the practical settings, 
resources and mobilisations within contentious politics. Axis 2 is to explore implications for 
democratisation through restructuring individual-society-state relationships within contentious 
politics. Both axes intertwine with each other and show a two-way flow: the contentious 
movement and democratic transition are both from top-down and from bottom-up. As for the 
civil society and contentious mobilisation at the meso level, this indicates the dynamics of 
society-state relations in terms of interference from the state, and individual-society relations 
in terms of the penetration from the private sphere. For the contentious groups, activities and 
Party-state responses at the micro level, it focuses on the individual‘s challenge to the state 
and the state‘s responses to society at both central and local levels. The individual-society-
state relationship defines contentious participants, mobilisation and consequences and is in 
turn being reshaped by the contentious politics. Meanwhile, this relationship is under 
transformation as embedded in the process of modernisation and transformed towards a 
better-balanced power relationship that will contribute to democratisation at the macro level. 
 
For the methodological conduct of the research, an integration of new institutionalism and 
rational choice was refined as the research paradigm that combined methodological 
collectivism and individualism for a better comprehension of the interaction between the 
institutions and challengers in China‘s contentious politics. Based on the epistemological 
paradigms, methodological principles of positivism and hermeneutics/constructionism are 
applied to deliver both inductive and context-specific reasoning, to build up both an objective 
empirical foundation and a subjective interpretative tower. Such a methodological pluralism 
leads to a practical research design containing both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
The main instruments adopted for data collection are interviewing, documentation and 
internet content analysis. With emphasis on the similarity of contentious activities, the semi-
structured interviewing was conducted on the following sample groups with the total number 
of 120 participants: urban workers (including laid-off workers and white-collar workers) and 
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migrant workers from labourers; university/institute students and scholars, writers, journalists, 
lawyers and dissidents from intellectuals; Falun Gong practitioners, both official and 
underground Christian/Catholic church members and a few Buddhist monks from religious 
groups; a small amount of entrepreneurs and cadres. The fieldwork was carried out in two 
cities in China – Beijing and Wuhan - as well as using ten email interviews used to question 
overseas dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners in summer 2006. The questions have 
covered: 1) interviewees‘ opinions on conditions, changes and problems in a variety of 
subjects in political, economic and social-cultural themes; 2) the interviewees‘ personal 
autobiography, self-identity, interaction with both formal groups and informal networks and 
the personal/organisational relationship with the state; 3) interviewees‘ (possibility of) 
participation, forms and strategies for contentions, attitudes and evaluations towards both the 
contentious activities and Party-state responses. The first-hand data from qualitative 
interviews has provided the research with richer material and valuable quotations to enliven 
the findings and make the results more interesting. This information obtained by interviews is 
also well supplemented by evidence from documentation, tested and reinforced by discourse 
analysis of the data. 
 
10.2 Evaluating hypotheses and questions 
 
There is a normative and ethical presumption on human society that contentious politics as a 
whole promotes representative government with accountability and transparency and 
maturates a civil society based on law, being both the substance of democracy and also a good 
way for people to govern themselves. Based on this presumption and on China‘s specific 
conditions, I‘ve developed 3 hypotheses to investigate 6 research questions. 
 
H1: Contentious politics is modernisation-driven. 
Q1: What are the social changes, along with social problems, that are emerging and 
intensifying in China‘s modernisation process? 
Q2: How are the changes and problems of China‘s modernisation process transformed into the 
drivers behind contentious actions? 
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This hypothesis has been vindicated by Chapter 4. The theoretical basis behind H1 is the 
political opportunity structure operating at the macro level that accounts for the emergence of 
social-political contentions. Practically, I tried to find out how individuals and groups 
themselves perceive, measure and evaluate the opportunities and threats as realistic 
motivations for contentious activities through semi-structured interviews. For Q1, this chapter 
first examined a list of indicators from political, economic and social-cultural dimensions and 
provided a contour map of China‘s realities and problems. Over half of the respondents 
regarded the following issues as most problematic: ‗Corruption‘, ‗Rule of law‘, ‗Power-
money exchange‘, ‗Poor-rich gap‘, ‗Fake goods & poor quality‘, ‗The problems of 
agriculture‘, ‗Environment & resources‘, ‗Reform of SOEs‘, ‗Social ethics & morality‘ and 
‗Drugs, gambling & pornography‘. Notably economic problems accounted for the majority of 
the public dissatisfactions while injustice and inequality received the most grievances.  
  
For Q2, it is believed that the cultural implications of the social change, media interpretation 
and personal experiences are the keys to evaluating and attributing the opportunities and 
threats, so it is necessary to explore the popular trends of social perception and mentality in 
response to the changing social realities and problems. There is strong nationalism of different 
stands in response to China‘s modernisation and globalisation. There is a common perception 
that the ruling classes who are more responsible historically for the old institutions have 
gained most of the reform benefits through privileged status and unchecked power and 
corruption, while labourers have been burdened with the cost of the reform and benefited 
much less from it. There is towering rage towards the depth and width of corruption in China, 
which has threatened economic prosperity and political authority. However, there is growing 
awareness that the party‘s inability to control corruption, because of the weak law 
enforcement and the central-local complexity, further undermines its legitimacy. There is 
prevailing recognition of the profit-driven cultures derived from the poorly-regulated market 
economy and reform-opening up fever and of the accompanying moral decay, ideological 
collapse and faith vacuum. There are also worrying concerns about social safety and security 
and deep grievances towards the governmental failure to establish a complete security system.  
 
While people are expressing more concerns on the side effects and problems of reforms, there 
emerge strong requests for nation-state reestablishment, on social equity and welfare, on 
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morality reconstruction and on economic sustainability with an emphasis on environmental 
issues. These requests have constituted the popular response and attribution to the social 
realities and problems at the macro level, which set up a social ethos background for the 
emergence of social and political contentions. The international environment, domestic 
political system and Party-state capacity are all interrelated to frame the landscape of 
contentions. The mass media and the internet have also empowered people to challenge the 
Party monism and other sources of authority and made opportunities and threats perceivable 
and transferable to challengers.  
 
Therefore, the modernisation process, especially the economic liberalisation in China, has 
multifaceted political, social and cultural implications. The achievements and transformations 
during modernisation and the problems of the unevenly-developed society should provide 
opportunities and triggers for an expanding arena of expression, participation, mobilisation 
and contention. In practice, while the problems have overshadowed the progress in most 
aspects in public opinion, they form a more radical drive for contentions and a hopeful 
demand for change through the popular perception of opportunities that are transferred from 
threats. It is true that the current of contention is modernisation-driven. 
 
H2: Civil society is both the origin and destination of contentious politics. 
Q3: How does civil society develop with Chinese characteristics? 
Q4: How is civil society related to contentious politics? 
 
Chapter 5 as well as the empirical Chapters 6 to 8 sought to justify, in the Chinese context, the 
theories that civil society is the organisational basis and origin for contentions and that in the 
long term contentious mobilisation will increase individual rights awareness, being bound by 
civil virtues and directed by the rule of law, all of which will aid the advance into a robust 
civil society.  
 
For Q3, data collected through the interviews about people‘s membership and participation in 
civil society organisations (CSOs) in China was analysed with the support of related literature, 
statistics, reports and cases. The flourishing of civil society in China has been primarily and 
obviously presented by the proliferation of civil society organisations. However, the divisions 
within the civil society are deepening with reference to social classes and groups, regional 
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differentiation, age groups, ethnicity and religion, and possibly leading in turn to stratification, 
confliction and exclusion within social contentions. The inter-penetration of the private and 
state spheres is also remarkable. On one hand, organisational and institutional resources are 
still not evident or significant to most Chinese people as they continue to depend on the wide-
ranging informal networks (guanxi), which provide necessary social capital, resources and 
relations. These guanxi, with their penetrative effects, have been the most evidently Chinese 
characteristics of its civil society. On the other hand, the Party-state would like to continually 
form a civil society under its control by establishing government sponsored organisations and 
taking various approaches to restrain other interest groups, non-governmental organisations or 
religious associations. Such governmental co-optation and interference, especially on 
registration and management of CSOs, and CSOs‘ close relations with the government for 
development have been further palpable Chinese characteristics. Meanwhile, the new medium 
of the internet has enlarged and strengthened the Chinese public sphere by providing the 
social arenas for individuals and groups to critically discuss public affairs of common concern. 
This online public sphere also helps mobilise resources for both online and offline contentious 
activities. The characteristics of Chinese civil society can be defined as the alliance of 
different networks and social forces, the cooperation with the government and the use of 
modern information techniques. Chinese civil society is special, which adds a special 
condition to Hypothesis 2. 
 
As for Q4, as most contentious activities take place spontaneously, the organisational factors 
and resources for collective activities are always and inevitably intertwined with the informal 
and non-institutional ones, with the online networks and fluid factors. Therefore, it is not easy 
for civil society to conduct its representational function to pre-manifest the mobilisation of 
social interests towards political participation in a law-based manner within the complexities 
of state-society-individual relations (Kerr, 2009). From the interview results, the linkage 
between contentions and formal organisations is relatively weak. This fact to a certain degree 
also reflects the absence and inadequacy of particular organisations or structures, especially 
formal ones that purport to speak for the contentions and who constantly clarify group goals, 
organise and mobilise resources and dictate the course, content and the outcome of struggles. 
For example, the waves of the most frequent labour disputes and other observable contentions 
show a large degree of spontaneity rather than being pre-meditated, and this exposes the 
weaknesses and difficulties of an immature civil society. Even when the contentious groups 
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are formed within the civil society sphere, they often lack resources such as money, power 
and influence with other prominent institutions to make successful use of proper contesting 
channels. As a result they may have little choice but to pursue their ability to disrupt public 
order as a ‗negative inducement to protesting and bargaining‘ (McAdam et al, 1996: 14-5), in 
ways that are easily de-legitimised and repressed by the state under the guise of prioritising 
stability. Contentions rather reflect the fragmentation and divisions of civil society 
organisations, the penetration of the private sphere and the interference of the state sphere.  
 
On the other hand, though pre-existing CSOs and related resources are largely inadequate, 
there is still sufficient space and opportunity for in situ or online social appropriation within 
the special Chinese characterised networking and power context. Contention is not only about 
group mobilisation and articulation, but also about how the political context or space shapes 
these processes and channels them and the consequences for how the power is balanced, 
negotiated and transferred among different social and political forces. This as a whole must 
nurture the bases for a vigorous civil society, delicately surmounting its cleavages and 
adjusting the state-society-individual relationship. Even if there are no particular organisations 
or structures for social and political contentions, politics is also taking place spontaneously 
with social appropriation. There are still authentic organisational dynamics in the later stages 
of collective actions, and these produce more political opportunities and framing processes 
than during the emergent phases (McAdam et al, 1996: 15). This provides a mode by which 
the first unorganised contentions can be moved into several possible processes, including 
being repressed by the government into silence, or being tolerated, ignored or repressed and 
then advancing together to form some formal or information structure to plan for the next 
contention, or being guided or channelled by the government and then joining the 
governmental or semi-governmental association to further protect certain rights. The civil 
society organisations can construct communications, interactions and associational 
relationships within the socially contentious mobilisation in this way. From the social 
contentions of different groups it can be observed that the functions and roles of civil society 
have been diversified and through a variety of components; their political consciousness has 
been enhanced, making civil society itself increasingly vibrant. In general, when a vibrant 
civil society together with its associational proliferation and civic merits has become a social 
reality in China, this has begun to transform the political culture and power structure, though 
still with Chinese characteristics of interference by arbitrary state power and fragmentation by 
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egoism or cleavages. Moreover, the transformation of the media and the development of 
cyberspace to a great extent enlarge the public sphere, and thus influence the political culture 
and power structure by providing the public with information to qualify for democratic 
participation, supporting the development of both the social contentions and civil society 
during the process of mobilisation and inter-related frameworks. So Chinese civil society is 
still vigorously presented in the popular contentious waves and it obtains fresh and powerful 
sources and energies from the self-consciousness, mobilisation and contentions of different 
social groups.  
 
If the Chinese characteristics of civil society are applied, H2 can be partially verified. The 
growing participation in CSOs, the publicisation of Guanxi and the mobilisation of internet 
resources all contribute to a hybrid contentious politics in China. And this contentious politics 
directs to a further evolution of civil awareness, strength of people and a more 
institutionalised civil society. As power is further balanced, negotiated and transferred among 
different social and political forces, there will be greater demand for organisational resources, 
autonomy and rule of law to inspire a promising future for the civil society. However, 
organisation and association should still be the cornerstone and dominant factor for civil 
society. At the moment, the immaturity and fragmentation of civil society in this sense, 
featuring inter-penetration of the private and state spheres, has indeed made the relationship 
between civil society and contentions a fluctuating one in China.  
 
 
H3: Contentious politics will lead to representative governance and 
democracy. 
Q5 What are the features and trends of contentions of different social groups? 
Q6 How does the Party-state respond to different contentions and how can we evaluate such 
state-society-individual interactions? 
 
Chapters 6 to 9 have tried to justify this core hypothesis of the thesis with a large collection of 
empirical evidence as well as document support. This has provided insightful deductive 
arguments to verify H3, identifying the prospects of contentious politics to a pro-democracy 
course in China after reviewing and sifting the vast scope of contentious activities and 
evaluating their interplay with the Party-state. Based on the grand theoretical model as shown 
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in Figure 1, I‘ve conducted a two-way flow of discussion via the two research questions. For 
Q5, the direction of analysis is from the macro opportunity structure and meso-level 
mobilisation to record the micro framing of contentions. It‘s about how individual and 
collective grievances actually turn into contentious activities, and how different groups 
mobilise resources, frame contentious strategies and discourse and activate cultural and 
emotional processes. The subjects targeted in this research are three social groups – 
intellectuals, labourers and religious group – who were selected based on their unique 
attributes and positions in the changing society, their tendency to express their grievance, their 
associational bases, their frequency of taking actions and their influences.  
 
Based on the data from fieldwork and documentation,  the obvious causes and triggers of the 
grievances and contentious activities of peasants are land requisition, power abuse by local 
cadres, conflicts around grassroots elections and self-governance, lack of social security and 
environmental problems; for migrant workers the main issues are unpaid wages and 
compensation, problems with temporary residence permits, difficulties in children‘s education 
and conflicts with city residents; for laid-off workers concerns are also unpaid wages and 
other welfare funds, unregulated privatisation of SOEs, corrupt managers and officials, house 
eviction and arbitrary urban administration. As a whole group, labourers can be characterised 
as both scattering and gathering, which greatly affects their contentious status and strategy. 
The loose organisational base or even a lack in organisational resources determines that the 
cost of establishing a formal leadership, collective strategy and consensus is relatively high 
amongst the dispersed labourers who are more concerned about their individual rights. 
Weiquan (rights-defending) organisations among migrant workers, peasants and laid-off 
workers are prevailing, and some involve people of other social status and classes. The 
catalyst for the emergence and growth of such popular organisations is the increase in interest 
and weiquan consciousness of labourers. In the contemporary context, familiarity with the 
laws and policies is becoming increasingly important. However, using the weapons of the law 
often means seeking administrative intervention rather than appealing through the courts. 
Petitions to the higher administrative level (shangfang) also require the framing of the art of 
contentions including timing, place, opportunity, number of petitioners and presentations, in 
order to both raise the higher authority‘s attention and save face for it. Generally there is still a 
high threshold for labourers to defend their rights through channels provided by the 
authorities, which means the normal use of administrative or legal resorts by individuals is 
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highly costly and inefficient.  
 
Though the interview results have shown that labourers are most cautious in taking 
contentions on their own, they are more willing and courageous when organised and led by 
activist leaders in taking collective measures. They are increasingly resorting to other groups 
and resources for resolution, representation and help, such as the local people‘s congress 
representatives, good governors (qingguan), lawyers, journalists, professors and even 
foreigners. Sometimes these groups outside labour circles are third parties in the contentious 
episodes and at other times they are fully engaged, taking the leading role in the beginning or 
in the middle of the contentions for mobilisation and strategic framing. The majority of 
labourers‘ contentions are still traditional and spontaneous, focusing on economic issues, 
targeting particular enterprises and suffering from the disadvantaged status in lack of modern 
organisational resources and negotiation techniques. Such localised and small-scale 
contentions are basically insufficient to wield overt political threats towards the authorities, 
nor are they enough to exert much pressure for the government officials to act and implement 
complete justice for them. 
 
When it comes to the contentions of the intellectual group, we see that these sub-groups of 
scholars, students, lawyers, journalists and dissidents have largely shared in and contributed to 
the new social tendency of internet contentions, and in different forms – in social-political, 
nationalist or pro-democratic movements. As shown in a number of cases studied in Chapter 7, 
the internet can facilitate the formation of public opinion, the orchestration of popular 
political movements and the production of a trans-boundary public sphere. The virtual identity 
of netizens and the real identities of intellectuals have combined by means of disseminating 
information, organising online petitions and offline protests, and in turn extracting varying 
degrees of responsiveness and accountability from the authorities and affecting government 
decision making on important social, political, economic and diplomatic issues (Tai, 2006). 
The phenomenon of ‗experts turning to the internet‘ is also more and more common. 
Intellectuals have begun to rethink their own academic and professional endeavours and 
reassess the aims and obligations of their critical engagement for social-political change under 
new circumstances. Celebrities from elite intellectuals and popular intellectuals have both 
their space and influence on the internet and the internet has blurred such different variations. 
The internet in fact has created more connections, communication and cooperation between 
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the local political elite and intellectuals. Different online behaviours such as the utilisation of 
the human flesh search engine are under constant scrutiny in the light to echo the merits of a 
free public sphere for civil society in promotion of democracy, sense of responsibility, bonds 
of trust, self-reflection, justice and other public virtues. 
 
The intellectual religious contentions have presented the changing nature of the relationship 
between religious beliefs, intellectual and popular consciousness and CPC problems of 
governance. As for the multi-directions of the Chinese Christian movement, the intellectuals‘ 
role of enlightenment has overlapped with their Christian identity when they have strived for 
democracy, for religious freedom and human rights and for the meaning of life and ultimate 
concern. The religious groups such as Falun Gong claim that they have no political ambitions, 
but their movement can impact the political discourse and contribute to the political transition 
in China as well, as indicated in the history of their contention with all kinds of innovative 
strategies. Public responses both inside and outside China towards the Falun Gong movement 
and governmental suppression are still very diverse. It is obvious that Falun Gong‘s views and 
arguments are absent and easily repressed by the powerful state propaganda, policy and police 
machinery from the beginning of the crackdown.  
 
In summary, the contentious activities of different groups vary from each other to a great 
extent. At the same time, they have all formed a set of critical and constructive 
conceptualisations of their own, as well as their contentious strategies, repertoires and 
innovations of actions to influence the authority, the media, public discourse and social 
culture. In addition, there is a growing tendency for the inter-group interaction and 
collaborations in contentious politics, which has also delicately surmounted the cleavages of 
civil society. Indeed, people‘s contentious activities in China have led to political changes; to 
answer the question whether it is leading to representative governance and democracy still 
needs to take into account the Party-state responses to contentions. 
 
As for Q6, a disintegration of Party-state responses to each group‘s contentions shows that the 
flow of analysis goes from contentious politics to restructuring individual-society-state 
relationships, from the contentious activities taking place at the grassroots level to a 
generalisation of their implications for the macro transformation of the government and the 
political system. Chinese authorities have placed different levels of emphasis in terms of the 
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main three strategies – co-optation, toleration and control – with respect to each group. Based 
on the conceptualisation of how different cases fit together with regards to the response of the 
authorities, such ranking of strategic emphases indicates the activity and capacity of the Party-
state as well as its passivity and limits.  
 
The activity and capacity of the Party-state is demonstrated by its flexibility and adaptability, 
and its strength of control. The authorities have been both adept and sophisticated at moulding 
ideology and policies to fit practical reality. Meanwhile, there are certain premises and 
boundaries that cannot be compromised by the Party-state, As a result, dissident voices have 
been marginalised; self-censorship has been established within the public both mentally and 
physically, and in a sense the Chinese Communist leadership is holding a diverse China 
together, having contentions largely under control and maintaining an orderly and stable 
society. 
 
On the other hand, the passivity and limits of the Party-state can also be understood with 
regard to the facts of ongoing resistance, popular cynicism and the great incoherence and 
ineffectiveness of the official responses themselves. The ‗harmonious society‘ sentiments 
have given rise to ironic criticisms of the government for the continuous disharmonious social 
problems and its inability to manage conflicts. The implementation of pro-people policies, in 
terms of pension, education, healthcare and housing and to guarantee social equality and 
justice, has often failed to meet people‘s expectations. As for the complaint and petition 
system, only a small percentage of those who file grievances this way ever have their 
problems resolved. Additionally, during the official pacification or controlling actions applied 
to different contentions, law often gives way to administrative power while the dysfunction of 
bureaucracies is unavoidable without rule of law and democratic supervision. Though the 
dissenting voices have been marginalised due to the official controlling strategies, at the same 
time they are driven underground or outside of China, and are even becoming the seeds for 
mobilisation into new secret societies or the basis for miscommunications between Chinese 
and international society.  
 
The central-local inconstancy is remarkable. The central authorities and activists often find 
themselves to be partners in the same struggle against local government. Petitioners travel to 
Beijing in large numbers with the belief that central government officials will be more 
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responsive than the local ones, while Beijing, unable to cope with the increasing flood, is 
making various efforts to force local officials to take greater responsibility. When it came to 
carrying out the policies or commands from the central authorities, the local governments in 
fact have created their own space to bargain, considered to be more concerned with regional 
interests and profits, and some even overtly agree but are covertly opposed to the central 
instruction. The responses were also different from place to place depending on the regional 
development of economy, politics and society. 
 
Characterised by publicity, openness, interactivity, diversity, and instantaneity, network media 
have changed the logic of the public agenda setting (Wang, 2008). There is evidence to 
suggest the authorities as a whole have become more open, receptive and responsive. 
Netizens‘ collective civic wisdom is increasingly taken into account by the authorities, as the 
status and impact of netizens has become more and more significant and powerful in Chinese 
social life along with the popularity and development of the internet. Ordinary people may not 
be highly educated, but if they can have all the information and conduct a full discussion, 
their collective judgment is likely to be better than that of the government alone, and their 
decisions will be in the best interests of the majority of the people. As public opinions on the 
internet are formed, disseminated, selected and explored through online bulletin boards, 
forums, chat rooms, postings and blogs on numerous Chinese websites, the highest level of 
central government has its own team and websters to collect information, opinions and 
suggestions online. Internet polls, surveys and responses on bulletin boards are also gradually 
having a real influence. Slowly maturing public opinions have promoted the willingness of 
the Chinese government to take action on many occasions to address issues of concern to 
Chinese netizens (Tai, 2006: xiii).  
  
The Party-state is contradicting in itself. It is problematic to co-opt all social groups for the 
interests of the ruling party and for the purpose of ruling. It is also paradoxical to make efforts 
to maintain political control while preserving an image of tolerance. The authorities try to 
achieve contentions management through self-imposed censorship and a set of moulding and 
combining responsive strategies. The process of local implementation and practice of power 
towards varied contentions is also questionable; cases of abuse are frequent. The relationship 
between the state and society contains missing links and a lack of mutual understanding and 
reflection. This is why the co-optation – toleration – control strategies don‘t work very well to 
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channel the storms of popular grievance, nor do they work consistently to coordinate 
conflicting interests among different hierarchies of governance.  
 
In conclusion, the political system has made significant adaptations by performing new 
functions and strengthening regulatory capacity to the challenges of an increasingly diverse 
society. Because of the interaction between the authorities and different contentious groups, 
the power structure has been changed to some extent, which has changed the political-
ideological environment and has urged the Party-state to improve governance and to be more 
representative. However, based on the examination of state responses to the contentions of 
different groups at both central and local levels, the co-optation – toleration – control 
strategies work neither coherently nor effectively. Adaptive moulding is the most significant 
feature of these strategies, which has short-term gains, but it cannot eradicate the roots of the 
problem or prevent grievances from becoming accumulated, organised and publicised into 
large-scaled contention. The mounting contentions and challenges have shown that rule of law 
and democracy, as a way to transform the existing legal and political system, are the only 
alternatives to resolve and channel the unstoppable wave of contentions in the long term, 
leading to social justice, good governance with transparency and accountability and protection 
of freedom.  
 
Contention can render the authorities more representative, make them recognise and 
communicate with the civil society and it can limit the private corruption and penetration, in a 
movement towards a sincere regime of people‘s democracy. However, it can also reflect the 
fragmentation of both civil society and the authorities, and a deviated individual-society-state 
relationship by the penetration of private informal networks or strong state dominance, as 
shown by the interview results. Without an institutionalised fulfilment of the rule of law, 
social relations and mass media, and in particular the internet, have played more important 
roles in contentious politics. However, the hypothesis that contentious politics will lead to a 
robust civil society and a representative government, and finally democracy, cannot be fully 
verified considering the complexity of Chinese characteristics and the fact that society is still 
weak in China. Arguably the power and wisdom of the public should be further explored and 
their potential to challenge the authorities turned into positive strength to establish a better 
political and governing system. Meanwhile, the Party-state should realise that, with the basic 
single-Party authoritarianism remaining intact, maintained and even strengthened, the 
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problems of modernisation cannot be fully solved by the positive actions that it has already 
taken or the pro-democracy changes that it has made; serious political institutional reform 
should be stepped forward. Only by the combination of both bottom-up and top-down efforts 
will contentions be firmly and positively linked to democratisation in China. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Introduction Letter for Interview 
This letter is to introduce Ying Yu, who is a 2
nd
 year PhD student in Politics at Durham 
University, UK and who is working as a fieldwork interviewer for the research project 
Assessment of China’s Realities, Problems, Contentious Activities and Party-State Responses. 
I, David Kerr, am her PhD supervisor. 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. The interview will take up to 40 minutes. 
The interviewer will ask you questions about your opinions and experiences on China‘s 
realities and problems. In particular, we are interested in your attitudes towards the current 
waves of contentions and your evaluation on the Party-state reactions. There are no right or 
wrong answers – we would like to hear whatever you have to say. If you feel uncomfortable 
about any of the questions and you don‘t want to answer them, please just let the interviewer 
know and she will move on to the next question. 
The interviewer will ask to record the interview and also take some notes during it. This is to 
help us learn as much as possible from what you have to say. 
Any information that you tell us will be treated with the strictest confidentiality and 
anonymity. This means that only the researcher will use the information. You don‘t have to 
give your full name and your contact details will not be shared with anyone else. In all the 
outcome reports, we will make sure that you cannot be identified. If you have any concerns 
during or after the interview, you have the right to withdraw from the research or ask for 
information you provided to not be used. 
You may contact me or Ying Yu (ying.yu@durham.ac.uk) at any time if you wish to talk about 
the research. Thanks again for your time and help. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
(Signature) 
Dr. David Kerr 
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School of Government and International Affairs 
University of Durham 
Durham DH1 3TU 
United Kingdom 
Email: david.kerr@durham.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)191 334 5665 
Fax: +44 (0)191 334 5661 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire (English version) 
Part 1 Demographic questions: 
1. Sex: M/F 
2. Age 
 20-30 
 31-40 
 41-50 
 51-60 
3. Place of birth 
 Beijing 
 Wuhan 
 Other cities in Hubei province 
 Provinces except Beijing and Hubei  
4. Current residence 
 Beijing 
 Wuhan 
 North America 
 Europe  
5. Educational level 
 Primary school 
 Junior high school 
 Senior high school 
 Vocational school 
 Diploma 
 Bachelor 
 Master 
 PhD 
6. Occupation 
7. Political affiliation 
 CPC member 
 Youth League member 
 Member of other parties 
 None 
8. Religious affiliation 
 Catholic/Christian  
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 Buddhist 
 Falun Gong 
 None/Atheist 
 
Part 2 The environment for contentious activities: 
9. (A) Are you interested in China‘s national and international situation? (Level 1-5) 
10. (A) In what ways do you obtain or exchange such information?  
 TV  
 Radio  
 Newspapers  
 Magazines  
 Community or street bulletin board 
 Internet – websites/forums/blogs 
 Family and friends  
 Neighbours  
 Workmates 
 Members from the same organisation  
11.  (B) a. The range of political subjects in China:  
International position & relations; Reunification with Taiwan; Minority ethnics and races; 
Democracy & human rights; Party & state leadership; Governments & bureaucracies; NPC & 
elections at all levels; Democratic parties & CPPCC; Policy making & implementation; Rule of 
law; Political rights & participation; Ideological & political education; Patriotism & nationalism; 
Political culture & bureaucratism; Corruption; Party factionalism; Political taboos 
b. The range of economical subjects in China: 
Comprehensive national strength; Market economy; Macro regulation & control; Open-up & 
international market; Reform of SOEs; Private & civil enterprises; Job market & the recruitment; 
Pension & welfare; The problems of agriculture; Financial & stock market; Real estate market; 
Environment & resources; Business competition & ethics; Poor-rich gap; Fake goods & poor 
quality; Power-money exchange; Economic crime 
c. The range of social-cultural subjects in China:  
Mass media; Official & civil organisations; Charities & endowments; Marriage & family; Human 
relations; Traditional & modern culture; Religions & beliefs; Social ethics & morality; Social 
ethos & public opinion; Entertainments; Problem of population; Migration & social mobility; 
Stratification of social status; Problem of education; Academic corruption; Juvenile delinquency; 
Drugs, gambling & pornography; Gangsterdom 
In what area do you think the greatest changes have taken place? Which aspects are you most 
concerned about? What do you think are the biggest problems? What are you most satisfied/dissatisfied 
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with? (C) What aspects relate most closely to your life? What aspects have greatest influence on your 
life either in good or negative way?  
12. (D) What most easily trigger people‘s and your grievances? Under what circumstances are people and 
you more likely to take contention?  
13. (E) Do you reckon yourself as a person caring about this country and its people? Do you have a sense 
of national pride and esteem (level 1-5)? Do you have a sense of social justice (level 1-5)? Will you 
have grievances when knowing anything unequal or unjust?  
14.  (E) What do you value most and pursue in your life (money, power, prestige, faith, ideals, morality, 
family, social justice, societal welfare, national prosperity, etc.)? Have you ever changed your values 
and beliefs (if yes, what are the influential factors – family, friends, celebrities, changing society, 
religion, media, the internet, etc.)? 
 
Part 3 State-society-individual relations:  
15. (F) What kinds of people make up of your networks? How are your relationships with others 
(frequency of contact)? How do you understand the function and influence of informal networks and 
relationships (guanxi) in your own life and in China?  
16. (G) What kinds of organisations do you belong to? What role do you play and what are the rights and 
responsibilities in such organisation(s)? 
 Farmer/fisherman group or cooperative 
 Other production group 
 Business association 
 Professional association  
 Academic and alumni association  
 All-China Federation of Trade Unions  
 All-China Women‘s Federation  
 Neighbourhood/village committee 
 Community service group 
 Township-based community group 
 Ethnic-based community group 
 Religious or spiritual group  
 Political group  
 Cultural group or association  
 Burial society or festival society 
 Finance, credit or saving group 
 Education group  
 Health and medicine group 
 Sports group 
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 Youth volunteer group 
 NGO or civic group  
 Other groups 
17. (G) There are differences in characteristics: age (generation), gender, place of birth, residence (and 
duration), dialects, ethnic background, education, occupation, income, social status, religious and 
political beliefs. To what extent do any such differences divide your organisations? 
18. (H) How deep is the relationship within your organisations and how is the leadership? Do you trust 
each other? Will you have financial linkage or support with other members? Did you ever take any 
collective actions within your organisations for any collective reasons? Did you participate in any 
collective actions organised by other organisations?  
19. (I) Do you think people have the right to form organisations freely? Have you ever heard or 
experienced the governmental interference in your organisation or in others? Did you feel or 
experience any (unpleasant) interference from the state power in any area of your own life? 
20. (J) Do you trust or support the central/local government and the Communist party? How did you show 
your support? When was the last time you got to vote? Do you have your own standard for voting? Did 
you have any contact with the governors or officials? Were they efficient in solving problems? 
 
Part 4 Contentious activities and the Party-state responses: 
21. (K) What are your personal life standards? What identity/status do you categorise yourself into? Are 
you satisfied with your status quo? What are you most worried about? Do you think you can make 
some changes to your family or the society by yourself? What occurrences are most likely to trigger 
your grievance? 
22. (L) What would you like to do (did you do) to release grievances over anything?  
 Give vent or resort to families and friends 
 Use the internet to sign petitions and express opinions  
 Sign petitions, give statements or speeches in public 
 Expose to the media  
 Resort to the judiciary or consult with solicitors 
 Appeal to the local or higher governmental department 
 Resort to the civil organisations 
 Establish interest group with other victims 
 Participate in collective strike, demonstration, parade, sit-in, etc. 
 Take extreme, violent or armed actions 
23. (M) People may take all the channels to express and release grievance. Do you think people have the 
right to take contentions? What are your attitudes and responses towards contentious activities of 
different groups? 
 Object stoutly  
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 Blame  
 Not agree or object 
 Be indifferent  
 According to the specific condition 
 Identify with 
 Understand  
 Sympathise 
 Support and help 
 Participate in 
24. (N) The government may have different responses towards different contentions. What kinds of 
responses have you been aware of? To what extent do you agree with what the government has said or 
done?  
 Establish specific department 
 Tolerate 
 Pacify 
 Cooperate 
 Provide financial support 
 Propagate in the main media 
 Resolve problems effectively 
 Delay in problem-resolving 
 Ignore  
 Criticise in the main media 
 Blank off information 
 Set on surveillance  
 Rummage  
 Threaten  
 Restrict 
 Prohibit  
 Imprison 
 Amerce 
 Put in labourer camp 
 Repress (with arms) 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire (Chinese version) 
中国当代社会现状及问题，社会抗争及政府应对措施评估 
知识分子，劳工及宗教人士访谈——提问指南 
 
第一部分：基本情况 
01． 性别 
02． 出生年份（请问您是几几年出生的？） 
03． 出生地 
04． 居住地（按时间顺序至今） 
05． 教育程度 
06． 职业（按时间顺序至今） 
07． 政治面貌（提供选项：共产党员［包括发展对象］，共青团员，其他党派，普通群众） 
08． 宗教信仰及倾向 
 
第二部分：社会现状及问题 
09． 您对中国国家大事及新闻感兴趣吗？（级别 1-5） 
10． 您会通过那些途径获取和交流有关信息（国内与国外有何不同，目前居住地和家乡有何不
同）？（提供相关选项：电视，广播，报纸，杂志，社区或街头宣传栏，网络新闻，和家人
朋友谈论，和工作单位同事或其他组织成员谈论，网上交流等） 
11． a. 中国政治的有关话题（制成卡片）：国际地位与国际关系，民主与人权，党和国家领导人，
政府机关及公务员，各级选举与人大，其他党派与政协，政策的制定与执行，依法治国（立
法，执法，守法），政治权利（强调自由言论，结社，示威，游行）与政治参与（居民委员
会，基层选举，权力监督），思想政治教育，爱国主义与民族主义，意识形态（马列主义毛泽
东思想邓小平理论江泽民‖三个代表‖胡锦涛‖和谐社会‖），官僚主义，公款消费，政治禁忌，
政治犯，劳改制度，贪污腐败，派系之争。 
b. 中国经济的有关话题（制成卡片）：综合国力，市场经济与宏观调控（市场规范，国家政
策），对外开放（投资与贸易，走私），国企改革（国有资产流失，下岗职工），民营企业（乡
镇企业），就业市场与人才需求，最低收入与社会保障（包括医疗），三农问题，金融市场，
证券市场，住房市场，环境与资源，贫富差距，假冒伪劣（商品，服务），公共基础设施，经
济伦理（游戏规则，致富手段），行业竞争（垄断行业，一窝蜂现象），钱权交易，经济犯罪
（偷税漏税，高科技犯罪）。 
c. 中国社会文化的有关话题（制成卡片）：大众传媒（政府宣传与口号，媒体自由，媒体腐
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败），人口问题（计划生育，老年化，民工潮，贫困人口，人口买卖），阶层地位（机会）差
距，教育问题（农村教育，应试教育，高等教育，大学扩招），学术腐败，婚姻家庭，青少年
犯罪，毒品赌博和色情行业，黑社会组织（官黑结合），政府组织与协会（妇联，工会等），
民间组织与协会，慈善捐助，人际关系，娱乐生活，社会风气，伦理道德素质，宗教信仰，
传统与现代文化。 
您对哪些方面最感兴趣，了解和感触最多（少），最（不）满意，和您的生活关系最（不）密
切？哪些方面问题最严重，争议最大，最易激起民愤甚至民众的抗争行为？ 
12． 您觉得自己是忧国忧民的人吗？您的民族自豪感和自尊心强吗？（民族意识）您的社会正义
感强吗？家人朋友怎样评价？ 
13． 您目前信奉和遵循怎样的价值观（您认为对您很有价值的，您在努力追寻的）？（金钱，权
力，信仰，理想，道德，社会公益与个人利益等）您的观念曾经发生过改变吗？影响因素有
哪些？（家人朋友，社会的变化，媒体，网络等） 
 
第三部分：组织团体及国家-社会-个人关系 
14． a. 您有参加过任何长期或临时的，正式的或非正式的组织（或协会）吗？该组织在社会中有
怎样的作用和功能？参与人数或会员有多少？您有担任任何组织和领袖工作吗？您在组织中
有何权利和义务？（提供选项，制成卡片：农, 林，渔业合作组织，其他行业生产组，商会，
职业性团体与协会［企业家，医生，教师，军人等］，学术性组织或校友会，工会，妇联，村
民/居民委员会，社区服务组织，地域性老乡会，少数民族组织，宗教性组织，政治性组织
［包括政党学习小组，时政讨论会，社会运动组织等］，文化艺术协会，婚葬节庆组织，理财
信用小组，教育性组织［家长会等］，健康医疗组织，体育运动组织，青年志愿组织，非政府
慈善福利组织，其他。） 
b. 您所在组织的成员中，他们在性别，年龄（代际），民族，籍贯，居住地及年限，语言，教
育程度，职业，收入，社会地位，宗教信仰，政党和政治倾向上差异大吗？（可制成卡片）
哪些分歧会导致组织内部的矛盾？有任何歧视的态度和行为吗？ 
c. 您有参加组织中的任何集体活动吗？您有经历过任何为了社区（或团体）利益或为了解决
社区（或团体）问题的群众自发的集体活动吗（包括共同向有关政府部门上访）？在集体活
动中人们的合作性强吗？ 
d. 您信赖组织中的领袖以及其他成员吗？如果您经济上有困难会向他们求助吗，相反的，您
会向他们提供经济援助吗？ 
15． 您信赖和支持中央和地方政府吗？（级别 1-5）两者您认为有很大区别吗？您会如何表示您的
支持？您认为政府办事效率如何？您最近一次选举或投票是什么时候？您有自己的选举和投
票标准吗？ 
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第四部分：社会抗争及政府应对措施 
16． 您对于自己和家人的生活，目前最担忧的事情有哪些？认为可以（单单）靠自己的努力改变
现状吗？ 
17． 当您有任何不满或遭遇任何困难时，您会怎么做？（向家人朋友发泄和求助，公开发表言论
［网上签名论坛聊天室部落格，公共场合发表演说，向媒体记者曝光或在报刊杂志发表文
章，是否匿名］，向司法部门和律师咨询求助，向当地或上级政府部门上访投诉，向有关的民
间组织求助，联合其他受害者建立共同的利益团体，支持和参与罢工示威游行静坐绝食等抗
议活动，采取极端的武装抗议。可制成卡片。） 
18． 您怎么看待八九民运（官方的说法），反美反日，法轮功，罢工，上访以及各种群体事件？您
觉得目前人民的抗争行为形势如何？ 
19． 对于您本阶层的抗争行为，您认为原因有哪些，对象有哪些，采取的形式有哪些？一般结果
如何？有何社会影响？你的态度及相应的做法——坚决反对，指责，不赞同，漠不关心，视
情况而定，认可，理解，同情，援助，支持，参与（可制成卡片）。您在怎样的情况下有可能
参与？政府态度和应对措施——态度略，措施包括成立专门部门，舆论宣传，批判，信息封
锁，宽容，安抚，合作，支援，有效解决，拖延，不理会，监视，搜查，威胁，限制，监
禁，经济处罚，劳教，禁止，武装冲突，镇压。您认为中央和地方政府在态度和处理上有区
别吗？您怎么看待政府的行为？ 
20． 您了解其他阶层的抗争行为吗？问题同上。 
21． 您认为政府处理方式不同的标准是什么？ 
 
262 
 
Appendix 4: Categorisation of Respondents Interviewed 
No. Interviewee (Labourer) Place  
of Interview 
Date  
of Interview 
1.  A migrant waiter Beijing 26/6/06 
2.  A migrant waitress  Beijing 26/6/06 
3.  A migrant waiter Beijing 26/6/06 
4.  A migrant construction worker Beijing 27/6/06 
5.  A migrant construction worker Beijing 27/6/06 
6.  A migrant construction worker Beijing 27/6/06 
7.  A migrant porter Beijing 30/6/06 
8.  A migrant construction worker Beijing 3/7/06 
9.  A migrant hairdressing apprentice Beijing 4/7/06 
10.  A laid-off worker Beijing 4/7/06 
11.  A laid-off worker Beijing 6/7/06 
12.  A laid-off worker Beijing 7/7/06 
13.  A laid-off worker Beijing 8/7/06 
14.  A laid-off worker Beijing 8/7/06 
15.  A laid-off worker Beijing 12/7/06 
16.  A laid-off worker Beijing 12/7/06 
17.  A laid-off worker Beijing 13/7/06 
18.  A white-collar worker Beijing 13/7/06 
19.  A white-collar worker Beijing 14/7/06 
20.  A white-collar worker Beijing 14/7/06 
21.  A white-collar worker Beijing 15/7/06 
22.  A white-collar worker Beijing 15/7/06 
23.  A white-collar worker Beijing 15/7/06 
24.  A migrant waiter Wuhan 17/7/06 
25.  A migrant waitress Wuhan 17/7/06 
26.  A migrant porter  Wuhan 17/7/06 
27.  A migrant construction worker Wuhan 17/7/06 
28.  A migrant construction worker Wuhan 18/7/06 
29.  A migrant construction worker Wuhan 18/7/06 
30.  A migrant construction worker Wuhan 18/7/06 
31.  A migrant hairdressing apprentice Wuhan 24/7/06 
32.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 24/7/06 
33.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 25/7/06 
34.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 25/7/06 
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35.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 27/7/06 
36.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 27/7/06 
37.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 28/7/06 
38.  A laid-off worker Wuhan 28/7/06 
39.  A white-collar worker Wuhan 31/7/06 
40.  A white-collar worker Wuhan 31/7/06 
41.  A white-collar worker Wuhan 1/8/06 
42.  A white-collar worker Wuhan 2/8/06 
43.  A white-collar worker Wuhan 3/8/06 
    
No. Interviewee (Intellectual) Place of 
Interview 
Date of 
Interview 
44.  Beijing University student Beijing 28/6/06 
45.  Beijing University student Beijing 28/6/06 
46.  Beijing University lecturer  Beijing 28/6/06 
47.  Beijing University lecturer Beijing 28/6/06 
48.  Qinghua University student Beijing 29/6/06 
49.  Qinghua University student Beijing 29/6/06 
50.  Qinghua University student Beijing 29/6/06 
51.  Qinghua University professor Beijing 29/6/06 
52.  Renmin University student Beijing 5/7/06 
53.  Renmin University student Beijing 5/7/06 
54.  Renmin University student Beijing 5/7/06 
55.  Renmin University student Beijing 5/7/06 
56.  Beijing Normal University student Beijing 7/7/06 
57.  Beijing Technology University student Beijing 8/7/06 
58.  Capital Normal University lecturer  Beijing 10/7/06 
59.  CASS student  Beijing 11/7/06 
60.  CASS student Beijing 11/7/06 
61.  CASS researcher Beijing 12/7/06 
62.  A journalist  Beijing 12/7/06 
63.  A lawyer Beijing 13/7/06 
64.  A lawyer Beijing 13/7/06 
65.  A journalist  Beijing 14/7/06 
66.  Huazhong Normal University student Wuhan 18/7/06 
67.  Wuhan University student  Wuhan 19/7/06 
68.  Wuhan University student Wuhan 19/7/06 
69.  Wuhan University lecturer Wuhan 19/7/06 
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70.  Wuhan University professor Wuhan 19/7/06 
71.  Huazhong Normal University student  Wuhan 20/7/06 
72.  Huazhong Normal University student Wuhan 20/7/06 
73.  Huazhong Normal University lecturer  Wuhan 20/7/06 
74.  Wuhan University of Science and Technology student  Wuhan 21/7/06 
75.  Wuhan University of Science and Technology student Wuhan 21/7/06 
76.  Wuhan University of Science and Technology student Wuhan 21/7/06 
77.  Wuhan University of Science and Technology lecturer Wuhan 21/7/06 
78.  Hubei University student  Wuhan 22/7/06 
79.  Hubei University student Wuhan 22/7/06 
80.  China University of Geoscience student Wuhan 24/7/06 
81.  Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics student Wuhan 25/7/06 
82.  A lawyer  Wuhan 26/7/06 
83.  A lawyer  Wuhan 28/7/06 
84.  A journalist  Wuhan 31/7/06 
85.  A journalist Wuhan 1/8/06 
86.  A journalist in UK England (email) 17/8/06 
87.  A journalist In USA England (email) 18/8/06 
88.  A lawyer in USA England (email) 21/8/06 
89.  A lecturer in the UK England (email) 22/8/06 
90.  A lecturer in The USA England (email) 23/8/06 
    
No. Interviewee (Religious Group) Place  
of Interview 
Date  
of Interview 
91.  A Christian student Beijing 30/6/06 
92.  A Protestant minister Beijing 2/7/06 
93.  A Protestant minister Beijing 3/7/06 
94.  A Christian retiree  Beijing 6/7/06 
95.  A Christian entrepreneur  Beijing 6/7/06 
96.  A Catholic minister Beijing 9/7/06 
97.  A Catholic nun Beijing 9/7/06 
98.  A Buddhist monk  Beijing 10/7/06 
99.  A Buddhist monk Beijing 11/7/06 
100.  A Buddhist monk Beijing 16/7/06 
101.  A Christian student Wuhan 20/7/06 
102.  A Christian student Wuhan 26/7/06 
103.  A Catholic minister Wuhan 27/7/06 
104.  A Protestant minister Wuhan 2/8/06 
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105.  A Buddhist monk Wuhan 3/8/06 
106.  A Falun Gong entrepreneur in Canada England (email) 24/8/06 
107.  A Falun Gong journalist in Canada England (email) 25/8/06 
108.  A Falun Gong retiree in Canada England (email) 28/8/06 
109.  A Falun Gong student in France England (email) 30/8/06 
110.  A Falun Gong lawyer in France England (email) 31/8/06 
    
No. Interviewee (Entrepreneur) Place  
of Interview 
Date  
of Interview 
111.  A business owner Beijing 30/6/06 
112.  A senior manager  Beijing 8/7/06 
113.  A business owner  Beijing 10/7/06 
114.  A business owner Wuhan 20/7/06 
115.  A senior manager Wuhan 22/7/06 
    
No. Interviewee (Cadre) Place  
of Interview 
Date  
of Interview 
116.  A community cadre  Beijing 28/6/06 
117.  A district government official Beijing 1/7/07 
118.  A district government official Beijing 10/7/06 
119.  A community cadre Wuhan 21/7/06 
120.  A district government official  Wuhan 26/7/06 
 
266 
 
Appendix 5: Typical Transcripts (abbreviated) 
Migrant worker on construction site in Beijing (interviewee number 4) 
Female, aged 39, from Xiaogan, Hubei province, residing in Beijing, junior high school, no 
political or religious affiliation, administrator in catering and accommodation service for 
migrant workers at the construction field. No involvement in any organisations. 
 
Religious affiliation:  
There are many people believing in Christianity in my hometown. My sister and aunty are 
Christians, describing this faith as perfect and even persuading me to convert. But after 
reading Bible for two hours, I really had no interest in Jesus – a foreigner. There are some 
other people worshipping Buddha and Kwan-yin in the temples. I had no interest in Buddhism 
either. 
 
Information exchange:  
I am keen on news and want to know about the current affairs. I watch the 30-minute CCTV 
news network broadcast at 7pm every night. But we have only one TV in my room on this site, 
and there are almost no newspapers or magazines to buy as we are far from the city centre. 
Seldom did I discuss the news with my workmates and other migrant workers, who were 
really pitiful and had little access to information. This place is kind of isolated from the 
outside.  
Actually I hate the Internet, which especially did harm to children. My son was 14 years old 
and he was addicted to the Internet games. I felt the regulation was so loose for the Cyber café 
that underage children were still allowed to enter. Once I even reported the case to the security 
authorities, but there were too many Cyber cafés in the town. At last I had to transfer my son 
to the village school where my mum lived and the environment is much simpler. I think this 
problem is serious everywhere and many parents are so headache.  
 
Economy:  
I found one of the most serious problems in economy is the Poor-rich gap, which is so huge. 
Power-money exchanges are particularly severe and everywhere, so are the fake goods, as you 
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cannot find a real thing of a real brand in our village shop. Rural problem is another big 
problem. Those peasants especially the elders are so pitiful as they don‘t have any social 
security or welfare. Their children also earn very little through farming. I also saw some old 
men of over 70 years‘ age still doing farm work in the field and I really sympathised them. 
Yes the government has done quite a lot to solve the rural problems such as regulating the 
taxation. But I think the government should provide a life guarantee for people over 60 or 70 
in the countryside. They are also human beings, aren‘t they? However, not many people 
appeal for them to the higher authorities and they themselves just don‘t have the 
consciousness to demand and live to their own traditions generation after generation. 
 
Society and culture:  
Population is a huge problem; especially in the rural area the ratio between male and female is 
greatly unbalanced. For example, there are 80 students in my son‘s class (Level 7) – 60 boys 
and 20 girls. I‘m really very worried about this problem in the countryside and the future 
effects on marriage since the peasant families still prefer males than females. The migrant 
workers did receive discrimination in the big cities especially 10 years ago when I first come, 
but the situation has been improved now. Maybe it‘s the transformation of my own mindset – 
more calm and peaceful: I AM a migrant, then what‘s wrong with that? Now it is so popular 
in the rural areas that husband and wife go to cities to work and leave our children and old 
parents at home, 80% is the case. 
Education is the question I‘m most concerned: the entrance mark for the students in Beijing to 
go to Beida, Qinghua is 200 degrees lower than it is for Hubei students. That‘s a huge and 
unfair difference! I really want to transfer my son‘s Household Register to Beijing. But it‘s 
nearly impossible after I tried several channels and relation networks. My husband and I 
worked here for over ten years and it‘s still impossible for such transfer. I don‘t know if 
buying house property would entitle me a Beijing Household Register. I cannot do anything 
that is not certain enough. There are just 5 years to go for my son to attend the entrance 
examination. I felt rather helpless in this issue. Another problem in educational system is the 
random educational charge. When my son went to primary school in Xiaogan, the school 
charged regularly without clear explanations or receipts. But the situation in Beijing schools is 
much better. My old sister has transferred her child‘s Household Register to Beijing through 
networking, buying two houses and lots of money. I feel every aspect of society in Beijing is 
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more advanced than in my hometown, in particular the quality and civilisation of people. I 
really want my son to live in Beijing – the metropolitan city in the future. 
Drugs are really harmful and rampant especially in my hometown Xiaogan. My nephew who 
was only 20 has become a drug abuser, failing to give it up for 5 to 6 times and now his 
family is almost broken.  
 
Politics:  
(After looking through the subjects, she said:) we migrant workers are the lowest stratums of 
the society. We only know the outside world through TV news, and most workers themselves 
don‘t have such access. We don‘t know much about how the politics is operating. We have no 
social security, no medical insurance, no retirement income and we have so many future 
worries. For the politics and policies, I only care about those that have a direct impact on 
peasants or migrant workers‘ life. I‘m also concerned about the rule of law and legislation. 
My favourite TV program is Focus Interview, which talks in truth and expose many unknown 
cases and the dark side of the society. 
Life is so difficult. In my childhood, we even have no rice to eat (about 25 years ago). Now 
people can live a life at a subsistent level expect those who have no kin and cannot support 
themselves. Then you cannot blame those peasants who want a male heir even they know the 
number of male largely exceeds that of female. So the family planning policy cannot be 
completely implemented if the government doesn‘t reform the rural welfare system. Though 
people have changed their mindset and don‘t want to have many children now, the only child 
must be a boy – no family would cease bearing child if the first-born is a girl. There is one 
good point with the policy implementation that pregnant women in the countryside are not 
allowed to have B-Ultrasound Examination, so that there are less abortion of babies. Another 
problem is the medical care in the countryside – the worst condition you can imagine. People 
would choose to go to the big or medium hospitals in the town rather than local small clinics. 
 
Self-evaluation:  
I felt not much difference in living standards between Beijing and my hometown. Though we 
earned more here, we spend more economically. We have an attitude that the aim to be here is 
to make money rather than enjoying life. Anyway the living condition here at a construction 
field is awful and far from the luxurious city centre.  
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I can say I‘m patriotic and I hope that China will be prosperous and powerful. I also have a 
certain sense of social justice and public morality, I‘m happy to help people and do good 
things, but I think I won‘t take any action if I see anything bad happening. Family is most 
important to me, and the child as well. When I worshipped the ancestor during the spring 
festival, I just prayed for the peace in the family rather than riches and honour. 
 
Networking: 
I‘m too easy to trust people and be cheated in the financial cases when borrowing money to 
others. Please don‘t tell my husband. 
Relation with the government  
I feel the policies made by the central government are really good, but they are obviously 
distorted when reaching the localities. I once voted in the village committee election in my 
mum‘s village and my mum asked me to casually pick up one candidate. I realise that this 
kind of election is not democracy! At last the person in the position has already been assigned 
by the higher authority no matter who those candidates are. Even the roll call is a kind of 
running forms. Nothing is real democracy.  
There are no human rights in Beijing for migrant workers. I remember when being checked 
the temporary residence permit, migrant workers were never treated as human beings. They 
were scolded by rude language, forced to kneel or squat and even beaten violently. One of the 
workers I know once experienced this in 2000 and had a severe confrontation with the civil 
defence officers (they are not police officers). Now the administration is better and migrant 
workers were registered and managed through computer networks. 
Contentions 
We migrant workers as a whole don‘t have high quality or sense of self-protection. As for 
myself, I would resort to the judiciary or consult with solicitors. I believe in the legal measure 
to deal with conflicts, for example, with our building property management company. I also 
encountered the cases that the labour contractors delayed the workers‘ wages. But it can be 
resolved effectively and quickly when you appeal to the Labour Bureau, because you are in 
Beijing. In my hometown there are much more such cases and everything is ill regulated.  
I remember once a time there was a very popular practice of opening brick factories in the 
village, which occupied large amount of land and polluted the environment and were 
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protested by many villagers. This case was made bigger and was exposed by the provincial 
media. 
Party-state responses 
My husband‘s sister, 60 years old, has been appealed to Beijing for 4 years. She was 
previously a worker in a textile factory, and then factory was bankrupted and brought by 
another company. She used to live in the factory apartment, but since all the land has been 
sold out she had nowhere to live. She came to Beijing every year but the government officials 
just delayed in solving her problems and sent her back several times. Now her basic living 
problems still remained unresolved. I felt really disappointed about that. You know other 
people laid off from the factory were also so poor and pitiful. But we can‘t do anything about 
that. 
Cases 
I don‘t feel antipathy towards Falun Gong, neither do I believe in them. At first I had some ill 
feelings against them when I heard the governmental propaganda and description about them. 
But one day I picked up a computer disk at my staircase in Xiaogan – it uncovered some 
unknown facts about Falun Gong along with photos, videos, reports and arguments. I began to 
believe Falun Gong might be a healthy Qigong exercise rather than an evil cult. But I was 
surprised that it also said the government and Jiang Zemin did manipulate such plots against 
Falun Gong. I really don‘t know which side is the right and wrong in this case. 
I remembered and admired the student movement in 1989. There was also severe violence in 
Xiaogan. I didn‘t know much about the movement but I really thought it was good for young 
people to act. At least they were anti-defalcation and anti-corruption. I remembered there was 
a huge slogan on the ads broad in the city centre: ‗Donations were given to Deng‘s (Deng 
Xiaoping) son; Coloured TVs were given to Zhao‘s (Zhao Ziyang) son; What can I give to 
you, my motherland?‘ You know at that time the son of Deng defalcated the donations to the 
disabled and Zhao‘s son sold and resold coloured TVs. It was really amazing. I heard there 
was too heavy a repression upon the movement. I felt the repression was too serious and 
grievous. But people were united and enthusiastic at that time. My neighbour‘s son, who 
studied at Wuhan University, went to Beijing to attend the movement. After the repression he 
came back being asked if he was afraid. He said, ‗what should I fear about? I am just a son of 
peasant. You know the son of professor was also sitting there on the Tiananmen Square. Is my 
life more worthy than his?‘ People were so concerned about the country and its problems at 
that time. I found it a good period of time.  
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I also thought the anti-Japan parade was quite good. It was also very astonishing. My nephew 
attended the parade and they even besieged the embassy. But I didn‘t know the concrete 
situation, as the TV news report was too short and simple. 
 
An undergraduate student in Psychology from Wuhan University (interviewee number 
67) 
Male, aged 22, from Wuhan and residing in Wuhan, BSc in Psychology, Youth League 
member (with no sense about it), Christian.  
Information exchange: 
Internet is the main media. I spend more than 4 hours online every day. Besides browsing the 
news, I also look through some interesting focus discussions, forums and others‘ blogs, 
making occasional comments. I myself have blog of my own. Besides exchange opinions on 
current affairs with a broad range of Internet users, I mainly discuss with my roommates and 
friends rather than course mates.  
Social problems 
I have totally no idea about elections, neither do I know anything about how the national or 
local leaders are selected out. And nobody has ever asked me to vote or talk about voting. So 
my feeling is that someone just became a certain leader in a very strange and incredible way. I 
heard something about village election from the news report and it seemed somewhat violent 
in some villages.  
I think Wuhan is a relatively stable place according to the problems of population such like 
mobilisation, migration and different division and stratification of classes. And I don‘t think 
polarisation is serious in Wuhan. Though there may be labour conflicts or other contentions 
reported happening in Wuhan, but none seems to be very big news. 
Among all the social-political-economic aspects and problems in China, I find the medical 
reform is the most outstanding one and one of the biggest failures. Its total system is 
unreasonable. Some reports from the media and institutions abroad, such as the International 
Red Cross, also criticised that this medical reform is a complete failed trial from the top to toe. 
Though I seldom go to see a doctor and have little experience about how it functions, I always 
feel it problematic due to the conflicts or contradictions appearing in the mass media.  
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Besides, the disorder and even a mess of real estate market is another serious problem that 
someone has bided up the price to an unbelievable extent. Another issue is the political 
elections and I never know what is going on especially according to the entire turnover of the 
state leadership in 2004. I also recall that during last ‗Two-conference‘ some delegate exposed 
that there were huge corruptions and scandals in the 2008 Olympics construction projects. 
Surely I know corruption prevails in all aspects of social, economic and political life and this 
one impressed me a lot recently. 
 
Self-evaluation: 
I think my sense of social justice is relatively strong as I‘m always concerned about the social 
phenomena and news and the law, etc.  
Compared with other people around, the life standard of my family is above average. The 
most influential event to my family is that my mom went to work for a German company 
while working for Wugang (Wuhan Steel Processing Co., Ltd) at the same time. Generally we 
didn‘t encounter any great difficulties or troubles, but from last year when my father changed 
his job to another post by compulsory manoeuvre, his work became more unstable and more 
tiring. 
Medical reform can most easily irritate my family and my grandma‘s family as it relates so 
close to us. Once the elderly go to the hospital, they would complain a lot. They want to 
change the situation but only to take some non-positive actions such as trying to transfer to 
another hospital or try to buy medicines by themselves or invite a doctor at home. I feel 
helpless to change the society with my own strength, but I think after finishing the studies, I 
can at least make some changes to my own life and my family in the future.  
 
Networking and organisation: 
Actually in my family we don‘t attach much importance to relations or networks compared 
with other families as we seldom invite other people home or go out with others. I think in 
China it‘s impossible to put an end to ‗depending on the relations‘. Sometimes it‘s necessary 
or even beneficial as long as the result turns out to be a win-win situation no matter what 
method you use. So it depends and sometimes it‘s inevitable.  
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Talking about the community, I suddenly recall that once a year my family was selected to be 
the 5-star family. It was so strange and funny and we even didn‘t know what was happening. 
We like joining the community collective activities such like watching movies. I remember 
one year in a festival, there were singing and dancing performances organised by Wugang 
since the residents in our community are mostly Wugang people. My family went to watch 
and had a good time. There were also charitable activities like collecting money and clothes 
for the people suffering from the flood. We made donations too. 
I think if you just organise a small group or association, it‘s ok and you are free to do it. I 
don‘t know if you need to pass any scrutiny, but the direct upper institution should know what 
happens. For example, if you want to organise a club in the university, you should have 
sanctions from certain university department. Falun Gong is the organisation I know to be 
prohibited. I have two relatives who have practiced Falun Gong. They certainly encountered 
the governmental interference. But they, along with a gang of Falun Gong practitioners, 
always have gatherings at home or somewhere else. I remember at the peak time of 
prohibition, some officials or police officers went to their house to check and even arrest some 
of them. The result is their meetings became secret and underground. I really have no idea 
about the consequences of the arrested ones.  
Contentions 
When I by any chance encounter anything unequal or unjust, I will easily be irritated. And the 
measure I take is resorting to the Internet. I‘ll sign on the Internet or write in my blog or write 
on some forum. I‘ll also talk with friends especially Internet friends or even strangers in one 
forum. I remember after the recent Diaoyu Island issue, there raised a large movement 
widespread on the Internet to boycott the Japanese products.  
I think among all these measures signing a petition whether on the road or on the Internet is 
the most convenient and easiest way and effective sometimes. Though it may have less impact 
than the parade or demonstration on the scene, the latter may be less likely to be granted 
sanctions and more dangerous indeed. The danger lies in the potential conflicts with the police 
who are usually surround the environment and if there are some participants with ill intentions 
to make trouble, the innocent populace may be at risk of being taken advantage by them.  
People have the right to take contentious activities, but some are permitted officially, others 
are not. I remember in the 1999 anti-American parade when I was only a junior middle school 
student, my schoolmates and I asked to go on parade with great collective rage. Though the 
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teachers didn‘t allow us to do so because we were too young, I know a lot of students from 
high schools, colleges and universities took the actions. At that time, the government, no 
matter central or local, was also active and cooperative. And the solution to this tragedy was 
also effective and reasonable. 
I by myself have signed for the anti-Japan movement on the Internet. I don‘t think such on-
line patriotic movements would be interfered by the government; at least they have gone on 
well until now. Actually I‘m not much concerned about the results of the movements, but I 
believe they should be useful and there should be relative reports afterwards. 
Among our students, I ever heard from the news that some students collectively protested for 
the unreasonable fees or curriculum in some schools and universities. Most parents would 
participate as well and went altogether to argue with the school committee. Some of the 
conflicts are resolved in peace. Some are evolved into bigger issue exposed to the education 
department, the government and the media and the responsible person in the school 
committee may be punished.  
Party-state responses 
The government always said there were a minority of wicked people behind the contentions to 
manipulate the process. But I don‘t think it so complicated at least our students‘ parade is 
quite simplex though I don‘t know others like Falun Gong movement. Generally I believe in 
half of the governmental propaganda as there is certainly something deep being concealed by 
them though you can hardly find fault at the superficial level of the official explanation. 
Actually did the authentic report ever exist? I also received a lot of information from the 
Chinese media abroad which may show something different and can form good comparison 
and reference, but I don‘t believe them all either.  
Cases 
As I am a Christian, I found the Christian group in China can‘t gather openly and that‘s a sort 
of unequal treatment. In fact there are too few churches and they are too official to meet so 
many Christians‘ real needs to meet or have bible study. The thing is, the appearance and swift 
development of family churches, by itself shows a kind of repression from the government. 
It‘s a no-choice alternative because these Christians can‘t gather together openly and freely. I 
read from some books and news that some family churches in Beijing were interfered and 
persecuted by the government. And I once attended a meeting held by a family church 
organisation in a café bar. The locality was delicately picked because they ever encountered 
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previous persecution. There were also some foreigners present. We watched some officially-
prohibited videos about the social cultural and historical reality of China, which really 
impressed and even shocked me a lot and reverse some of my opinions too.  
According to Falun Gong, I find their books are nonsense after I read them. The thoughts and 
theories are problematic undoubtedly. But I think the exercise is useful. I don‘t fully believe 
what the government criticised about them, nor do I fully disagree with what the Falun Gong 
practitioners defended for themselves and even what they brought forth to resist and protest 
the government. Some should be true. I think the way they resort to the international society is 
feasible and quite tolerable. After all they are the weak and vulnerable group and need a lot of 
help and support. But I can‘t agree when they sometimes take extreme or too radical actions 
to protest such as self-burning or any armed or destructive conflicts against the embassy. At 
present, Falun Gong has become a political taboo and seldom do people talk about it. I think 
the spiritual and religious area as a whole including the underground Christian church is very 
sensitive to people who would concern it but rarely talk with others as if there is potential 
danger behind.  
According to the economic protects conducted by labours, I consider them to be totally 
reasonable with great understanding and sympathy. The react from the government usually is 
negotiating with them but preventing them from agitation, parade or any open, collective and 
large-scale gathering or activities. 
I also heard from the media as well as my parents about the June 4th 1989 and I only know 
my parents‘ attitudes are to sympathise for the students who were made use of by others. The 
responses from the government at that time were very negative and I think that was improper 
or even proved to be wrong. 
 
A dissident lecturer in USA (interviewee number 90) 
Male, aged 51, from Guangzhou, residing in California, PhD in Chinese Philosophy, no 
religion (but had an interest/empathy in Christianity), no political affiliation, a university 
lecturer and a news analyst at the local Chinese radio station.  
Information exchange: 
The Chinese media (TV programs and websites) appears the same at home and abroad. 
However, I may get some different information and voices from Chinese newspapers 
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published by Chinese community abroad, from the local media in English and from a lot of 
overseas websites in either language. The difference mainly lies in the content and the angle 
of viewpoint. But I don‘t think the viewpoint of a foreigner to look at what happened in China 
is always objective.  
 
Social problems and resolutions: 
Politics 
About the international relationship: When China is developing in all aspects and becoming 
more interdependent with the outside world, China should pay more attention to the still great 
sufferings and disasters in the world – terrorism, racist hatred, conflicts, slaughter and war. 
We Chinese people have suffered some unimaginable and unbearable disasters from outside 
and inside, along with more than 70 million people‘s abnormal death and other countless 
miserable tragedies so that they fully understand the tribulation, suffering and death in the 
whole world. However, we should not take the attitudes of difference, ignorance, let alone 
gloat over other people‘s misfortune (malicious pleasure or self-satisfaction has shown the 
deep root of the worst and darkest part of the nationality); but should show sincerity, 
sympathy, concern and love to hatred and misery, to fight against violence and coercion using 
the weapon of justice. Actually what happened to every country is closely related to each 
other, we have to hold a whole-world breadth of mind and wide perspective, to explain and 
deconstruct hatred and conflict by benevolence and forgiveness, to reconstruct order by law 
and human right so that peace can be attained in the new global world. Today we must employ 
the deepest spiritual resources of Chinese and Western culture to establish the rational moral 
and harmonious future world. 
Democracy and human rights 
The cultural revitalisation in the West brought forth the fruits of science, democracy, and 
social-economic development. Behind the success is the enormous spiritual impulse of 
religion, moral and ethics. So China must realise that the western democratic principles, 
human rights and rule of law began with the idea of human equality and value. So cultural 
generation and moral reconstruction should be the scene ahead of and penetrating the actual 
political institutionalisation. China was often scolded for poor human rights record by the 
West especially the USA in the international society, but we need not scold them back but to 
find a way to improve the situation from our traditions. I believed not in individualistic human 
rights, but the human rights in relations to guarantee the interests of family, society as well as 
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individuals. As China in general finds it difficult to accept the individual dimension of human 
right and easily regards it to be egoism, Chinese traditions pay great attention to family 
relations and social relations. China always uses the perspective of relation or network to 
think and act. Therefore, we should not copy the Western models, but to absorb the spiritual 
essence of Western cultures as well as to explore our own in order to find a suitable path for 
China. 
Society and culture 
One of the biggest problems is social ethics and morality. The Communist revolution with its 
peak of the radicalism and craziness of the Cultural Revolution suppressed and destroyed the 
most magnificent tradition and civilisation and then created the ever-biggest vacuum in the 
national mentality, spirit and soul. Likewise, under such a barren condition, to blindly catch 
up economic modernisation, to reform and open up without mature institutionalisation would 
inevitably lead to national corruption. The lust and ugly side of the culture and national spirit 
has been shown everywhere. People as individual are not responsible for the society while 
deciding their own life but to fall into egoism to be self-centred and irresponsible. The 
government emphasised ‗rule of virtue‘ as they realised the serious problem. But morality is 
deeply rooted in a nation‘s cultural soil; we can only go back to China, beginning with the 
heuristic education and encouragement rather than the heteronymous doctrine and propaganda 
to inspire people‘s moral autonomy, and walk to the authentic ‗rule of virtue‘. 
Religion, unlike mere ethnics or morality or a virtue system to teach people to do good, is to 
solve the problems unsolved by philosophy and science such as suffering, sin and death. 
Though I claim to have no religion, I‘m studying religions and philosophies and especially 
interested in Christianity. To some extent I believe there is a God existing. Christian 
evangelical movement has been flourishing in China these years, that‘s very good 
phenomenon, but Chinese are also resorting to various religious sects and practice to fill in 
their spiritual vacuum. Actually there is a huge supermarket of gods and idles, people can 
choose what or who they want to worship. So there are various choices and various 
superstitions, which have equal erosive and destructive impacts on the traditional culture and 
people‘s heart as the material/ money worship. Atheism is not as popular as propagated by the 
official media. Actually it is also argued that atheism is anti-superstition and an active world 
viewpoint. I once suggested the government to loosen and broaden the ideology as anti-
superstition and active worldview rather than applying Atheism or Marxism only. The 
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officials showed interest in it but with smiles admitted it was not that easy to change. So I‘m 
not a dissident in a rigid way, I have many interactions with Chinese authorities.  
I also hope that China can correct many bad habits in hygiene, traffic regulation and social 
public order (such as spitting everywhere, crossing the road disorderly, jumping the queue, 
dirty toilets) by dint of the great opportunity of 2008 Olympics to be new and fresh in the eye 
of international society.  
Consciousness and value 
I care and concern for China and Chinese people very much and I‘m always grieved and 
empathetic at those people suffering from social injustice. China herself has already suffered 
so much in the modern histories and now in China there are so many problems. You cannot 
just use the international standard to criticise China but rather be committed to the motherland 
of China, in the centre of China‘s tribulation and spend the tough times with over 1.3 billion 
Chinese people. As an intellectual, I have the solemn and sublime sense of mission for the 
revival of Chinese nationality and the flourish of Chinese culture. I also have very high 
expectation and confidence for motherland to break through the stereotyped thinking of 
conflict and opposition but to re-establish the concept of cultural dialogue between Chinese 
and the world culture. Chinese souls are most valuable to me. I wish to influence and 
transform more and more people through faith, culture, morality and love – love from human 
beings, from the entire cosmos and from God. 
Contentions and Party-state responses 
Contentions are not always negative – when people are faced with problems and when 
dissatisfaction and grief come out towards the authority, people can take active and positive 
measure to solve the problems and have communication with the authorities. But people‘s 
perspective needs to go beyond the current suffering, grief, competition and previous hatred, 
because hatred would give birth to new hatred; conflict would generate new conflict. Then 
more and more hatred and conflict would form severe clash and crisis. Therefore contentions 
are not to magnify and expand conflict, are not to upgrade hatred, are not to emphasise 
negative forces or destructive strengths, but to express people‘s different voices and grievance, 
to reveal social injustice and other problems, to appeal for the protection of human rights and 
freedom, to resist the coercive politics in pursuit of democracy in a constructive way. 
Contentions are records of people‘s tribulation and part of it. At last mighty mercy, love and 
hope should come from the tribulation, affliction, trial, distress, or suffering and then 
transform them. 
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